THE ABONGO ABROAD: MILITARY INTERNATIONALISM, TRAVEL, TRAINING, AND PEACE IN GHANA AND THE UNITED STATES, 1960-1992 by Clune, John Valentine
 
THE ABONGO ABROAD: MILITARY INTERNATIONALISM, TRAVEL, TRAINING, AND 
PEACE IN GHANA AND THE UNITED STATES, 1960-1992 
By 
John Valentine Clune 
 
Submitted to the graduate degree program in History and the Graduate Faculty of the University 
of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
________________________________        
    Chairperson Sheyda F. Jahanbani       
________________________________        
Anton Rosenthal 
________________________________        
Elizabeth L. MacGonagle 
________________________________        
Marie G. Brown 
________________________________  
Holly T. Goerdel 
 
Date Defended: May 1, 2014
 
ii 
 
 
 
The Dissertation Committee for John Valentine Clune 
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
 
THE ABONGO ABROAD: MILITARY INTERNATIONALISM, TRAVEL, TRAINING, AND 
PEACE IN GHANA AND THE UNITED STATES, 1960-1992 
 
 
 
 
 
      ________________________________ 
 Chairperson Sheyda F. Jahanbani 
 
 
       
Date Approved: June 17, 2014
 
iii 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation searches the global commodities of military education and training assistance 
and international peacekeeping missions between the 1960s and 1980s for the meaning people on 
both the sending and receiving ends made of the international experience. For Ghanaian soldiers 
and their families and for American communities around large institutions for military education,  
training and service abroad paradoxically eroded national identities while creating new global 
citizens, within limits, as individuals and families developed transnational friendships and reaped 
social and financial benefits from the exchange. It argues that all participants in the global 
system of military-sponsored international travel approached the act with different ideas about 
what the travel signified, what opportunities it presented, and what change it intended to bring 
about, but all participants believed the travel inspired or revealed a new psychological orientation 
capable of transcending national boundaries and actualizing a global identity, which I call 
Military Internationalism. States and national policymakers appealed to such a transnational 
identity when forming, sustaining, and justifying international military exchanges (including 
education, training, and peacekeeping). Policymakers in both the United States and Ghana 
assumed that international travel, especially for military elites or potential elites, could yield 
corporate transformation and modernization to recipient states’ entire societies, via the military. 
Those advancements only occurred after individual transformations. Individual actors manifested 
Military Internationalism when they imagined themselves part of a global community that was 
sometimes smaller, sometimes larger than their respective nation-states. Around American 
institutions for military education, the community structures that evolved to welcome, instruct, 
and socialize visiting military personnel and their families flourished on their unofficial status. 
American women, especially, thrived in the environment which specifically discounted the role 
 
iv 
 
of the state while elevating values of hospitality, internationalism, and world peace. Ghanaian 
families on military-sponsored courses abroad also employed international education to exercise 
a global social imaginary based on entrepreneurial travel to relieve economic and political 
stresses in Ghana. Finally, large numbers of Ghanaian soldiers and their spouses integrated the 
trials and danger of international peacekeeping both for the benefits they provided and with a 
genuine faith that their service nurtured an authentically better world. 
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Introduction 
A few ardent Muslims have been able to make their pilgrimage to Mecca, thus becoming alhajis 
while on ‘Op Sunrise.’ From time to time, a few of the officers and men with an interest in 
agriculture express a wish to visit some kibbutzim to acquaint themselves with Israeli farming 
techniques and know-how, which are well known to be among the best in the world . . . In short, 
the Ghanbatt participation in ‘Op Sunrise’ has been immensely beneficial. The troops have 
benefitted professionally by operating alongside so many other national contingents, and the 
travel to other parts of the world far from home is in itself a great education. Our officers and 
men went to the Pyramids of Giza, the sands of Sinai and the holy places they had heard of at 
Sunday School. 
 – Lieutenant General Emmanuel Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldier’s 
Reflections1 
 
After most folks had eaten the fried chicken or whatever, the music changed. Kenny 
Shuttleworth of Kansas City called square dance instructions to several hundred hardy dancers, 
from many score countries, some of whom didn't even understand English. That proved no 
problem. Dancers from Colombia, Finland, Thailand, Japan, and on and on, joined in Do-Si-Do’s 
and Aleman Rights as if they had been doing them for years.” 
– John Reichley, The Leavenworth Times, July 30, 19872   
 
In Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Anthony 
Appiah defends ordinary citizens on both the sending and receiving sides of the great projects of 
cultural imperialism in the twentieth century. They are not “blank slates on which global 
capitalism’s moving finger writes its message, leaving behind another homogenized consumer as 
it moves on,” he argues.3 That attitude, he says, “is deeply condescending. And it isn’t true.”4 
People distinguish the good from the bad that they see, and the lessons they take from 
“Westernization” are not necessarily the same ones “cultural imperialists” try to sell.5 Instead, 
Appiah reflects, “people in each place make their own uses for even the most famous global 
commodities.”6 Even more significant than the differences in power or wealth they reveal, 
                                                 
1 Emmanuel A. Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldier’s Reflections (London: Hurst, 1989), 158. 
2 John Reichley, “Do-Si-Do in 70 Languages,” Leavenworth Times, July 30, 1987, 4, Leavenworth Public Library. 
3 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, Issues of Our Time (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2006), 111. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 113. 
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exchange in global commodities also exposes participants’ obligations to one another and 
provides opportunities for individuals to create new ties—“Beyond,” Appiah suggests, “those to 
whom we are related by the ties of kith and kind, or even the more formal ties of a shared 
citizenship.”7 The global commodities of military education and training and international 
peacekeeping offered those opportunities and exposed those obligations. This dissertation 
searches military educational exchanges and United Nations peacekeeping missions between the 
1960s and 1980s for the uses people on both the sending and receiving ends had for the 
international experience. It explores how military education and service abroad paradoxically 
eroded national identities while creating new global citizens, within limits, as individuals and 
families developed transnational friendships and reaped social and financial benefits from the 
exchange. It also suggests that we need a different way to account for and describe the new 
identity that emerged.  
Several different groups interact in this account: American social scientists, diplomats, 
and foreign policy planners in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, who tried to employ American 
military assistance to achieve American political objectives while delivering economic 
development to some other parts of the world. Ghanaian military-turned-political leaders who, in 
the three decades after independence in 1957, tried to leverage internationally-available military 
training programs and Ghana’s own moral authority as a pan-African leader for their political 
purposes. American civilian volunteers who served military families from abroad as “sponsors,” 
teachers, and friends during their stay in the United States and sometimes for longer after in 
communities around the United States’ institutions for educating and training military officers. 
Ghanaian officers and their families in communities around military training institutions abroad. 
And Ghanaian soldiers of all ranks who served in United Nations peacekeeping operations in the 
                                                 
7 Ibid., xv. 
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Sinai between 1973 and 1979 and in Lebanon continuously after 1979, and their families, who 
bore the burdens of the separation and the danger, and obtained the financial benefits that came 
with UN peacekeeping service.  
Travel, specifically military-sponsored international travel, connected the ideas behind 
international military education and peacekeeping policies to people in both Ghana and the 
United States between the early 1960s and 1980s. The mostly men who devised those policies 
and the men and women who actually travelled drew different meanings from the experience. 
Those complementary meanings are the subject of this work. It argues that all participants in the 
global system of military-sponsored international travel approached the act with different ideas 
about what the travel signified, what opportunities it presented, and what change it intended to 
bring about, but all participants believed the travel inspired or revealed a new psychological 
orientation capable of transcending national boundaries and actualizing a global identity, which I 
call Military Internationalism. States and national policymakers appealed to such a transnational 
identity when forming, sustaining, and justifying international military exchanges (including 
education, training, and peacekeeping). Individual actors manifested Military Internationalism 
when they imagined themselves part of a global community that was sometimes smaller and 
sometimes larger than their respective nation-states. 
None of the participants used this phrase. I use it because all of them hinted, through the 
policies they created, the international relationships they formed, the personal, political, or 
economic use they made of their travel opportunities, and the fragile strands of peace they sought 
to nurture, that their participation in military travel resulted (or promised to result) in not just a 
better world, but better people within the better world. Further, the essential personal 
transformation was international; it could only be activated in an international setting, and its 
reference points were necessarily extra-national.  
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In Part 1, this dissertation explores the way American and Ghanaian governments made 
international education and training an essential aspect of their foreign policy in the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s. Using archival sources from the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 
published Congressional and Presidential documents, and modernization theorists’ own work, 
Chapter 1 argues that in the United States, an alliance of academic elites and policymakers in the 
Kennedy Administration blended the prior American assumption that the national military 
represented modernity in “developing societies” with their new emphasis on modernization as a 
Cold War strategy. The United States’ international military education and training program 
became their preferred method to transform visiting elites from target states into “modern” men 
and American allies at a low cost. As an essential aspect of international education, the 
“Informational Program for Foreign Military Trainees and Visitors in the United States” made 
the American people themselves full participants and legitimate subjects for lessons in 
American-style modernity. Since that program made psychological transformation its primary 
purpose, not any specific or measurable change to the military capabilities or political structure 
of recipient states, American ideals about the exceptionalism of American society sustained the 
international military education and training program during the next three decades, even when 
most other aspects of American military assistance policy changed drastically.  
Chapter 2 integrates archival sources describing the founding of Ghana’s Military 
Academy and Staff College and its own military-produced publications to argue that for 
Ghanaians after independence, just as for Americans, the social value of lessons in military 
leadership, management of modern state institutions, and the vague category of professionalism 
transcended the national location where those lessons occurred. Ghanaians consumed those 
lessons from a wide variety of educational and training facilities abroad in the sixties and 
seventies, but also built their own capacity to provide them to Ghanaians and military personnel 
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from other African states as well.  Meanwhile, the United States provided international military 
education grants as its only military assistance to Ghana during that time. The rise of Ghanaian 
Colonel Ignatius Acheampong to power in 1972 should have represented a crowning 
achievement of American military education, but instead he demonstrated its potential downside. 
The small American military education program was not only not enough to create “military 
professionalism” or secure a balanced civil-military relationship in another state, it may actually 
have encouraged discontented military leaders to seize power. 
Chapter 3 argues that in the 1970s and 1980s, Military Internationalism did real work 
defending the international military education and training ideal as the U.S. Congress questioned 
the role of American training in producing or encouraging dictators abroad. Department of 
Defense and State Department officials equated the program with the Fulbright scholarship, and 
argued that the program’s essential power to transform societies was through its humanity, not its 
militarism. They reiterated the long-held belief that life among Americans fundamentally 
changed people. That change was the first goal of the program, they argued, and society-wide 
improvement would result, but only in the long term. Careful re-wording of the program to 
emphasize “internationally recognized human rights” and shifting justifications for U.S. military 
assistance to Ghana in the years surrounding the Rawlings revolution exposed the international 
military education and training program as, essentially, an act of faith. But the original 
confidence that human-to-human interaction could transform visitors was not a myth. In 
American military assistance policy, it was often the only “real” thing.  
Part 2 explores how individual American and Ghanaians envisioned their role in 
international exchange. Travel conveyed tangible political and economic benefits, but this 
section argues that individuals’ outlooks became more transnational (or international, given the 
ongoing reliance on state structures) as a result. Chapter 4 argues that seeking alternate, informal, 
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or voluntary routes for international cooperation provided American women new opportunities to 
seize leadership roles in community organizations. Around Fort Leavenworth, for example, 
American volunteers in the People-to-People movement acknowledged, “To achieve peace we 
have tried military power, foreign aid, lend lease, diplomacy, and so on, without the long-term 
success we had hoped to achieve. Now, without detracting from these efforts, let us try building 
peace through friendship.”8 Surveying local newspaper articles and monthly newsletters from the 
Greater Kansas City Chapter of People-to-People International, I find local initiatives for global 
peace articulated mostly in women’s voices. 
The final chapter argues that Ghanaian families also employed the infrastructure of 
international military cooperation to form an alternate global identity that was not simply larger 
than the nation-state. Ghanaians in international military service represented some aspects of the 
Ghanaian nation—such as in Ghanaian participation in the UN or Ghanaian leadership among 
multilateral peacekeeping forces. But the idea of a Ghanaian nation was problematic even within 
Ghana during these decades, and Ghanaian families actively manipulated state structures for 
military travel in ways that actually destabilize the nation-state as the essential unit of analysis. 
This chapter uses Ghanaian soldiers’ memoirs, entries from peacekeeping journals in the Sinai 
and Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s, and Ghana’s Armed Forces News newspaper to explore the 
way Ghanaian families used international military travel as a transnational economic strategy 
within a larger social imaginary that equated travel with “getting ahead.” In that sense, Ghanaian 
military families abroad resembled other Ghanaians in the diaspora. For military wives, that 
service placed new expectations on them for work, family, and home, but it also provided them 
with the means to make claims against the state to fulfill them. Finally, the way individual 
Ghanaians embraced peacemaking on UN missions in Egypt and Lebanon also reveals that the 
                                                 
8 Chuck Nelson, “President’s Corner,” Contact, Greater Kansas City People-to-People Council Newsletter, 
November 1970, 4, Binder: Contact 1970s, GKCPTP. 
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global identity military service activated had imaginary roots accessible only through specifically 
military channels. 
 Given the slowness of measurable results toward global peace, economic development 
across the global South, or Ghanaian political development to appear between 1960 and 1990, 
international military travel did not yield the results Ghanaian or American policymakers 
expected. American defense policymakers and Congressional critics expressed doubts about 
these international exchange programs repeatedly in the 1970s and 1980s, but never abandoned 
them. Instead, they vaguely recognized that the essential historical process at work resisted 
measurement through statistics. International travel changed people’s minds, and the world 
changed within the minds of people. What those involved saw differently about themselves, 
about their new international relationships, and about the world, is the subject of this work. 
 
The Case for Ghana 
Unlike other examples of American military assistance in the Cold War that metastasized 
into full-blown proxy wars, created puppet governments that depended on American military 
assistance to maintain their political control, or transferred great quantities of American weapons 
over long periods, the case of Ghana demonstrates the intangible assumptions of Cold War 
military assistance exceptionally well.9 During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian 
Relations, 1960-1968 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: 
America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Jeffrey 
Taffet, Foreign Aid As Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (New York: Routledge, 2007); 
Thomas C. Field, “Ideology as Strategy: Military-Led Modernization and the Origins of the Alliance for Progress in 
Bolivia,” Diplomatic History 36, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 147–83; Robert H. Holden, “The Real Diplomacy of 
Violence: United States Military Power in Central America, 1950-1990,” The International History Review 15, no. 2 
(1993): 283–322; John S. Fitch, “The Political Impact of U.S. Military Aid to Latin America: Institutional and 
Individual Effects,” Armed Forces and Society 5, no. 3 (Spring 1979): 360–86; Chester A. Crocker, “Military 
Dependence: The Colonial Legacy in Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 12, no. 2 (June 1, 1974): 265–
86; James A. Bill, “The Military and Modernization in the Middle East,” Comparative Politics 2, no. 1 (October 
1969): 41. 
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routinely employed military assistance as capital in their ideological proxy battles. Unlike 
nineteenth century colonial powers who acquired their social consciousnesses as an afterthought, 
deeply held ideological views drove U.S. and Soviet Union competition for new states’ 
allegiance from the start —a struggle Odd Arne Westad labels “The Empire of Liberty” versus 
“The Empire of Justice” over what historian Melvyn Leffler calls “The Soul of Mankind.”10 The 
way both U.S. and Ghanaian policymakers expected national and corporate benefits to flow from 
the small but persistent relationship of military education and training exchange reveals more 
about their own ideologies regarding transnational educational experiences than about any 
mutual desire to create a “strong” military. Leaders in both Ghana’s and the United States’ 
governments willingly ignored a great deal about the other, including: a reputation for neo-
colonial meddling, rumors of CIA involvement in Ghana’s coups, and support for white rule in 
South Africa on one hand, and a heritage of ineffective, politically unreliable rulers, pan-African 
socialism, and a “malcontent” military that refused to exit national politics on the other. What 
both sides ignored about the other on the policy level reveals in much higher relief the faith in 
the fundamental goodness of the human exchange that underwrote the relationship for so long, 
even if both sides rarely admitted it. 
Ghana’s prominence as the first newly independent African state south of the Sahara 
made American foreign policy there both ideologically representative and strangely unique. 
Americans readily took Ghana to represent the rest of the global south, but America’s 
relationship with Ghana was very different from other influential or contested states in Asia, 
Latin America, and even Africa.11 Ghanaian independence forced Americans to confront how 
                                                 
10 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5; Melvyn P Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the 
Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 8. 
11 Philip E Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); See David E. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1955); David E. Apter, Ghana In Transition, 2nd Revised (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
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they related with one another, most notably in the way they envisioned equality. To African 
Americans, Ghanaian independence in 1957 invalidated American racism.12 Even white 
American political leaders clamored to make Ghana a symbol of (or proxy for) their civil rights 
agenda.13 Ghana also tested the integrity of the ideologies behind foreign aid that united 
economic development projects with security assistance, but which resolutely rejected escalating 
weapons sales in favor of entirely human resource-centered modernization projects. Finally, 
American responses to recurring military coups d’état, punctuated by interludes of constitutional 
government in Ghana, reveal how American foreign policy rhetoric evolved to tolerate military 
rule for different reasons over time. Because the United States’ military presence in Ghana was 
so small and depended almost entirely on international education and training exchanges, 
Ghana’s case demonstrates especially well the persistence and limits of ideology in foreign 
policy.14 Specifically, official references to the personal interaction between Ghanaians and 
Americans, especially between military personnel and American communities, remained the 
essential justification for the American policy for thirty years.15  
                                                 
University Press, 1972); Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffmann, All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 
1960s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 157; Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United 
States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 198. 
12 Kevin Kelly Gaines, American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 5; James T. Campbell, Middle Passages: African American Journeys to 
Africa, 1787-2005 (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); Jason C Parker, “‘Made-in-America Revolutions’? The ‘Black 
University’ and the American Role in the Decolonization of the Black Atlantic,” The Journal of American History 
96, no. 3 (December 1, 2009): 727–50; Horace Campbell, “Pan-Africanism and African Liberation,” in Imagining 
Home: Class, Culture, and Nationalism in the African Diaspora, ed. Sidney J. Lemelle and Robin D. G. Kelley 
(London: Verso, 1994), 285–307; Penny M. Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Black Americans and 
Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Saidiya V. Hartman, Lose Your Mother: A 
Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 38. 
13 James H. Meriwether, “‘Worth a Lot of Negro Votes’: Black Voters, Africa, and the 1960 Presidential 
Campaign,” The Journal of American History 95, no. 3 (December 1, 2008): 737–63; Muehlenbeck, Betting on the 
Africans; See also Mary L Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
14 See, for example, Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2009), 3. 
15 See Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans; Gaines, American Africans in Ghana. 
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Ghana’s leadership among nonaligned states revealed the ways American foreign 
policymakers’ struggled to make their side attractive, even relevant, to the great numbers of 
newly decolonized peoples and their states around the world. The former colonial or 
semicolonial countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America suffered as ideological battlefields for 
Cold War hegemons, but leaders in the bloc of nonaligned states that emerged in the late 1950s 
asserted a third way to maintain their economic and political independence and ensure that 
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could intervene abroad at will.16 Kwame Nkrumah 
attended the April 1955 Asian-African conference in Bandung, Indonesia even before Ghana 
became independent and he steadily rose in international influence to make Ghana a charter 
member of the Nonaligned Movement at the 1961 Belgrade conference.17 Nkrumah’s aggressive 
nonaligned rhetoric irritated President Kennedy—he complained that Nkrumah had “been bad” 
in Belgrade—but Nkrumah forced American leaders to recognize his power to restrict American 
aid that smacked of “neo-colonialism” and demand American support for projects that promised 
“development.”18  
In the early 1960s, nonalignment provided Nkrumah with leverage over the terms of 
Ghana’s relationship with the United States that few other leaders of small states shared and that 
heightened the global propaganda value of all U.S.-Ghanaian cooperation.19 Kennedy made 
“engaging” nonaligned states the centerpiece of his new, ideological approach to foreign 
                                                 
16 One reason Westad employs the suspect term “Third World” is to validate this “third way” and restore agency to 
decolonized elite who struggled to forge their own path between two powerful hegemonic forces. Westad, The 
Global Cold War, 2. 
17 Ibid., 98, 107. 
18 Kwame Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path (London: Panaf, 1973), 173; “232. Memorandum of Telephone 
Conversation between President Kennedy and the Acting Under Secretary of State (Ball); September 21, 1961,” in 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XXI Africa (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off, 1995), 355; 
John F Kennedy, “242. Letter From President Kennedy to President Nkrumah; December 14, 1961,” in Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XXI Africa (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off, 1995), 371–372; 
Hoffmann, All You Need Is Love, 154. 
19 Robert B. Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 138. 
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relations.20 For modernization theorists in his administration, nonaligned states offered the 
highest psychological return on investments in the development of the “Southern Half of the 
Globe.”21 Meanwhile, Kennedy aggressively wooed Nkrumah through an unprecedented 
personal diplomacy initiative.22 Therefore, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson gauged their Cold 
War influence across Africa and Asia on Ghana.23 Later in the 1960s, Ghana manifested many of 
the same political and economic tragedies that Cold War competition wrought upon contested 
states.24 The nonaligned coalition also fractured as Cold War tension exacerbated differences 
between nonaligned states.25 Rather than focus on Ghana as a victim of Cold War competition, 
however, this work argues that the Nonaligned Movement’s response to the Cold War amplified 
Ghana’s international significance, and the United States became even more attentive to the 
psychological impact of its foreign policy initiatives there.26  
In the early 1960s, American policymakers still saw the world as a national security 
problem, but correlated the broadly diverse aspects of the U.S.-Ghana relationship as essentially 
psychological, not political, matters. U.S. funding for the massive Volta River dam project, 
Ghana’s pioneering acceptance of Peace Corps volunteers, competition for leadership among 
United Nations peacekeeping forces in the Congo, and Ghana’s pursuit of military training from 
British, Canadian, and Soviet sources all merged in a new sensitivity to the connections between 
                                                 
20 Rakove names this foreign policy “engagement.” Ibid., xx–xxi. 
21 Ibid., xxi. 
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anti-colonial nationalism and economic development that sprung, at their heart, from challenges 
related to new interpretations of modernity in American foreign policy.27 That is why American 
military assistance to Ghana took the form it did—limited almost exclusively to providing grants 
for Ghanaian officers and non-commissioned officers to travel to the United States for 
professional education and training. This assistance agenda persisted through the 1970s and 
1980s though, suggesting that the ideological assumptions that first connected military education 
to modernity had deeper and sturdier roots than other American projects abroad.28 
European and American definitions of “modernity” had long justified imperial behavior, 
but the modernization that American foreign policymakers described in the 1960s threaded so-
called “realist” concerns with national power with a new faith in the psychological 
transformation to modernity that social scientists proposed. Since the 17th century, Europeans 
had equated their technology—especially their military technology—with social and cultural 
superiority, even applying “scientific” criteria as they did.29 The development of free labor, 
universalist concepts of culture, and abstract notions of equality that accompanied nineteenth 
century definitions of modernity simultaneously implied “backwardness” for the “primitive 
societies” in European colonial crosshairs.30 American imperialists also employed this version of 
modernity, sometimes softened for domestic consumption by claiming a “civilizing mission,” to 
justify the United States’ expansion across the western plains, the Pacific, and Latin America in 
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the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.31 After 1945, American foreign policy equated the 
modernizing mission in contested new states into a life or death struggle against communism.32 
Increasingly throughout the 1950s, a coalition of federally funded economists, sociologists, 
historians, and political scientists mingled around influential universities, including Princeton, 
the University of Chicago, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for 
International Studies to articulate new applications in “developing states” for their theory of 
modernization.33 Energetic Cold Warriors and self-assured social scientists formally united in the 
Kennedy administration, and modernization theory guided American foreign policy with the 
force of ideology for nearly a decade.34 It was through the lens of modernization ideology that 
Kennedy and his cabinet devised their strategy for the cascade of African states emerging from 
colonialism—nineteen between 1960 and 1961 alone.35  
Despite massive upheaval in its domestic political situation and international influence, 
Ghana selected military personnel for American-sponsored education and training programs 
without interruption after 1962. This relationship was unusually persistent and constant, but it 
was also small; rarely did more than forty Ghanaian military personnel come to the U.S. in any 
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year.36 Ghanaian political and military leaders claimed varying levels of autonomy in describing 
this partnership with the United States, but they defended their relationship and appealed to it to 
access other American resources. They did so because they shared common assumptions about 
military professionalism, broadly conceived, and transnational education that I call Military 
Internationalism. Ghanaian and American leaders’ justifications differed and evolved, especially 
as Ghana slowly developed its own capacity to provide similar training to its own soldiers and to 
soldiers from elsewhere in Africa, but Ghana offers a unique view of the program’s ideological 
assumptions that changed surprisingly little. 
 
Identities: Transnationalism, Military Internationalism, Modernity, and Diaspora 
This work posits that the best way to describe the policies and people in international 
military settings is by examining the identity that grew around those settings. Arriving at the 
conclusion that I am actually describing a transnational identity marked by internationalism and 
accessible only through military travel, however, requires some clarification of terms.  
First, I acknowledge the danger of choosing to analyze or describe an identity, but the 
term does useful work.37 I am not trying to interject my own pet identity—internationalism 
facilitated by military travel—onto the list of identities already in widespread academic use 
(nation, ethnicity, gender, class, etc.). The identity I describe even fits, somewhat, Rogers 
Brubaker and Frederick Cooper’s criteria of candidates for improved replacement labels, 
including: self-understanding changing as a result of external experience; commonality, 
connectedness, or membership in a group; even a “transnational issue network,” formed around a 
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moral core and crossing cultural and state boundaries.38 Military internationalism is not a 
bounded group, network, or a cultural category in the sense of nation, race, or class, however. 
One could not claim it or claim to belong to it; nor did it require an “other” in order to coalesce.39 
Instead, I suggest that the international experience reveals weaknesses in other identities that 
need to be accounted for—nationality among the most prominent—and that the internationalism 
that emerges is closer to “real” than previously assumed. Military Internationalism fits Kwame 
Appiah’s definition of identity: “one among other salient modes of being, all of which have to be 
constantly fought for and rethought.”40 Such an identity may linger in remission, waiting for a 
person to acknowledge and grasp, as historical circumstances require. Further, Appiah’s 
description of identity acknowledges the myths and lessons that make it powerful, personal, and 
historically dangerous. Identities are complex, multiple, and grow out of changing responses to 
economic, political, and cultural forces, and usually in opposition to other identities, for example. 
They flourish despite our own misrecognition of their origins. They stubbornly resist reason, 
which makes them a challenge to intellectuals whose task it is to disrupt discourses built on 
“racial” or “tribal” difference.41  
Military Internationalism also matches Appiah’s prescription for identity: that the 
strength behind identities comes not from inventing self-isolating ones, but by constructing 
alliances across states and other identities.42 Doing so requires an act of will, he argues; a 
conscious response to a sense of obligation to others that he calls “Cosmopolitanism.”43 As an 
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ethical approach, Appiah’s sense of cosmopolitanism permits relational, regional, and even 
national identities to persist alongside universal or global senses of communitarianism in ways 
that challenge older definitions of cosmopolitanism that emphasize an intentional embrace of 
divergent experiences for the purpose of welcoming contrasts rather than uniformity.44 But the 
way both Ghanaian military travelers and American volunteers around military bases expressed 
instrumental purposes for their international cooperation strains even Appiah’s definition for 
cosmopolitanism. Ghanaian men and women genuinely imagined themselves part of a global 
community, but also employed their relationship to the Ghanaian state to maximize their own 
political and economic freedom. Likewise, prominent members of People-to-People boasted that 
their “Mid-western hospitality” embracing international visitors made them the ideal Americans. 
When they described themselves as “cosmopolitan,” they idealized their regional identity, 
declaring an internationalism that, they crowed, “a visitor might not anticipate.”45 Celebrating 
one identity over another violates the essence of cosmopolitanism in its anthropological sense, 
which encourages individuals to resist the pressure to privilege those nearest to themselves and 
to seek the other.46 Therefore, even though the participants sometimes used the word to describe 
themselves, I consider the global identity military travel revealed international rather than 
cosmopolitan. 
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This work employs transnational and international analyses of the history of American 
foreign relations to evaluate that identity’s origin.47 This is not an obvious approach, even though 
American foreign assistance policy to poorer states was always an international concern. 
Transnational and international histories are broader both vertically and horizontally. They 
include in their scope groups of elites and sub-elites, and they evaluate evidence from as many 
different locales as possible to tell stories that are more complete. Their primary purpose is not 
simply to augment the history of the interactions of nation-states; rather they respatialize the 
historical narrative to include broader spectra of social scales, both larger and smaller than the 
nation.48 Transnational histories consider the nation-state an essential layer of foreign relations 
and foreign policy, but not the only one, and often not the dynamic one.49 I still must explain 
how elite policymakers at the national level devised and idealized the United States’ massive 
foreign aid program, and the prominence military educational exchanges played in that program. 
The state, formal inter-state agreements, and multilateral organizations like the United Nations 
that reified the nation-state system of sovereignty and leaned heavily on nation-states as primary 
actors were still essential, and I include them here as well.50 The actors in this work never wholly 
escaped the shadow that the United States, Ghana, or the United Nations cast over their options, 
and so it is appropriate to call this an international, rather than transnational, history.51  
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On the other hand, for the individuals in the story, the national, local, and the global 
entwined. The communities we examine here were neither fully within nor simply larger than 
their nation-states.52 Often, just as Micol Seigel recognizes in Uneven Encounters, “people gazed 
out at each other to understand themselves as national beings, using their viewfinders to locate 
useful touch points.” They did so, however, “not as representatives of their national units but as 
members of other social formations, imagining themselves in relation to and in solidarity with 
one another.”53 This is the transnational perspective.54 It seeks cultural aspects of international 
politics, non-elite agency, and hybridity. Transnational histories use methods of social history to 
follow actors across borders and examine how non-national or super-national factors shaped their 
understanding. Military Internationalism crystallized assumptions about military 
professionalism, transnational education, the limited importance of the state, and the problematic 
assumption of nationalism between individuals involved in military exchanges. In American 
communities around Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for example, state-approved programs for 
international officers required and blessed local volunteers—not state employees, and often 
women—who in turn celebrated their independence from the state and seized further initiative 
from the state to share their own version of Americanism that was both regional (Mid-Western) 
and transnational.  
Here it becomes apparent that evolving transnational historiographies often align 
imperfectly across subjects. Terms like “international,” “transnational,” and “modern” signify 
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different historiographical truces for scholars of American foreign relations than for scholars of 
the African diaspora, for example. David Korang’s Writing Ghana, Imagining Africa defines 
“internationalism” as the “tendency for the global imposition of the nation-form,” with emphasis 
on the negative connotation of “imposition.”55 For Akira Iriye, on the other hand, 
“internationalism” describes people and groups seeking an alternative community of nations 
joined through cultural interchanges rather than power politics.56 Similarly, American scholars 
label as “transnational” histories that refuse to confine themselves to artificially derived national 
containers and recognize that migration, trade, tourism, technology, capital, and ideas spread 
even without—or in spite of—national boundaries to cross.57 Iriye’s “cultural internationalism” 
qualifies as “transnational” here. In diaspora studies, on the other hand, “transnationality” 
describes an identity that merges physical presence outside home with national resources that 
have power to bind people and communities across distances.58 Detachment, willingness to 
participate or be part of multiple places, or simultaneous presence in multiple worlds—these are 
the marks of the transnational diasporic identity. In describing Military Internationalism as an 
identity, I combine the commitment to a transnational global community that presents an 
alternative to formal national structures, but that also requires national cooperation for 
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administrative sustenance. It is “internationalism” in Iriye’s sense, but also in its ongoing 
reliance on formal state cooperation. 
Dense thickets of meaning also obscure the term “modernity,” depending where one 
stands. Historian Frederick Cooper recognizes at least three conflicting historiographical senses: 
Modernity alternately represented Europe’s civilizational legacy to the world (delivered via 
empire), or the bundle of Western-derived social, political, and ideological imperial constructs 
that “sterilizes the rich diversity of humanity.”59 Non-Western peoples might also describe 
modernity as a hybrid of their own cultural forms that merged their traditions with external 
perspectives on progress to represent their own self-consciously distinct programs.60 This 
dissertation recognizes an essential distinction between modernity (or modernization) as an 
ideological imposition upon African objects and modernity as a vocabulary that Ghanaians 
adopted in order for their claims to be recognized. The same word imputes very different levels 
of agency onto actors, but in most cases in the twentieth century, becoming “modern” equated to 
“improvement.”61  
Even when the actors themselves used the term, the meaning did not always speak for 
itself. In 1959, for example, the Ghana Military Academy allotted more time to “Modern 
Subjects” than History, Mathematics, Science, or French in its curriculum.  62 In 1961, the 
American defense attaché to Ghana admired a textbook on “Modern Civilization” among the 
batch of books he presented as a gift to the Ghana Military Academy.63 In those cases, “modern” 
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signified “legitimate knowledge,” and at least three different parties in post-colonial Ghana vied 
for the authority to define it—post-colonial nationalists under President Kwame Nkrumah, 
Ghana’s British-educated military elite, and American foreign policymakers.64 In another case, 
when a Ghanaian Army officer declared in 1969, “Modern military leaders should have the 
breadth of outlook, cultural background and sound judgment which surpasses fundamental 
soldiery qualities,” he appropriated the well-worn grooves of the “modern military” from 
American and British social science-turned-foreign policy to prepare the ground for a return to 
military rule, should Ghana’s second republic fail to match the military’s imagined aptitude for 
governance.65 In the United States in the late 1950s, intellectuals behind modernization theory 
erected an entire taxonomy for what constituted “traditional” versus “modern”—the latter 
condition indicated by devotion to compound interest, Newtonian physics, and “high mass 
consumption”—and proposed a set of universally applicable steps to regulate the process.66 
Despite defining supposedly objective benchmarks for measuring and comparing societies in the 
stages after “takeoff,” when modernization theorists said “modern,” they meant “Western.”67 
And when American political scientists and military assistance planners in the 1970s and 1980s 
routinely acknowledged no clear evidence that new states’ militaries were also “modernizers,” 
they employed the self-evident category of “modern” military technology—which only a small 
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number of states were capable of producing—in the much less clear metaphor of what comprised 
“modern” political stability.68  
“Modernization” also provides a short cut into the historiography of American 
intervention in the global South throughout the twentieth century, but demonstrates how neat 
terms and bounded historiographies get messy when explored from the bottom up. American 
scholars such as Nils Gilman, David Ekbladh, Nick Cullather, and Michael Latham all argue that 
the transformation American foreign policymakers intended for the world was primarily 
psychological.69 Paradoxically, then, the programs they devised to bring about this 
transformation were not pragmatic, as they imagined, but also reflected their own psychological 
assumptions about modernity and progress. That is one reason they so often used the term 
“developing” to describe target or client states: in order to demonstrate the process of 
modernization, they first infantilized those societies rhetorically.70 Akira Iriye warns, however, 
that just because U.S. universities during the Cold War designed some academic programs for 
foreign students to popularize the ideology of liberal capitalism through the concept of 
modernization, participants did not necessarily see the experience so.71 Instead, he suggests, 
“through educational exchanges, thousands of young men and women were sharing similar 
intellectual experiences and developing a vocabulary through which they could engage in 
meaningful interactions.”72 Prominent American social scientists in the late 1950s and 1960s 
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thought they had devised a recipe for universal, transferrable stages for modernizing the 
“developing world,” but even they acknowledged that the first acts of modernization must be 
personal and mental.73 Global events in the 1960s dissolved their certainty and eroded their 
influence. Meanwhile, three decades of historians have questioned whether “modernization” 
offered anything at all to those states, or really said more about the people making the policies.74  
Contemporary actors had specific meanings in mind when they used the term “modern,” 
and this work acknowledges them. Those meanings had a history even then; and now they have a 
historiography. But modernity also has a meaning for historians looking backward, and I use the 
word to describe processes of change that actually shaped people’s lives even when they did not 
use it. C. A. Bayly argues that part of being modern was deciding to be modern, or at least that 
one lived in a modern world.75 Bayly, Peter Braham, Chandan Reddy, and Frederick Cooper 
would agree on some characteristics of “modernity”—mass citizenship, industrialization, 
bureaucracy, and secularization within bounded nation-states in the abstract; health facilities, 
education, and access to markets more specifically.76 But more than simply exposing parts of the 
world the West “left behind,” modernity provided a language to base claims against the West—
as in, “if you think we should be modern, help us find the means.”77 Ghanaian families who 
participated in military-sponsored international travel absorbed external standards for the modern 
military and the modern family, but they also employed that travel to base claims against those 
international structures for the tools to attain that modernity. This is the sense in which I employ 
the concept of “modernity,” then: concentrating not on the theory of difference, but as a policy.78    
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In the ways they attached to American communities or combined international military 
travel with diasporic strategies for personal or family improvement, Ghanaian soldiers and their 
families also moved fluidly between local, national, and global identities. The weak Ghanaian 
state’s drastic fluctuations in the three decades after independence compelled such fluidity. Even 
the very existence of a Ghanaian “nation” during those years is far from settled; meanwhile 
scholars lament the nation-form itself as colonialism’s lingering curse on Africa.79 On one hand, 
as the product of British education, training, and organization, the Ghanaian army represented 
both the “colonial-school-generated nationalism” and successor/heir to the colonial system 
Benedict Anderson identifies.80 Other traditions of Ghanaian nationalism, especially those 
Kwame Nkrumah championed, were “famously pan-African,” and “rather oddly unconnected 
with the Ghanaian state.”81 Given such weakness in the Ghanaian state, we should not be 
surprised to find alternate sources of military corporate identity, and find them in the same place 
we would look for other Ghanaians: abroad.82 New diaspora studies—especially those examining 
the post-independence African diaspora—rethink the conceptual boundaries of diaspora 
communities and reject paradigms requiring clearly bounded, isolated groups with clear-cut 
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ethnic and racial categories.83 Instead of—or, at least, parallel to—a world of nations, a world of 
transnationalism, travel, and cross-cultural borrowing emerges.84  
Using a diaspora approach to explain how Ghanaian families crafted transnational 
identities from the meaning they derived from international military travel leads back to the 
essence of transnationalism, identity, and internationalism. Despite their presence in an arguably 
proto-national organization, Ghanaian military families abroad and Ghanaian peacekeepers 
regularly ascribed transnational meanings to their international experiences. They shared with 
other families in American communities around military schools a devotion to cultural exchange, 
peaceful cooperation, education, and community service. On peacekeeping deployments or on 
the home front during their family members’ deployments, they expressed national pride 
sometimes, but tempered it with devotion to the United Nations as the most promising agency to 
deliver world peace. Iriye considers alternate, transnational routes toward peaceful cooperation 
the definition of internationalism, although he excludes or fails to recognize international 
military partnerships as legitimate participants in his definition.85 Perhaps they were too 
beholden to formal political structures to qualify as “transnational,” but the peaceful world that 
the individuals who joined them envisioned was not different. 
Military Internationalism represents the subversive presence of Akira Iriye’s “imagined 
world” of international organizations that reflect transnational concerns and strengthen the sense 
of global, human interdependence within the supposedly “real world” of competing sovereign 
states, power, and nations.86 “I have felt it would be useful,” Iriye writes in his essay 
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“Internationalizing International History,” “to postulate the simultaneous existence of two 
worlds, one consisting of sovereign states as they have actually developed over time, and the 
other a putative global community, the product of forces of globalization.”87 Iriye's “imagined 
world” is distinctly different from Anderson's “imagined community” that segregates itself into 
the nation-state. Iriye suspects, and I agree, that what others think were the geopolitical triumphs 
of the “real world” in the twentieth century were actually short detours on the way toward the 
global “imagined world.”88 In this light, the temporary dominance of Modernization Theory over 
American foreign assistance policy in the early sixties, military coups in Ghana in 1966, 1972, 
1979 and 1981, and the military balance of power between Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon may not 
have been the “real world” at all, but diversions on the road to the imagined world Iriye conjures. 
That helps explain why measuring and justifying America’s international military education 
program so befuddled policymakers for decades. 
This new understanding sets us looking for different evidence and provides us with a 
different standard to measure “results” in American military assistance policy in the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s, Ghanaian military participation in training, education, and peacekeeping 
abroad, and American communities embracing international military families. Senators and the 
State Department alike found little evidence that American international military education and 
training programs brought “political development” to target states in the global South, created 
“professional” or non-political militaries, or even bought Cold War allegiance.89 Neither do I. 
Education abroad or peacekeeping service alleviated some Ghanaian soldiers and their families’ 
economic and political stress in that time, but not permanently, and it did not restore democratic 
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rule promptly. Instead, I see evidence of the imagined world appearing, or re-appearing, as 
military travel connected individuals and groups from different lands who developed alternative 
communities based on their cultural interchanges.90  
As historiographical terms, militarism and internationalism clash, so Military 
Internationalism requires careful explanation. Throughout the twentieth century, internationalists 
sought alternate solutions for interstate rivalries, arms races, and constant preparation for war.91 
But the United States’ vast military assistance infrastructure often disguised imperial behavior 
during the Cold War.92 On the other hand, the Cold War did not impede postwar exchange 
programs of civilian students, scholars, or community leaders under programs like the Peace 
Corps or Fulbright, which Iriye considers “as good a symbol of cultural internationalism as 
any.”93 “Even if one could accept that Kennedy and Johnson were callous, scheming men,” 
Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman asserts when describing the Peace Corps, “one still had to account for 
the tens of thousands of volunteers—who surely were not all CIA agents or naive dupes.”94 After 
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carefully accounting for elites’ hegemonic motives for supporting cultural exchange programs 
from their impact on individuals, these programs still provided genuinely illuminating 
intellectual experiences in which men and women developed a vocabulary for meaningful 
interaction. International travel for military education and training did, too. Of course, some 
Americans considered deterrence and a strong national defense tools for peace, and supported 
international military education as a national security strategy, but this was not 
internationalism.95 Instead, American volunteers around military bases claimed that they “leaped 
governments” to bring about world peace. They celebrated their international friendships’ nation-
blindness as the only true path to peace. Similarly, Ghanaian soldiers on UN peacekeeping 
missions in the Sinai and Lebanon expressed a genuine belief that they represented the best of 
the global community, and that their considerable sacrifices actually brought peace. 
Even though both American and Ghanaian actors developed alternate, transnational 
communities, in this story they never completely escaped the nation-bound infrastructure of 
international military travel. The American Defense and State Departments administered the 
International Military Education and Training program as a formal, bilateral, diplomatic 
arrangement. Each year, government officials justified the program’s goals specifically in terms 
of American foreign policy objectives and, to the extent they could, their projected impact in 
receiving countries. Military officers in the Ghanaian government carefully considered their 
national and corporate interests when employing international training assistance and 
participating in peacekeeping missions. Without nation-states, these exchanges and deployments 
could not occur. State power funded and regulated military individuals and their families’ 
physical movement. When Captain Henry Kwami Anyidoho brought his wife Mercy to the 
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United States for training in 1975, for example, his military status permitted her to travel on the 
U.S. government’s nickel. Similarly, the Ghanaian state did not employ military courses overseas 
with universal intent. Potential uses included state-backed rewards as well as state-sponsored 
exile. In some ways, courses overseas were the state’s response to its own relative weakness 
domestically.  
On the other hand, nation-states had only partial control over content of those exchanges. 
Even then, when there were formal, state-driven curricula of knowledge to be imparted, the state, 
the community, and the individual families themselves interpreted the context of the exchange 
for themselves.  Indeed, the state seemed to acknowledge and, to some extent, celebrate, its 
inability to regulate this context, reflecting an internationalist faith. This paradox—states’ 
ultimate lack of authority over the psychological essence of national military travel—is one of 
many that helps us better understand Military Internationalism. 
 Americans made it their purpose to train thousands of international officers (and dozens 
of Ghanaian officers) for service in an ideal state not coincident with the states they actually 
represented. American policymakers, military trainers, and members of civilian communities 
around international military officers reconciled Ghanaian politics with their sense of purpose 
based on a combination of the “privilege of ignorance” Seigel describes and a basic preference 
for military rule over communism if democracy was in question.96 Much of the rhetoric 
surrounding American sponsor families at military schools was specifically post-state, non-state, 
extra-state, or anti-state. More than simply celebrating the common person, these Americans 
often celebrated the common person’s ability to create far more enduring bonds of friendship 
than the state could ever hope to (or at least to do it less expensively). Beyond that, as we shall 
see in the monthly newsletters from the Greater Kansas City Chapter of People-to-People 
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International, American sponsor families rarely dwelled on the political legitimacy of sending 
states. Instead, they routinely celebrated universal aspirations for peace, cross-cultural 
understanding, and fellowship, and claimed that governments were actually obstacles to global 
cooperation. They understood that military officers represented their nations, and that their travel 
was nationally-sponsored, but imagined themselves not as representatives of their national units 
but as members of larger social formations—what Seigel calls “odd-shaped beasts, neither fully 
within nor simply larger than their nation-states.”97 
Among the most startling paradoxes of Military Internationalism was how little American 
policymakers questioned the intangible, long-term benefits of international military exchanges 
despite little concrete evidence that they brought the modernization, professionalism, or 
allegiance they professed. The United States made no systematic effort to maintain contact or 
influence with international graduates of American military programs. Regularly after 1959, 
Defense and State Department officials proclaimed international military education programs 
“cost-effective,” but they never quantified what that meant. In the early 1960s, intellectual critics 
of military assistance resented that military educational assistance exceeded Fulbright and 
USAID educational exchange spending combined, but held out hope that they would eventually 
divert the “military” aspects of the program into “other socially useful activities.”98 As we will 
see, the U.S. international military education and training program never consumed more than a 
small percentage of American military assistance budgets, but it did not escape oversight or 
Congressional scrutiny. Instead, defenders of the program routinely touted its intangible benefits, 
“long term” results, and “relationships of a higher order” as above measurement, and above 
question. In other words, without saying so, they acknowledged that the “imagined world” that 
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Military Internationalism reflected defied the waves of ideological revision and fiscal realism 
symptomatic of American foreign policy in three decades after 1960. 
 The way Military Internationalism engaged the regional at the expense of the national in 
support of the global presents a final paradox. Sponsor families around Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, were keen to adopt international officers and their families partly out of empathy for 
international visitors in general, but also because they believed that life in eastern Kansas and 
Kansas City offered a purer version of Americanism than visitors could obtain elsewhere in the 
United States. Volunteers in both the Greater Kansas City Chapter and the international 
headquarters of People-to-People promoted “Mid-western values” for being more welcoming, 
having more time for visitors, for accepting “the dark skinned student [or] the student in the 
funny robe” more readily than East or West Coast residents could. In 1962, they called this ethos 
“Wheat Belt Internationalism.”99  
For women from Ghana and Kansas, “the personal was international.”100 Kansas City 
women leveraged their local prominence as volunteer sponsors into leadership positions in 
organizations supporting international families. Women who wrote “From the Fort” columns for 
the Leavenworth Times and the Kansas City Chapter of People-to-People International’s 
“Contact” newsletter offered their own interpretation for the meaning of international military 
travel. They seized the opening the language of volunteerism carved to make themselves central 
to the practice of citizen-diplomacy. For Ghanaian women, modernity imposed new expectations 
as partners, homemakers, and caregivers for military personnel, but international military service 
also opened opportunities for Ghanaian women to demand better access to the tools to meet 
those standards. Ghanaian soldiers’ wives (all Ghanaian peacekeepers before 1985 were male) 
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who lived in on-post communities and separate from their extended families became more 
independent, advanced their education, and developed new home-making skills in their 
husbands’ absence. Meanwhile, Ghanaian men and women leveraged the fiscal benefits of UN 
service or education abroad to build homes, start farms or business, and purchase appliances, 
cars, and business equipment to insulate them from Ghana’s heaving political and economic 
climate. Internationality, in other words, was an alternative to identities of nationalism and 
urbanization competing within Ghana during those decades, and we find Ghanaian military 
families expressing it in ways similar to other Ghanaians in the post-independence diaspora.101 
 As a social history of military subjects, some of the military terms we use are 
intentionally imprecise. Staff College, for example, meant different things in different countries. 
In the United States, it generally applied to schools for mid-grade officers, usually Majors and 
Lieutenant Colonels (i.e.: Command and General Staff College, Air Command and Staff College, 
Marine Corps Command and Staff College). These were often divisions of larger military 
educational structure, such as the Naval War College, Air University, or junior partners to other 
schools, such as the Army War College. The situation was similar in Ghana. The Ghana Armed 
Forces Command and Staff College included both a junior division and a senior division. The 
junior division began in 1963, but the senior division (for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels) 
received its first students in 1977. For the purpose of this dissertation, in order to keep the terms 
roughly similar, I use the term Staff College to refer to the senior division in Ghana, and the 
intermediate service schools like Fort Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff College in the 
United States or their equivalent in allied countries.  
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Similarly, the “Army” and “Armed Forces” were not the same either in the United States 
or in Ghana, but I sometimes interchange the terms here. Ghana has had a separate Air Force and 
Navy since 1961, but they have always been small, roughly ten percent of the Army’s size, 
which varied between about 7,000 in the early 1960s, grew to 14,600 by 1966, then slowly 
shrunk to 10,000 by 1981.102 All three shared Ghana’s Military Academy and Staff College, 
although all have separate training facilities as well. I do not intend to gloss over institutional 
difference between the services, especially since these differences are even more significant in 
the very large Armed Forces of the United States. This dissertation explores international 
military education from a national policy perspective and the communities around certain 
military facilities, however, not distinctions between the different services.103  
Finally, written sources about Ghanaian military subjects are scarce and problematic. I 
received research funding from the United States Air Force Academy’s Directorate of Education 
research division and coordinated access to Ghana’s Staff College, Director of Public Relations, 
and Military Academy through the U.S. Embassy’s defense attaché office. I recognize that these 
military-sponsored resources demand careful attention to objectivity.104 But the sources’ own 
patchiness do as well. Even within the Ghana Armed Forces’ collections, access was gravely 
limited to extant collections (which were few), to the willingness of Ghana Armed Forces 
personnel to cooperate (which they seemed exceptionally willing to do), and the likelihood that 
little evidence that openly criticized Ghana’s military regimes would have reached me, if it 
survived at all. The Directorate of Public Relations for the Ghana Armed Forces maintains only a 
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fraction of the Ghana Armed Forces News editions they published between 1967 and 1992. 
Other libraries around the world maintain other issues, but not with regularity. Although Ghana 
published journals from all of their peacekeeping contingents after 1979, only a few before 1990 
survive. Finally, in all these official publications, women show up only when bidden, and we 
recognize that only filtered versions of their words appear printed in official Armed Forces 
publications. Memoirs (by male authors) describe Ghanaian families’ economic and political 
strategies as families, but Ghanaian military wives’ voices or Ghanaian women soldiers’ voices 
from this time period are very difficult to locate. On the other hand, if Ghanaians’ military 
service abroad resembled other Ghanaian migrant or travelling workers in other contexts, we 
recognize common strategies for Ghanaian military wives and Ghanaian women elsewhere in the 
diaspora.105 
There was no necessary connection between what the Ghanaian officer experienced and 
what the United States expected its international officers’ program to achieve as an application of 
foreign policy. After 1966, Ghanaians as a whole may have quietly questioned the military’s 
legitimacy despite (or because of) its near-continuous hold on Ghana’s government, but the 
United States never discontinued its programs of military educational assistance. Abroad, 
Ghanaian officers’ status as students and recipients of international education did not change. 
Neither did their “mission” to translate those lessons back to Ghana, regardless of the uncertain 
legitimacy of military government. This constancy reveals as much about what the United States 
considered the role of the military in the modern nation-state as it does about Ghanaians 
themselves or the Ghanaian army. How Ghanaian officers interpreted the experience, or how it 
provided individual, corporate, and national resources in the form of a transnational or global 
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identity, is a different question, wrapped up in the meanings of nationalism, modernity, and 
identity itself. 
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Part I 
Chapter 1: Modernization Ideology and the United States Military Assistance 
Program  
Military leaders are often far less suspicious of the West than civilian leaders because they 
themselves are more emotionally secure. This sense of security makes it possible for army 
leaders to look more realistically at their countries. All of these considerations make it easier for 
military leaders to accept the fact that their countries are weak and the West is strong without 
becoming emotionally disturbed or hostile toward the West. 
– Lucian  W. Pye, “Armies in the Process of Political Modernization.”1 
 
 
Introduction: International Military Education in the Decade of Development 
“With the signing into law of this bill, a Decade of Development begins,” President John F. 
Kennedy declared on September 4, 1961 as he autographed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.2 
Seven months had passed since he took office, and in some ways Kennedy’s “Decade of 
Development” was already in full swing. Within weeks of the inauguration, his “Special 
Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid” and urgent-sounding State of the Union address had 
replaced “mutual security” with “development” as the justification for American foreign 
assistance, had claimed “the whole southern half of the globe” as the new battleground in the 
Cold War, and offered a compelling litany of priorities for the fight.3 Atop the list, Kennedy 
blasted the United States’ $3.2 billion security assistance program as “bureaucratically 
fragmented,” “awkward and slow,” “haphazard and irrational,” “obsolete, inconsistent and 
unduly rigid,” and he recommended “the replacement of those agencies with a new one—a fresh 
start under new leadership.”4 The Foreign Assistance Act was an essential first step, and all 
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summer, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and assorted 
Under Secretaries and Deputies wrangled with Congressional committees to ensure its passage.  
Kennedy issued three orders the following day that demonstrate how tightly he correlated 
the Cold War to military assistance for the “southern half of the globe.” After ordering the 
resumption of underground nuclear testing, Kennedy demanded an update on the status of 
education and training programs for military officers from Latin America and Africa.5 
Responding to a political crisis in Brazil, Kennedy announced, “As the events of the past week 
have shown in Brazil, the military occupy an extremely important strategic position in Latin 
America. I would like to know how many officers we are bringing up from Latin America to 
train here and whether we could increase the number.”6 He issued a National Security Action 
Memorandum requesting “what other steps we are taking to increase the intimacy between our 
Armed Forces and the military of Latin America,” and recommended creating programs to bring 
to the U.S. “a good many officers from the different countries of Latin America” for lessons in 
combating communism and subversion, controlling mobs, and fighting guerillas.7 “In addition to 
increasing their effectiveness,” Kennedy supposed, “it would also strengthen their ties with the 
United States.”8 As if completing that thought, Kennedy issued National Security Action 
Memorandum 89 moments later, demanding an update on “whether Mr. Nkrumah is going ahead 
with his plan to send 400 of his troops to the Soviet Union for training.”9  
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Those two concerns—Latin American officers training in the United States and the 
source of military training for Ghanaian cadets—reflected both old and new directions in 
American foreign policy in 1961. Providing training for military personnel in target countries 
had been an essential aspect of American military assistance in the decade prior to the “decade of 
development,” but Kennedy’s idea to bring as many of them as possible to the United States 
reflected a new faith in the potential for the United States to instill more than just combat skills. 
Likewise, Kennedy and his cabinet considered Ghana a bellwether for all of Africa. They 
acknowledged President Kwame Nkrumah’s influence as a Pan-African leader, and carefully 
considered the public relations impact of every aspect of U.S.-Ghanaian relations.10 Kennedy and 
Nkrumah had tangoed all summer. In March, after meeting Kennedy in Washington, Nkrumah 
declared, “We are anti-colonialists and we shall always remain so until all the colonialists are 
gone,” but, to calm American fears, “I think anti-colonialism was invented by the United 
States.”11 In April, Nkrumah gave Kennedy a “small miracle” by becoming the first world leader 
to invite Peace Corps volunteers, probably saving Kennedy’s high-profile program.12 By 
September, Nkrumah pressed Kennedy to confirm the United States’ offer to help fund the Volta 
River dam project while simultaneously offering (or threatening) to send up to four hundred 
army cadets to the Soviet Union for training.13 All sides accepted that military training abroad 
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denoted states’ strategic alignment in the Cold War, but more than that, Kennedy and his 
advisors believed that military training caused lasting psychological and emotional 
transformations that could propagate throughout a society.14 This was why they were so keen to 
maximize the number of officers from Latin America attending training in the United States and 
so concerned over Nkrumah’s plan to send cadets to Russia.  
This chapter explores how training and education for foreign military personnel in the 
United States came to assume such strategic and psychological significance in the early 1960s. It 
argues that influential academic elites, guided by modernization theory, integrated prior 
American assumptions about the military as a modern institution in the late 1950s, and they 
restructured foreign assistance policy in the 1960s to make international military education and 
training a preferred method to transform visiting elites from target states into “modern” men and 
American allies at a low cost. These programs tapped into the deeply held assumption that life 
among American communities spontaneously conveyed the same political, economic, and social 
values which American social scientists later equated with modernity, and which helps explain 
the persistence of international military education programs long after modernization theory 
declined in influence.  
American military assistance programs had implicitly accepted American communities’ 
power to transform visiting military personnel from underdeveloped countries for half a century. 
That faith paralleled other American assumptions about the psychological power of military 
defeat to goad the underdeveloped world to choose to modernize.15 These two beliefs merged 
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powerfully in the late 1950s, as American military assistance programs expanded rapidly in the 
Cold War’s heat and as a coalition of professional academics and policymakers applied new 
theories of economic development to American foreign policy. With funding from an often-
opaque alliance of philanthropic foundations, research universities, and the CIA, a core of 
influential historians, sociologists, economists, and political scientists developed a theory—or 
ideology—of modernization, which articulated a collection of assumptions about the nature of 
American society, and its ability to transform the economically and culturally deficient world.16  
The great, founding projects of modernization theory connected economic development 
in poorer nations to eventual success in the Cold War, but they were not, essentially, about 
economics.17 Modernization was both an ideology and a discourse, and it dictated strategies in 
foreign aid, trade, counterinsurgency, and nationalism that were partly economic, partly political, 
but largely mental.18 Academics such as Walt Whitman Rostow, Lucian Pye, and Daniel Lerner 
became policymakers after Kennedy’s election in 1960, and they applied modernization theory 
to all aspects of American foreign policy as a result. 
When modernization theorists in the Kennedy administration asserted control over 
military assistance policy, especially those parts of American military assistance that sponsored 
foreign military personnel for training in the United States, they were not inventing a new 
purpose for military assistance. Instead, they re-imagined the role for military forces in newly 
decolonized states away from intimidation and coercion into a kind of institutional bridge. A new 
ideological emphasis on economic and political development could supplement preexisting 
programs that connected the U.S. armed forces with the “new states’” national militaries. 
Development theorists used American military assistance programs as vehicle to transfer 
                                                 
16 Cullather, “Modernization Theory,” 213–217; Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 5, 55. 
17 Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society; Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto. 
18 Cullather, “Modernization Theory,” 213, 217. 
 
41 
 
“modern” ideas about technology, rational organization of society, and citizenship directly from 
Westerners onto new states’ emerging military elites.19 In the larger context of the 1960s, which 
often rationalized military force in the service of modernization projects, programs that targeted 
specific military individuals for lessons in modernity thrived.20   
This chapter describes the two essential transformations that had to occur in order for this 
to happen. First, modernization theorists wrested control of the massive American military 
assistance program of the 1950s from “unimaginative” and security-minded bureaucrats in the 
Eisenhower Administration, Defense, and State Departments. Second, those theorists supplied 
military assistance with a new reserve of intellectual credibility—or at least the opportunity to 
reframe the American Cold War foreign policy debate away from a defensive focus on “security” 
to match their program of transforming the world through economic development. 
 Modernization theory fueled the great, often tragic projects of American foreign policy in 
the first half of the 1960s, but behind the projects lay assumptions about what made modernized 
people, and what role those people played in hoisting their societies into modernity. Massive 
development programs, including the Alliance For Progress, TVA-style resettlement in 
Afghanistan’s Helmand Valley, and the “strategic hamlets” on the Mekong River typified the 
lofty, often faulty, ideologically-driven “Economists with Guns” at the tragic height of their 
power.21 In the heyday of authoritarian high modernization, there was no distinction between 
hydraulic and social engineering, dam builders achieved the status of a technocratic warrior elite, 
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ideology was strategy, and “developmental dictatorships” were preferable to vulnerable 
democracies.22  
Not all projects of modernization theory occurred overseas, or with such tragic 
consequences. American military assistance, including education and training of foreign military 
personnel, occurred in hundreds of places. For many soldiers, especially in Southeast Asia and 
Latin America, American military training came to them.23 For thousands of others, officers and 
enlisted—up to 15,000 per year, some years—the United States paid for their travel and training 
in America. Especially in countries where the U.S. had few military assets, little capacity to 
project military power, but the desire to influence policy, International Military Education and 
Training was the only program of U.S. military assistance. The U.S. had such a relationship with 
Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, Niger, Ivory Coast, and Liberia between the early 1960s and 
1990.24 In Ghana, despite twenty-five years of military regimes—some with American support, 
some without—alternating with brief interludes of civilian government, American military 
assistance policy based solely on training exchanges sturdily weathered great changes in 
American foreign policy objectives and Ghanaian political realities. 
The Vietnam War supposedly exposed the hubris behind modernization ideology. 
Massive aid budgets collapsed and the “New Mandarins” retreated, chastened, to academia.25 
But one of the most compelling ideas behind the ideology in the first place never went away—
that life among ordinary Americans left permanent, lasting impressions on visitors from the 
global South, and these individuals could, over time, refine entire societies.26 That vision of the 
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“imagined world” of global, human interdependence the modernization theorists had temporarily 
assimilated as they tended the supposedly “real world” of competing sovereign states, power, 
and nations, had survived. It was not clear whether that ideal would be enough to preserve 
international military training programs in the era of reduced faith in foreign aid, reduced 
confidence in the good intentions of the U.S. government, and reduced budgets after the Vietnam 
War. And as later chapters explore, individuals around American schools had always considered 
their relationships with visiting military families the program’s most significant outcome 
anyway, so they seemed not to notice the rise and fall of the sociology of modernization theory. 
 
Mutual Security Program Reform as Ideological Reform 
With large budgets and little data demonstrating their effectiveness, American military 
assistance programs were likely targets for modernization theorists’ intellectual makeover in the 
1960s. Military assistance had been the focus of postwar American aid in Europe, Iran, Korea, 
China, and the Philippines since World War II, and by the 1950s, promised to expand 
everywhere else the Truman Doctrine touched.27 In the 1950s, states in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America which were emerging from colonialism or colonial-type exploitation were central to 
U.S. foreign policy. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower deemed controlling access to its 
resources, markets, and labor crucial to containing the Soviet Union and defending U.S. 
hegemony everywhere.28 Therefore, they justified most foreign aid mostly in terms of political 
and economic security, even when the targeted recipients had no obvious military connection.29 
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Nearly all foreign aid deemed even remotely “security-related” fell under the massive Mutual 
Security Program, which had grown to $3.2 billion by 1960.30 Mutual Security Program projects 
designed to increase international cooperation and foster peace dwarfed any comparable civilian 
program. In 1960, for example, the Mutual Security Program provided funding for 16,500 
foreign personnel military to receive training or education in the United States—exceeding the 
number of students trained there under the Fulbright, Smith-Mundt, and Agency for International 
Development programs combined.31  
In the first months of his presidency, when Kennedy promised to transform America’s 
bloated foreign assistance bureaucracy and replace it with a responsive, pragmatic, and 
administratively centralized infrastructure headed by “first-class development planners,” the 
Mutual Security Program was a prime target.32 As he eliminated the jumble of disparate 
assistance programs it unevenly contained and consolidated control over all foreign assistance—
civilian and military—within the State Department’s new Agency for International 
Development, his staff reevaluated the ideological potential of American military assistance and 
altered those aspects they considered most likely to have long-term effects at the lowest cost. 
Programs that sponsored foreign military personnel for training and education in the United 
States survived because they could provide both.33  
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Kennedy was not the first president to think seriously about foreign aid, however, and 
while his reforms were significant, they occurred at the nexus of contending political forces over 
a decade old. During his second term, Truman attempted to replicate the successes of the 
Marshall Plan, proposing a massive foreign aid program to combat communism by promoting 
economic recovery through “Technical Assistance” to poor nations around the world, but a 
parsimonious Congress immediately limited the program’s funding.34 Eisenhower likewise 
struggled to convince Congress and the American people of the need for more foreign aid funds 
and greater flexibility to administer them. Different Congressional factions hindered 
Eisenhower’s initiatives to expand the foreign aid program while pressing the administration to 
spend its money on programs variously more, or less, justified by national security alone—even 
as the very definition of “national security” shifted and expanded continuously.35 On the other 
hand, nearly all agreed that the American people themselves were the best ambassadors of the 
American way of life to the rest of the world.36 Notable cultural diplomacy programs expanded 
in the 1950s, including the Fulbright-Hays scholarships, the President’s Special International 
Program—jazz musicians on tour, and “People-to-People International,” which Eisenhower 
founded in 1956 to help “people to get together and leap governments—if necessary to evade 
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governments—to work out not one method but thousands of methods by which people can 
gradually learn a little bit more of each other.”37 And since any dollars that brought foreigners to 
the United States would be spent in the United States, each party in the negotiation over the size 
and role of American foreign assistance policy considered those dollars well spent.  
President Eisenhower faced withering Congressional attacks as he attempted to reform 
the Mutual Security Program during his second term.38 Not all angles played equally effectively 
in public opinion, but with $3.2 billion appropriated for a Mutual Security Program that 
encompassed military assistance, development loans, technical assistance (“Point Four”) and the 
nebulous category “defense support,” the charge that America’s foreign aid programs were too 
expensive consistently resonated with the American people.39  
Criticism generally came from two opposite camps: those who objected to foreign aid in 
principle and those who thought America’s foreign assistance program needed to focus less on 
security and more on development. Eisenhower believed that the American people fully accepted 
the responsibility for military assistance in order to contain communism, but he thought they did 
not comprehend how broad the definition of military assistance could be.40 He was unable to 
defend the nation’s interests and contain communism abroad, he complained, while 
Congressional expectations for budgeting and oversight rose and American public opinion 
strongly opposed foreign “economic aid.”41 He dreaded a retreat from America’s proactive 
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financial role abroad, telling Congress “the only alternative we can see to the inter-dependent 
allied Free World, strengthened by our aid where needed, would be the Fortress America 
concept—taking our first stand in the last ditch.”42  
American public opinion had never fully embraced foreign assistance, as many in 
Congress routinely remembered. A trail of committee hearings and reports criticized the Mutual 
Security Program for a host of reasons: it wasted money on poorly conceived or elaborate 
programs; it funded plans that produced no tangible results; American loans would likely never 
be repaid; it spent dollars that provided little help to America’s troubled economy; it played into 
Soviet rhetoric of American militarist expansion. Senator Allen J. Ellender (R-LA) colorfully 
observed, “A decade of many ill-conceived and loosely managed expenditures of America's 
wealth” had turned “what began as a nourishing broth of ‘international cooperation for peace’ 
[into] a witches’ brew—a serious threat to our own economic stability and growth.”43 William 
Dawson’s (D-IL) House Committee on Government Operations, attacked the entire aid agenda. 
“It is, quite literally, all things to all men,” he thundered in 1958, claiming he had “never seen 
any evidence that the level of aid for any country [had] been systematically determined by 
economic experts.”44 Representatives from all sides contended that the Executive branch had too 
much authority to act without Congressional consent.45 
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Others in Congress did not shrink from the idea of massive aid, but objected to the 
program’s execution, which seemed to lack a central strategy. A powerful new group of 
Senators—including John F. Kennedy—pushed for even more proactive foreign assistance; 
deemphasizing military assistance and focusing more aid specifically for economic 
development.46 “Foreign aid is both an unavoidable responsibility and a central instrument of our 
foreign policy,” J. William Fulbright’s (D-AR) Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
acknowledged in 1961. “It is dictated by the hard logic of the cold war and by a moral 
responsibility resulting from poverty, hunger, disease, ignorance, feudalism, strife, revolution, 
chronic instability, and life without hope.”47 Foreign aid was “indispensable,” the Senate 
concluded, but “it can also be said that it has fallen short of the millions of words that have been 
uttered in its behalf.”48  
Eisenhower’s attempts to reform military assistance made little headway, and only 
confirmed this group of progressives’ misgivings. In September 1958, Secretary of State Dulles 
warned Eisenhower, “Unless we are able to justify a military assistance program in forthright 
and explainable terms . . . we will be faced with increasing pressures for indiscriminate cuts in 
military assistance funds in the interest of devoting the resulting savings to economic 
development programs.”49 Before asking Congress for another dollar for the Mutual Security 
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Program, Dulles recommended that “the basic purposes of our military aid, and the standards to 
be used in fixing its level, be appraised by a public committee of respected and qualified private 
citizens.”50 In November 1958, Eisenhower tapped his friend William H. Draper, Jr., a former 
Army General, former Under Secretary of the Army, and “the first professional west-coast 
venture capitalist” to head a special committee to study the military assistance program.51 
Following his dream of shifting the country’s financial core west, Draper formed the venture 
capital firm Draper, Gaither and Anderson in 1958, joining retired Air Force Major General and 
former Ambassador to NATO Frederick L. Anderson, Jr. and Horace Rowan Gaither, Jr., 
chairman on the boards of the Ford Foundation and RAND and author of the influential and grim 
1957 Gaither Report on nuclear survival.52 In his Army days, Draper had helped administer the 
Marshall Plan in Europe, and his conclusions reflected this experience. 
The Draper Committee was another of the ad hoc committees of former generals, 
industrialists, and businessmen, that had become a kind of shadow branch of American 
government after 1945 and which drew the disdain of intellectuals like Rostow.53 Eisenhower, he 
later accused, was “shaped by military and budgetary tactics rather than a theory of history.”54 
He was “unimaginative,” conservative, willing to “innovate as little as his responsibilities 
required,” and motivated only to “reduce the burden in cost and manpower of holding the line 
around the periphery of the communist bloc.”55 To Rostow, advisors like Draper, with military 
and business backgrounds made them “mediocre . . . long on technical assistance types and 
desperately short of men at home and in the field who understand the economic development 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 “Draper Investment Company,” accessed October 30, 2013, http://www.draperco.com/english/our-history/. 
52 David L Snead, The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University 
Press, 1999). 
53 See Morton H. Halperin, “The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process,” World Politics 13, no. 3 (April 1, 
1961): 360–84. 
54 Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History, 86,111. 
55 Ibid., 111, 87. 
 
50 
 
problem.”56 Under Kennedy, prominent economists, sociologists, and historians from MIT’s 
Council on International Studies re-formed the powerful cliques that wielded similar influence 
over foreign assistance policy. 
Embedded in their final report, published in August 1959, the Draper Committee revealed 
a special enthusiasm for training foreign military personnel in the United States. They also   
recommended the expected things: consolidate aid programs, strengthen the State Department’s 
authority over non-military assistance, extend aid appropriations for two or more years instead of 
just one, and require the Department of Defense to fund those military assistance programs it 
desired out of its own budget.57 But programs that sponsored training for foreign military 
personnel in the United States received Draper’s most significant recommendation. In 1960, $99 
million of the $3.2 billion mutual security budget went toward training foreign military 
personnel, he claimed, yet “there is no single aspect of the Military Assistance Program which 
produces more useful returns for the dollars expended than these training programs.”58 Despite 
Draper’s strong criticism that recommended abandoning other aspects of the mutual security 
program, these training programs gathered increasing praise.  
Even Draper admitted, however, that in the hands of military trainers, these programs 
failed to fulfil their potential.59 Military training needed to broaden its scope to coincide with the 
overall objectives of American foreign policy and focus on building leadership and professional 
expertise, and not simply transmit technical skills.60 “In some of the less developed countries,” 
Draper claimed, “a large proportion of the managerial and executive skills that exist are in their 
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armed forces.”61 More than a military training program, therefore, the Military Assistance 
Program needed to embrace its potential for sociological transformation.62 Through it, “recipient 
countries undergo significant changes—organizational, sociological, economic, and sometimes 
political.”63 The committee noted that the program brought more than 10,000 foreign nationals to 
the United States each year, but recommended that it expand to include more. “This training,” 
Draper argued, “can do far more than teach recipients to use military equipment and research. It 
brings foreign nationals into close contact with United States citizens under conditions which 
tend to promote an appreciation of the values of our civilian way of life.”64 Policymakers in the 
Kennedy administration later seized this sentiment and codified it into policy. 
Draper still did not stray far from inherited, strategic justifications for sponsoring foreign 
officers in the United States. “Many officers, returning to their native countries, often form the 
nuclei of Western-oriented leadership,” the final report argued, as if being Western-oriented 
sufficed as the goal in the Cold War.65 Draper’s outlook was primarily security-oriented, but he 
recognized the potential for military training exchanges to develop individuals’ understanding 
and respect for American institutions and acknowledged those individuals’ potential to transform 
their native military, social, and political institutions along more modern lines. This potential, it 
turns out, was precisely the point upon which the “old look” of the Eisenhower administration 
would pivot to the new approach favored by Kennedy and his cabinet of academics-turned-
policymakers.66  
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The Modernization of Military Modernization 
In August 1959, in the same month that the Draper Report spelled out the Eisenhower 
administration’s final attempt to reform the massive Mutual Security Program, the RAND 
Corporation sponsored a conference in Santa Monica, California on the role of the military in 
“underdeveloped” countries. Some of the most influential academic proponents of modernization 
attended, including: Lucian Pye, who was raised by Protestant missionary parents in China and 
whose history of the Malayan insurgency in 1956 prescribed the psychological process of 
modernization as the solution for the economic and social appeal of communism; Edward Shils, 
a prolific scholar of Cold War foreign policy, propaganda, and new nations; and Daniel Lerner, 
whose 1958 study of Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iran and Lebanon in The Passing of 
Traditional Society first explicitly theorized the process of social transformation as 
“modernization.”67 All three worked for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for 
International Studies (CIS) at the time, the CIA-sponsored research center that was also home to 
the influential economist Max Millikan and to Walt W. Rostow, who eventually rose to chair the 
State Department’s Policy Planning Staff under Kennedy and served as National Security 
Advisor under Johnson.68 The conference proceedings, published in 1962 as The Role of the 
Military in Underdeveloped Countries, became the most influential attempt to come to grips with 
the apparent paradox that transitional societies “apparently find it easier to create modern armies 
than most other modern structures.”69 At that moment, social scientists informed by 
modernization theory seized the initiative in theorizing, rationalizing, and executing American 
military assistance. As they did, programs which brought military officers from new states to the 
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United States for education and training acquired special significance because these programs 
encompassed so many of modernization theory’s tenets of faith—at a low cost. 
 
The historiography of modernization and development ideology clearly establishes the 
preeminence of social science in driving American foreign policy toward developing states. 
Social science was slow to incorporate military assistance, however, which had thrived under a 
different set of assumptions during the second half of the century.70 In the late 1950s, 
modernization theorists successfully absorbed the rationale and administrative control over 
military assistance for three reasons: first, as we have seen, Congressional and American public 
opinion supported military assistance to the global South but largely disapproved of providing 
strictly “economic” aid, so modernization theorists carefully couched their programs in terms 
that permitted access to large “security” budgets; second, even though social scientists largely 
refused to examine the significance of the military in newly decolonized prior to 1960, many 
other Western scholars already acknowledged that the military often played a “modernizing” role 
in defeated states; and finally, a series of significant scholarly works in the late 1950s and early 
1960s filled the gap between the under-theorized phenomena of military modernization and the 
spread of military rule in the global South. 
Influential academics-turned-policymakers supplied that prior understanding of the 
military’s modernizing function with intellectual respectability and a share in the political 
bonanza for modernization theorists in the Kennedy administration. The way international 
military training programs unified the psychological aspects of modernization—a person could 
become a modern person, and the good soldier was a modernized man—with the prior and 
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resilient public faith in the goodness of American communities later insulated these military 
assistance programs when modernization theory declined. 
The myth that military conquest begot modernity in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the 
Middle East had a long history. Since the mid-1800s, both Western and Egyptian nationalist 
historians agreed that Mehmed Ali’s conscripted army, formed in response to Napoleon’s 
humiliation of Egypt, laid the foundation for Egypt’s national “take-off” in the early nineteenth 
century and earned Ali the title, “Founder of Modern Egypt.”71 Even then-Colonel Anwar Sadat 
apparently considered the criterion of a good Egyptian officer in 1960 “the degree of his 
familiarity with the West.”72 In 1929, Arnold Toynbee mused before the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs that the people of Turkey, Egypt, and Persia owed their “present 
enlightened rulers to the Great War.”73 Military defeat in World War I had awakened a spirit of 
self-questioning, dislodged “traditional Islam . . . in its bigoted form,” and “given way to a spirit 
of inquiry and self-questioning” in the Middle East.74 In Turkey between the wars, but especially 
after World War II, secular, intellectual politicians had harnessed the reform-minded military to 
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produce a West-facing, rapidly-modernizing, civilian-run state, and an essential Cold War ally.75 
Similar events seemed to unfold in Iran after World War II.76 
Military conquest also fueled America’s modernizing mission abroad. A New York 
Tribune reporter sailing with Matthew Perry in 1853 exulted at the “great American Navy—that 
glorious institution which scatters civilization with every broadside and illuminates the dark 
places of the earth with the light of its rockets and bombshells.”77 Modernity poured from 
American cannons. Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 earned Western commentators’ praise 
as a laudable attempt to spread modernity.78 After the U.S. occupied the Philippines, Cuba, and 
later Haiti, the military led reconstruction projects, importing modern technology.79 The army 
and navy also worked closely with other aspects of the modernizing mission, including 
missionaries, philanthropic organizations, and, eventually, development theorists, who arrived 
after the dramatic displays of American power which reoccurred in Tokyo Bay, Manila, Haiti, 
and postwar Europe in the century before 1950.  
Americans offered military education in the United States as one path for elite subjects of 
its expanding empire to transform their societies in the early twentieth century. While the U.S. 
Army initiated many infrastructure projects in the Philippines as part of its counterinsurgency 
strategy, its overall program was one of “social engineering.”80 To American commanders in the 
Philippines after 1898, native Filipinos became fit for military leadership only after the U.S. 
Congress authorized admitting Filipino cadets to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 
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1908.81 Filipino West Point graduates could then command indigenous scout units, liberating the 
U.S. Army from its ongoing pacification mission in the Philippines. In 1935, American General 
Douglas MacArthur envisioned a Philippine Military Academy “built on the lines of West 
Point,” and convinced President Manuel Quezon that only Filipino graduates of the real West 
Point and Annapolis become the first Superintendent, Commandant, and training staff for the 
new Philippine Military Academy.82 Between 1904 and 1937, the United States sponsored 
ninety-three Chinese men to attend American military colleges—including West Point, The 
Virginia Military Institute, The Citadel, and Norwich—to help modernize nationalist China’s 
army and insulate it from communists.83 In 1919, acting Secretary of State Frank L. Polk pleaded 
with Congress to permit “intelligent and spirited young men” of the “sister Republics of the 
Americas” to send cadets to West Point and Annapolis, anticipating that they might “return to 
their native countries deeply impressed by our system of training and our institutions and well 
prepared to develop military training at home.”84 Congress finally acquiesced in 1938.85 Military 
education and training in the United States had deep roots in American modernization programs 
abroad, its importance expanded in proportion to Cold War military assistance programs. 
The truce that emerged in the late 1950s between prominent social scientists and 
modernization theorists who advocated military assistance as a strategy for development was so 
important because prior to then, most thoughtful observers did not equate military capacity with 
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modernity or progress, and warned of the ascendance of military ideology over the state. From 
Princeton University, the influential historian and German émigré Alfred Vagts warned in 1937 
(and again in 1959) against militarism—evident in the spectacles of Fascism—that was anti-
democratic and recent, but not modern.86 Armies served modernity only when they made 
“efficient, rational, up-to-date, and to a certain extent, humane uses of the materials and forces 
available to them,” Vagts wrote.87 Militarism, on the other hand, was anti-rational, traditional, 
and displayed “the qualities of caste and cult, authority and belief.”88 Even after World War II, 
Vagts lamented the spread of “civilian militarism,” evident in “the churn of officers rising in 
Turkey, Iran, Thailand, Indonesia, Egypt, Iraq, [and] Lebanon and civilian governments 
appropriating military titles for their prominent civilians in the Soviet Union and other places.”89 
Most social scientists prior to 1960 shared Vagts’ reluctance to embrace the union of militarism 
and modernization as a promising strategy for encouraging development in poorer states, 
motivated either out of a traditional liberal suspicion of armies, by a presumption that military 
phenomena were anachronistic, or by preoccupation with other trendy social issues like 
industrialization and urbanization.90  
What was different about the modernization theorists’ understanding of military 
modernization was the evolving definition of “modernity.” Since the 17th century, Europeans had 
equated their technology—especially their military technology—with social and cultural 
superiority.91 By the nineteenth century, influenced by theories of evolution, the “civilizing 
mission,” and abstract notions of equality that accompanied industrialization and urbanization, 
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“modern” became synonymous with “improvement,” while simultaneously implying 
“backwardness” for the “primitive societies” abroad.92 The Americans in Tokyo Bay in 1853, 
Manila in 1899, or Panama in 1912 were no different.93 Still, “modernization” before the 1950s 
usually referred to technical improvements in physical or bureaucratic infrastructure, 
administrative streamlining, or the introduction of new machine equipment or chemical 
fertilizers, for example.94 To Edward Shils, modernity demanded “breaking the power of 
traditional interests of chiefs, sultans, and priests, universal public education, democracy, being 
scientific, [and] being economically advanced and progressive”—in other words, “‘Modern’ 
means being Western without depending on the West.”95  
To the extent that people in the new states world aspired to be “modern” before the 
1960s, they were also reacting to the spread of liberalism, nationalism, the concept of class, and 
world religions in an increasingly globalized political and cultural economy.96 By negotiating 
these influences for themselves, people in developing places could decide that they were modern, 
or that they lived in a modern world, whether they liked it or not.97 Before World War II, the 
term “modernization” was never used to describe a society as a whole.98  
This is not to say that all social change caused by war was modern, or represented 
modernity. Instead, when specific scholars of modernization theory, such as Lucian Pye, Daniel 
Lerner, or Edward Shils accepted military technology and military sociology as contributors 
toward the economic, political, and mostly psychological evolution modernization theory 
encompassed, they modified prior understandings of modernity to fit a new paradigm, the 
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transformation of an entire society and articulated through modernization theory.99 In Lerner’s 
words, “Individuals and their institutions modernize together.”100 By the late 1950s, 
modernization as an ideology had coalesced around deeper, older cultural assumptions about 
American society which intellectuals, officials, and the American public already largely 
shared.101 As its theorists became more influential, they also incorporated prior assumptions 
about the role and promise of American military assistance programs. 
The August 1959 RAND conference in Santa Monica was the turning point in 
reinterpreting the modernizing potential for the military in “underdeveloped countries” because it 
separated the economic problem of military spending from the sociological potential for military 
forces to transform societies. Prior to that, economists condemned military spending for 
derailing, not helping, developing economies. Max Millikan and Walt W. Rostow’s 1957 A 
Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy, the most influential work on development 
economics thus far and which claimed to have harnessed the near-unanimous, collective 
expertise of the CIS, baldly declared that military spending prevented poorer states from growing 
economically and only made their leaders more likely to pursue totalitarian measures.102 In 
economic policy, military spending was suspect. As part of modernization theory, on the other 
hand, which proposed a series of steps toward economic “take-off” which required first the 
social transformation from a “traditional” to “modern” personalities, programs which isolated 
future military leaders from their “traditional” societies could be a perfect fit.103 At this 1959 
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conference, social scientists blessed that essential intellectual leap over the economics of 
development to the uses of foreign military assistance to create modernized people.  
The military in postcolonial societies could be an avenue for advancement and a proto-
democratic institution, these scholars argued, but the potential for abuse of this advancement 
made it essential to understand its influence. Distinguishing “civilian” and “military” outcomes 
from foreign assistance was difficult enough. American scholars did not agree on the stakes. At 
the RAND conference, University of Chicago sociologist James S. Coleman and Belmont Brice, 
Jr. argued that in African states, civilian policymakers and the army shared the same basic goals 
of stability, order, national unity, and rapid modernization. “These are the goals of the educated 
African nationalist,” they wrote, and if the civilian regimes could not deliver them, “there is a 
high probability that the military will intervene.”104 These scholars acknowledged “a unity in the 
common economic and social problems” and the “paramount task of finding a format for civil-
military relations appropriate to their social structure.”105 “Military aid has had to become 
economic aid,” Shils wrote, since it already contributed to “roadbuilding, health facilities, 
communications networks and the like, all of which have directly facilitated economic 
growth.”106 Shils, Pye, and Coleman all assumed that military assistance had the potential to 
introduce economic and institutional reforms that yielded modernization, but only when that 
assistance behaved like economic aid, and not as an incentive for national militaries to intervene 
into politics. In 1959, as African states seized their independence in great numbers, widespread 
military intervention was still a concern, but not yet a reality. It became reality across Africa and 
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Asia early in the 1960s, but in 1959, the example of Turkey, which exemplified the modernizing 
military which spurred advancement, then retreated from politics, held great promise.107    
Participants at the 1959 conference lamented how few scholars had seriously examined 
the military’s potential political influence on African and Asian “new states.”108 Lucian Pye’s 
presentation, reprinted in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, lowered the 
barriers to the scholarly acceptance of military assistance in the service of modernization.109 
Although he later taught courses in counterinsurgency for the State Department, Pye was not 
simply an apologist for military rule.110 He regarded military dictatorships as interim solutions, at 
best.111 He pragmatically pointed out, however, “The military has become the key decision-
making element in at least eight of the Afro Asian countries.”112 He continued, “We are 
confronted with the awkward fact that there has been almost no scholarly research on the role of 
the military and the political development of the new states.”113 Daniel Lerner considered “the 
absence of definitive case studies” an opportunity to “make general observations,” that offered 
considerable tolerance for early military participation in the process of modernization, but which, 
it later showed, rarely applied outside of Turkey.114 The scarcity of data seemed to result from a 
willful refusal to integrate military sociology into political science, not just an imbalance in the 
study of social change in the global South.115  
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Within ten years, most observers would decry these early attempts to justify or coopt the 
momentum of military assistance for advancing modernization theory as unfortunate or sinister 
evidence of the “theory-research gap” between expectations and political, social, and economic 
reality in the new states.116 In 1959, however, political conditions in the United States made 
social scientists reconsider whether military elites in new states might be a fertile field for their 
modernization efforts.  
Some scholars considered the military the ideal example of modernity in developing 
states because the ideal soldier supposedly manifested a complete transformation into a 
“modern” personality, which valued technology, industry, mobility, and nationalism. Training in 
“modern subjects” such as engineering, ballistics, and communications was “specialized, 
technical, and nonhumanisitic,” Edward Shils wrote.117 Therefore, the “military officer class” 
represented a “disproportionately larger sector of the modern intelligentsia” and became “major 
representatives of modernity in technology and administration” in new states.118 In the 
“underdeveloped society,” Lucian Pye proposed, “the good soldier is also to some degree a 
modernized man.”119 Further, “the armies created by colonial administration and by the newly 
emergent countries have been consistently among the most modernized institutions in their 
societies.”120 The military establishment “comes as close as any human organization can to the 
ideal type for an industrialized secularized enterprise.”121 Describing the 1952 Joint American 
Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, Lerner and Robinson argued that the Turkish army did more 
than acquire military and technical skills in “the maintenance and operation of modern 
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machinery.”122 The “thousands of young Turkish farm lads” who went through the program, they 
argued “acquired a new personality . . . Along with the physical and social mobility opened to 
them through the military training program, they acquired also the habits of psychic mobility.”123 
From then on, “the young discharged soldier is likely to find his traditional society inadequate to 
sustain his new level of expectation . . . Hence, it is likely that the soldier returning to his native 
village will resist falling back into the premechanical era.”124 The Turkish Army became “a 
major agency of social change precisely because it spread among this key sector of the 
population a sense of identity.”125 Modernity was partly economic, partly institutional, but 
largely mental, and modernization theorists meant to surpass the prior tradition of accepting the 
military as an avenue for modernizing institutions and advocate military assistance programs to 
modernize people.126  
The Turkish case demonstrates how American scholars in the late 1950s absorbed the 
prior appreciation for the national military’s modernizing effects and transformed them into case 
studies for modernization theory. Where prior scholars had recognized the political union 
between the old Ottoman army and the caliph, as if “the Ottoman government had been an army 
before it was anything else,” Lerner argued that Ataturk demonstrated how to modernize the 
Turkish military while breaking the cycle of military intervention in Turkish politics.127 Instead, 
“the maintenance of civilian supremacy in republican Turkey has been a historical fact of the 
first order.”128 Ataturk broke the cycle of military intervention, inherited from classical Ottoman 
and Persian lore, but which had remained “a regular feature of the postwar scene.”129 Turkey 
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offered a model, then, in which the military, “historically the chosen instrument for imposing 
stability, can be transformed into an agency that promotes mobility within a framework of 
civilian ingenuity and innovation.”130  
Even after the military overthrew the civilian government in 1960, Lerner and Robinson 
still praised the Turkish army. World Politics published their 1959 presentation as “Swords and 
Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force” in October 1960, with a new ending 
that excused the May 1960 coup as over-eager haste from “frustrated” military leaders from one 
of “the new nations-in-a-hurry.”131 When Turkey’s civilian government refused to lead those 
“major programs that shaped national development—basic education, technical training, [and] 
industrial production,” Lerner and Robinson argued, the military could be counted on to 
intervene.132 Turkey also seemed to demonstrate that military intervention in politics was not 
inevitable—or at least, it did not have to be disastrous.133 As an American ally and NATO 
partner, then, reinterpreting recent Turkish history as a modernization success story had 
enormous strategic significance for modernization theorists-turned-policymakers who believed 
they could achieve similar results in other contested areas.  
For a few years after 1959, Americans sought other examples where military rulers also 
triumphed as modernizers. In 1961, UCLA’s Amin Banani argued that Reza Shah’s Iran was a 
triumph of secular nationalism. The unified, standing army permitted the Shah to undermine 
traditional clerical power, reform judicial and educational systems, and set Iran on the path to 
economic liberalism.134 In Egypt, where historians attributed the rise of nationalism in the 
nineteenth century to the humiliating experience of military defeat, a new CIS-sponsored study 
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by Princeton University sociologist Morroe Berger reevaluated the importance of Western 
tutelage on the Egyptian military. Using the typical lexicon of modernization theory, Berger 
argued that for Mehmed to create a modern, self-sufficient, and efficient army, he needed “new 
educational methods, a new kind of industrial discipline, a different sort of administrative arm 
with new and unfamiliar loyalties—in short, virtually a new society.”135 Mehmed failed, Berger 
wrote, because he either failed or refused to “to invoke the symbols of nationalism or these 
symbols were beyond his own imagination.”136 The Egyptian military’s great modernizing power 
receded after Mehmed died in 1849, revived after the British occupation in 1881, but peaked 
after World War II: “Nationalism, and political and social reform—in a word, modernization: 
this was the main preoccupation of many of the younger officers reared in the period of British 
imperial decline.”137 In Taiwan, a partnership between liberal developmentalists in the State 
Department and the Economic Cooperation Administration appeared to have harmonized U.S. 
government agencies, Taiwanese government intervention, and private investment to produce 
“military Keynesianism” in the shadow of communist China.138 In all three places, harnessing 
and projecting nationalism remained the modern military’s major function, and nationalism was 
one precondition for modernization.139 
Nationalism formed the quintessential aspect of the modern military identity. For 
modernization theorists, training in citizenship was the most significant feature of the modern 
army’s process of acculturation.140 The army, just like civilian elites and policymakers, shared 
the same goals of stability, order, national unity, and rapid modernization: “These are the goals 
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of the educated African nationalist,” Coleman and Brice wrote.141 From Turkey to Asia to 
Africa, young men from isolated villages “now suddenly felt themselves to be part of the larger 
society.”142 The military’s “strong sense of nationalism and national identity, with pervasive 
overtones of xenophobia” threatened (or promised) to “repress tribal and separatist 
attachments.”143   
Modernization theorists considered valid only those forms of nationalism which, for 
residents of newly decolonized states, required external reference points that were only available 
through instruction from Western sources. The same nationalism which resulted from 
participation in the external, modern military project was supposed to prepare the military man to 
acknowledge graciously the inadequacy of his own society. When “large numbers of officers are 
forced to look outside their society for their models,” Pye wrote, “they have greater awareness of 
international standards and a greater sensitivity to weaknesses in [their] own society.”144 Further, 
military leaders were more self-confident, more able “to deal frankly and cordially” with external 
authorities, and more willing to accept correction from the West.145 Modern men could also face 
facts: “Military leaders are often far less suspicious of the West than civilian leaders because 
they themselves are more emotionally secure.”146 Therefore, Pye continued, “it is easier for the 
military leaders to accept the fact that their countries are weak and the West is strong without 
becoming emotionally disturbed or hostile toward the West.”147 Walt Whitman Rostow called 
this supposed phenomenon “reactive nationalism,” and predicted that newly modernized elites 
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would uproot their traditional societies in order to protect them from humiliation by 
foreigners.148 This very conviction permeated the American military assistance program that 
brought military members from dozens of countries to the United States for professional 
education and training and formed the core of American military assistance policy to Ghana for 
the next thirty years. Of course, Ghanaian policymakers and Ghanaian officers carried different 
assumptions about the practical and ideological significance of their training. 
Not only did these theorists assume that the habits of the modern military could spread to 
the rest of society, by identifying indigenous officers as an alternate postcolonial elite, theorists 
easily integrated existing American military assistance policy from the early 1960s. Officers 
especially, Pye wrote, were “spiritually in tune with the intellectuals, students, and those other 
elements in society most anxious to become part of the modern world.”149 They were also blank 
slates who did not carry the intellectual baggage of the independence struggle, and who might 
respond eagerly to the supposedly merit-based opportunities the military provided. “An Army 
officer at present,” William Gutteridge wrote about Ghana in 1965, “is more likely to be the son 
of a peasant cocoa farmer or a post office official than of a professional man, who will probably 
have educated his son for the bar or the civil service or a similar occupation of established 
prestige.”150 Those from humble families or rural regions who had secondary education might 
choose the military to overcome the hindrance their social or regional background posed.151 
Modernization theorists recognized that military service during the colonial era carried a 
stigma. Men from repressed minority groups often served, or the uneducated, or those without 
other economic options.152 In Ghana, colonial-era soldiers were called “Abongo Boys,” a 
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degrading epithet for men who became soldiers because they had no education, had dropped out 
of school, or were “failures in general, who turned to soldiering as a last result.”153 In the 1940s 
and 1950s, these were mainly Ghanaians from the north. Ghanaian historian Stephen Kojo 
Addae suggests, “No sensible young man with a secondary education (and these were 
overwhelmingly southerners) would want to be a soldier.”154 As the proto-modern postcolonial 
institution, modernization theorists argued that the military-turned-modernizer offered education 
and social mobility, and promised to replace regional ethnic conflict with national pride. Lerner 
and Robinson claimed the military experience had fully integrated Turkish society: “Even ethnic 
minorities are now accepted as candidates for officer status. In the fall of 1955, indeed, several 
women were admitted to Turkey’s War Academy as cadets.”155   
Applying military assistance in ways that harnessed the power of this “reactive 
nationalism” required identifying and isolating emerging military elites. The “Turkish 
experience,” Lerner proposed, had shown that “the distinction between economic and military 
assistance can be easily exaggerated,” and “the army, the public school, the industrial enterprise, 
the economic planning organization of an underdeveloped country tend to converge on common 
objectives.”156 Only with deliberate planning could military assistance attain “the maximum 
effect upon the economic and social development of the recipient country.”157 The nature of the 
American diplomatic service overseas, however, and the limited formal contact between State 
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Department employees and foreign militaries meant that few lessons in modernity via military 
training could occur there. It was essential that foreign military personnel came to the United 
States.158 Therefore, Lerner recommended, “Foreign military personnel coming to this country 
for professional or technical training should perhaps also be exposed to our economic processes, 
political institutions, and social practices.”159 Although this type of professional military training 
“may well come to differ somewhat from that which is most appropriate in the United States or 
Western Europe,” he argued, “perhaps, learning from the Turkish experience, we can help other 
countries to harness their national motivation to become strong, via military organization, more 
directly to the drive for accelerated development.”160   
 
As the 1950s ended, influential social scientists who articulated a technocratic solution to 
the political, economic, and cultural poverty of the “developing world” overcame their reluctance 
to endorse military assistance as a strategy for modernization. They did so partly because the 
multibillion dollar Mutual Security Program, flawed as it was, offered a lucrative path to enact 
their projects. National security still generated public support, while Americans generally quailed 
at foreign economic aid. Supposed success stories in Turkey, Egypt, and Iran also lent 
intellectual credibility to the power of military service to transform individuals. The method and 
the place where military men and women received those lessons in nationalism, technology, 
professionalism, and modernity became important links connecting modernization theory, 
American security assistance policy, and programs that brought foreign military personnel to the 
United States.  
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Modernization Theory Becomes Policy 
“The Rostows of this world are not content merely to write books,” historian Mark 
Mazower writes, “they aim to shift policy,” and modernization theorists ascended to positions of 
political influence in the new Kennedy administration.161 “Euphoria reigned,” recalled 
Kennedy’s “court historian” Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “we thought for a moment that the world 
was plastic and the future unlimited.”162 Rostow crowed, “Since Nov. 8, 1960, [Kennedy’s 
election], a most extraordinary concentration of thought and memoranda-writing has taken place 
on the question of how to reorganize foreign aid.”163 At the CIS, Millikan, and Lerner continued 
to mingle social science scholarship with influencing policy. Pye took a position at the State 
Department. 164 Rostow, who had coined Kennedy’s evocative phrases “the New Frontier” and 
“the Development Decade” during the campaign, became one of Kennedy’s most influential 
advisors. He set right to work dismantling the “old look” of military assistance, calling it “a 
defensive effort to shore-up weak economies and to buy short-run political and military 
advantages” to inaugurate “a coordinated Free World effort with enough resources to move 
forward those nations prepared to mobilize their own resources.”165 The liberal universalism of 
modernization theorists offered interchangeable, scientifically-derived, and measurable paths that 
could be transplanted onto any society and accelerated, with care. But for it to operate when 
grafted onto existing military assistance programs, another, less definable faith in the 
transformative power of the international military ideal had to exist first.  
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Under current leadership, it seemed to modernization theorists of the early 1960s, 
American military officers were incapable or unwilling to perceive the potential for transforming 
visiting foreign officers under their charge. At least, they were wasting an opportunity. U.S. 
military forces offered an effective path to development, but military leaders were slow to 
understand the revolutionary nature of their task, their human subjects’ potential as targets for 
modernization, or the richness of their environments for teaching.166 In a 1962 article in World 
Politics, Charles Windle and T. R. Vallance of George Washington University’s Human 
Resources Research Office acknowledged a consensus among intellectuals that training foreign 
military personnel in the U.S. had considerable potential to transform target societies, but just 
like Harlan Cleveland in The Overseas Americans, they lamented that the American military still 
concentrated too much on teaching “combat.”167 American military trainers lacked the foresight 
to combine military and nonmilitary capabilities. “Other potential benefits of training, such as 
improving the political, social, and economic status of foreign countries, are treated as collateral 
benefits,” they moaned, and military administrators only considered these “byproducts” useful 
“if they can be achieved simultaneously with military benefits at little or no extra expense.168 
Given the tendency of Congress “to prefer defense aid to foreign aid expenditures,” Windle and 
Vallance advocated maintaining the current programs that brought large numbers of the global 
South’s new alternate elite to the United States for military training.169 But they also suggested 
that an ambitious effort to “diversify institutional commitments within the defense 
establishment” might wrest the social significance military training from “a heavy investment in 
the production and use of weaponry to other socially useful activities.”170 The existing 
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infrastructure of military assistance, then, provided a convenient host through which theorists 
attempted to insinuate a new ideological program aimed at spreading the lessons of 
modernization to visiting elites from newly decolonized states.  
 
In 1961, the ideological content of those programs changed dramatically. When Kennedy 
ascended to the Presidency in 1961, he claimed to close the door on the moribund “Decade of 
Defense,” and announced that the 1960s would be a “Decade of Development.”171 Secretary of 
State Rusk told Kennedy that Congress and the American people were tired of the “old symbols, 
maladministration and waste, neo-isolationism, and the protectionism produced by the economic 
distress in our own country.”172 Rusk called for “A fresh, positive aid program, scaled to the 
requirements, and presented with persistence and boldness.”173 As he introduced his Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 to Congress in March 1961, President John F. Kennedy amplified that 
message, and called for a massive reform of the foreign aid system that was as much ideological 
as it was practical.174 More than just the “Mutual Security” label disappeared from the American 
foreign aid program in 1961. “I am recommending the replacement of those agencies with a new 
one,” Kennedy told Congress; “A fresh start under new leadership.”175 All aspects of American 
aid were fair game for reform. 
Where modernization theory merged with prior American assumptions about their 
exceptional communities, the international military education and training program deflected a 
challenge, and secured a new purpose for itself. Great personalities churned American foreign 
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policy in the summer of 1961 that threatened all aspects of American foreign assistance. On May 
31, 1961, as he convened the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for hearings on the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, J. William Fulbright leveled what seemed like a withering criticism 
against American military training programs. “Apparently,” he challenged, “we have trained 
military forces for the kinds of battles that are not fought. We have trained individuals who have 
not had the will to protect their freedom.”176 He captured the mood of the Senate, Kennedy, and 
much of the American public when he criticized “routine, unimaginative administration of 
programs, and there is a belief that we have become bogged down in annual expenditure 
procedures without much rhyme or reason or planning for the future”177 In that small corner of 
the massive foreign aid structure in which international military training and education resided, 
however, a subtle shift in emphasis reinforced the program’s ideological foundation for decades. 
As the Senate hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act sprawled across June, across town 
at Foggy Bottom, Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles channeled Fulbright’s anger to assert 
the Department of State’s new authority over American military assistance programs. On June 
14, Bowles sent Secretary of State Rusk a sweeping proposal, outlining a broad reform agenda, 
and recommending improvements for nearly every aspect of State’s involvement with American 
foreign policy. Bowles interpreted the Department of State’s scope of authority over security 
assistance broadly. “Another area of our overseas operations which we should consider most 
carefully,” he told Rusk, “is the thousands of military personnel from foreign countries who are 
brought each year to the United States under the Military Assistance Program for training by the 
U.S. military in the use of new weapons and techniques.”178 To Bowles, “These many contacts 
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provide a ready-made opportunity to create a better understanding of our country, its beliefs, and 
policies.”179 He called for a reevaluation of the program to “improve their general understanding 
of the United States, its people and its policies.”180  
What Bowles called “a better understanding of our country, its beliefs, and policies,” 
represented an explicit, and new, endorsement of foreign military training in the U.S. for a 
completely different purpose than Fulbright recognized. Although Fulbright railed against all 
American training missions, those overseas as well as those occurring stateside, and Bowles 
addressed only that subset which occurred where foreign military personnel received training in 
the U.S., Bowles and Rusk clearly expected different outcomes than military competence, the 
ability to fight the correct battles, or efficiency of administration. This training did not require a 
specific, national security-directed justification, and its primary lessons had no specific combat-
related relevance.181 Bowles’ recommendation clarified prior State Department policy drafts that 
searched for a new, coherent rationale for U.S. military assistance programs that encompassed 
more than just “the military posture of the United States.”182 Those programs that brought 
foreign military personnel to the U.S. were an ideal place to start.  
Following Bowles’ directive, in 1963, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick 
issued an initial policy memorandum to the Secretaries of the armed forces and commanders of 
all military commands establishing “An Informational Program for Foreign Military Trainees 
and Visitors in the United States.”183 The “Informational Program” memo established several 
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“informational objectives” that dictated the types of additional classes, visits, and lessons desired 
to give foreign military trainees “a balanced understanding . . . of United States society, 
institutions, and ideals.”184 It required all military education facilities that hosted international 
students to present lessons in these subjects because, Gilpatrick wrote, “Successful attainment of 
these objectives and full exposure of the foreign trainee to the nonmilitary aspects of American 
life are considered to be of importance to the military assistance program second only to the 
strictly military training objectives of that program.”185 Centers for American military training 
and education, such as the Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, had hosted international students from allied states for decades, and many had already 
developed programs for augmenting their courses’ military curricula with tours, guest lecturers, 
or “demonstrations of American life.” This memorandum formalized the agenda of those 
programs across all Department of Defense institutions. In January 1965, the Department of 
Defense replaced the policy memorandum with a formal directive that dictated the program’s 
intent and content for the next two decades. The directive changed slightly in 1985, adding 
“human rights” and “women’s rights” as areas of emphasis, but the eleven “significant facets of 
American life” that the directive aimed to display remained.186 
The “significant facets of American life” the Informational Program identified reads like 
a modernization theory cookbook, “each of which contributes a sound grasp of our society, 
institutions and ideals.”187 Regarding American government, the informational program should 
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“make a point many if not most foreigners misapprehend” about federal, state, and local 
government accountability and decentralization, with special attention to political parties and the 
“loyal opposition.” To demonstrate the American economy: tours of both big businesses and 
labor unions; understanding “the diversity of enterprise and ownership in our mixed economy;” 
the importance of “education, research, and governmental assistance” in improving agricultural 
productivity; public housing and welfare projects “will be of particular interest to foreign 
military trainees.” To display American society: public schools and universities showed “the 
connection between education and a responsible citizenry”; the free press—that one American 
institution “foreigners find most difficult to grasp”; political and civil rights for minority groups 
“with special reference to the Negro problem”; visits to baseball and football games, golf 
matches, rodeos, and regattas.188 Although each military facility interpreted and applied the 
Informational Program according to its own circumstances, these categories had little military 
application. Instead, they exactly match modernization theorists’ model of “a New Deal on an 
international scale,” which considered full employment, an end to poverty, unionism that 
embraced big business, inclusive governance, and respect for civil liberties the praiseworthy 
products of American liberal universalism.189  
Army officials did not distinguish between formal Informational Program activities and 
unofficial, community-sponsored activities when describing their programs for international 
officers. At Fort Leavenworth in 1991, for example, Colonel William Eggering, the American 
officer in charge of in international students, described a typical year’s schedule: Picnic with 
Leavenworth Sponsors; Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Plant tour; tour of Southwestern Bell 
Telephone company; tour of TWA airline maintenance facilities in Kansas City; Kansas City 
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People-to-People Rodeo; Fall and Spring Food Fairs; Military Order of the World Wars 
luncheon for International Officers; Winter Formal ball; Kansas City and Leavenworth Rotary 
Club functions; Tour of Fort Hood, Texas, Houston, and NASA; Washington DC trip, including 
Colonial Williamsburg and Norfolk Naval Base; Kansas State Government Tour; Missouri 
riverboat tour; Guest speakers, including a state senator, judge, AFL-CIO representative, 
National Organization for Women leader, and local school officials.190 The Informational 
Program funded some of these activities, including the tours of Houston and Washington, DC. 
Local organizations including the Leavenworth-Lansing Chamber of Commerce, Rotary Clubs, 
Officers Wives Club, and Greater Kansas City Chapter of People-to-People sponsored others. 
Colonel Eggering made no distinction between functions, since they all matched the 
“Commandant’s Goal” to “assist officers and families in acquiring a balanced understanding of 
U.S. society, institutions and goals.”191 
 As an attempt to graft lessons in liberal universalism embedded in modernization theory 
onto an existing military assistance program, Military Internationalism supplied the essential 
ideological bridges between American foreign policy, the Informational Program, and American 
communities. First, extant international military training programs provided access to thousands 
of visitors from the global South each year. By 1960, military training brought more foreign 
students to the United States than any other exchange program combined, including between 90 
and 130 international officers attending six month or one year long courses at Fort 
Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff College annually after 1956.192 Next, 
policymakers—including the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and 
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modernization theorists in the Kennedy Administration—agreed that understanding the United 
States’ “society, institutions, and ideals” were as important in producing psychological 
transformation as any supposedly “military” lessons visitors learned. They also agreed that 
American civilian communities, not military training staff, best demonstrated those ideals, and 
instituted the Informational Program to codify that faith into military policy. 
The Informational Program did not invent interaction between military posts and their 
communities, it formalized existing bands of cooperation that had formed organically. Local 
sponsor families had been assisting international officers and their families at Fort Leavenworth 
since 1952, coffee klatches and international language clubs for wives and families began in 
1947, and at its very first membership dinner in February 1963, the Greater Kansas City People-
to-People branch made cooperating with Fort Leavenworth’s international officer program a top 
priority.193 The Informational Program’s authors recognized existing community attitudes and 
programs surrounding foreign military personnel in American communities, then attempted to 
focus the programs’ ideological content to match the goals modernization theory prescribed for 
creating a new elite in target states.  
Finally, although the Informational Program enumerated specific political, economic, and 
cultural lessons, it assumed that civilian communities supporting each activity automatically 
represented the ideal for the visitor to experience. As we will see, the communities themselves 
also assumed as much, as they un-self-consciously merged international visitors into their 
community organizations. In many cases, as when the Greater Kansas City People-to-People 
branch boasted of being the exemplar branch for People-to-People International worldwide, the 
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international visitors sometimes became community organization’s raison d’etre.194 All the 
Americans in the process, from modernization theorists to policymakers to communities, 
believed that the experience of life in ordinary American communities would inspire or reveal a 
new psychological orientation in international military visitors. Military Internationalism, 
therefore, provided the unspoken catalyst for the ideals of modernization embedded in the 
Informational Program.  
The location of the exchange mattered, and American education and training programs at 
overseas locations never attempted to match the ideological and psychological impact of 
American training within the United States. In Latin America, for example, Kennedy’s Alliance 
for Progress was no less committed to applying modernization ideology through economic and 
security assistance, but most encounters with Latin American military students took place in 
Latin America, usually at the U.S. Army School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone.195 
The U.S. poured five times as much money into international military training and education for 
Latin America than Africa in the 1960s, and trained thirteen times more Latin American students 
than Africans, but the vast majority of that training occurred at the School of the Americas.196 
Canal Zone schools made no attempt to provide students with broad exposure to American life. 
All instruction was in Spanish and emphasized “teaching students with a lower educational level 
certain basic and less sophisticated military subjects,” including automotive and radio repair, 
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artillery, infantry, and military police tactics.197 By the 1970s, counterinsurgency dominated the 
curriculum.198 Uruguayan officers later recalled that courses in internal security, urban 
counterinsurgency, intelligence, and “interrogation by military intelligence” were the most 
popular.199 The Canal Zone schools left a legacy of militarism within some Latin American 
societies that continued after the School of the Americas moved to Fort Benning, Georgia in 
1984. American-sponsored training for Latin American militaries still took place 
overwhelmingly within Latin America even after the move.200 Even in Georgia, anthropologist 
Lesley Gill argues, despite an initial nod to the ideals of the Informational Program, American 
faculty and off-base communities employed the language of international exchange imperiously 
to enforce a culture of inequality.201 “A Latin American soldier,” Gill argues, “would have to 
search hard before he encountered large numbers of white, middle-class citizens who represent 
the ‘real Americans’ of military imagery.”202  
The School of the Americas offered a much starker contrast to the less technical, mostly 
political, objectives of the international military education and training program for selected 
military elites from West Africa. It reveals a chasm separating the ideologies of international 
military education and the actual results of that training indicative of the disastrous Cold War 
legacy of Third World military intervention Odd Arne Westad describes.203 Chapter 3 will argue 
that evidence of American support for human rights abusers in Latin America and elsewhere 
barely dented the ideological shell protecting the international military education and training 
program. Evidence and ideology inhabited separate worlds. Civilian volunteers around other 
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American military schools saw a third side to the issue, as well. For them, as Chapter 4 explores, 
international military families’ presence actualized their own faith in the power of personal 
relationships to exceed national foreign policy objectives. 
 
When reforming the Military Assistance Program to encourage stateside military courses 
to emphasize lessons in the American way of life, Kennedy, Rostow, Rusk, and Gilpatrick 
tapped into the public’s own faith that it already embodied a modern ideal. The new Kennedy 
administration energized or steamrolled many competing government factions into supporting 
the significant reforms the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 enacted. The Act, and coincident 
legislation creating the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress, capitalized on Americans’ 
confidence in the useful—and even transformative—power that living among the American 
people could have on visitors from around the world.204 Most of all, Kennedy’s reforms securely 
enshrined those programs which brought foreign military personnel to the United States with a 
narrative that affirmed, despite a dearth of supporting evidence, their transformative potential, 
their long-term success at forging strategic partnerships, and their cost-effectiveness. Those 
“significant facets of American life” the Informational Program held up for foreign military 
visitors reflected a shared faith in a version of Military Internationalism that provided a fertile 
ground for applying modernization theory in American communities. Ironically, as we shall see, 
the ideological content of military exchange programs remained largely outside of federal 
control. The Informational Program also survived long after modernization theory became 
unfashionable.  
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Military Modernization’s Eclipse 
Events in the mid-1960s shattered the truce between apologists for “military 
modernization” and social scientists with grave misgivings about the rapid expansion of military 
governments in the global South. Nationalism, war, and a rash of military coups throughout 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America forced social scientists and politicians to reevaluate the 
usefulness of military assistance programs as a whole.205 Training and education programs for 
foreign military members in the United States did not end, however. Other parties in the initial 
bargain, including the recipients themselves, simply changed or even heightened the rhetoric 
behind Military Internationalism to defend and uphold the U.S.’s foreign military training 
program. For some states, including Ghana, the patterns of American military assistance based 
exclusively on international military training and education became firm, and both the type and 
quantity of American aid changed little after that. 
 
Social scientists had always struggled to understand the connection between the 
military’s potential as modernizer versus its potential as political usurper. By the mid-1960s, 
some blamed social science itself for failing to take military sociology seriously or evaluate 
modernization theory critically. Henry Bienen of Princeton accused “academic opponents of the 
conception of militaries as modernizing institutions” of abandoning the field between 1960 and 
1965.206 In the decade after 1967, research on the performance of military rule in new states 
abounded, refuting the previous assertion that the Turkish experience was an appropriate model 
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for understanding Asian or African states’ modernization, and pointing to evidence that military 
officers often were equally corrupt, unable to build legitimate political institutions, and had 
fewer public administration skills than the civilian governments they replaced.207 Nevertheless, 
influential new academic currents also acknowledged the military’s potential to maintain order, 
despite its seeming inability to restore constitutional rule, and tempered Western social 
scientists’ condemnation of military regimes.208 
In 1965, Samuel P. Huntington forged a new path to understanding, even tolerating, 
military regimes. Huntington enabled the intellectual detachment of the large and ongoing 
military assistance program from the ideological sustenance it had enjoyed in the early years of 
the decade, and which appeared increasingly threatened as the Vietnam War expanded. Arguing 
in World Politics that “rapid modernization” often produced political decay, not political 
development, Huntington suggested that American policy ought to be to delay modernization 
where adequate political institutions did not also exist.209 Military officers in juntas or 
dictatorships may be “modernizers par excellence,” he argued, but they were frequently 
“indifferent or hostile to the needs of political institution-building.”210 On the other hand, 
military officers, as patriotic conservatives, could also inhibit the unregulated expansion of mass 
participation in government that threatened developing societies. Huntington argued that 
“modernity” did not entail prosperity, liberty, or progress; those resulted from a just and stable 
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political order.211 To him, modernization theory was really only thinly disguised universalism. It 
revealed more about American liberalism than it provided answers on how to help new states 
achieve stability or prosperity.212 He was not the only theorist who called for a re-evaluation of 
American foreign policy in the global South world based on a pragmatic acceptance of the reality 
and potential of military intervention, but he was among the most influential.  
By the early 1970s, the catastrophic Vietnam War, the perceived failure of the War on 
Poverty, the persistence of postcolonial nationalism, and the emergence of radical critiques of 
American empire diminished modernization theory as a guide for American policy.213 Noam 
Chomsky condemned Kennedy’s clique of public intellectuals and technocrats whose “will to 
power, cloaking itself in idealism” only spread tragedy in the Third World by expanding 
American imperial power.214 Andre Gunder Frank argued in 1966 that underdevelopment in the 
Third World was actually a built-in and intentional counterpart to capitalist development in the 
First World, while Gabriel and Joyce Kolko revived William A. Williams’ criticism of American 
foreign policy for expanding the American economic empire at the Third World’s expense.215 
Critics from the right, such as P.T. Bauer’s 1972 Dissent on Development, questioned whether 
foreign aid did more harm by concentrating power in the inefficient and unaccountable state.216 
Motivated by ideological criticism from left and right, Congress slashed all foreign aid programs 
after 1967.217 Thomas E. Morgan (D-PA) of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs captured 
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the mood of a stingy and suspicious Congress, arguing in 1969, “the construction of powerplants, 
highways, irrigation systems, and even the financing of projects for the improvement of the 
health and diet of the population frequently do not bring about the basic changes in social, 
political, and economic institutions which are essential to economic development and the 
attainment of social justice.”218 The era of grand projects by the “Mandarins of the Future” and 
the “Economists with Guns” seemed to end, even if Walt W. Rostow refused to repent of it.219 
Congress slashed military assistance budgets after 1967, but left international military 
education and training programs mostly intact. The original faith, embedded in the Informational 
Program’s assumption that life among American communities offered essential political and 
social lessons and transformed visiting military personnel, preserved them. Writing in Foreign 
Affairs, the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) defended the 
reorientation American foreign aid that dispatched with the illusion of massive American 
economic aid creating stable democracies in the global South, and instead “put social and 
political evolution as the first concern, with economic aid playing the supporting role rather than 
the other way around.”220 As one new direction for foreign aid, Fraser suggested, “Providing 
students from developing nations with a more profound understanding of development processes 
and their relationship to ideology would be most productive.”221 As if taking their cue from 
Fraser, with austerity looming over American military assistance budgets, programs that targeted 
individual recipients of American versions of modernity never lost their ideological luster. 
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In January 1968, as one bad year ended and another just beginning, and as the President, 
Secretary of State Rusk, and Defense Secretary McNamara planned for further dramatic cuts in 
foreign assistance, they reiterated their support for programs that brought individuals from 
potential allies in the global South to the U.S. for military training. McNamara foresaw no end to 
the Vietnam War, feared direct communist assaults elsewhere in Asia, and expected the Soviet 
Union to attempt to displace or replace U.S. or Western influence everywhere else.222 Despite a 
thirty-three percent reduction in Military Assistance Program funding in FY 1968 and further 
reductions in FY 1969, he refused to alter the overall program’s major objectives of providing 
“friendly countries” with arms, obtaining U.S. access to bases abroad, helping “friendly countries 
protect the fabric of their societies against internal violence,” and “dispos[ing] nations favorably 
toward the US in their diplomacy [and] public sentiment.”223 All those objectives remained valid, 
he said, and none was inherently more important than any other, but he calculated that U.S. 
military assistance only directly contained communist military aggression in Korea, Taiwan, 
Greece, Turkey, and Iran.224 Even against internal instability, McNamara reasoned, “there are 
distinct limits to the usefulness of military assistance.”225  
In all other cases, the goal of American military assistance was essentially political in 
nature, intended to foster favorable attitudes toward the US and its policies, especially “in 
countries where the military is an important political force.”226 Joint training programs, 
McNamara wrote, “particularly training in the US, [are] the ingredient for which I do not believe 
there is a real substitute.” “Such training is an effective augmentation of our diplomacy,” he 
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argued, “and should be continued.”227 Especially in states dominated by their militaries, 
McNamara argued, even the smallest programs for military assistance provided “a basis for 
frequent communications between US and local military leaders” which was otherwise “not 
easily accessible to influence through normal diplomatic intercourse.”228 This was partly an 
expression of distrust for diplomats. More likely, McNamara idealized the free communication 
between military officials of similar rank between different states an essential facilitator for 
Military Internationalism. As a result, McNamara and his successors devoted a larger percentage 
of shrinking American military assistance budgets to those programs as the decade closed. Up 
from 6% of the total budget in 1962, international education and training absorbed 10% percent 
of the total Military Assistance Plan budget of $800 million in 1967.229 By 1969, Congress 
appropriated $375 million for entire Military Assistance Plan (down from $1.6 billion in 1962), 
but international education and training absorbed 14% of it.230  
In academic and policy circles, by 1970 modernization theory had lost relevance, but its 
embedded assumptions which motivated military education and training programs had not gone 
away.231 Despite widespread disillusion with what the historian of modernization theory Nils 
Gilman calls “the atrocities committed from Iran to China to Vietnam in the name of 
modernization,” some of the specific projects that modernization theorists championed in the 
early 1960s continued. What saved them were their intellectual justifications that rested on pre-
existing emotional foundations, and which, as Elizabeth Cobb Hoffmann suggests in the case of 
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the Peace Corps but which applies equally to those Americans who administered the 
Informational Program, “did more for the helpers than for the helped.”232  
 
Conclusion 
 For three decades after the Deputy Secretary of Defense proclaimed it in 1963, neither 
the specifics nor the assumptions behind the Informational Program changed much. Most other 
aspects of American foreign assistance policy did. That is because the assumptions were older 
than modernization theory, and they preceded theorists’ ascent to political influence in the early 
1960s. For a century, as the American empire spread west across the Pacific and south through 
Latin America, American soldiers, politicians, and scholars had assumed that the United States’ 
military embodied the ideal of modernity, and that it spread modernity in its wake. American 
communities around military facilities which trained foreign soldiers had incorporated them into 
their economic and social lives for decades, and, later surveys speculated, would continue even if 
the Informational Program formally ceased. But modernization theorists “usually denied any 
connections with earlier philosophies of history,” Michael Latham argues, and they seized the 
opportunity of Kennedy’s election to assert a new ideological mold onto a popular, and growing, 
program of American assistance around the globe.233 
International military education and training became a prime target for modernization 
theorists’ ideological makeover in the early 1960s because those programs already reached so 
many men and women from target states. In the past, Cold War justifications built around arming 
and training American allies to combat or contain Communism overseas motivated the expansion 
of training and education programs. When a critical mass of academics-turned-policymakers, 
largely funded by the federal government, definitively broke with prior liberal traditions that 
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suspected or rejected the military’s usefulness as social reformer, they found in place a large, but 
mostly un-theorized, infrastructure for international exchange. This chapter explained how 
influential scholars such as Lucian Pye, Edward Shils, and Walt W. Rostow filled those 
intellectual gaps with the principles of modernization theory. With proper guidance from 
Washington, they thought, American military education and training programs could focus and 
transmit essential lessons in American modernity. The Informational Program that emerged in 
1963 read like a master syllabus of modernization theory adapted for ordinary Americans’ use.  
Abroad, meanwhile, the apostles of high modernization escalated war in Vietnam, 
fabricated famine in India, and exacerbated political and agricultural crises in Afghanistan and 
Philippines in the 1960s.234 Either unwittingly or as canny political stunts, President Johnson and 
his advisors tried to turn these manufactured disasters into rituals of global leadership, but the 
academic consensus behind them did not hold.235 As academics rejected massive American 
intervention in military-supported modernization projects in the late 1960s, American foreign 
policy also retrenched. But neither in rhetoric nor in practice did the Informational Program 
abandon what modernization theorists first assumed it could accomplish: Visiting military 
personnel from target countries received from American communities lessons in American 
democracy and economy to become modern men and women; they internalized these lessons to 
critique their own societies and better appreciate the United States as individuals, and then on an 
institutional level as more and more graduates filled their nations’ military services; either under 
constitutional rule or military rule—it did not much matter which—the American-trained 
military officers replicated modernity in their home societies, which made them naturally align 
with the United States in the Cold War. 
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Since American military education and training programs reached small numbers of 
military personnel in each target state, and since the transformation took place primarily at a 
subconscious level, the process was nearly impossible to measure. Indeed, high-profile cases of 
American-trained military officers periodically going amok occasionally threatened the entire 
proposition, but the faith held throughout the 1960s. Partly because it was so inexpensive, 
relative to massive aid projects that failed even more spectacularly, the program remained intact 
even when Congress slashed all other foreign assistance after 1967. But low cost was built-in to 
the ideology. What made the program so persistent was the specific sites of ideological 
transfer—American communities—were permanently above question. Indeed, they had always 
been, even before modernization theory became trendy. Modernization theorists re-assessed, 
approved, and refined the specific lessons in modernity that the Informational Program proposed 
to transmit, but implicitly recognized that the American people behind the institutions it idealized 
needed little ideological intervention. Such an intervention would have been unlikely to succeed 
anyway, as we shall see, since the communities had well-established motives for interacting with 
visiting military personnel and their families. From an American perspective, all parties involved 
in the interchange—from modernization theorists, State and Defense department staff, American 
military officers at education and training institutions, to civilians around such places—accepted 
the fundamental goodness of the personal interaction. The Informational Program’s faith in the 
power that ordinary Americans already possessed reveals that modernization was only a 
temporary and parallel explanation for the larger processes of internationalism already at work in 
American communities. Grand national strategies, foreign policy objectives, and high-level 
diplomacy often intervened in the program’s global structure, but individual human contact 
remained above discussion as the essential catalyst for the exchange’s fundamental usefulness. 
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Chapter 2: Independence and Internationalism: Ghana’s National Military 
and American Assistance Policy 
 
Introduction: Three Boxes 
“On occasions such as this,” Charles de-Graft Dickson, the Minister Responsible for Defense, 
told the gathering at the Ghana Military Academy, “it is always better not to make long 
speeches.”1 Canada had donated about “70 odd books and pamphlets” to the Ghana Military 
Academy, which was just a month away from graduating its first class of officers. De-Graft 
Dickson made sure to mention the eight Canadian instructors teaching at the Academy on this 
August afternoon in 1961.2 Then, on behalf of the Osagyefo, the President, he thanked the 
government and people of Canada, and the “short, but very impressive” ceremony ended.3  
The next day, Lieutenant Colonel Harry Coates, the U.S. Army Attaché to Ghana, penned 
a letter to the Ministry of Defense offering to donate another collection of books and 
pamphlets—gathered from the United States’ service academies in New York, Maryland, and 
Colorado—to the Ghana Military Academy.4 Francis H. Russell, the American Ambassador, 
intended to present the gift personally, so Lieutenant Colonel Coates requested, “A suitable 
ceremony be arranged,” and he “recommended” that Ghana’s Minister of Defense and the Chief 
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of Defense Staff attend.5 Coates and the Minister of Defense scheduled the ceremony for 
September 5, 1961.  
Something came up—or rather, something crashed—and the Ghanaians postponed the 
ceremony. On September 1, the twin-engine airplane plane carrying Brigadier Joe Michel had 
crashed at a Ghanaian air base. He died from burns the next day.6 Michel was Ghana’s second 
commissioned officer; one of only two Ghanaian generals; the commander and hero of Ghana’s 
brigade in the Congo. He had just been promoted Chief of Staff of the Opération des Nations 
Unies au Congo (ONUC—United Nations Operation in the Congo), the highest promotion any 
African had attained in an international peacekeeping mission.7 Ghana’s President Nkrumah 
blamed the colonial powers for sabotaging Ghana’s peacekeeping mission, claiming they were 
desperate to prevent a Ghanaian from demonstrating that Africans were capable of commanding 
international troops.8 In deference, the U.S. agreed to postpone its book presentation ceremony 
until after Michel’s funeral service.  
This second book ceremony de-Graft Dickson apparently did not consider the kind of 
occasion to avoid a long speech. Neither did the U.S. Ambassador, who praised the gift of books 
as “symbolic of the bond of friendship” between the American and Ghanaian military 
academies.9 “There is a natural fraternity among those whose lives are dedicated to preparing for 
the defense of justice, liberty, and freedom,” Ambassador Russell claimed as he praised the 
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particular quality of this batch of books.10 “I was struck by the titles of these 300 volumes,” he 
said, “They seem to me to be fully as symbolic of the gift itself.” Mixed among titles on 
ordinance, tactics, science, and math he also found “history, government, law, international 
relations, economics—and one called ‘modern civilization.’” Struck, but not surprised, Russell 
reflected that a text on “modern civilization” fit perfectly on the Ghana Military Academy’s 
library shelves, dedicated as it was to “the preservation of the vast total of human values which 
that title comprehends.”11 
Just one month later, while on a visit to Moscow, the Ghana Military Academy 
Commandant received another box of books, courtesy of the Red Army.12 The Commandant and 
Ghana’s Ambassador addressed the parcel of books to the Minister of Defense and put it on an 
airplane for Accra. Nobody saw the books again. By May, the humiliated Commandant, Chief of 
Defense Staff, and Minister of Defense searched in vain for the boxes. After a year of searching, 
they quit.13 
The story of these three parcels of books weaves assumptions about modernity and 
modernization, post-colonial African nationalism and pan-Africanism, and Cold War politics in 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Maj. Gen. S. J. A. Otu, “Loose Minute; May 1, 1962; Subject: Gift of Russian Books for GMA Library” (Burma 
Camp, Accra, May 1, 1962), RG 14/4/506 Ghana Military Academy; document 234, PRAAD; Maj. Gen. S. J. A. 
Otu, “P.S.; May 3, 1962; Subject: Reference Minute 4 on Page 234” (Burma Camp, Accra, May 3, 1962), RG 
14/4/506 Ghana Military Academy; document 235, PRAAD; “Message from the Principal Secretary, Ministry of 
Foreign Affiairs (Accra) to the Principle Secretary, Ministry of Defense (Accra); August 14, 1962; Subject: Gift of 
Books to the Ghana Militayr Academy By the Army of the Soviet Union” (Burma Camp, Accra, August 14, 1962), 
RG 14/4/506 Ghana Military Academy; document 237 (approximately--damaged), PRAAD; A. A. Adusei, 
“Message from the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Defense (Accra) to the Principle Secretary, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Accra); October 4, 1962; Subject: Gift of Books to the Ghana Militayr Academy By the Army of the Soviet 
Union” (Burma Camp, Accra, October 4, 1962), RG 14/4/506 Ghana Military Academy; document 274, PRAAD; 
“Message from the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affiairs (Accra) to the Principle Secretary, Ministry of 
Defense (Accra); November 1, 1962; Subject: Gift of Books to the Ghana Militayr Academy By the Army of the 
Soviet Union” (Burma Camp, Accra, November 1, 1962), RG 14/4/506 Ghana Military Academy; document 284, 
PRAAD. 
13 “Message from the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affiairs (Accra) to the Principle Secretary, Ministry 
of Defense (Accra); November 1, 1962; Subject: Gift of Books to the Ghana Militayr Academy By the Army of the 
Soviet Union.” 
 
94 
 
Ghana. Political and military leaders in Ghana, the United States, and elsewhere publicly 
affirmed a faith in international military cooperation, especially in exchanges of education and 
training, to transcend or smooth the coarse diplomatic relationship between the states. Those 
exchanges never fully escaped their political context, but they routinely appealed to non-political 
or transnational ideals of modernity through civil-military relationships that elites of both states 
accessed for their separate purposes.  
From their earliest attempts to strengthen functioning national bureaucracies after 
independence in 1957, leaders in Ghana’s government and Armed Forces integrated international 
assistance in the form of financial aid, opportunities for education and training abroad, and 
outside investment in Ghana—both economic and in human resources.14 The source of that 
international assistance indicated broad trends in Ghanaian Cold War alignment, to some extent, 
but also reflected internal competition between factions of the Ghanaian state.15 Before his ouster 
in 1966, President Kwame Nkrumah tried to balance the legacy of British organization and 
training in the Army by accepting training and equipment from Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union.16 He did so partly to assert Ghanaian non-alignment and exert diplomatic leverage against 
both blocs, partly to weaken the ideological coherence of a military he suspected was plotting his 
overthrow, and partly to finance his own personal President’s Own Guard Regiment.17 But 
Nkrumah and his successors never questioned the importance of maintaining at least a token 
national military, so they also consumed international military assistance because Ghana largely 
lacked the capacity to produce and cultivate personnel capable of performing military tasks.18  
                                                 
14 Kwame Nkrumah, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (London: Panaf, 1973), 136; “Ghana Asks ‘Bold’ 
Western Aid,” New York Times (1923-Current File), July 6, 1960; Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition Re-
published in 1963 as “Ghana in Transition,” with new editions in 1968 and 1972. Baynham, The Military and 
Politics in Nkrumah’s Ghana. 
15 Baynham, The Military and Politics in Nkrumah’s Ghana. 
16 H. T. Alexander, African Tightrope: My Two Years as Nkrumah’s Chief of Staff (London: Pall Mall, 1965). 
17 Baynham, The Military and Politics in Nkrumah’s Ghana; Addae, A Short History of Ghana Armed Forces, 134, 
144; Aboagye, The Ghana Army, 98. 
18 Addae, A Short History of Ghana Armed Forces, 170–186. 
 
95 
 
Ghana was never simply a client for international military aid. Ghanaian officers did 
receive commissioning training and staff college training in a half dozen countries after 1957, 
but the very same professional training Ghanaians received at military schools abroad, Nkrumah 
and his successors also exported to other African states. Nkrumah seized the opportunity to 
provide troops and support for United Nations operations in the Congo within days of the crisis, 
and maintained his commitment to the mission despite widespread condemnation from other 
African leaders.19 Even during periods when Ghana struggled to “feed itself,” Ghanaian leaders 
considered Ghana’s capacity to export military expertise central to their pan-African vision for 
collective security.20 Other African states sent cadets to Ghana’s military academy within three 
years of its opening in 1961 and to Ghana’s staff college in just the second year of its existence.21 
This chapter argues that for Ghanaians, just as for Americans, the social value of lessons 
in military leadership, management of modern state institutions, and the vague category of 
professionalism transcended the national location where those lessons occurred. Ghanaian 
politicians and military officers—who were sometimes the same—widely and readily re-
interpreted international discourses on civil-military relationships to devise their own 
understanding of how international military resources could serve Ghana’s national interests. 
They consumed those lessons from a wide variety of education and training facilities abroad, 
with a broad tolerance for the political legitimacy of the sponsoring states. Likewise, as soon as it 
attained an institutional capacity to do so, Ghana re-transmitted those same lessons to personnel 
from other African militaries—also with a considerable tolerance for the uncertain legitimacy of 
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recipient regimes. Just as the Americans did, Ghanaians acknowledged a wide range of political 
configurations among partners in international military education and training because they 
believed the program itself was the mechanism to bring democracy, justice, and even legitimacy 
to new states. Later chapters will show that the sub-national and corporate benefits that flowed 
from international education made individual Ghanaians and their families reluctant to condemn 
sponsoring states’ political or social virtue.  
For three decades after 1960, the United States maintained a small international military 
education and training exchange with Ghana that generated a disproportionately large portion of 
the rhetoric behind American assistance policy to Ghana. It was the only military assistance the 
United States provided to Ghana, despite occasional assurances that the U.S. considered Ghana 
an essential, yet undeveloped, potential ally in Africa.22 Continuously since the early 1960s, 
American policymakers expected the small military education and training program there to 
yield long-term American influence, with great potential for future results. The rise of Ghanaian 
Colonel Ignatius Acheampong in 1972 should have represented a crowning achievement of 
American military education, but instead he demonstrated its potential downside.23 Acheampong 
was a Command and General Staff College graduate, and precisely the sort of ascendant military 
officer the American program proposed to educate, but when he overthrew Ghana’s second 
republic, the U.S. mostly disregarded his American education.24 Acheampong showed that for 
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the U.S., Military Internationalism worked best in the abstract. 
Ghanaians never rejected American grants for military education abroad, but they 
responded to the limited opportunities for such training in the 1970s by building their own staff 
college and accepting officers from other African states there. The Armed Forces’ effort to 
“Ghanaianize” the staff college demonstrated the fluidity of roles between consumer of 
international military education and provider. By the late 1980s, a Ugandan military officer 
attending the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College likened the college’s annual 
journal to a mouthpiece for African independence from “The Colonised Mind.”25 By then, Ghana 
continued to accept grant aid to send promising military officers to staff colleges around the 
world, but through its own staff college offered professional education and training that Major 
Tumukunde of Uganda equated with “surviving on our own,” as the “proper utilization of the 
natural and human resources within our countries.”26 The irony was that little of the Ghana 
Armed Forces Staff College was exclusively African. But Military Internationalism could bind 
Ugandan officers to ideal African communities just as easily as it bound Ghanaian officers and 
American communities.  
 
Training and Education, Integration and Isolation; U.S. Assistance Policy to Ghana before 
1966 
Ghana epitomized most of the preoccupations, ambitions, and limitations of American 
foreign policy with respect to decolonizing Africa in the early 1960s, and sponsoring education 
and training for Ghanaian military personnel represented the standard American military 
assistance program accompaniment. Proxy battles between the superpowers in the Third World 
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may have been the Cold War’s main event and not an afterthought, as Odd Arne Westad argues, 
but lingering colonial influences complicated both American and Soviet neo-colonial strategies 
for engaging newly independent states.27 Leaders of African states resisted the hegemony of the 
Cold War powers as strenuously as they battled colonialism, and American foreign policymakers 
knew it.28 Ongoing deference to colonial powers limited the United States’ relationship with new 
states, making it “triangular,” while at the same time opening a “window of vulnerability” for the 
Soviet Union to attack continued Western hegemony over the Third World.29 Therefore, as Walt 
W. Rostow recalled, “The essential gamble of the United States in the developing world of the 
1960s was on the ultimate strength of the determination of nations to maintain their 
independence.”30  
Ghana provided modernization theorists an opportunity to test whether they could assist 
newly decolonized nations’ development without threatening their independence. American 
economic assistance to Ghana in the early 1960s revolved around the Volta River project: a 
massive dam, hydro power plant, and bauxite-aluminum processing plant, built by a consortium 
of American manufacturers under the Kaiser Aluminum Company and financed largely through 
U.S. government-backed loans.31 By most accounts, the dam was a massive modernization 
success story, providing Ghana fresh water and enough surplus electricity to export to neighbors 
since 1966.32 But throughout 1961, fear that Nkrumah would nationalize the dam and aluminum 
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industry and fear of repeating Eisenhower’s blunder of reneging on a promise to fund the Aswan 
Dam in Egypt caused President Kennedy and his advisors to vacillate over extending 
government insurance for Kaiser’s investment.33 By September, Kennedy privately decided to 
abandon the plan, and that “he had given up” on Nkrumah, “as bad as he’s been in Belgrade, as 
well as his desire to send 400 soldiers to Russia.”34 But with the help of Secretary of State Rusk 
and Under Secretary of State Ball, who feared that governments across Africa would accuse the 
U.S. of applying “political strings” to aid that were “indifferent to Africa’s development needs,” 
and that “refusal to go forward here were be misunderstood all over Africa,”  Kennedy changed 
his mind.35  
Fear that the Soviet Union would take over the project, Kennedy’s claim to have deep 
personal relationships with so many African nationalist leaders (including Nkrumah), and fear 
that Nkrumah would expel the first group of Peace Corps volunteers he had welcomed with great 
fanfare earlier in the summer convinced Kennedy to finance the dam.36 Most of all, Rostow 
recalled, Ghana “provided an occasion to test and explore the complexities of the doctrine that 
long run rather than a short run American political interests should guide aid allocations.”37 In 
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Ghana in 1961, modernization theorists prevailed, supporting a long-term development program 
that integrated private industry, government subsidies, and high-profile technological projects 
with modernization ideology, underwritten by faith in its power to knit psychological allegiance 
with the United States to a massive infrastructural project. The Volta dam also represented a 
point of intersection between the parallel tracks of decolonization and the Cold War. All aspects 
of American economic, political, and cultural diplomacy interacted in this decision. It involved 
social scientists and policymakers in capital cities, but also American Peace Corps volunteers in 
rural Ghana, Ghanaian army cadets in the Soviet Union, industrialists, and diplomats across 
Africa and Asia. The dam represented a high-profile example of American development in 
Ghana, but behind that major project, we find the intersection of several other currents of 
American foreign policy with Ghana. Whether the United States should provide military 
assistance to Ghana was one such current.  
  In the spring of 1963, the Office of the Director of Military Assistance within the U.S. 
Department of Defense drafted a five-year plan providing the rationale, objectives, and details 
for the United States’ military assistance policy to Ghana. The plan acknowledged that the 
United States was just one among several states from which the Ghanaian government sought 
economic or military assistance. While the U.S. recognized Ghana’s ongoing military 
relationship with the United Kingdom, American policymakers also perceived that the non-
aligned Ghanaian government carefully considered the ideological implications of any military 
assistance it received in order to maintain its anticolonial, non-aligned reputation. Therefore, the 
United States selected a military assistance policy that deferred to the United Kingdom and 
Canada to assist with training Ghanaian officers in Ghana, but would augment via grant aid 
advanced or specialized military education and training in the United States.  
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The United States military assistance plan for Ghana in the early 1960s typified the new 
faith, inspired by modernization theory, that a small international military education and training 
program could yield great improvements in any contested state’s political and economic 
development, augment or eventually replace the former colonial power’s influence, and secure 
new states’ long-term ideological orientation to the West. The U.S. Defense Department’s Office 
of the Director of Military Assistance drafted the five-year plan for Ghana in 1962, which 
predicted great national benefits from a small investment. Following guidance from Kennedy’s 
Policy Planning Staff for non-NATO recipients with “no demonstrable military requirements for 
assistance,” the American plan recommended using as little military assistance as possible, 
applied “primarily for the achievement of political purposes.”38 It sought to supplement, rather 
than supplant, British and Canadian military assistance efforts in Ghana, to assist in “civic 
actions projects which will contribute to social and economic development,” prevent or limit 
Soviet “bloc penetration” in Ghana, and foster an “anti-Communist, Western oriented military 
community.”39 “The British and Canadian governments have primary responsibility for 
providing military assistance to the Ghana Armed Forces,” the plan acknowledged, therefore 
U.S. policy would be limited to training Ghanaian personnel at service schools in the United 
States, which the Ghanaian government eagerly accepted in the past.40  
These objectives, and the specific programs the United States employed to achieve them, 
reveal that American policymakers understood the U.K.’s ongoing, but declining, influence in its 
former colonies, and Ghana’s tense relationship with its former colonizer. In the educational 
exchange program they advocated, the Americans also revealed faith in the ability of 
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international military education and training to create significant psychological effects, which 
they assumed would bring about Ghana’s grand, national, strategic re-alignment toward the 
United States. What is most interesting is that American planners assumed that the programs that 
would achieve these results required little administrative oversight. Their results would flow 
naturally from the nature of the experience of international education and training itself.  
American planners in 1962 considered military assistance from Canada an acceptable 
proxy for American or British support, but integrating the three nations’ programs in Ghana also 
revealed the problem of finding the proper balance for American intervention versus deference to 
former colonizers in Africa.41 Some American attempts at assertiveness were just clumsy, as in 
March 1962 when the State Department proposed a sweeping scholarship plan in the United 
States for military elites from across West Africa. The French Secretary of State for African-
Levant Affairs Jean Sauvagnargues ridiculed the idea.42 “To train a few NCOs and junior 
officers in American methods and then to expect them to fit well in their own small local forces 
which have received French training (“formation”) does not make sense,” he told U.S. 
Ambassador James Gavin.43 “There are many fields in Africa where American aid and training 
[are] badly needed,” he informed Garvin, “military training is not one of them.”44 On one hand, 
Sauvagnargues’ colorful and vehement opposition to the American proposal reveals one aspect 
of the complicated “triangular” relationship between American, European, and African states at 
this time.45 It also reveals another instance where American planners expressed faith in the 
universal modernizing power of educating and training elites from the global South. The concept 
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was of joint State-Defense Department origin; it intended to engage a wide variety of African 
nations despite language difficulties; it assumed that military education in the West could impart 
lessons or an identity that greatly outweighed any differences in national tactical or 
organizational models; and it represented American faith that the education of a few individuals 
abroad could transform vast segments of African society. These assumptions comprise several 
aspects of the state-endorsed version of Military Internationalism the U.S. applied with more 
tangible results in Ghana. 
The Africa-wide training proposal went nowhere, but the U.S. Director of Military 
Assistance made training and education the cornerstone of American assistance policy with 
Ghana in 1962. The U.S. plan deferred “primary responsibility for providing military assistance 
to the Ghana Armed Forces” to the British and Canadian governments and “deliberately 
restricted” the U.S. program to “training Ghanaian officers and enlisted personnel” in service 
schools in the United States.46 But while the United States’ strategy incorporated British and 
Canadian participation, the Americans were also readily prepared to supplement their efforts 
when British, Canadian, or Ghanaian resources ran short. They had once already, in March, 
1962, when “Ghana was forced to cancel a sizable number of officers and enlisted men from 
attending courses of training in foreign countries other than the US due to lack of funds.”47 
Offering military education gave the U.S. a method to enlarge its participation in the “triangular” 
relationship without directly interfering in the former colony. 
The United States’ appraisal of Ghana’s foreign policy objectives and domestic politics 
also encouraged the military assistance plan based on foreign training alone. In 1963-1964, the 
Defense Department projected military expenditures of $40.7 million to absorb eleven percent of 
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Ghana’s national budget.48 American planners expected Ghana’s economy to be unable to 
support Nkrumah’s desire to expand the Armed Forces to include a jet fighter squadron, an 
additional artillery regiment, and new warships.49 Even though American planners expected the 
Soviet bloc to continue offering equipment and training to Ghana, the U.S. refused to sell or loan 
expensive or complicated military equipment. “Since arms and equipment for the military must 
be considered non-productive in nature,” the plan stated, “insistence on such purchases will 
inevitably detract from Ghana’s ability to further general economic development.”50 Too large a 
military assistance program “would be embarrassing to the Ghana Government since its 
propaganda, with respect to the U.S. position in the NATO Alliance and its attempts to label the 
U.S. as ‘Neo-Colonialist’ in its relations with emerging African countries, would be hypocritical 
and ineffective.”51 Despite “some expressed uneasiness on the part of left-wing elements in the 
Government who feel that the Ghanaians involved are being subverted in the U.S. while in 
training,” Ghana “eagerly accepted” American grants for training in the U.S.52 The Director of 
Military Assistance staff weighed Cold War competition over Ghana, lingering British influence 
there, and the harmful effects of militarizing Ghana’s economy, and they reaffirmed international 
education and training as the most effective and cost effective path for American security 
assistance to Ghana. 
American planners understood how damaging dependence on foreign suppliers for 
military equipment and arms transfers could be, but they placed great faith in the psychological 
potential of their alternatives to technical military assistance. The American program fostered “a 
spirit of Western oriented democratic attitudes in the military forces of the newly emerging 
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nations in Africa.”53 To the U.S., “the Ghana Armed Forces are considered apolitical,” but when 
the twenty-one Ghanaians who attended courses in the U.S. between 1962 and 1963 returned to 
Ghana, they came back “enthusiastic about U.S. military training techniques, facilities, 
amenities, arms, equipment, technical skills, etc.”54 Even more, they developed “an appreciation 
for the abundant life of Americans.”55 “This enthusiasm has spread throughout the Ghana Armed 
Forces,” the assistance plan projected, and “the result has been a marked friendliness and 
eagerness for information about the U.S. military affairs and American life on the part of the 
personnel of the Ghana Armed Forces.”56 New initiatives in the American military assistance 
program—which became the Informational Program later in 1963—promised that “visits to such 
places as American homes, local industries, industrial and cultural exhibits, country and state 
fairs, places of historical interest, and sporting events, will be effective in fostering goodwill and, 
acquainting the individual with American culture.”57 American planners were convinced that this 
“surprising enthusiasm” was responsible for the fear that those “left-wing elements” in the 
Ghanaian government had that Ghanaians were “being subverted in the U.S.”58  
The 1963 American military assistance plan for Ghana plan bonded modernization 
theory’s assumptions about the transformative potential of intervention among news states’ elites 
to American military assistance policy in Africa. The plan proposed no equipment sales, 
recommended sending no military assistance teams, nor sponsoring any civic action projects 
within Ghana. It advocated only “providing technical and administrative training of such a nature 
as not to materially increase the combat effectiveness of the Ghana Army or generate requests 
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for U.S. equipment.”59 Grant-based training aid for Ghana fit within the United States’ larger 
Military Assistance Plan in 1963, which supported “any action on the part of the US that might 
influence [an] individual or group of individuals to a better understanding of the basic precepts 
and culture of the American system.”60 The U.S. planned to provide between $140,000 and 
$160,000 in grants, which would enable twelve to fifteen Ghanaian military personnel to receive 
training or education in the United States each year.61 American planners assumed this level of 
support sufficient to help create “a well-trained, experienced and disciplined Officer and Non-
Commissioned Officer Corps,” to “foster a spirit of Western oriented democratic attitudes,” and 
to “counter unfriendly or hostile propaganda” emanating from the Soviet bloc.62 The plan 
considered military assistance a multinational endeavor. It acknowledged the primacy of the 
Commonwealth in specific assistance programs, but also incorporated the variety of national 
influences over individual Ghanaian trainees within a larger perspective that encompassed all 
international encounters as equally influential, and equally valid, toward transforming the 
Ghanaian armed forces into a modern institution within a modernizing state.  
This plan acknowledged the United States’ limited immediate influence in Ghana, but 
also revealed great confidence in the long-term, non-specific value of Military Internationalism 
to reap strategic benefits. The United States’ assistance plan for Ghana also expressed precisely 
the political, psychological, and economic rationale for the international military training and 
education program that became the centerpiece of American policy toward sub-Saharan Africa in 
general, and Ghana in particular. American military assistance planners were almost delusional 
about the positive influence of a visit to the U.S., even suggesting that the United States should 
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restrain itself to keep the Ghana government from having to counter America’s rapidly 
expanding influence with Soviet interference. By 1963, the United States’ military assistance 
program had evolved, acknowledging that the greatest benefit of these visits to the United States 
came not from the military training itself, but through the psychological and social 
transformation encouraged through the Informational Program. Finally, with complete faith in 
the political windfall of these psychological effects, the U.S. created an enduring mold for 
American military assistance policy to Ghana that would last a quarter century.  
 
Ghanaian Nationalism, Pan-Africanism, and Military Internationalism in the early 1960s 
In the early 1960s, both British-educated Ghanaian military leaders and Pan-Africanist, 
anti-colonial politicians under Kwame Nkrumah already incorporated international political, 
economic, military, and cultural resources for their own benefit. When integrating Ghana into 
their larger security and development objectives in Africa, American diplomats and military 
assistance planners merely tapped in to lively, preexisting discourses over the relationship 
between Ghana’s President, military hierarchy, the extensive use of training programs from 
foreign countries for Ghanaian personnel, and the presence of foreign military training 
professionals in Ghana. These churning local and international influences complicated even the 
most capacious understanding of post-colonial nationalism in Ghana. To the extent that so many 
contemporary standards for military organization and training had non-African—often 
colonial—origins, we expect to find the Ghana Armed Forces seeking equipment and assistance 
from abroad. But from the earliest days of independence, competing Ghanaian political and 
military leaders alike employed internationally-developed descriptions of professionalism and 
loyalty to frame their own discourses on the nature of African self-reliance and the duty of the 
national military in dangerous political times.  
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Just as American policymakers did, Ghanaian leaders assumed professional military 
training created common, universal products. Elites in both states expected that the ideals of 
professionalism, service, deference to civilian rule, and loyalty to result regardless of the national 
origin of the training. Speaking at the Ghana Military Academy, Nkrumah praised loyalty above 
other martial virtues, but he and the British-trained Army brass who increasingly opposed him 
had different ideas about which part of the Ghanaian state that loyalty should adhere. Both 
approached the Ghanaian nation with different definitions, which gave the specifically 
international programs they both depended on to expand and mature Ghana’s young military 
different ideological significance. The 1966 coup that deposed Nkrumah was, in one sense, a 
culmination of the tension between powerful domestic political blocs whose own vision for the 
nation could only be realized through extraordinary international intervention and assistance. In 
this conflict, the international and the local interacted directly, often at the expense of the 
national.  
The epidemic of African coups in the mid-1960s set off waves of scholarship in the West 
attempting to explain the military’s ascendency among competing domestic factions in post-
colonial Africa.63 After Ghana’s coup in February, 1966 scholars plumbed the relationships 
between the charismatic Nkrumah and his ethnically disunited state, or the Western-oriented 
military and Nkrumah’s socialist Convention People’s Party, or the struggle between ex-colonial 
and neo-colonial powers and new states in Africa.64 In their memoirs, which followed shortly 
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after the coup, both Nkrumah and the military officers who overthrew him described the events 
leading to the coup in terms of national honor, or in pan-African terms, or in terms of economic 
or political independence from either Western or Eastern ideological blocs.65 Although some 
scholars suggested examining the sociology of the armed forces, rather than the national origin 
of its training, as the most important determinant of military behavior, in most of these accounts, 
the modern, independent nation-state reigned as the ideal political, economic, and cultural form, 
against which Ghana’s experience with personal rule and military rule only deviated.66 Despite 
modernization theorists in the United States’ early hope that Military Internationalism had the 
power to create the ideal, modern nation, in Ghana only disappointment resulted. Only in the 
long view did Military Internationalism offer promise as a corporate or national, and not just 
individual, identity.   
For its part, the Ghanaian government recognized that military assistance, like all other 
forms of international cooperation, could serve its own national objectives for non-alignment and 
development. The post-colonial context of international competition and Ghana’s own limited 
resources restricted its options to consume this assistance however. Before 1966, Ghana under 
Nkrumah attempted to balance American and Soviet offers of military assistance with Ghana’s 
prior and ongoing attachment to the Commonwealth for military organization and training. 
Ghana also attempted to engage military expertise from India, Yugoslavia, and Israel while 
aggressively committing Ghana’s military to U.N. operations in the Congo, as Nkrumah hoped to 
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balance Ghana’s non-aligned image with his own pan-African ambition. In Nkrumah’s foreign 
policy, nationalism and internationalism merged. 
 
Although officers comprised only ten percent of the Ghanaian military after 
independence, all of Ghana’s competing political factions considered recruiting, training, and 
promoting officers the most important aspect of creating Ghana’s national army, and one that 
Ghana could not perform without international assistance.67 Nkrumah sought to expand the 
armed forces from 4,000 to 7,000 by 1961, to 14,600 by 1966, and to create a separate air force 
and navy.68 In 1960, he unilaterally claimed for Ghana authority over the United Nations mission 
to the Congo.69 Most importantly, he sought to “Ghanaianize” the Armed Forces, to eliminate its 
dependence on British officers who were “seconded” (serving on loan) to the Ghanaian Army, 
and to place senior Ghanaian officers in positions of command. A shortage of Ghanaian officers 
complicated this plan. The British had created only twenty-eight Ghanaian officers between 1953 
and 1957. Most graduated from military academies around the commonwealth, after a short 
preparatory course for prospective officer cadets at the British-run Regular Officer Special 
Training Schools facility in Teshie, near Accra.70 All but one had first been enlisted soldiers in 
the colonial army; this both a symptom and cause of the low esteem potential elites held for 
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military service.71 At independence, however, there were no Ghanaian officers in the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel or above.72 Nkrumah and the Ghanaian Ministry of Defense projected in 
1959 that Ghana needed to train 180 more—thirty per year—by 1965.73 The Ghana Military 
Academy partially filled Ghana’s urgent needed to create Ghanaian military officers to replace 
British ones and to supervise the expansion of Ghana’s military, but even this national effort was 
extraordinarily international. The Ghana Military Academy relied heavily on foreign officers as 
instructors; meanwhile, Nkrumah also dreamed that it would also train officers from across post-
colonial Africa.  
Producing Ghanaian officers was never simply a Ghanaian endeavor. By Nkrumah’s 
request, the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst’s Director of Staff, T. J. S. Anderson, visited 
Ghana in December 1959 and drafted the plan which guided the Ghana Military Academy’s 
creation.74 In April 1960, the Ghana Military Academy opened on the facilities of the former 
British-run training school in Teshie. To fill Ghana’s urgent need for military officers, the Ghana 
Military Academy would accept between twenty and forty cadet candidates for each 18-month 
course, beginning in April 1961.75 A groups of incoming cadets formed an “intake,” and 
Ghanaian officers have referred to themselves by military academy intake number ever since.76 
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According to Anderson’s initial plan, Ghana would still send five officer candidates per intake to 
the Sandhurst, and five cadets from each intake to other commissioning sources abroad, 
including India, Pakistan, Australia, and Canada.77 Ghana expected one third of the 180 officers 
produced between 1961 and 1965 to receive their commissions from a source outside Ghana. To 
Anderson, it was the combination of Ghanaian-trained officers and “the present arrangement of 
sending a number of officer cadets to overseas establishments each year” which offered “every 
prospect of building up a first-class corps of officers.”78  
Even the value of the officer’s commission itself required international validation. 
Ghanaian officers feared that a military commission earned in eighteen months in Ghana might 
lack the prestige of a continental military commission. Practical considerations—specifically, 
Ghana’s urgent need for officers—dictated the choice of an eighteen-month course, but so short 
a course seemed also to require strict entry standards.79 An eighteen-month course “would 
produce worthwhile results provided that only candidates with the right sort of entry 
qualifications as well as the essential qualities of character and mind are accepted,” Anderson 
projected.80 He noted, “The course at the Ghana Military Academy will be notably shorter than 
those conducted in similar academies elsewhere,” including Sandhurst, the U.S. Military 
Academy (West Point), the Malayan Federated Military Academy, the Pakistan Military 
Academy, or the French, Canadian, or Australian academies.81 In his history of the Ghana Armed 
Forces, Stephen Kojo Addae suggests the “advantageous international character” of the 
Sandhurst diploma made local African training seem “parochial” by comparison.82 On the other 
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hand, Ghanaian officers who graduated from Sandhurst did not accept the “Queen’s 
commission” at ceremonies in England, and instead received a commission from Nkrumah upon 
returning to Ghana.83  
Such a declaration of independence served several goals. Nkrumah and other pan-
Africanists considered maintaining a core of African elites critical to validating their charges 
against the absurdity of racism that justified paternalist apologies for lingering colonialism.84 A 
national army was an essential ingredient for sovereignty, and Nkrumah’s ambition for African 
nations to liberate themselves depended on the capacity to create and maintain one.85 And as a 
leader among Non-Aligned states, Nkrumah’s ideology of “positive neutrality” from Cold War 
manipulation required the ability to resist “pacts and agreements” which drew small states into 
superpowers’ orbits.86  
From its inception, however, the Ghana Military Academy struggled to hire Ghanaian 
instructors, and depended on international officers to fill essential training posts. As early as 
1959, the Ministry of Defense asserted “the aim of Government policy to Ghanaianize the 
academy teaching services as soon as possible,” and requested the Ministry of Education to help 
find at least four suitable Ghanaian university graduates for the academy faculty prior to its April 
1961 opening.87 Symptomatic of the low esteem of the military in Ghanaian society in 1959, the 
Ministry of Defense acknowledged difficulty finding four suitable candidates, and asked for an 
all-out effort to find at least one Ghanaian, who could “be closely associated with the 
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administration and formulation of policy in the early stages of the Academy.”88 Meanwhile, 
expatriate officers from the British Army served as instructors at the Ghana Military Academy 
until September 1961, when the Canadian Armed Forces Training Team, Ghana replaced them.89  
From its inception and initial planning stages and throughout its early years in operation, 
the Ghana Military Academy employed international standards, international staff, and 
international methods to train officers in Ghana’s national army. “Ghanaianization” never 
implied self-sufficiency. Instead, Nkrumah and the Ministry of Defense concentrated on 
producing Ghanaian officers, whose very presence projected African authority, competence, and 
modernity by international standards.  
A new kind of modernity became the curriculum. For sixty years prior to Ghana’s 
independence, the Royal West African Frontier Force had applied European racial and cultural 
categories to identify “martial races” by ethnicity (Hausa from the North) and religion (Muslim) 
to seek specifically un-modern recruits.90 Colonial armies sought soldiers from traditional 
“tribal” areas in the northern Gold Coast and Asante, a type military historian David Killingray 
describes as “untouched by modern ideas of government or commerce, providing non-literate 
men who would be a clean slate upon which could be written new military codes of discipline 
and obedience.”91 The British considered the “over-educated” young men from the southern 
coast as “dangerous and possibly left-wing.”92 Paradoxically, European officers in colonial 
armies attempted to impose their own doctrines governing hygiene, gender roles, and nuclear 
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families within larger projects of “detribalizing” Africans through military discipline.93 Like 
other administrative structures, colonial armies rarely had the resources or will to follow through 
on their plans to reorder indigenes’ social life, however, so campaigns to regulate soldiers and 
their families’ bodies rarely turned out as planned.94 
After independence, the remnant of British officers and Ghana’s own military and 
political leaders integrated a version of modernity into the Ghana Military Academy charter that 
more closely reflected the values of nationalist intelligentsias who bridged the colonial and post-
colonial periods, including an emphasis on literacy, nationalism, and bureaucratic efficiency.95 
The modern officer, the charter declared, had “a sound education in appropriate academic and 
military subjects [and] a wide interest in the current problems of world affairs.”96 The 18-month 
curriculum consisted of three academic terms, focusing on Military History, Mathematics, 
Science, and French. A fourth topic, “Modern Subjects,” was the only academic subject the 
charter recommended be included in each of the three academic terms. The aims of “Modern 
Subjects” were: “to promote and encourage the study of the Commonwealth and its relationship 
with the rest of the world in the 20th century;” “to develop the ability of the officer cadet to deal 
with ideas and to form considered judgment as part of a sound liberal education;” “to create and 
sustain his interest in human affairs and to help him to be aware of contemporary problems;” and 
to “develop his powers of self-expression both verbally and in writing.”97 “Modern Subjects” 
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would require cadets to develop “historical perspective, and the habit of clear thinking,” since the 
“ability to express thought in simple and direct language and on paper are to be regarded as of 
great importance than the pure academic knowledge.”98  
What the British officers who prepared the charter assumed made Ghanaians into 
“Modern Subjects” closely matched the categories of psychological transformation American 
modernization theorists also articulated. This is not surprising, since ideologies of development 
and modernization had flowed easily across the Atlantic for a century.99 Nationalism, 
faithfulness to the Commonwealth, literacy in English, opinion-forming, and “clear thinking” 
resemble the “preconditions” Rostow and Lerner identified as essential for “traditional societies” 
to abandon.100 British officers’ prescriptions for insulating former colonies (or those Britain was 
considering granting independence) from communist insurgency matched American observations 
at the same time.101 Communism appealed to the “rootless” and “impatient” in colonies, Lucian 
Pye argued in Guerrilla Communism in Malaya  ̧when efficient political and administrative 
forms failed to fill the vacuum left by weakened traditional social ties.102  
“Modern Subjects” were a bundle of Western ones, and filling the gap in Ghanaian 
students’ understanding of modernity apparently required as much effort as correcting their 
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deficiencies in Mathematics, English, and Science combined.103 American Ambassador Russell 
was pleased with himself for donating books that offered Ghanaian cadets extra instruction in 
“modern civilization.”104 Including “Modern Subjects” in the charter of the Ghana Military 
Academy reveals some of the contest over who had the authority to define “modernity,” to assign 
legitimacy to knowledge, and to identify which characteristics of postcolonial nationhood were 
essential.105 Modern knowledge, Benedict Anderson suggests, furnished moral importance even 
to colonized populations, so even externally-derived military training might still serve nationalist 
ends by reinforcing the modernizing elite’s authority—either in the person of Nkrumah or the 
colonels who later overthrew him.106 To the extent that “Modern Subjects” looked like a 
template for creating a reliable postcolonial elite comfortable and conversant with former 
colonial structures, it portended the eventual struggle between the military and the fiercely anti-
colonial Nkrumah over which versions of modernity and nationalism would survive in Ghana.  
When he sacked Major General Henry Templar Alexander, the last British officer to 
serve as Ghana’s Chief of Defense Staff, in September, 1961, Nkrumah symbolically abandoned 
the steady, incremental, improvement of Ghana’s military along the British model, but he did not 
abandon international sources of military training.107 “Ghanaianization” eliminated British 
officers, but retained the Canadian training staff. To Nkrumah, Ghanaianization was equally 
about creating a global or pan-African as well as Ghanaian image; retaining British Chiefs of 
Defense Staff before 1961 had been a case of choosing Ghana’s national interests, specifically, 
institutional coherence with the British model, over pan-African interests. When Nkrumah 
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eventually sent seventy-five Ghanaian officer cadets to the Soviet Union for commissioning 
training in 1961, he was also attempting to balance a global, non-aligned agenda with his own 
domestic one. Alexander had strongly opposed Nkrumah’s plan to employ Soviet training on 
practical grounds, arguing that incompatible models of training, equipment, and operations 
would result. Alexander had said that same thing about the mixed Israeli and Indian program to 
train Ghanaian Air Force pilots in 1960, ultimately dismissing the Israelis and retaining the 
Indians because they followed a “Commonwealth” model.108 And while Nkrumah publicly 
aligned himself with the Soviet bloc in a number of ways, Ghana continued to accept military 
training and military equipment from NATO as well as Soviet sources.  
Both Nkrumah and the British-sympathizing senior Ghanaian officers who eventually 
overthrew him explicitly accepted that any method of recruiting, training, and promoting officers 
in Ghana’s military would be an international effort. Foreign military academy staff produced 
syllabi for Ghanaian use; foreign officers taught at Ghana’s Military Academy until Ghanaians 
could be found; Ghanaian cadets would travel to any service academy which would accept them; 
and, beginning with the first class of 29 Ugandan cadets to graduate from the Ghana Military 
Academy in 1965, Ghana’s own education and training apparatus would serve other African 
states as well.109  
In Ghana, international education served competing uses, both of which were tangential 
toward building up the state, yet both upheld “loyalty” as a primary value. British-trained 
officers leaned heavily toward their martial traditions in the Commonwealth while Nkrumah 
sought to balance the lingering Commonwealth and NATO influence with Soviet-oriented 
training. Despite dire warnings and grave consternation at the time (which may have further 
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encouraged the British-trained officers to overthrow Nkrumah in 1966) the eighty-eight Soviet-
trained officers then in the Ghana Armed forces were equally competent, and earned equal 
promotions.110 The source of training—East or West—did not matter considerably. Meanwhile, 
Nkrumah admonished the Ghana Military Academy’s 1962 graduating class that the foremost 
quality required for an officer was loyalty. “Loyalty must transcend all personal interests and 
ambitions, tribal, or regional considerations,” he told them.111 “Loyalty demands of you that you 
place the interests of the State above all others, and all your actions must be guided solely by that 
consideration.”112 This may have simply been an attempt to encourage the officers to inform on 
one another, as he continued: “You must beware of any covert attempts to undermine your 
supreme loyalty to the State and you should bring them to the notice of the authorities.”113 But 
Nkrumah’s address, like the one he gave the following year, clearly privileged the state, asserted 
the military’s duty to the state, and although it mentioned the Party, did not demand allegiance to 
either it nor to himself.114  
Meanwhile, a Canadian officer in Ghana in the early 1960s recalled the “wrenching 
experience” of observing Army officers and cadets, as Nkrumah led the country from 
Parliamentary democracy toward a one-party state. “We at the military academy continued to 
give lectures about the Army’s responsibility to be loyal to the duly elected civilian 
government,” wrote former instructor and Canadian Lieutenant Colonel G. D. Hunt, “to which 
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the cadets listened respectfully but, I’m sure, with inner amusement at this white man’s fairy 
tale.”115  
What makes Hunt’s recollection of the “white man’s fairy tale” of Army loyalty to the 
civilian government so poignant is that he himself—a Canadian officer before a class of 
Ghanaian cadets—was part of the mirage. Different aspects of fantasy adhere to the concept of 
military loyalty. Civilian control of the military was, at best, a Western illusion, if not an 
imposition.116 In other places in West Africa, postcolonial nationalism successfully enveloped 
previously strong corporate bonds between companions, and there was no reason nationalism 
would not subsume the military’s independence in Ghana.117 A decade later, scholars and 
soldiers tried to correlate widespread and persistent military rule in Africa with precolonial 
governing traditions, but the contemporary influence of Western social science required extra-
national reference points to explain most aspects of Ghana’s military evolution.118 So while some 
Ghanaian officers (and their Canadian instructors) may have desired Ghana’s civil-military 
relationship Ghanaian state to resemble a Canadian or American-style model, even that model 
was an incompletely realized ideal even an ideal in the West.  
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The new Ghanaian military was not simply one social movement assuming its place in 
the nation. It is possible that Nkrumah’s cautious admonition about loyalty to the state and 
Canadian and Soviet commissioning training for Ghanaian cadets were mere cases of reinforcing 
the dominance of the nation-form. But the political tragedies each attempted to head off 
(Nkrumah’s “covert attempts” and eventual coup; Hunt’s “wrenching experience” of military 
acquiescence to one-party rule) affirm the presence of a political ideal of military non-
interference in politics which all participants in international military training acknowledged, 
even if such training only weakly transferred the ability to attain such an ideal. If both sides saw 
in their version of the modern military the closest thing to pure nationalism, they arrived at that 
assumption via international routes. Ghanaian military personnel, then, were adept in national 
and international cultures, not to the neglect of either. Recognition of a similar “double cultured” 
identity occurs more often in the historiography of the African diaspora—which, as we will see, 
offers another useful way to understand how individuals related with Military Internationalism 
institutionally—but it applies in this discussion of Ghana’s domestic military institutions as 
well.119 On the other hand, the “double-cultured” identity also implies the ability to “come and 
go freely between rustic and urban circles.”120 In the case of Military Internationalism, the 
Ghanaian military seemed conversant—even fluent—in international military standards for 
political behavior with a much more limited ability to enact that identity in practice in 
governance. In this case, the evidence suggests that if Internationalism appears to privilege the 
Western and modern nation-form, it is from a policy perspective, not an individual one.     
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American Assistance and Ghanaian Internationalism after 1966 
The evolution of U.S. military assistance policy to Ghana following its 1966 coup 
illustrates a new combination of pragmatism and idealism in American understanding of its role 
in Africa. Ghana’s military leaders assured the United States that their military incursion was 
justified, and would be brief, but President Johnson and his advisors still considered military aid 
to Ghana a multinational effort, and resisted expanding American assistance. Meanwhile, the 
Vietnam War sapped domestic support for American military assistance in general. The United 
States’ ongoing international military education and training program with Ghana exemplified 
how, despite some glaringly contradictory results, foreign policymakers placed even more faith 
in the long-term benefits of training foreign military personnel in the United States. The U.S. still 
lacked concrete evidence of their effectiveness, but as the academic consensus that had initially 
supported military modernization crumbled in the late 1960s, those programs remained intact 
with new ideological scaffolding.  
When Ghanaian military and police officers took over the state in 1966, they drastically 
curbed Ghana’s cooperation with communist states, but Ghana’s significance as a pan-African 
leader was already shrinking. Their action represented a local response to specific political and 
economic conditions in the Ghanaian Armed Forces and in Ghana’s balance of power.121 On the 
other hand, between 1966 and 1969, when the National Liberation Council restored 
constitutional rule, the regime consciously expressed its national agenda according to 
international norms. From justifying the initial coup and military rule in general to defending 
Ghana’s defense policy and reliance on international training programs, Ghana’s military leaders 
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altered, but never abandoned, the international reference points for the national military. While 
they continued to believe in the military’s power to modernize Ghanaian society, they retained 
external models of modernity that employed broadly internationalist rhetoric for support. 
 
Few in the United States or Ghana were surprised when British-trained military and 
police officers overthrew President Kwame Nkrumah in February 1966. Nkrumah had escaped 
assassination or overthrow at least seven times between 1962 and 1966.122 Although there is no 
public evidence the United States explicitly participated in the successful coup, it maintained 
close contact with the men the U.S. knew were preparing the coup and conducted “psychological 
warfare” aimed at diminishing Nkrumah’s domestic support since 1964.123 President Johnson 
considered the event a “fortuitous windfall” and sent congratulatory messages to the National 
Liberation Council along with initial gestures of support in the form of “a few thousand tons of 
surplus wheat or rice.”124 
Ghana’s new head of state, Lieutenant General J. A. Ankrah, made little headway 
convincing the United States to expand its economic and military assistance after the coup. He 
knew he had the United States’ political support, and delivered captured Soviet anti-aircraft guns 
to the U.S. as a gesture of goodwill, but he wanted economic assistance in the form of an 
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International Monetary Fund “line of credit,” considerable agricultural aid to avoid a famine 
“within the next few months,” and an anti-aircraft radar and missile system of his own to defend 
against external threats.125 The State Department provided $35 million in economic aid, but 
feared “Ghanaians have exaggerated expectations of what the U.S. can do for them.”126 Officials 
at the State Department knew that Ankrah was disappointed with the “relative paucity of 
support” that other Western countries—especially Britain—had provided, but they resolved only 
“to press the Ghanaians toward the U.K., as its traditional supporter.”127 Congress would not 
support expanding military assistance beyond its current, limited program, so Secretary of State 
Rusk directed the embassy in London to press the British and Canadians to reassess their ability 
to help Ghana.128 Ankrah exchanged warm letters with President Johnson in the spring of 1966, 
culminating with a visit to Washington in October 1967.129 Johnson told Ankrah that the U.S. 
would “continue to train Ghanaian officers in the US, but we hope Ghana will look to the UK 
and Canada for the bulk of its military needs.”130 Significantly, the U.S. still considered training 
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Ghanaian military elites part of its strategy—perhaps its only strategy for military assistance to 
Ghana. 
Ghana’s military leaders seemed to have convinced American policymakers that they had 
acted judiciously and were working to restore constitutional rule as soon as possible. Within a 
month of the coup, Ankrah sent a warm but slightly desperate letter to President Johnson 
describing his rationale for seizing power and intention to restore democracy as soon as 
possible.131 In his reply, Johnson acknowledged the coup’s necessity, offered some food aid, and 
held out hope for a return to democratic rule.132 Coup leader Colonel Akwasi Afrifa credited the 
army’s commitment to democracy to traditions forged at the Royal Military Academy, 
Sandhurst.133 By spring, 1967, William F. Gutteridge of the Royal African Society published an 
article in African Affairs that recognized the persistent psychological importance of Western 
military training on Ghana’s military leaders, but also drew a distinction between imagined 
Western military traditions of “non-intervention in politics” and the reality behind military 
influence over Western politics.134 Gutteridge argued that, rhetoric aside, Western militaries 
regularly intervened in their states’ politics. Meanwhile, Ghana’s coup leaders seemed genuinely 
distressed about their political role. Further, although foreign aid for African militaries, 
particularly the training of officers overseas, may provide them some encouragement to 
intervene in politics, to Gutteridge, the purpose of their intervention was more likely “determined 
by particular local conditions than by the influence of the source of assistance.”135 Gutteridge 
gave the Ghanaian military the benefit of the doubt in 1967, and provided some academic cover 
for continued American programs to train Ghanaians. In June 1967, Ankrah again assured 
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Johnson that he had begun “steps toward civilian rule and the re-establishment of institutions 
essential to democratic Government.”136 Prior to Ankrah’s October 1967 visit, Walt W. Rostow 
reassured Johnson that “Ankrah and his colleagues haven’t behaved like the usual military 
dictatorship,” and praised Ankrah’s National Redemption Council’s steps to draft a new 
constitution and prepare for elections.137 
Despite their relief at Nkrumah’s overthrow, American diplomats did not wholeheartedly 
support Ghana’s coup leaders. For one, they suspected that Ghana was requesting weapons it 
could not afford and did not need, given its insignificant external threat. While fending off 
Ankrah’s requests for anti-aircraft radar, Secretary of State Rusk advised the American 
Ambassador in Ghana to avoid discussing sales or grants of military equipment and “do nothing 
to encourage” the Ghanaian government “on prospects for US military assistance” of any kind.138 
The costs of providing “adequate defenses against vague threats” would be too high. Further, the 
State Department considered the army itself a threat to Ghana’s stability.139 At 15,000 men, the 
recently expanded army was the largest in West Africa, served little useful purpose, and 
consumed far more national resources than Ghana could afford. But given Ghana’s high 
unemployment, it could not be reduced without serious danger.140 Franklin H. Williams, the 
American ambassador in Accra, feared that the failed counter-coup of April 1967 had shown the 
potential for more political violence. “The army is too big. The army is larger than the country 
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needs or can afford,” he reported to Washington.141 Yet even those army officers who were 
“more interested in quality than quantity” recognized that “this is not an opportune time to cut 
back” and risk a counter-coup or add to Ghana’s unemployment.142  
By 1967, the President and the Secretary of State also knew that domestic and 
Congressional support for expanding military assistance to Ghana or any other African country 
had withered. Congress had cut the Military Assistance Program by nearly half in 1967, and 
expected to cut it further in 1968.143 In May, Rusk told the U.S. Ambassador in Ghana that 
“Congressional distaste” would prohibit any new grant-based military assistance programs.144 “It 
[is] not a question of being opposed to aid or help to individual countries,” Rusk cabled. “He 
personally believed” that the U.S. spent too little on aid, but with the large federal deficit and 
“heavy Viet-Nam budget,” he expected Congress to slash all foreign aid further.145 Under 
Secretary Katzenbach advised President Johnson to give Ankrah the same news in October, 
during the head of state’s visit to Washington. “We value Ghana’s constructive influence in 
Africa, and we want to let [Ankrah] know it,” Katzenbach told Johnson. “At the same time, we 
want him to understand that there are limits to what we can do for Ghana.”146 “There is great 
hostility in the Congress to military aid,” he wrote.147 “We will continue to train Ghanaian 
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officers in the US,” he added, “but we hope Ghana will look to the UK and Canada for the bulk 
of its military needs.”148 
As the President, State Department and Defense Department all planned for Congress to 
cut drastically all future foreign military assistance programs in 1967, they reiterated their 
support for programs that brought individuals from the global South to the U.S. for military 
training. In his detailed report to the President describing the expected impact of Congressional 
cuts on the military assistance program, Defense Secretary McNamara considered America’s 
specific military objectives in Africa “quite limited.”149 Except for minor programs to continue to 
lease military facilities in Ethiopia and Libya, and offset Soviet influence in Algeria, the U.S. 
predominantly aimed to “improve the capabilities of the armed forces to maintain internal 
security, where appropriate, as a basis for orderly national development.”150 Of all military 
assistance, McNamara claimed there was no substitute for training programs in the U.S. “Such 
training is an effective augmentation of our diplomacy,” he argued, “and should be 
continued.”151 International education and training absorbed 14 percent of the $375 million 
Military Assistance Plan in 1969 (itself down from $1.6 billion in 1962). On the other hand, 
despite the 1963 projection to spend $150,000 on Ghanaian training grants, in 1967, the U.S. 
spent only $25,000 for twelve Ghanaian students’ training in the United States. Thirteen arrived 
in 1968; fourteen in 1969 as the United States began sponsoring Ghanaian officers for Command 
and General Staff College. The main justification for military education and training programs 
had shifted from being modernization-based toward a more pragmatic supplement to diplomacy 
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as the political environment in Africa shifted toward military governments, but faith in the 
programs’ power to transform society continued in both the United States and Ghana.  
 
In February 1967, the Director of Public Relations for the Ghana Armed Forces published 
volume 1 of the Ghana Armed Forces Magazine. This journal, the head of state Lieutenant 
General Ankrah, stated in an editorial in the first issue, would inform the Armed Forces and 
Police Service of “the affairs of our country,” it would “provide a forum for the sharing of 
experiences,” and would “serve as a chain of brotherhood among officers and men.”152 The first 
several issues included local interest stories, updates from different branches of the service, and 
news of armed forces sporting clubs. The magazine, which renamed itself the Armed Forces 
News or AF News after 1969, was always a mouthpiece for the current regime, military or 
civilian, but in attempting a wide coverage of political, military, and social events in Ghana, it 
published articles from a variety of sources, including chaplains, enlisted correspondents, 
editorials from Ghanaian units outside Accra, and occasionally letters to the editor.153 
Anonymously penned articles celebrating the coup, with titles like: “The Coup: A Ray of Hope 
At Last,” ”The Expected Day!” and “The Rationale Behind Military Intervention” filled several 
pages as well. Some of the magazine’s more thoughtful articles reveal a subtler approach to the 
coup and to the magazine’s purpose explaining it. They also reveal a complex dialog between 
Ghana’s Armed Forces, Ghana’s government, and international standards for military 
professionalism, diplomacy, and journalism.  
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In the first article of the first issue of the Ghana Armed Forces Magazine, Ankrah offered 
the standard justification for the coup, but he did so in a surprisingly multicultural way. After his 
explanation, and before declaring the magazine’s purpose, Ankrah included an elegy for the 
coup’s relatively few casualties—seven soldiers and four civilians dead—which he merged with 
Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. “We do well to remember those of our comrades who 
paid the supreme sacrifice by laying down their lives in selfless devotion,” he wrote.154 “We who 
are left behind are morally bound to dedicate our lives to the democratic ideals for which they 
gave their all and their best.” He continued: “Let this be our daily resolve that these our dead 
comrades shall not have died in vain and say with that great champion for civil liberties that this 
nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom and that we in Ghana shall thrive in 
democracy, freedom, tolerance, goodwill, prosperity and peace.”155  
Ankrah was not writing strictly for a foreign audience here, although early editions of the 
AF News appeared in libraries around the world.156 His next sentence, “This new journal is 
earnestly commended to your patronage,” spoke directly to the men of the Armed Forces and 
Police Service. Nor is it likely that he plagiarized Lincoln’s stirring prose, expecting nobody to 
notice—he specifically cited “that great champion for civil liberties.” Instead, in the first article 
of volume 1, issue 1 of the Ghana Armed Forces Magazine, the Commander of the Ghana 
Armed Forces, through the cooperation of the Director of Public Relations, described the 
political and moral role of the military in Ghanaian society in terms that specifically merged 
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Ghanaian and international language, symbolizing the Ghana Army’s simultaneous presence in 
both milieus. 
Through the AF News, Ghana’s military leaders regularly blended national and 
international rhetoric to explain domestic politics and Ghana’s relationships with regional and 
global partners. In 1969, on the verge of returning to constitutional rule, the AF News’ “The 
Rationale Behind Military Intervention in Politics” integrated Feliks Gross’ The Seizure of 
Political Power in a Century of Revolutions, Finer’s The Man On Horseback, and Huntington’s 
Changing Patterns of Military Politics in order “to discuss the conditions under which coups and 
Revolutions can be deemed inevitable,” and partially excuse the Ghanaian case.157 In articulating 
Ghana’s defense policy, Colonel A. K. Kattah compared Nkrumah’s “muddled up” priorities and 
“expensive white elephants,” which failed to follow “age-old strategic and diplomatic tenets” 
against American, British, and Israeli strategic concepts, which “were clear and precise and were 
based on their fundamental conception of what entailed dangers to their national interests.”158 In 
1968, Public Affairs officer Captain S. G. Amoo began his article describing the role of the 
Director of Public Relations by quoting James Forrestal, the United States’ first Secretary of 
Defense without irony: “I know of no task that is more complex, except possibly the task of 
government itself, then that of engendering in a democracy and appreciation of the role of the 
Armed Forces.”159   
Raising the Ghanaian public’s appreciation for the role of the Armed Forces also merged 
local and international discourse. Early editions of the AF News attempted to remove the stigma 
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of military service and rehabilitate the “Abongo.”160 Amoo’s “Selling the Forces to the 
Taxpayer” imagined “these strong Abongo boys” coming to Ghana’s economic aid, mobilizing 
military men and equipment on behalf of Ghana’s cocoa industry. 161 When they did, in 
December 1968, hauling 1,400 tons of cocoa in army vehicles from the interior to the coast over 
badly degraded roads, the AF News celebrated the new rapport with locals, in which “any fear or 
mistrust which these inhabitants might have entertained about the military gave way to 
harmonious relationship between them.”162 In volume 1, issue 1, Public Affairs officer 
Lieutenant A. A. Enninful attempted to put the Abongo stereotype to rest. For Ghanaian parents, 
“the lofty ambition for their children was to give them a high education for a white-collar 
executive position, a doctor, or engineer – but not a soldier.” 163 Enninful imagined a past scene 
in the home of a young man announcing his plan to join the service to his parents, where “the 
wailing of mothers” usually accompanied “the least inclination of their sons to join the army”: 
“Abongo? Not for all the breath that holds me—not in my lifetime. You can join your 
abongo when I’m dead and gone you damned one; and even that my ghost shall keep haunting 
you.”164  
Now, Enninful wrote, the well-organized and disciplined Armed Forces have replaced the 
traditional Asafos of old, and “most parents are beginning to realize the Armed Forces is a useful 
arm of the nation, with a large fund of bright prospects for the youth.”165 The Armed Forces 
liberated Ghana, Enninful suggested, when it “took up arms one morning to chase out Kwame 
Nkrumah, his myrmidons, and his Corrupt People's Party organization from our midst.”166 As 
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Ghana’s economy struggled, the Armed Forces offered an alternative, often international path for 
those who could not afford to educate their children. “A number of young officers are currently 
on study leave in Ghanaian universities,” he wrote. 167 Even more, “Elsewhere in European 
universities, there are lots more studying engineering or doing post-graduate courses.”168 Even as 
an avenue for advancement within Ghana, and as an antidote to the stereotype of the parochial, 
uneducated abongo, the Armed Forces advertised itself through the international opportunities it 
offered. As Chapter 5 explores more, many Ghanaian soldiers recalled that these opportunities 
had enticed them to join the service. 
International education and training provided multiple fora for Ghanaians to articulate 
national objectives. When a group of senior American military officers from the National War 
College visited Ghana in spring, 1968, the Ghanaian Chief of Defense Staff, Air Marshall 
Michael Otu addressed them at length about Ghana’s defense policy, which the AF News 
reprinted. The Americans, Otu suspected, “may be dying to hear from our lips, our own version 
of the defense or justification for the forcible overthrow of the old regime,” but he defiantly 
refused to give it.169 Instead, he summarized Ghana’s domestic and regional security roles and 
called the West to task for its failure to ensure justice in Rhodesia and South Africa. “There is no 
doubt that the sincerity and motives of Western powers towards Africa and African problems is 
facing a severe test,” he told them.170 “If only they would not betray the humanistic ideals upon 
which their countries and their greatnesses have been founded the solution may not be too far to 
seek.”171 On the other hand, as Ghana’s Armed Forces sought greater efficiency and expertise, he 
recognized the ongoing importance that “both officers and men take advantage of higher military 
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courses overseas not available in Ghana.”172 “Here,” he continued, “I must express my deep 
gratitude to countries like yours, Canada, and UK which readily provide us with these training 
facilities.”173 Finally, he addressed Ghana’s industrialization and economic development, the 
National Liberation Council’s path toward restoring constitutional rule, and the Armed Forces’ 
potential as a resource “for the development of the country in various fields, including: building 
of bridges, roads and townships; conveying essential supplies and foodstuffs to afflicted areas 
during emergencies and national disasters; [and] medical evacuation by air.”174 Ghana’s Chief of 
Defense Staff in 1968 clearly considered the military the most modern institution in Ghanaian 
society. 
Modernization theory declined in the West in the late 1960s, but Ghanaian voices still 
reaffirmed old assumptions about the military as the most organized, cohesive, or rationalized 
institutions in Ghanaian society. When the civil state crumbled during years of military rule, 
simply remaining intact made these self-fulfilling assertions.175 From its very first issue, the AF 
News repeated this claim, although not without contradiction.176 “As a large complex 
organization involves almost every aspect of the national, political, social and economic life, the 
Armed Forces should, without any reservation, maintain leaders to transcend . . . elementary 
military qualities,” it argued in 1969.177 Military leaders worked “in close harmony with civilian 
diplomats, scientists, economists, legislators, industrialists and experts in other innumerable 
fields,” it continued. Therefore, “They should have the ability to make sound judgments on 
matters relating to a large percentage of the population of the country.”178 As if recognizing the 
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likelihood that military rule would return to plague Ghana, the final issue before the first round 
of elections in 1969 both praised and cautioned military personnel. “The Armed Forces is the 
most organized institution in the country,” read an unattributed article titled “Military Personnel 
and Politics.”179 “It is a closely knit body, and the nature of our job requires absolute solidarity 
and loyalty to our superiors, inferiors, and one another.” While admitting Ghana’s “first attempt 
at self-rule was a pathetic failure, and should be better forgotten but for the fact that we need past 
experience to guide future actions,” this article still warned, “it is also in our interest to eschew 
politics.”180  
Even when a military junta that vocally proclaimed its preference for American 
assistance took power in Ghana in 1966, the United States did not expand its military assistance 
program beyond its ongoing training and education mission. This was not simply a case of the 
U.S. preferring the new Ghanaian government as a Cold War proxy. American diplomats in 
Accra and Washington suspected the military regime’s capacity to govern and refused to fulfill 
the military government’s other requests for weapons and equipment. Sponsoring training and 
education in the United States, on the other hand, easily accommodated military rule because it 
promised to deliver a different kind of result. Especially when strong Congressional reaction 
against failed American modernization-turned-military missions in Asia and Latin American 
threatened foreign assistance budgets, both the State and Defense Departments reiterated the 
usefulness of education and training programs. The Americans’ response to persistent Ghanaian 
requests for more military aid exemplified how the State and Defense Departments responded to 
Congressional pressure to downsize all security assistance programs: Military education and 
training programs were the best way to provide corporate benefits to the recipient nations and 
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Cold War allegiance—at low cost—in the long term, but they did so at a personal, psychological 
level. Military rule in Ghana, therefore, did not require the United States to reconsider its 
assumptions.  
 
As they had since independence, members of the Ghanaian Armed Forces after 1966 
mingled local and international language to articulate their national agenda. When validating the 
coup or describing military rule, they carefully selected rhetoric that merged fluency in 
internationally recognized discourse—like the Gettysburg Address—with local idioms—like the 
“Abongo” stereotype—to reveal a transnational understanding of the role of the military within 
Ghanaian society. Between the first and second coups, even the most stalwart defenders of 
Nkrumah’s overthrow carefully acknowledged internationally-recognized norms of civilian 
control of society. On the other hand, by recycling previously fashionable academic rhetoric 
affirming the military’s potential as the most modern and organized social institution, they kept 
alive and modified an international intellectual import that had largely gone out of fashion in the 
West.181 This combination of local and international references portended ongoing military 
involvement in Ghanaian government.   
 
Ghana’s Return to Military Rule and the Limits of American Military Education 
Scholars did not universally condemn the first Ghana coup in 1966, and Ghana’s return to 
civilian rule in 1969 suggested the initial foray into military rule might have been an aberration 
or a correction. In July 1970, as part of the Pugwash movement, the Adlai Stevenson Institute 
sponsored the first Pan-African Regional Symposium on Disarmament and Development at the 
University of Ghana. The symposium drew tame conclusions about civil-military relationships in 
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Africa. It acknowledged that excessive defense budgets in Africa diverted essential resources 
away from economic and political growth and made African armies more likely to intervene in 
politics; but with proper guidance, armies could “be directed to nonmilitary objectives” and 
“make a tremendous contribution to physical development.”182  
The conference’s choice of venue—the University of Ghana in 1970—is more telling. 
Ghana was the first African state to return to civilian rule after a coup, and so it inspired 
academic speculation cloaked in hope that other military-run states might also return to 
constitutional rule. When Ghana’s Education Minister addressed conference attendees, he argued 
that small states and new states depended even more heavily on the international order, 
especially the United Nations, not just for their own security, but also as the most effective path 
to national greatness.183 Transnational cultural and educational exchanges directed toward 
industrialization and economic integration offered the best alternative to militarization, Minister 
William Ofori-Atta argued, asserting that international cooperation was the essential component 
to avoiding economically debilitating military competition.184 For Ofori-Atta and the 
conference’s other scholars who feared that Ghana was still particularly vulnerable to relapse 
into military rule, military intervention would more likely produce political decay than political 
development continent-wide, but international intervention in education and training was the 
antidote to military intervention in politics.185   
Ghana’s initial popularity as a proto-independent African state, its descent, revival, and 
re-descent into military rule made it a common example for scholars of military rule in Africa 
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and a representative case study for American military assistance policy over time. Ghana’s 
second coup in 1972 and the persistence of military rule elsewhere in Africa required scholars to 
reassess military rule’s justice and prospects for success. Usually, observers condemned the 
military leaders who, after overthrowing civilian governments, were unable to govern more 
efficiently and unwilling to return to constitutional rule. Samuel Huntington had argued in 1968 
that “military explanations do not explain military interventions,” and that coups were simply 
one manifestation of the general polarization and politicization of social and political institutions 
in underdeveloped societies.186 After Ghana’s second coup, however, most scholars considered 
the military itself the problem. The first coup violated previously “inviolable territory;” the 
military’s appetite “had grown perhaps by feeding;” and “the aftermath of military intervention 
is military intervention.”187 
One reason American policymakers had such difficulty evaluating the long-term effect of 
their assistance programs was that recipient nations had unique, and often changing, uses for 
American aid. The case of Ghana demonstrates that even in a state that struggled to balance 
power between military and civilian political factions, America’s military exchange program 
assumed disproportionately large significance only in the American perspective.  
 
Kofi A. Busia, Ghana’s Prime Minister between 1969 and 1972, recognized that domestic 
political and economic conditions had distinctly international causes, but international military 
assistance rarely emerged as a solution. The ruling military council had established Busia’s 
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Progress Party into power in 1969, and even though Busia rejected Nkrumahism, his vision of 
Ghanaian nationalism was no less pan-African. In October 1969, he told a gathering of American 
journalists at the National Press Club, “We shall not be tied to the apron strings of any country, 
whether East or West. We shall make our own decisions and take our stand on all international 
issues on the basis of two considerations: the interests of our country within the context of our 
international obligations; second, our consideration for the welfare and peace of the world on 
which our own progress and prosperity will ultimately depend.”188  
The extent to which Busia or future leaders were willing to condemn American policy 
toward South Africa offered one measure of their diplomatic allegiance to the United States. 
Busia trod a precarious route between appearing as an unpopular “dialogue man” to ordinary 
Ghanaians, or placating the Americans in order to secure economic assistance. Ghana’s urgent 
need for debt relief or restructuring convinced Busia to moderate his critique of American 
policies, especially its toleration of Apartheid in southern Africa.189 Like other leaders across the 
Organization for African Unity, Busia struggled to keep alive enough diplomatic goodwill with 
the United States to sustain the economic assistance he needed when Ghanaians overwhelmingly 
opposed both Apartheid and the United States’ role in preserving it.190 At home, Busia criticized 
Apartheid, even encouraging the OAU to do more to train anti-Apartheid “freedom fighters,” but 
sent mixed signals to the world by siding with President Nixon in the United Nations to 
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encourage “dialogue” over sanctions.191 Meanwhile, he pressed the U.S. for more economic 
assistance. Ghanaians may be grateful for U.S. aid, he said, but “as a democratic country which 
underwrote Nkrumah’s tyranny . . . they should do more to underwrite the system which we are 
trying to build here.”192 Busia—the civilian statesman—used his limited diplomatic leverage to 
both prod and praise American foreign policy in Africa. Later, shortly after Colonel 
Acheampong overthrew Busia’s government, the American-trained military officer rejected that 
cautious path, re-affirming Nkrumahist priorities of “positive neutralism” and “non-alignment,” 
and announcing that Ghanaian diplomats would “no longer be advocates of dialogue with South 
Africa.”193 If acquiescence to other American security initiatives in Africa was one desired 
outcome of its ongoing military education and training program, Acheampong’s repudiation of 
“dialogue” suggests that objective failed.  
America repaid Busia’s circumspection with ambivalence. In its May 1971 policy 
planning paper for Ghana, the State Department wished to maintain Ghana’s generally favorable 
outlook toward the U.S., but “without trying [sic] ourselves closely to either Busia’s 
government’s political designs or its political future.”194 To the Americans, “The Busia 
government has not come to grips with such problems as endemic corruption, governmental 
inefficiency and lack of coherent planning.”195 In addition to continuing economic aid—
especially food and commodities—the State Department recommended maintaining its current 
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diplomatic “courses of action,” including: cultural diplomacy programs, “an imaginative and 
flexible Peace Corps presence,” its “information program activities,” and academic exchange 
programs.196 The State Department also recommended maintaining “at least present funding 
levels of the small but important [Military Assistance Program] training program.”197 The 
military might eventually pose a threat to Busia’s government, but the State Department’s 
country team thought the military leadership closely aligned with Busia’s Progress Party.198 On 
the other hand, since the military remained “the major force capable of unseating any 
government,” State Department staff feared Ghana’s weak “military and government control 
mechanisms” made it vulnerable to a “captain’s coup”—overthrow by junior military officers.199  
 Military assistance formed only a small part of America’s foreign policy with Ghana 
before the second coup in 1972, but the United States’ ambivalent reaction to the coup belies the 
emphasis it placed on keeping that small military education and training program operating. In 
their draft policy planning paper, composed six months prior by U.S. Embassy staff in Ghana, 
the country team included another sentence in the recommended “course of action” regarding the 
Military Assistance Program cited above. It read: “Maintain at least the present funding levels of 
the small but important MAP Training Program. This is the only program we have directed 
toward the politically crucial military establishment.”200 That second sentence disappeared from 
the final, State-approved document in May 1971.  
The embassy’s country team prepared their draft in December 1970, and in retrospect, 
that statement seems prophetic. Just eighteen months earlier, Lieutenant Colonel Ignatius Kutu 
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Acheampong had completed his year at Fort Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff 
College in the United States. He seemed to be precisely the kind of prominent military 
establishment figure the Americans intended to inspire. One year after this draft, however, he 
seized control of Ghana’s government while Busia travelled in England. Yet to the extent that the 
Americans noticed the connection between their international military education and training 
program and Ghana’s new military government, it barely affected the United States’ relationship 
with Acheampong. 
In the first weeks after the coup on January 13, 1972, American Ambassador Fred Hadsel 
sat tight. Days after the coup, in a cable back to Washington, he mused about the “[the] basic 
dilemma which has concerned me from [the] inception of [the] coup.”201 Coming to Busia’s 
defense might appear to support democracy in Ghana, but returning to the status quo ante—and 
the ineffectual Busia—risked “delaying [any] solution to Ghana’s fundamental problems.”202 
Colonel Acheampong’s National Redemption Council (NRC) regime seemed by the 20th of 
January to be “apparently in full control of the country,” therefore American action supporting 
Busia might “encourage more extreme governmental action which would be inimical to our 
interests here and elsewhere in Africa.”203 Hadsel did not assume that Acheampong’s rise 
represented a freshening of Ghanaian-American relations. On the other hand, if the U.S. should 
“focus on Ghana’s economic problems, putting these above our admiration for Busia and our 
dismay at a military coup,” they might encourage “sensible solutions (if the NRC will take 
sensible action), [and] seek to achieve a condition in which democracy can be renewed.”204 
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Hadsel chose the latter path, but not out of confidence that anything about Acheampong’s 
training made him a natural ally with the United States. 
Hadsel’s first impression of Acheampong and his colleagues on the National Redemption 
Council was that they appeared “woefully inexperienced in government administration.”205 They 
seemed united only by a common “disgruntlement over lack of promotions.”206 Still, in the brief 
biographies of NRC members that he cabled back to Washington and to other diplomatic posts 
across Africa, Hadsel revealed an unusual attention to the international sources of their military 
education. Acheampong, Hadsel acknowledged, graduated from the U.S. Command and General 
Staff College and “has complained about officers his junior being promoted ahead of him and of 
[former Chief of Defense Staff] Addo’s alleged preference for officers trained in [the] UK.”207 
Lieutenant Colonel Chemogo D. Benni attended the Indian Military Academy, and had 
graduated from Ft. Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff College in 1969.208 Major 
Anthony H. Selarmey attended the U.S. Army’s Officers’ Advanced Armor Course at Ft. Knox, 
Kentucky in 1968.209 Major Kwame Baah earned his commission in India, and had served as 
“staff officer to defense adviser in Ghana’s embassies [in] London and Washington.”210 All these 
officers had received advanced training or been posted abroad, but they neither attempted to 
personify “professional” ideals of civil-military separation and Cold War allegiance to the West 
embedded in American assumptions nor was Ambassador Hadsel surprised that they did not. 
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In a conversation with the U.S. Defense Attaché one month after the coup, Acheampong 
remembered his military training in the U.S. warmly, and “proudly explained that most of the 
members of the NRC were graduates of US or UK schools.”211 Acheampong “emphasized 
Ghana’s continuing need for education opportunities of this kind,” and made special mention of 
the superiority of American military education, “noting that the preference for UK training 
imposed on the armed forces by former [Chief of Defense Staff] Addo was part of the past.”212 
Such an endorsement by the new, American-trained leader of a troubled African state 
ought to have been the ultimate validation of America’s international military education and 
training programs, but it was not. It barely registered to American diplomats, scholars, or the 
Defense Department itself. The American ambassador immediately discounted Acheampong’s 
ability—he was “woefully inexperienced in government administration” and “completely 
uninformed on international relations and obligations”—and suspected his judgment—Hadsel 
would recommend sensible solutions, he said, but he doubted the NRC “would take sensible 
action.”213  
For his part, Acheampong did not demonstrate the emotional attachment or political 
allegiance with the United States that American justifications of the program touted. He later told 
the Accra Daily Times that he began preparing a military takeover as soon as he returned from 
the United States.214 He rarely referred publicly to his American military education, even in the 
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Ghana Armed Forces’ official newspaper. By 1977, his official biography made no mention of it, 
despite describing his other military posts in the 1960s in great detail.215  
Instead, he quickly revealed that the he placed Ghana’s primary political, economic, and 
international concerns before his relationship with the United States—diplomatically or 
militarily. He proclaimed, “My belief in Pan-Africanism is total absolute,” including “total 
commitment to [the] aims and objectives” of the Organization for African Unity, while 
advocating a mix of continental and national self-reliance.216 He unilaterally postponed 
repayment and repudiated Ghana’s international debts, arguing, “We are jealous of our 
sovereignty which we would not like to see mortgaged to any power.”217 He restored diplomatic 
relations with the People’s Republic of China and several Eastern European states, including 
East Germany, and attempted to revive East German economic development projects Ghana had 
unilaterally terminated after the 1966 coup.218 In April 1972 he announced, “The National 
Redemption Council rejects any form of dialogue with apartheid South Africa, as long as that 
country sticks to its policy of racism.”219 “The time has come for us to stop trying to be second-
rate Europeans,” he wrote in 1974. “Our mission is to become first-rate Africans.”220And like the 
military government of 1966, he was reluctant to shrink Ghana’s large armed forces, arguing that 
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instead of adding to the unemployment rolls, Ghana could harness the army’s trained personnel 
and equipment for a new program of self-reliance called, “Operation Feed Yourself.”221  
Ghana’s military leaders understood their unpopularity with respect to academic critiques 
of military rule abroad. The AF News published only one book review 1976: a critique of 
Austin’s Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, which concentrated mostly on deriding University of 
Boston historian Valerie Plave Bennett’s “Epilogue: Malcontents in Uniform.”222 “It reeks with 
that ‘conservative’ American tendency to look at un-American situations with distorted vision,” 
wrote Tom Dorkenoo, the AF News’ editor. “The 318 page book has largely failed to give deep 
insight into the subject or subjects it set out to write about,” he continued, “yet it is a book for 
one to read, if only to know the minds of the authors and what academicians, Ghanaians and 
foreigners think of the years before and after the advent of the NRC-SMC Government.”223 In 
short, Acheampong revealed rather closely the same kinds of domestic political and economic 
concerns, with an equal understanding of the international nature of their origins, as previous and 
later Ghanaian governments. Acheampong’s year-long education at an American staff college 
made no obvious impression on either his own pronouncements, his willingness to condone 
American policies toward southern Africa, or on the United States’ diplomatic mission to Ghana.  
Likewise, America’s military assistance policy undertook little soul-searching, even after 
one of its own alumni demonstrated the program’s negative potential to produce tragic results. In 
1976, Ambassador Shirley Temple Black reaffirmed the long-held American opinion on 
international military education and training grants to Ghana. Responding to Secretary of State 
Kissinger’s request that all foreign missions evaluate their states’ needs for American 
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international military education and training grants (with an eye toward trimming the program), 
Black assured Kissinger that Ghana depended on American military training. The training reaped 
significant benefits for American interests, she argued, and professional military education 
specifically was the most useful for those reasons.224 Ghana most desired courses “which will 
enhance professional development,” she said, and assumed that they would give up all other 
training to hold on to their slots for Command and General Staff College and similar advanced 
education.225 Those courses were also the “most beneficial to US national interests,” she said, 
because “these are timed for the period during an officer’s career just prior to his possible 
assumption [to] key roles either in the military or in the government.” 226 The Ghana government 
“has planned ahead in its training program on the basis that US assistance could continue for 
some time,” and Black feared that Ghanaians would assume that cuts to the program would come 
from “political, rather than inflationary or budgetary” factors, as a form of American “retaliation 
for foreign policy actions along lines which have been well publicized recently in US press and 
abroad.”227 Should the Americans cut their military education and training budget, she feared, 
Ghana might turn to the U.K., Soviet Union, or Eastern Europe for training courses, which 
“would not be helpful in any way to US-Ghanaian bilateral relations.”228 
Here, again, we see an American official projecting that Ghanaian participation in 
American professional military education served the Ghana Armed Forces’ corporate needs, 
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secured American interests in Ghana’s government, and kept Ghana from seeking military 
assistance from the communist bloc. The Americans even closely managed which American 
schools they would fund for training grants: Black observed that the Command and General Staff 
College occurred at a critical juncture in the Ghanaian officer’s career—“just prior to his 
possible assumption of key roles either in the military or the government.” Black either failed or 
declined to acknowledge that Acheampong had followed precisely the short path from American 
staff college to a key role in government—coup leader and head of state. Within two months of 
this reply to Kissinger, Acheampong’s foreign policy so frustrated Black that she temporarily 
froze all new aid programs to Ghana and recommended her own recall to the United States to 
reevaluate American-Ghanaian relations.229 That she would still place such high confidence in 
international military education and training programs to serve both American and Ghanaian 
interests suggests that either an imagined or idealized logic underwrote that program. Despite the 
glaring failure of one American staff college graduate to so transform U.S.-Ghana relations 
according to that ideal, American and Ghanaian policymakers clung to those exchange programs. 
Even if Acheampong was an outlier rather than the desired outcome of international military 
education and training programs, the operation and justification for the international military 
education and training program changed little for the Ghanaian military or for American 
policymakers after 1972.  
 
The Ghana Armed Forces Staff College and Military Internationalism for Export 
One reason neither the U.S. nor Ghana overestimated the significance of Acheampong’s 
year at an American staff college was that before 1976, all senior Ghanaian officers completed 
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staff college abroad.230 Since Nkrumah’s time, the Ghanaian Armed Forces had struggled to 
create a Ghanaian staff college. The school’s eventual formation in 1976 reveals many of the 
paradoxes between states’ faith in Military Internationalism to transcend national or corporate 
military identities and the practical difficulty for small states to rely on external (international) 
assistance programs to produce the equivalent of senior civil servants in a military government. 
Just a few years after opening, the Ghana Armed Forces Staff College’s “Ghanaianization” plan 
again reenacted the struggle to develop a specifically Ghanaian—or African, given the number of 
non-Ghanaian students there—institution. The staff college that resulted negotiated international 
military norms which it had inherited and which continued to be refreshed through ongoing 
training abroad, and national performance in the context of a military-run government. 
 
Since independence, no Ghanaian political or military leader questioned the importance 
of staff college training, but the expense of building a national staff college and the availability 
of staff college training abroad postponed the Ghana Armed Forces Staff College’s creation for 
over a decade.231 Kwame Nkrumah founded Ghana’s National War College in 1963, intending 
for it to serve all Africa. By uniting, he reasoned, small African states could manage the high 
costs of training and equipping their armies and resist being “drawn into making defence pacts 
with foreign powers which may endanger the security of us all.”232 Lack of funds stymied the 
National War College plan, but the school Nkrumah founded became the Junior Defense 
College, which has provided primary staff college training for Ghanaian lieutenants and captains 
                                                 
230 According to Addae, Ghana’s standards mirrored other Western militaries regarding staff college: usually an 
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since 1964.233 After the 1966 coup, the military government accepted more military training 
assistance from abroad both to demonstrate “the country’s reorientation to the west” while 
cutting Ghana’s military budget.234 It tabled the plan to build a Ghanaian staff college.235 After 
1966, Ghanaian officers received staff college training in the U.K., U.S., Australia, Canada, 
India, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan, but after 1971, Commonwealth schools required Ghana 
to purchase tuition rather than receive training slots as grant aid.236 Before 1972, Busia’s 
government made no effort to fund the staff college plan, but the Acheampong regime revived it 
in January 1973. The Ghana Armed Forces Staff College accepted its first students in January 
1977 in Teshie, alongside the Military Academy and Training School.237 
Avoiding the cost of sending officers abroad was one significant reason Ghana revived 
the staff college plan in 1973, but the staff college was not strictly an insular national 
organization.238 Just as the Ghana Military Academy had, Ghana’s staff college became a center 
for pan-African military education. Four Nigerian officers joined the second Ghana Armed 
Forces Staff College course in 1978, and forty-one Nigerians had graduated by 1992.239 Starting 
in 1981, one Tanzanian officer joined each class. Later officers from Sierra Leone, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe attended Ghana’s staff college.240 In 1980, Ghana and Nigeria began exchanging 
faculty at their respective staff colleges; by 1984, two of each nation’s officers taught at the 
other’s staff college.241 
The staff college’s international character revealed Ghana’s increased participation, not 
segregation, from ideals of global military integration and demonstrated Ghanaians’ comfort as 
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full participants as both a source and subject of international military education. Acheampong’s 
1975 address to the Ghana Military Academy’s graduating class that included the first Liberian 
graduate expressed “the honor of training both officers and cadets from other friendly African 
countries,” and “renew[ed] our offer to all friendly African countries; our doors are still wide 
open and we shall feel honored to continue to share our experience with them.”242 In the same 
year, as Ghana struggled to find a site for the staff college and develop a curriculum, Ghana’s 
Chief of Defense Staff Lieutenant General Lawrence Okai asked the Canadian and British armed 
forces to provide faculty and staff.243 More than financial reasons forced Ghana to seek British 
and Canadian help. Okai graduated from the British staff college at Camberly in 1966, and 
intended for Ghana’s school to meet “Commonwealth and international standards . . . as this 
would enable the Directing Staff [the faculty] to be exchanged between Ghana and other 
Colleges of Commonwealth countries.”244 It also equipped Ghanaian graduates to lead 
international contingents of United Nations soldiers in peacekeeping missions abroad, which 
Ghana had begun again in earnest in 1974.245 From the beginning, the Ghana Armed Forces 
intended for its staff and graduates to participate in staff assignments and exchanges with other 
nations, assuming equality even with the British and Canadian schools that sent faculty to Ghana. 
Just as Ghana’s domestic economic policy of “flexible self-reliance” merged national and 
international influences, financing, and participation, the Ghana Armed Forces Staff College 
exemplified the dynamic flow of local and global in military education which forms one aspect 
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of Military Internationalism. The campaign for “Ghanaianization” in the late 1980s reveals some 
of this dynamism. One former Commandant recalled the “initiative to Ghanaianize the Staff 
College completely” began in response to the “heavy” Canadian and British influence over the 
college and its curriculum.246 Ghanaianization was about more than just finishing the decades-
long process of replacing British influence from Ghana’s armed forces, but that was an important 
first step. At the senior staff college’s founding in 1976, a seven-person Commonwealth Military 
Advisory team, headed by a British Colonel who also served as the Deputy Commandant, 
augmented the small Ghanaian faculty.247 During the initial negotiations in 1975, Britain 
requested that a British officer should fill the Deputy Commandant’s position, “to prevent the 
British officers from coming under direct command of Ghanaian authorities.”248 Over the next 
decade, the British influence declined, but never disappeared. By 1987, the Ghanaian faculty had 
grown to eleven and the British contingent had shrunk to two—but a British Colonel still filled 
the Deputy Commandant position.249 
At least one former Staff College Commandant hated that structure. The Ghanaian 
Commandant was the unit commander; in his absence, the Deputy Commandant performed the 
Commandant’s duties, including commanding Ghanaian officers, but he was technically not 
subject to Ghanaian laws. “It was not proper,” the former Commandant insisted, “The deputy 
therefore was performing the Commandant’s duties, so he was performing Ghanaian duties [but] 
he [was] not subject to Ghanaian law.”250 “When we did the review,” he recalled, “we 
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maintained him, but this time not as the deputy commander, but as the head of studies—[an] 
academic [position].”251  
“The review” occurred in 1991, when the Commandant, Brigadier I. G. M. Kpeto closed 
the senior division of the Ghana Armed Forces Staff College for one year to rewrite its syllabus, 
reorganize its faculty, and expand its facilities.252 In the 1980s, a former commandant recalled, 
“It was a very strong challenge . . . We were teaching our Ghanaian armed services as distinct 
from both America, Britain, and Canada. These were the places where we were attending the 
staff colleges, of course, also India. We were attending Indian Staff College, Pakistani Staff 
College. So all these things, we have people training here, people training there. Which 
personality are we going to teach? We have to reach a common one.”253 To stress Ghana’s 
difference, or at least its independence, Kpeto directed the Ghana Armed Forces Staff College’s 
one year sequestration. A staff officer recalled, “We wanted to see a lot more of Ghana asserting 
itself. Its own strategy, its own policies, not copying American strategy, or Britain. They are 
good for learning, but if the Ghana Armed Forces had to go to war, we would fight here, not 
outside, so let’s try and know our own territories, and use our own technology to develop our 
military.”254 Ghanaianization did not signal an end to the prior faith, partly borne out of Ghana’s 
inequality with larger Western militaries, that all professional education was equally valid, 
regardless of the source. Instead, it entailed Ghanaians adopting co-equal status with other staff 
colleges, considering Ghana a legitimate partner in providing military education and training for 
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international officers, and assuming an intellectual cohesion based on particularly Ghanaian 
experiences. 
Ghanaianization was also Africanization. Another former faculty member from the late-
1980s recalled, “The idea of the staff college, the whole idea of the Ghana Armed Forces Staff 
College was started by Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah. You wouldn’t believe it, he started it. . . The 
idea was to train Ghanaian and other African countries.”255 By 1989, he recalled, “When you go 
to our staff college, you have Tanzanians and Ugandans there, and in fact, nobody pays anything. 
All those countries, they don’t pay anything. You see, Ghanaians have that attitude, our sister 
countries let us help them . . . So you have a police man, you have a fireman, you’ve got a 
Nigerian, You’ve got somebody from East Africa . . . there was a man from Rhodesia...”256 
Throughout the 1980s, Ghana and Nigeria expanded their student exchanges and increased the 
number of faculty exchanges between the Ghanaian and Nigerian Staff Colleges from one to 
three.257 Meanwhile, it accepted officers from Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and 
even two officers from Transkei in 1992, just prior to that state’s re-absorption into South 
Africa.258 
Ghana’s official historians and its former faculty remembered the staff college as the fruit 
of broad international military cooperation, an indigenous institution of higher learning in the 
service of the national military, and a pan-African source for professional development and 
education. Just as it offered itself as an alternative to dependence on former colonial powers for 
other African militaries’ benefit even while it employed faculty from its own former colonial 
master, we cannot disentangle global forces from local conditions. Kwame Nkrumah began the 
Staff College idea as a Ghanaian initiative to serve pan-African ends, but throughout its long 
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period of gestation, the Staff College could never remove itself from global trends in 
international military educational exchanges—nor did it ever wish to. Nigerian students joined 
the Staff College’s third class in 1979; Sierra Leoneans and Tanzanians joined the fifth course in 
1981. Neither was its national character a given: during the mid-1970s, despite an agreement 
with the Ahwereasehene—sealed with six bottles of schnapps and one carton of beer—that the 
Staff College would be located sixty kilometers north of Accra near Awerease village, local 
politics and economics dictated that the existing barracks at Teshie would become the school’s 
permanent—while officially temporary—home.259 Meanwhile, British, Canadian, and Nigerian 
officers complemented the Staff College faculty. So also did Ghanaian officers who had attended 
Staff Colleges in Pakistan, the U.S., U.K, Canada, and India.  
Ghana’s Staff College evolved at what Jose Moya calls “the meeting of the extremes: 
global forces and local conditions, of the world and the village.”260 Even in the late 1980s, as the 
faculty strove to “Ghanaianize” the syllabus and faculty, the Staff College never rejected 
internationalism at the expense of the local. Here again, in Moya’s words, “the nation-state may 
offer the optimal unit of analysis” to study international policies, but it is “a faulty one for 
examining the actual process.”261 Instead, what Ghana’s officers called “Ghanaianization” 
appears even more internationally integrated than before, only with fewer non-African labels 
than before. 
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Conclusion 
If we Africans are serious about achieving our national emancipation, we must first of all 
have it clear in our minds that we are capable of surviving on our own; that all it would 
need is proper utilization of the natural and human resources within our countries. Any 
other assistance from any other source should be considered of secondary value. The 
harrowing Amin years should sometimes teach us a few lessons . . . A good part of the 
world ignored Uganda then. Aid only came in trickles. In spite of the atrocities during the 
noted years, Uganda boomed back. If the country was able to survive under anarchy, what 
would have been a situation under organized and enlightened leadership? Surely it would 
have been better. 
 – Major Benon Tumukunde, Uganda, in The Flame: The Magazine of the Ghana Armed 
Forces Staff College, 1989.262 
 
Ghana’s leaders accepted grants for military training from around the world for different 
reasons. On one hand, when President Kwame Nkrumah and the military officers who succeeded 
him sought education and training assistance abroad, they were filling a specific need for 
technical assistance Ghana did not yet have the capacity to provide for itself. Nkrumah and 
military leaders after him also publicly accepted that global norms for military professionalism 
and ideal civil-military relationships made the military a “modern” institution in society. But as 
the case of the three lots of textbooks donated to the Ghana Military Academy demonstrates, 
political considerations always hung over internationally-available education and training 
resources. How internationally trained military personnel interacted with the Ghanaian state after 
independence reveals the contradiction between global ideals of the professional military 
embodied in Military Internationalism and loyalty to the nation inherent in postcolonial 
nationalism.  
Programs which sponsored military education and training for potential leaders became 
the cornerstone of America’s security assistance relationship with Ghana because they merged 
assumptions about the modernizing power of transnational education with the political challenge 
                                                 
262 Tumukunde, “Inside a ‘Colonised Mind,’” 72. 
 
157 
 
of asserting American leadership in places where decolonization limited the United States’ 
freedom to intervene. Sponsoring military education and training offered a flexible, expandable 
response to Ghana’s needs that did not also tax the United States’ relationship with its other 
allies. In 1963, the Office of the Director of Military Assistance’s five-year plan for Ghana 
coincided with the Secretary of Defense’s expanding Informational Program for Foreign Military 
Personnel worldwide. Both plans affirmed the long-term, cost-effective value of international 
education and training alone. Even after the 1960s, when scholars and policymakers no longer 
assumed that political and economic development occurred in sequential stages dependent first 
upon the psychological modernization of a core of elites, the actual operation of American 
military assistance to Ghana changed little. When the products of American international 
military education and training seemed to both fulfill and contradict the ideals, as in the case of 
Colonel Ignatius Acheampong’s rise to power and violent demise, the ideology and rhetoric 
underwent surprisingly little change. Meanwhile, military rule persisted and Ghana’s economy 
struggled.  
Ghana’s participation in international military education and training never implied 
contentment with dependence on expertise it could not provide. From the start, Nkrumah 
intended Ghana to lead a self-sufficient, pan-African security coalition, and he expected Ghana’s 
military schools to instruct soldiers from across Africa. His aggressive participation in United 
Nations peacekeeping in the Congo represented that ambition, and caused tension with Great 
Britain and the United States, whose neo-colonial meddling he blamed for Brigadier Michel’s 
airplane crash in 1961. The Ghana Military Academy and Ghana Armed Forces Command and 
Staff College sustained Nkrumah’s dream, but the Armed Forces’ effort to “Ghanaianize” the 
staff college demonstrated the fluidity of roles between consumer of international military 
education and provider. By the late 1980s, as the epigram above suggests, a Ugandan military 
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officer attending the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College could use the college’s 
annual journal to express his recipe for African independence from “The Colonised Mind.”263 By 
then, Ghana continued to accept grant aid to send promising military officers to staff colleges 
around the world, but through its own staff college offered professional education and training 
that Major Tumukunde equated with “surviving on our own.”264  
When military rule came to Ghana, the assumption that military education and training 
yielded psychological results over the long term insulated the U.S.’s specific education and 
training program with Ghana from significant ideological scrutiny. The U.S.’s overall education 
and training program survived fierce Congressional inspection in the late 1960s for the same 
reason. Western observers did not initially consider Ghana’s foray into military rule in 1966 a 
fatal blow to constitutional rule or the death of civil-military ideals, but subsequent coups in 
1972, 1979, and 1981 obliged American assistance planners to reconsider their programs’ intent 
and capacity to help Ghanaian society. As we shall see, the United States adapted its rhetoric 
when describing the specific results military assistance could achieve in Ghana, but even great 
political change in Ghana never undermined the fundamental assumption that international 
education yielded individual transformations that would, over time, transform entire societies. 
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Chapter 3: “I Think They Would Be Better Off If We Took Them On A Tour 
Of Disney World:” Continuity and Change in International Military 
Education and Training  
 
Introduction: Momentum or Inertia? 
On Friday, June 22, 1990, in a small conference room in the Dirksen Senate Office Building 
where two witnesses sat before three senators, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) posed triumphantly 
before a report of thirty-five pages, stapled in the middle. “I understand none of you has had the 
chance to read it,” he boasted modestly, “so let me just read part of the findings.”1 Indeed not, 
the report did not exist a week before and Leahy specifically requested it be sequestered until the 
24th.2 He knew it so well because he had personally commissioned this General Accounting 
Office study a year prior, he had received a private summary briefing a month earlier, and it 
confirmed what he had thought for years: “IMET [International Military Education and Training] 
is a program that runs on momentum or inertia,” he declared. “Until this GAO study I requested, 
I do not think that anybody had looked at IMET since the early 1970s.”3 He was partly right.4 
The conditions the report exposed, including insufficient measurement and the tendency for 
America’s undemocratic allies to accept eagerly U.S. military education and training grant funds, 
had persisted since the early 1970s. In fact, they had persisted far longer than that.  
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Despite Leahy and his GAO report’s long-festering criticism of the program that funded 
education and training for foreign military personnel in the U.S., both continued to endorse the 
program because neither doubted the ideology behind it. The GAO accepted that international 
military education and training programs successfully exposed participants to “U.S. values, 
citizens, institutions, and commitment to human rights.”5 They both cited a February 1990 study 
by the Defense Security Assistance Agency as evidence, repeating the premise that “the IMET 
Program is one of the most cost-effective programs for pursuing U.S. foreign policy and national 
security objectives.”6 As he questioned Lieutenant General Charles Brown of the Defense 
Security Assistance Agency later in the hearings, Leahy quoted that GAO report, which in turn 
cited a Defense Security Assistance Agency article, which was itself an expanded version of the 
testimony the Brown gave to Leahy’s Senate Appropriations Committee one year earlier.7  
Brown stated in 1989, and repeated in 1990: “IMET has been generally recognized as our 
most cost-effective foreign assistance program. IMET is a people program that establishes 
valuable personal relationships and lines of communication with foreign military personnel, 
many of whom rise to prominent positions.”8 “Foreign military students learn our ways and are 
exposed to our values of support for democracy and personal integrity based on pride in military 
professionalism,” Brown said, “They, in turn, help spread these values in their countries by 
                                                 
5 General Accounting Office, Security Assistance: Observations on the International Military Education and 
Training Program, 22. 
6 Ibid., 23. 
7 Lt Gen Charles Brown, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1990; 
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations; House of Representatives; Part 5 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Print. Off, 1989), 516; The report was published as a scholarly article in Spiro C. 
Manolas and Louis J. Samelson, “The United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program:  
A Report to Congress,” DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management 12, no. 3 (Spring 1990): 
12–47. 
8 Lt Gen Charles Brown, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations; Senate 
Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1990; Part 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off, 1989), 194 Emphasis in original. Lt Gen Charles Brown, Senate Hearings Before the Committee on 
Appropriations; Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1991; 
H. R. 5114 (Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Print. Off, 1990), 933. 
 
161 
 
sharing their experiences with military and civilian counterparts.”9 That revolving door of 
Congressional evidence also exemplified the persistent assumption—that international military 
training produced psychological transformations—that had justified the program for three 
decades. 
Leahy and the GAO’s candid critique of the IMET program’s “inertia” and its inability to 
measure its own progress were only the last in a series of periodic attempts throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s by Congress, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense to evaluate the 
international military education and training program. This chapter shows the results of those 
attempts, and argues that despite occasionally pointed criticism, over that period, few deviated 
from the long-held faith in international military training’s potential to transform visiting military 
officers psychologically—at a low price. 
 As the 1960s closed, academic and diplomatic justifications for American military 
assistance policies evolved away from modernization theorists’ desire to transform the 
“developing world” and embraced the more decentralized and frugal Nixon Doctrine. Political 
intervention by African, Asian, and Latin American militaries seemed the norm in the early 
1970s, and the American government struggled to rationalize its military assistance policy 
against ongoing military incursions against democracy and civil rights. Detente with the Soviet 
Union and China made the Nixon Doctrine—which expected America’s allies to assume greater 
responsibility for their own security—look more like a tactical retreat than a total rout.10 In 1970, 
Nixon’s special Peterson Committee—named after the Bank of America president who chaired 
it—encouraged more private investment overseas, recommended multilateral institutions such as 
the World Bank replace unilateral American economic assistance, and exalted the power of 
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“market forces.”11 “If the goal is economic development,” the Committee reported, “the issue is 
one of efficiency, not ideology.”12  
Peterson also re-emphasized the long-held official justification that international military 
education and training made foreign militaries “self-reliant.”13 Meanwhile, the United States 
continued to support “bureaucratic-authoritarian” states like Brazil, Argentina, and South Korea 
and “Third World policemen states” such as Turkey, South Africa, Iran, and Indonesia with 
military assistance and training, while Washington interfered as little as possible in their 
democratically suspect domestic politics.14 The “New Approach to Foreign Aid” no longer 
considered massive physical, economic, or ideological intervention in most of the global South 
essential for U.S. security, but international military education and training programs remained 
an inexpensive way to preserve American diplomatic initiative, just in case.15  
Times changed. Even before Jimmy Carter’s election, “internationally recognized human 
rights” became a major concern in American assistance policy.16 To the extent that it tolerated 
other powers’ spheres of influence, detente was incompatible with the moral universalism 
inherent in American traditions of liberalism.17 Meanwhile, in response to austerity in the early 
1970s and against challenges to military assistance for regimes that violated their subjects’ 
human rights, the State Department, Defense Department, and Congress attempted to evaluate 
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American aid programs’ effectiveness. When it came to programs to sponsor foreign military 
training in the United States, they repeated old justifications, invented new ones, and ensured 
that the scope and purpose of these programs changed little for the next twenty years.  
Numerous and persistent military regimes in the Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
challenged American diplomacy. Some scholars argued—and policymakers agreed—that that 
military rule impeded national development in the global South, without admitting that U.S. 
military aid was responsible for the prevalence or persistence of military rule in the states the 
U.S. supported.18 Others noted that American allies were often highly modern, or possessed high 
organizational strength, but fell far short of democracy.19 When evaluating American military 
assistance programs, however, the State and Defense departments maintained their faith that 
programs which demonstrated in person the American model of civil-military relations had the 
most promise to undo the trend toward military rule. Curiously, for example, Ghana’s 1972 coup 
by a U.S.-trained army officer prompted little self-reflection in American policymakers. Even 
scholars who lamented the persistence of military rule noted only tangentially that Ghana’s new 
military head of state was a Command and General Staff College graduate.20 To some extent, 
this apathy was a symptom of a general decline in interest in West Africa among American 
foreign policymakers in the 1970s.21 But State Department officials and scholars also implicitly 
accepted what applied to many other newly decolonized as well: Ghana’s domestic political 
situation had largely Ghanaian explanations, and in Ghanaian foreign policy, U.S. aid competed 
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with other immediate issues like resolving its international debt and ending Apartheid in South 
Africa.22  
In the mid-1970s, in response to congressional, then presidential, concern over America’s 
image abroad and its responsibility to defend “internationally-recognized human rights,” the 
training program quickly adapted and adopted the new human rights paradigm. Despite scant 
evidence of its success, its administrators continued to boast of its long-term success and 
continued low cost.23 These criteria enabled the International Military Education and Training 
program to weather ideological and budgetary scrutiny in the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980s, often recycling year after year the same justifications that had worked for decades.  
The persistence of military rule in Ghana never seriously threatened American 
justifications for its ongoing military training and education grant program there. In the 1970s, 
scholars and policymakers clashed over what caused military rule, and whether American 
influence perpetuated it, but neither side expected military rule to go away.24 Throughout the 
period, and despite scant supporting evidence, Defense and State Department planners continued 
to recommend international military education and training programs as an ideal method of 
eliminating military rule from the global South.25 They did so partly because the specific 
International Military Education and Training program was relatively inexpensive, it conformed 
to new trends in American foreign policy deemphasizing direct intervention, and later proved 
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compliant to Congressional attempts to wend their concerns with human rights into American 
military assistance policy.26 International Military Education and Training was the United States’ 
only program for military assistance to Ghana, but when these anticipated outcomes failed to 
materialize, Defense and State Department policymakers re-emphasized the intangible, long-
term, and unaccountably cost-effective benefits of international military education that had made 
modernization theorists embrace it years earlier.  
Often, though, American military assistance planners exploited their old faith to offer 
new rationalizations for international education. Annual justifications for the United States’ 
small International Military Education and Training grants to Ghana dynamically adapted to 
rapid political change in Ghana after its 1979. IMET promised first to uphold the ideal of 
military professionalism in Ghana, then to temper the radicalism of military-led revolution in 
Ghana, then to rebuild the strained diplomatic relationship between Ghana and the U.S. that 
followed Flight Lieutenant Jerry J. Rawlings’ rise to power. Without ever changing the 
underlying faith in the power of international military education and training to transform 
individuals, American planners continually revised their estimates for the corporate, political, 
and diplomatic benefits that IMET promised to obtain in Ghana.  
Either through “inertia,” or “momentum,” between the 1950s and the 1980s, the same 
fundamental assumption that made foreign military training a natural instrument for 
modernization theorists persisted: life among American communities yielded lasting 
psychological benefits for foreign visitors that over time transformed their home states and 
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reinforced American influence there. This version of Military Internationalism endorsed 
international military training because it appeared to be sound foreign policy. Best of all, 
compared to the rest of American foreign aid, this “people-to-people” program was always a 
bargain.  
 
The Informational Program in 1971: Inertia, Ideology, and Military Internationalism  
Congress, the State Department, or the Department of Defense did not resolve 
philosophical and jurisdictional conflicts over who was best equipped to formulate, execute, and 
supervise American assistance programs. By 1972, officials in the State Department struggled to 
reassert their relevance and image, lamenting, “Congress tends to approach executive branch 
programs with suspicion, intensified by the impression of vast, essentially superfluous numbers 
of personnel and lack of leadership within the bureaucracy.”27 Congress and the American public 
neither cared nor supported security assistance (“just a euphemism for foreign aid”), and they 
considered the State Department “particularly ineffectual.”28 Neither the Peterson Committee, 
Nixon’s de-centralized foreign policy doctrine, nor internal attempts to validate and measure 
American military assistance programs resolved these conflicts in the early 1970s. In this 
turbulence, the simple assumptions which first commended international military education and 
training persevered, perhaps because of their simplicity. 
 
By the mid-1970s, few scholars of Western and African relations approved of the 
prevalence of military rule in Africa, but this did not imply an academic consensus on how 
American military assistance specifically influenced or encouraged military rule. Huntington 
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specifically argued that there while was no correlation between American military aid and 
military involvement in politics, there was also no evidence that professional training at schools 
like Fort Leavenworth had reduced the likelihood of military intervention either.29 “Military aid 
and military training are by themselves politically sterile,” he argued. “They neither encourage 
nor reduce the tendencies of military officers to play a political role.” 30 Princeton’s Ernest 
Lefever agreed: “A disproportionate amount of attention has been given to conflicting claims 
about the indoctrination effect, good or bad, of US programs on the political attitudes of 
individual officers,” he wrote, “when in fact, empirical evidence of [the Military Assistance 
Program’s] impacts on individuals is sparse and generally ambiguous.”31 Before 1971, the 
Departments of Defense and State had not seriously attempted to find this evidence. 
 Proponents of military education and training programs accepted the lack of objective 
methods for measuring their effectiveness to justify their continuation throughout this period. In 
June 1971, the Nixon Doctrine’s new emphasis on decentralizing American military assistance 
inspired G. Warren Nutter, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 
to request the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the effectiveness of military 
assistance programs that brought military elites from the poorer states to the United States for 
training and education.32 Defense Secretary Melvin Laird tasked the Department of State’s 
Inspector General of Foreign Assistance to perform an external review, and solicit individual 
services’ comments. Specifically, the inspector general team examined the “Informational 
Program and Orientation Tours”—those portions of the military education and training programs 
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explicitly intended to demonstrate those “significant facets of American life” to visiting military 
members at American Army, Navy, and Air Force facilities. The study’s conclusions reiterated 
the psychological and political impact of foreign military trainees’ visits to the United States, but 
expressed frustration over the program’s decentralized execution, inability to measure its 
effectiveness, and lack of follow-up with alumni of American military training and education 
programs.33  
These objections were entirely predictable outcomes of evaluating a foreign policy 
program rationalized entirely by faith in universal attitudes and behaviors mythologized in 
transnational military camaraderie. They raised some practical objections, but inspectors Neil 
Campbell and Elliot Strauss from the State Department also reaffirmed the program’s overall 
promise. Their report, and the reactions it prompted, revealed Military Internationalism’s 
elemental outlines, especially its durability, as it shaped American military assistance programs 
through the rest of the 1970s. The 1971 evaluation dealt with international military education 
theoretically; an actual case of a graduate of American military education who overthrew 
Ghana’s government in 1972 prompted very little reflection, and the evaluation offered no new 
basis to question the underlying faith either in 1972 or for the rest of the decade. Quite the 
opposite, the faith expanded to incorporate America’s newly concocted devotion to human 
rights. 
As if undermining their effort from the start, Campbell and Strauss admitted in 1971, 
there was “no yardstick by which the success of the [Informational Program] can be 
measured.”34 As both a symptom and cause of that problem, little data on graduates existed. 
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When successfully located and interviewed, graduates of American programs were “apt to tell 
enquirers what [they] wished to hear.”35 The programs clearly created personal relationships and 
“a friendly feeling for the United States,” but the investigators also noted, “there are a number of 
horror stories, Ali Sabry of Egypt, Qadhafi of Lybia [sic] and the President of Peru, all of 
whom profited by instruction at U.S. military schools but can scarcely be termed friends of the 
United States.”36  
Whatever results flowed from the international military education and training program 
and related programs to serve foreign military visitors, these analysts admitted that they came 
cheaply. In 1972, 12% ($61.2 million) of the $500 million national budget for military assistance 
programs paid for international education and training for foreign visitors. The Informational 
Program consumed just 2% ($1.37 million) of that segment, and just one quarter of one percent 
of the entire military assistance budget.37 Partly because they consumed so little investment in 
the first place and partly because they were the most visible American assistance programs to 
target states, such as Ghana, they avoided significant ideological scrutiny during the cycles of 
budget cutting of the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. They did not remain above criticism, 
however. 
The 1971 inspectors’ report claimed that “virtually everybody” they contacted 
acknowledged that the program needed stronger central authority to govern the types of lessons 
and interactions the various schools’ Informational Programs transmitted, but the report’s 
specific recommendations belie that observation. The report’s introductory cover letter even 
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acknowledged that any improvements to the program must not destroy its “voluntary and 
spontaneous nature.”38 In fact, it was these characteristics—voluntary, spontaneous, and 
decentralized—that made the Informational Program so representative of the nexus between 
official faith in the power of the average American to transform visiting elites and the average 
American’s disdain for official academic and diplomatic niceties in favor of their own, local 
version of Americanism.  
Sponsor families—those American families who assisted visiting military members by 
welcoming them into their communities, hosting them in their homes, or helping them navigate a 
difficulty with a base or community office—were the most useful. The inspectors admitted that 
the sponsor “usually becomes the [foreign military trainee’s] guide, philosopher, and friend” 
with respect to the various aspects of the military post and U.S. military life.39 Visits to 
American homes were the program’s “most effective portion.” “It is here that the trainee 
becomes disabused of some of his preconceptions of American life gained from the films and 
TV, and it is here that perhaps the strongest and most lasting friendships are formed,” the report 
claimed.40 Trainees received “the most accurate view of life in America as it is actually lived” 
through these home visits.41 The inspectors noted that sponsors were “sometimes recruited 
through the initiative of the foreign training officer, sometimes by civic groups such as the 
Chamber of Commerce, the mayor’s office, or volunteer women’s groups.”42 Further, the 
inspectors acknowledged, American families had been receiving foreign military visitors into 
their homes long before the Informational Program began in 1963, and “would probably continue 
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if the program should disappear.”43 The official sponsor family program merely put a formal 
label on an attitude or collection of behaviors toward international military students that 
American families and communities, including “volunteer women’s groups,” already exhibited. 
Without saying so, Neil Campbell and Elliot Strauss acknowledged the “imagined world” of 
transnational connections and alternate paths toward international cooperation that undergirded 
American military education policy in general.  
The State Department’s Inspector General team published its evaluation of ninety-five 
Department of Defense-run military education and training programs in November 1971, and 
offered suggestions to become more efficient or effective.44 They recommended, for example: 
better centralization of different schools’ programs, with a single Washington agency directing 
all programs; that the Informational Program carefully “lessen the entertainment element” of its 
programs and tours; that staff levels for officers who administered the Informational Program at 
various schools and bases should be standardized across the services; that U.S. agents abroad 
carefully screen each prospective student for English language proficiency, since “if his 
proficiency is indeed so low that he cannot keep up, his frustrations may prevent the United 
States from winning a friend”; and that services keep better track of their foreign graduates’ 
professional and personal progression.45 The Secretary of Defense forwarded the State 
Department’s findings to individual services and geographic commands in December 1971, and 
requested the services’ responses to the State Department’s findings.  
In their responses, those agencies that were closest to the foreign officers jealously 
defended their freedom of action, they felt free to interpret the intent and application of the 
Nixon Doctrine according to their own initiative, and considered the programs’ decentralization 
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necessary for their success. In other words, the officers who applied the American policy of 
training foreign military personnel and exposing them to “significant facets of American life” 
had their own conception of what made those facets significant and how best to pass their lessons 
along to visitors. They bristled at the suggestion that they needed further oversight from 
Washington. 
Naturally, Defense Department agencies resisted criticism from the State Department 
inspectors, but they combined geopolitical savvy with a more internationalist sense of the 
benefits of human-to-human contacts to parry critiques. For example, the State Department 
report singled out for criticism an annual “deluxe treatment tour” of the United States for 
graduates of Brazil’s and Argentina’s National War Colleges. Army General George V. 
Underwood, the commander of U.S. Southern Command, who was responsible for all interaction 
between American and Latin American militaries, blasted the report’s implication. First, he 
argued, the Argentines and Brazilians considered the tours “an integral, prestigious part of their 
study curricula” at their own war colleges, and had specifically requested that the U.S. include all 
Brazilian and Argentine war college students in them.46 In other words, the South American 
officers themselves considered a tour of American military, industrial, and government sites an 
essential aspect of integrating their own national military education with international content—
especially if it was at the United States’ expense—and this American general did not wish to 
disrupt that union of national and international purposes. Second, Underwood feared that 
eliminating these popular tours “could produce a host country reaction counter-productive to the 
intent of the Nixon Doctrine which advocates the maintenance of US influence and rapport with 
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foreign military personnel, especially those who are in a position to influence national 
policies."47 To him, decentralizing national diplomacy required increasing, not decreasing, the 
range of contacts between lower-level officials of all countries. The “corrective actions” the State 
Department recommended for saving money could not be accomplished by their suggested dates, 
Underwood argued, “Unless arbitrary, unilateral action is desired,” and he desired none of it.48 
Further, the commander warned ominously against clumsy attempts to reduce the size or scope 
of these tours “in order to minimize predictable unfavorable host country reaction to yet another 
case of what may strike them as paternalistic advice.”49 To Underwood, he knew best how the 
Informational Program affected its targets, and he deflected these attempts to curb his initiative 
by cannily citing traditional Latin American critiques of overbearing American behavior the 
State Department was sure to recognize. 
In directing the study, Assistant Secretary of Defense Nutter invoked the Nixon 
Doctrine’s emphasis on “enhancing the capacity of nations receiving U.S. military assistance to 
assume their own defense burdens” to justify close examination of the Informational Program, 
presumably to find cost savings.50 The U.S. Southern Command commander deflected this 
critical examination by re-interpreting the Nixon Doctrine back to Washington—in essence 
claiming the authority to decide for himself the strategic balance between costs, measurable 
results, and intangible psychological benefits in the form of Military Internationalism which 
could be counted on to reap benefits sometime in the future.  
Despite the supposed, unmourned death of modernization theory, many of the same 
older, deeper assumptions about the nature of American society and its power to bring about 
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sweeping, global transformations that had originally crystallized around modernization theory 
survived among those Americans who administered foreign military training programs.51 Those 
who did often displayed a key paradox of Military Internationalism: its participants freely 
adjusted its ideological content the further one traveled from the national centers of foreign 
policy and toward the points of interaction between individuals of different nations. Americans 
such as General Underwood, or, as we shall see, the Commandant of Fort Leavenworth’s 
Command and General Staff College, or the volunteer sponsors from the Greater Kansas City 
Chapter of People-to-People International, felt empowered to reinterpret the ideological content 
of programs that produced these interactions according to their own understanding of the 
national and humanitarian stakes involved. In this case, General Underwood perceived that a 
rash, Washington-directed plan to slash a popular Informational Program perk—as a grand U.S. 
tour for 200 to 300 senior South American military officers seemed to be—violated his own 
understanding of the goals and American military assistance policy in Latin America. Proximity 
to those South American officers informed his perspective on the exchange program, but his 
comfort objecting to the proposed cuts in the terms he did demonstrates that he exercised 
oversight from an ideological level that he felt empowered to define for himself. 
The U.S. Air Force’s Director of Military Assistance and Sales, Colonel Atlee R. Ellis, 
also objected to several of the State Department’s recommendations in ways that further reveal 
Military Internationalism’s local, versus national, manifestations. Specifically, Ellis rejected the 
report’s recommendation that the Department of Defense should centrally administer all 
Informational Programs and “provide the Military Departments with central policy guidance.”52 
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Program standards that ignored the diversity of foreign officers and the Air Force-run schools 
they attended would be awkward and, perhaps, humiliating, Ellis argued. It was more than a case 
of one size not fitting all. “The vitality of the program,” Ellis responded, “stems from the 
initiative and the ingenuity of individuals in the field who have the task of making the program 
function.”53 Neither these inspectors nor the Department of Defense seemed to understand the 
partnership between the official version of the Informational Program (IP) and the communities 
which supported American military schools. “In many cases,” Ellis wrote, “the financial 
obligations for picnics, luncheons, invitations to sporting events, visits to local industries, courts, 
newspapers, labor meetings, and other activities leading toward the achievement of IP objectives 
are borne by non-government, local and civic agencies providing the service for the trainees.”54 
In Kansas City, as we will see, local agencies took even more initiative than that.  
Day-to-day operations of diverse Informational Programs at military training facilities 
around the country were too closely connected with informal community-sponsored activities to 
make it possible to separate the two for the purpose of standardization or, it would seem, 
regulation. Just as the State Department inspectors recognized with the sponsor family program, 
which preceded and would likely outlive the official Informational Program, Ellis’ objection to 
standardizing the program from a central location corroborates that paradox of Military 
Internationalism. Ellis only appeared to advocate the “wider use of private initiatives” the 
Peterson Committee recommended as a “New Approach to Foreign Aid.”55 Assumptions about 
the impact of life in American communities on foreign military visitors preceded the Peterson 
Committee, just as they had modernization theory. Official justifications and administration of 
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international exchange programs grafted themselves onto community-based projects that already 
existed, in many cases. New approaches in foreign policy adopted these assumptions, but did not 
create them. That official comprehension grew up around official programs in such a way that 
official programs were rarely in sole charge of the functions, funds, or ideology of military 
exchanges at the community level.  
The first serious attempt to evaluate how the specific aspect of American military 
assistance programs which paired official training curricula with the extra-curricular “lessons” in 
American culture and values revealed both continuity and adaptability. The International 
Military Education and Training program not only survived the decline of “high modernization” 
in the late 1960s, it kept alive many of the assumptions about the transformative power of 
personal contact between Americans and visiting military personnel. American foreign policy 
de-emphasized direct military involvement in the target states and policymakers and scholars 
increasingly accepted that military regimes were bound to persist among American allies. As a 
result, faith in the transformative power of international military education and training and the 
Informational Program seemed as relevant as ever. Even when the Defense Department and State 
Department acknowledged that there was no way to measure the programs’ effectiveness, they 
never seriously questioned their basic assumptions. Instead, they revealed an ongoing faith in the 
power of personal transnational contacts to undergird American foreign policy.  
 
Military Internationalism, Human Rights, and the Indestructible International Military 
Education and Training Program  
Through the 1970s and again in 1979, Congress reassessed the purpose and execution of 
American military assistance programs, increasingly concerned with American military 
assistance for military regimes who violated their citizens’ human rights, especially in Southern 
 
177 
 
Africa and Latin America. Congress also routinely questioned whether the U.S. had any evidence 
that its military assistance programs were worthwhile. They usually received similar answers: 
visiting military officers obtained an appreciation for the “American way of life” that made them 
less likely to abuse human rights, and American programs yielded long-term benefits far beyond 
the cost of their training. Specific variations on that theme over the years reveal different reasons 
why this was so, however. With savvy, the Defense Security Assistance Agency modified the 
rhetorical shell protecting international military education and training to deflect criticism 
connecting this specific assistance program and human rights violations abroad.  
  
In the mid-1970s, the specific administrative and legislative definitions around 
international military training congealed, but the programs’ ideological justification remained as 
fluid as ever. In 1976, Congress extracted the U.S. training program from the larger Military 
Assistance Program and renamed it International Military Education and Training (IMET).56 
After 1975, the IMET program grew, from $29 million in 1975 to $56 million in 1985.57 
Between 1979 and 1982, IMET made up over 25% of the entire U.S. military assistance budget, 
but as military assistance grew to $9 billion in 1985, IMET returned to below 7% of the total.58 
Before 1976, about half of the 430,000 students the U.S. claimed to have trained since 1950, 
including a majority of Southeast Asian and Latin American students, received training at home 
or in nearby countries, especially U.S. schools in the Panama Canal Zone.59 That training 
consisted of a full range of technical, administrative, and combat skills, and even after the Canal 
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Zone school moved to the United States in 1984, exposure to “the American way of life” as 
prescribed by the Informational Program never really applied.60 Most other IMET students—
including all but 8 of 1250 from West Africa before 1973—attended training programs in the 
United States.61 In the 1970s, most foreign military students attended American courses in 
advanced professional education (especially staff colleges for officers and senior enlisted 
persons, such as the Command and General Staff College), and “resource management” 
(logistics, finance, administration, vehicle, equipment, and aircraft maintenance).62 The 
Departments of State and Defense administered the IMET program jointly, and did not require a 
clear military objective as a condition for any state’s participation. While there was no 
requirement for military education and training to occur at military facilities, it usually did. 
In the mid-1970s, defenders of education and training programs had to distinguish their 
program from other forms of American military assistance that had caused a string of 
humanitarian disasters, especially in Latin America. Reiterating their cost effectiveness was one 
strategy. In March 1976, testifying before the House Committee on International Relations, 
Lieutenant General Howard M. Fish, director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, stated, 
“Training of foreign military personnel is the most lasting value of military assistance and 
provides a simple, effective and relatively inexpensive contribution to the military strength of the 
free world.”63 The $32 million budget for international military training and education—about 
ten percent of the total for military assistance—“multiplied manyfold” in results. The program 
augmented U.S. foreign policy “by providing a significant opportunity for communicating with 
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the military leadership of other countries, especially the emerging leaders and youthful elements 
of the developing nations,” Fish argued.64 “The participants share the benefits of their experience 
with their countrymen when they return home to positions of responsibility and influence,” he 
added. “Thus, while improving indigenous professional skills and competence, training at the 
same time serves the broadest US military and political interests and in all probability provides 
the greatest return on any portion of our military assistance program.”65 Behind any strategic or 
ideological justification for international military education and training, claims that it was 
inexpensive, cost-effective, and provided “a good return on investment” had survived since 1959 
with little variation. 
How to calculate that return remained elusive. Under Secretary of State for Security 
Assistance Carlyle E. Maw repeated to the House Committee on International Relations the 
standard justifications for American training and education aid: “Our request for foreign military 
training amounts to only $30 million”; “The returns far exceed the costs”; and “Education of 
foreign military officers in American command, management and defense doctrine can 
contribute to personal international ties and understanding which will outlast any of the military 
equipment now being transferred to foreign governments.”66   
Congresswoman Helen S. Meyner (D-NJ) pressed back. “Even though this is relatively a 
small amount, $30 million when we deal as we do here at the Federal level in billions, why is 
this such good public relations?” she asked.67   
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“Well, I think the understanding that foreign military people obtain of the United States 
and our way of life is a very worthwhile investment,” Maw replied.68 “We bring promising 
officers to this country for broad training and experience in the United States. This has a lasting 
benefit.” 69 He went on, “My own feeling is that it is a tremendously valuable investment, 
something akin to the Fulbright scholarships where we bring people to the United States and give 
them exposure to our ways and methods and then they go back and take an important part in their 
own governments.”70   
Meyner was incredulous. “You say they learn about our way of life. It seems to me they 
learn from us how to kill each other. I think they would be better off if we took them on a tour of 
Disney World, they would learn more about our way of life.”71 
“Well, that is perhaps a bit of a callous approach,” Maw answered. “Most of these people 
are administrative. The facts of life are that in many countries of the world the military are the 
conservative forces helping maintain stability in their country.”72 
“Isn’t it possible that we may be contributing by doing this to the decline of democracy in 
Latin America?” Meyner persisted. “Don’t some of these people go back and overthrow their 
governments? Look what is happening in Argentina. Look at what did happen in Chile. This is 
what concerns me about this program. At least if they are going to have it, shouldn't they pay for 
it?”73 
Maw deflected, “I don’t know that the people trained in the United States are the ones 
that go back and try to overthrow governments. That would make an interesting study. I would 
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think the training here would be one that would lend to stability rather than instability. I would 
prefer to have the military training in this country rather than in Eastern Europe, for example.”74 
Meyner raised a familiar concern: how was international education and training different 
from the other military aid the U.S. had sent (or was still sending) abroad. Maw parried with 
familiar ambiguity: nobody really knew the specific results of the program, they agreed that it 
did good, and it provided a good return on investment. He also equated international military 
training with purely civilian educational exchanges, as if the Fulbright program and IMET 
program served the same ideological purpose. In fact, defenders of international military 
education regularly fell back to this position, holding up cultural exchange and internationalism 
as self-evident results. Later that day, as he fed John E. Murphy of the Agency for International 
Development softball questions on America’s concerns with foreign aid, Congressmen John H. 
Buchanan, Jr. (R-AL) illustrated a similar willful misunderstanding of American assistance 
programs that seemed to protect them from serious scrutiny:  
“Don’t you think it is true,” Buchanan asked Murphy, “that there is a great public 
misunderstanding of what development assistance is all about?”75   
“There is no question about it, Mr. Buchanan,” he replied. “You put your finger right on 
the nub of the problem—the lack of understanding on the part of the American people and the 
taxpayers of exactly what we are trying to do with the funds that we request for development 
assistance.”76  
This 1976 conversation echoed those of 1961, arriving at a similar conclusion:  If they 
understood, Buchanan and Murphy agreed, then the American people would agree that this was 
money well-spent because it matched their assumption that living among and learning from 
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Americans provided visitors lessons in modern politics, economics, technology, and culture that, 
Americans assumed, visitors would carry home with them. This assumption, fulfilled at low cost, 
had changed little from when the Draper Committee had articulated it in 1959, and survived the 
rise and decline of the modernization theorists, and recurred at Congressional hearings 
periodically throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  
Congressional discussions about the past, present, and future of international military 
education in the late 1970s repeated similar questions about the potential negative consequences 
of American military training, its “return on investment,” and how it fit into larger U.S. foreign 
policy. In hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in April, 1978, Under 
Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Lucy Wilson Benson 
repeated, “This program supports foreign policy objectives by providing an effective and 
relatively inexpensive contribution to the military strength and leadership of certain countries.”77 
She claimed that this professional training was “shifting in emphasis” to “broader fields of 
leadership training and resource management for senior military officers and junior and middle 
grade officers having leadership potential.” 78 Now, she said, training at “US military schools, 
e.g., Naval Command, Army Command and General Staff, and Air Command and Staff 
Colleges,” focused on leadership and professionalism, rather than training mechanical and 
military skills, but this was not entirely accurate.79  
Especially in Africa, as the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard M. 
Moose, Jr., testified, the line between “technical” and “professional” training was never clear. 
“Our proposed international military education and training programs this year will emphasize 
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the technical training of African military officers in our military schools,” he stated.80 Yet “the 
bulk of these funds will be used to provide training in professional management rather than 
equipment-oriented training.”81 Recipient states, in other words, had their own purposes for 
consuming American military assistance. Even the program’s three official objectives 
(improving international relations, teaching human rights, and improving national self-reliance) 
encompassed a wide variety of American military schools. Given this vagueness, the first 
principle—that life among Americans could transmit the most important lessons of all—still 
reigned. As the 1970s wore on, some in Congress and Presidents Ford and Carter increasingly 
emphasized such ideological outcomes for American foreign policy.  
In his 1975 article “The United States in Opposition,” ambassador to India and future 
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan defended American liberal internationalism and economic 
liberty against increasingly threatened political and civil liberties abroad.82 He announced to the 
world, and likely earned President Ford’s nomination to United Nations ambassador in 
appreciation, “It is time that the American spokesman came to be feared in international forums 
for the truths he might tell.”83 Neither Moynihan nor Ford was first to champion what later 
became the most distinguishable aspect of Carter’s foreign policy.84 Even Henry Kissinger 
accepted that values, in one form or another, had always been a central concern of American 
foreign policy, and that most Americans considered the amoral pursuit of power very un-
American.85  
The State and Defense Departments anticipated increased Congressional scrutiny of 
military assistance programs’ spotty record of supporting dictators in the mid-1970s, and 
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responded by touting their cost-effectiveness. Without irony, they also reformed the mandate for 
international military education and training to stake a claim as a primary method of instructing 
an American version of “internationally recognized human rights.”86 Doing so came naturally, 
since the original assumptions about what made military education and training in the United 
States already affirmed the enduring value of human-to-human contact, and Americans’ 
particular excellence at it. At least on paper, encouraging human rights became equal to the 
program’s other main purposes of encouraging effective and mutually beneficial relations 
between the U.S. and target states and improving those states’ ability it utilize their own 
resources (which might include defense articles the U.S. had sold them). In 1978, Congress 
amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to forbid all military assistance—including IMET 
grants—to states which engaged in “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights” and made “increas[ing] awareness of nationals of foreign countries 
participating in such activities” one of the IMET program’s three main objectives.87  
Even the new emphasis on “human rights issues as part of this leadership training” that  
Under Secretary Benson cited blurred lines between theory and practice in international 
assistance. The Department of Defense took until 1985 to update its directive on the 
Informational Program to reflect the added emphasis on “internationally recognized human 
rights,” but included this emphasis in its rehearsed and recycled repertoire of justifications for 
the international military education and training program routinely after 1978.88  
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As Congress debated the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 that eventually 
prevented U.S. military assistance to regimes who violated human rights, President Carter 
directed the Pentagon to review the policies and procedures governing U.S. training of foreign 
military students. This study intended to ensure the program followed a coherent rationale, that it 
reflected changing American foreign policy objectives, and allocated funds according to larger 
military and political priorities.89 The General Research Corporation published its thorough, if 
uninspiring report in March 1979. Like the 1971 review, this one included the standard articles 
of faith about the psychological impact of training in the United States on foreign military 
visitors, on the program’s benefits for American influence abroad, and it recommended vague 
policy changes to make the program more responsive to various inputs.  
From a different angle, however, this report reiterated in stunning detail how American 
political and diplomatic assumptions behind international military education interacted with 
individual military schools and training facilities and with local communities to imagine a set of 
psychological outcomes in target audiences that mirrored American foreign policy objectives. 
All of these variables interacted in specific locations (schools, bases, communities, etc.), but the 
logic of the overall system envisioned a universal process of transformation to create the desired 
outcome because the definitions surrounding American military education and training programs 
were so pliable. Finally, the report revealed the primacy that American policymakers gave to 
national formation as the desired outcome of its international military training and education 
program. But in the processes it describes, nationalism was only an immature form of Military 
Internationalism. National actors provided only the initial conditions for the transformative 
power of the educational experience in the United States. The desired policy-level outcome of 
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nationalism failed to recognize that American and foreign individuals themselves determined the 
actual psychological impact of the international exchange.  
The Defense Security Assistance Agency, which commissioned the 1979 study of 
international military education, considered its justification self-evident, and the report revealed 
familiar critiques. First, the study recognized (as we have), “the rationale for IMET [International 
Military Education and Training] appears not to have been uniform, vacillating in time from one 
concept to another.”90 This report attempted to devise a standard rationale, as well as a standard 
method for prioritizing allocations, but even in its pragmatic introductory summary, it repeated 
its broader faith in the United States’ ability to transform military visitors psychologically. “All 
IMET serves some specific and legitimate military purpose within the armed forces of the 
trainee’s country,” the report claimed, and “IMET is not a cultural exchange program, although 
the exchange in cultural values inherent in bringing foreign and U.S. trainees together may be an 
additional benefit.”91 This exact phrase occurs repeatedly in Congressional documents over the 
next decade, usually adding, “an additional cost-free benefit.”92 On the other hand, since most of 
the training occurred in the United States, English became trainees’ second language, “opening 
the door to Western literature well beyond military subjects.”93 Even when attempting to be 
pragmatic, these observers waxed philosophical.  
This attempt to quantify the benefits of professional military education acknowledged 
that even the term “professional” defied quantification. U.S. policymakers had been telling one 
another that their international military education and training programs emphasized 
“professional” courses, such as staff colleges, over mere “technical” training, but by 1979, there 
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was still no clear definition of what made some military training “professional,” and some not.94 
The CRS acknowledged, “A precise definition of the term ‘professional military training’ is not 
available at the U.S. Government interagency level, and there are varying views as to exactly 
what is meant.”95 To some officials, the term implied “postgraduate education of the type to be 
had in civilian institutions”; to others, the term included “certain courses of instruction for 
officers, particularly higher level courses, such as command and staff or war college.”96 Clearly 
staff colleges deserved the distinction, but there were also numerous other courses in the United 
States which were “difficult to so differentiate, and their arbitrary classification appears to serve 
no real useful purpose.”97 It might be more meaningful to simply define professional military 
education as “that training designed to provide or enhance recipients’ leadership”—not a difficult 
standard to argue.98 At best, only a very broad definition for “professional military education” 
would be feasible, the report suggested. “Better still,” it recommended, “for purposes of IMET, 
no definition at all.”99 Officers from “the less sophisticated countries have little need for what 
might be termed war college-level professional military training,” the report concluded, since 
their own training bases did not “produce personnel sufficiently trained to absorb higher level 
training.”100   
These analysts’ struggled to come to terms with what made “professional training” count 
as “professional,” or even useful, for foreign visitors, and revealed part of the paradox of 
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Military Internationalism. Not only was it impossible to clearly define “professional training” in 
a way that included both American and foreign assumptions, they decided it was best to avoid 
defining it at all. What was professional about any American training course would speak for 
itself, they assumed, because it was the environment of the course itself that was transformative, 
not the content of the training. Walt W. Rostow had said in 1961, in essence, that international 
military training was too important to be left to the generals. In 1979, the Congressional 
Research Service recommended against letting the definition of “professional” interfere with the 
intent of professional military education for foreign visitors—especially ones from “the less 
sophisticated countries.” In this paradox of Military Internationalism, definitions were not only 
changeable, but their very presence hindered the possibility for interchange. From the point of 
view of the recipient countries, a rigid set of American definitions limiting which schools were 
available for grant tuition may also have restricted their ability or willingness to receive this 
grant aid.  
Indeed, the purpose of international military education and training, as the U.S. saw it, 
was rarely to produce any specific military objectives at all. By legislation, the program’s three 
purposes were to encourage mutual relations between the U.S. and client states, to provide 
military training to help them utilize their own military equipment effectively in order to become 
self-sufficient, and “to increase the awareness of foreign nationals of basic issues involving 
internationally recognized human rights.”101 This report’s conclusions about “the less 
sophisticated countries’” inability to absorb the “higher level training” in some American courses 
and the legislative mandate to “increase awareness” regarding human rights also reveals the 
paradoxical relationship between the ideal versus the actual militaries in question and the ideal 
versus the actual states involved. As Ghana’s ongoing participation in American military 
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education and training programs throughout its period of military rule shows, Americans’ 
commitment to Military Internationalism tolerated remarkable diversity in client states’ domestic 
political and economic development or military sophistication. While the language in this 
particular report sounds condescending, the larger paradox of Military Internationalism was that 
it accepted considerable discontinuity between ideal political forms, ideal civil-military 
relationships, and those forms actually in place in client states.  
Their version of Military Internationalism did not hold client states to particularly high 
standards of governance because they considered Military Internationalism itself the method 
through which to transform those states. To some extent, the American attitude was one of 
tolerating friendly dictatorships abroad, even those which scholars legitimately considered 
harmful to democracy and justice in the global South.102 But from another perspective, the 
Americans responsible for executing this particular aspect of U.S. foreign policy continued to 
believe, as they had for two decades, that their program would be the mechanism through which 
democracy or justice might come to those states, via the military.  
Conflict over the centrality of the nation-state underlay the assumption that international 
military education and training yielded impressive, if vague, benefits. In part reflecting 1970s-era 
tolerance of bureaucratic authoritarianism, the 1979 report revealed a bipolar attitude toward 
national cooperation for its own sake versus for the sake of power. “In the simplest of terms,” its 
authors asserted, “the world is a collection of nation states . . . The nation state remains the 
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primary actor in the world, despite the greater ease of international travel and communication, 
despite greater interdependence between nations, and despite the advocacy in some quarters for a 
more interdependent world.”103 The U.S. was a nation-state “seeking to survive in a world 
system animated by considerations of power,” so the U.S. must combine its power with other 
nations “in order to ensure its own survival.”104 Foreign military personnel attended U.S. military 
training institutions to “acquire information and insight . . . on which to base a decision as to the 
practicality of cooperation with the U.S. on military matters.”105 Therefore, “When a foreign 
country agrees to send its military personnel to be trained by the U.S., it casts a vote of 
confidence in the U.S. and its military institutions . . . When the U.S. offers training to foreign 
military personnel on a grant basis, it demonstrates a continuing real and active interest on the 
part of the U.S. in the national security of the foreign country.”106 Further, since IMET aid was a 
grant program, the U.S. maintained some authority over which individuals could receive the 
training.107 According to these justifications, considerations of state power and national interest 
sustained these programs, so their effectiveness rested on how well they achieved these goals.  
Questions of modernity and the institutional connection between poverty and 
development became even more pressing in the 1970s, but relieving poverty or bringing 
modernity to the global South are notably absent from this 1979 explanation of the intent of 
American military assistance.108 The way the IMET program depended on a visiting individual’s 
personal conversion to faith in American political, economic, and social institutions provided an 
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alternate mechanism to conform to new directions in foreign policy in the 1970s which tolerated 
some bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes while de-emphasizing some aspects of state power—
such as the nagging persistence of military governments among American allies. Even as the 
discourse of aid shifted to de-emphasize state-based projects and embrace relieving individual 
poverty as a condition of assistance, the IMET program continued to declare that its original 
genius was to transform individuals, who in turn modernized their societies’ proto-national 
military institution.  
Policymakers in 1979 still could not comprehend how to measure the success of 
international military education and training according to nation-based criteria. They accepted as 
evidence that “large numbers of students that friendly foreign governments have been willing to 
commit to the armed forces of the U.S. for training and the number of countries willing to adopt, 
in large measure, the tactics, techniques, and weaponry of the U.S. are indicative of the success 
of IMET and prior grant programs.”109 This is a weak endorsement, however, considering that 
few other states offered comparable assistance, and the U.S. specifically recruited client states 
away from those that did—usually from the communist bloc.110 In 1976, Secretary of State 
Kissinger specifically asked all foreign embassies whether reductions in U.S. IMET aid would 
encourage those countries to look to China or the Soviets—and the U.S. Ambassador from 
Ghana replied that it probably would.111 The large number of graduates of American military 
training courses who had advanced to positions of prominence in their home militaries or home 
states offered another way to demonstrate the programs’ success.112 On the other hand, many 
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illegitimate world leaders had also graduated from American military schools—although this 
report mentioned few by name. The specific process for budgeting IMET training changed in the 
1970s, and IMET programs received their own specific appropriation separate from the larger 
military assistance program. The programs’ lack of concrete results made them increasingly 
vulnerable to arbitrary cuts by the Congress, “despite Executive Branch arguments that the 
training of foreign military personnel is one of the most effective means of enhancing the 
security and influencing the policies of recipient countries.”113 Terms of nation-states and power 
still failed to illuminate these programs’ tangible results. 
Where this report attempted to describe how military education and training programs 
advanced American geopolitical interests, it extolled the intangible benefits of international 
exchange to make its case. “It is in the training environment that military-to-military 
relationships of enduring value to the U.S. are made,” the report claimed. More than that, it said, 
“When U.S. and foreign military personnel sit down to plan and undergo training together, the 
mutual insight and rapport that result are of a different and higher order than relationships based 
on most other types of contact.”114 It argued that the American people continued to support 
international military education and training programs despite their unstable rationale, their 
vulnerability to budget pressure and “political considerations,” and their tendency to “vacillate 
from one concept to another” because they directly participated in these relationships.115  
The programs evaded measurement because they were pluripotent. To Ernest Lefever of 
the Brookings Institution, whose earlier work contributed to the Defense Security Assistance 
Agency’s 1979 report, the true benefits of foreign education and training programs took decades 
to mature.116 In the short run, some American-trained officers initiated coups in their home 
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states, but others fought against them; some advocated the nationalization of U.S. corporations in 
their countries, others resisted it; in civil wars both rebels and loyalists had trained in the U.S.117 
The program’s real benefit was more like an institutional subconscious, where “even if a small 
number of these attempt to emulate the Democratic values and practices they heard about and 
saw in the United States, the net, long-term effect, however modest, would be in the direction of 
a more representative and responsive government than most third world countries now enjoy.”118 
It might take decades for the fruits of these exchange programs to mature, these analysts 
reckoned, but that slow, psychological change would be more meaningful than any short-term 
policy alignment between the recipient nation and the United States—especially when those 
policy alignments rarely occurred as the U.S. hoped.  
The General Research Corporation’s American perspective did not acknowledge the 
power differentials between American training staff and foreign military students, and assumed 
that the individuals involved in these courses viewed themselves primarily as national beings 
when participating in them.119 In practice, differences in power and nationality required constant 
negotiation. On post, among men and women in uniform, power differentials could hardly be 
hidden, and only American faculty and senior officers had the authority to downplay them 
between fellow students or between students and instructors. In social situations, where 
community members struggled to host welcoming and inclusive events, specific “national” labels 
adhered with less uniformity, as we shall see. But the policy discussions surrounding these 
programs both justified them as pragmatic national policies while at the same time touting the 
enduring personal bonds they created.  
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In such a way, they reveal another paradox of Military Internationalism: its uneven 
dependence on state power. States facilitated international exchanges and provided official 
justifications to sustain them as government programs. After arranging these contacts, however, 
pragmatic rationalizations rooted in foreign policy objectives and state-building gave way to a 
deeper faith that visiting foreign military personnel and American families would interact in 
ways that represented a more natural internationalism which was not solely about national 
power.  
By defending international military education and training as a central site for 
transmitting American values and “ways of life,” Defense and State department planners 
appealed to international norms for practical as well as ideological reasons. Continuously after 
1979, Defense and State department staff claimed to “weigh human rights practices in each of 
the proposed recipient countries,” and that international military education and training best 
formed apolitical and professional graduates who, in turn, supported “democratic processes” and 
“the basic rights of individuals.”120 Emphasizing that they more than complied with the 
International Security Assistance Act of 1978 prohibition against IMET grants to states that 
grossly violated human rights, they preserved their program from excessive scrutiny and offered 
it as a proactive American endeavor to spread human rights awareness. In a kind of reverse 
“boomerang effect,” policymakers employed the internationally recognized rhetoric of human 
rights to defend the program they considered essential for forming transnational networks of 
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military officers who, they argued, could bring about the reforms human rights discourse 
prescribed.121  
We might question their sincerity, or at least recognize the absence of evidence for the 
point, but by regularly touting the way life in American communities actually improved foreign 
military personnel, policymakers appealed to deep-rooted assumptions. They were the same 
assumptions that motivated reformers of the old Mutual Security Program of the 1950s to replace 
the old justification of containing communism with a new emphasis on delivering political, 
economic, and most of all psychological modernity to target societies in the global South. 
 
U.S. and foreign governments employed a version of Military Internationalism which 
professed great faith in the power of international travel and mutual education and training, and 
operated those programs according to corporate calculations of national political, geopolitical, 
and economic interests. But in order for those contacts to yield “national” results—results based 
on the participants becoming more national beings by serving in their nation’s forces—very non-
national, human interactions had to occur first. In this way, state-based explanations of their 
programs still occasionally referred to the transnational benefits of interaction—what Iriye calls 
“Cultural Internationalism.” As a state-supported project, these programs adhered to a version of 
Military Internationalism that privileged the “national” results of the exchange. The 1979 
evaluation of the International Military Education and Training program repeated the potential 
for national development and increased “access” for American diplomacy in the global South. 
But a different, more cultural understanding of the consequences of exchange lay under the 
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administration of international military education and training programs, which observers 
obliquely acknowledged surprisingly often, and will be the subject of the next chapter. 
 
The Elastic Rhetoric of International Military Education and Training: The Ghanaian 
Case 
Throughout the 1980s, the language the Department of Defense used to defend 
international military education and training programs routinely stressed the pragmatic, national 
outcomes the programs delivered while acknowledging that they resulted from non-national, 
cultural, and human interactions. Official U.S. justification for international military education 
and training grants to Ghana during this time demonstrate the nexus between pragmatic national 
interests and a near-mystical belief in human-centered psychological transformations particularly 
well. Ghana’s case also demonstrated how the vocabulary around American military assistance 
programs adroitly shifted its shape without greatly disturbing the rhetorical or institutional inertia 
which supported them.  
In annual Congressional Presentations on Security Assistance Programs from the 1980s, 
the case of Ghana neatly demonstrates the flexible rhetoric defending the transformative power 
not just of American military assistance, but of international military education and training 
specifically. Through the 1970s and 1980s, the United States’ only security assistance to Ghana 
was through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, providing 
funding for an average of 30 Ghanaian personnel to attend training or education programs in the 
United States, and costing the United States about $240,000 per year.122 Most attended American 
staff colleges and war colleges; the rest attended programs for “military management and 
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technical areas such as finance, administration, and engineering.”123 Annual Congressional 
Presentations after 1979 did not state which specific schools each Ghanaian attended in the U.S., 
instead they all generalized around the theme of “improv[ing] Ghana’s own indigenous training 
capability and upgrad[ing] the educational and training standards of armed forces personnel.”124 
Compared to approximately $15 million per year in other types of American economic assistance 
to Ghana between 1978 and 1984, (including P. L. 480 “Food for Peace” food aid, Agency for 
International Development assistance, and the Peace Corps), IMET was a small program, but the 
Defense and State Departments considered it the United States’ only avenue of potential 
influence over Ghana’s politically influential military.125 
The Departments of Defense and State repeatedly claimed that the small IMET program 
in Ghana guided the Ghanaian government’s rapidly evolving perspective on the United States 
after 1979. As expected, the Defense Security Assistance Agency’s Congressional Presentation 
for FY 1980, written early in 1979, proclaimed that the IMET program “serves as an important 
element in our friendly relations with the Ghanaian government by providing professional 
training to key military leaders, current and potential,” while boasting, “the U.S. experience has 
also created understanding and respect for American values and institutions among Ghanaian 
military leaders.”126 The Defense Security Assistance Agency also suggested that American 
military training stabilized Ghana during uncertain political times. “In June 1978,” it recalled, 
without recognizing that Acheampong himself was an IMET graduate, “military officers led a 
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bloodless coup that replaced the government of General Acheampong. The new government has 
released political detainees and undertaken difficult and long overdue economic reforms. It has 
also upheld the previous regime’s commitment to step down in favor of a democratically elected 
civilian government.”127 The report projected that even after political power transferred to 
civilians, “Ghana’s military can be expected to play an important role in the country's economic 
and political development.”128 In early 1979, Ghana was on the verge of great political change. 
The Defense Security Assistance Agency intended that American-trained military officers would 
provide a steady, human rights-respecting influence and reliable partnership with the U.S. 
The Defense Security Assistance Agency’s 1980 Congressional Presentation mistakenly 
projected an even larger role for the armed forces in stabilizing Ghanaian politics.129 When this 
report arrived, Flight Lieutenant Jerry J. Rawlings’ Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC), which toppled the Supreme Military Council in June 1979, had temporarily 
relinquished power to a civilian government under President Hilla Limann.130 Rawlings later 
overthrew the Third Republic on December 31, 1981, but in the interim, the Defense Security 
Assistance Agency asserted that Limann’s government would depend on the “cooperation and 
support” of the Ghana Armed Forces for its survival.131 The reasons for the 1979 coup by “rank 
and file military,” the Defense Security Assistance Agency reported, were “severe inequities 
between officers and enlisted men, corruption in the military and the country’s depressed 
economy.”132 Although the report noted that Rawlings’ AFRC had executed eight top leaders, 
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“including three former heads of state,” it did not mention Acheampong among them.133 It also 
failed to evaluate whether a decade of American professional training had mitigated the 
inequities or corruption. Meanwhile, the United States’ “modest security assistance program” 
would remain “an important element in our friendly relations with the Ghanaian Government by 
providing professional training to key military leaders, current and potential.”134 In 1980, and 
again in the FY 1982 report (prepared in 1981, before Rawlings’ second coup), the Defense 
Security Assistance Agency boasted, “The professional training offered key members of the 
Ghanaian military in the US has given them an understanding of and respect for American values 
and institutions.”135 Further, the report suggested, “This reinforces their Western orientation and 
contributes to strengthening the friendly, cooperative relationship between Ghana and the 
US.”136 These are standard justifications, based on the oft-repeated narrative about the long-term 
psychological and diplomatic benefits of American training. At this point, despite the illegitimate 
rise and violent fall of one IMET-trained head of state in Ghana, the Ghanaian experience did not 
demand that the U.S. reconsider international military education and training as a whole. 
When preparing the FY 1983 Congressional Presentation in 1982, after Rawlings 
returned to power, the Defense Security Assistance Agency acknowledged Ghana’s new military 
government, but either failed or refused to acknowledge its revolutionary character.137 In January 
1982, Rawlings declared “revolution”—he later called it a “Holy War”—and accused Ghana’s 
military of “years of corruption in the highest ranks which has also seeped down the command 
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structure.”138 He declared: “We have now a People's Army, a People's Navy, a People's Air 
Force . . . We have seen enough of a traditional form of leadership which abandons the people 
once it is in power.”139 “The Revolution has no room for elitist, self-centered and materialistic 
officers,” the new Army Commander Brigadier Arnold Quainoo declared to the Ghana Military 
Academy’s 1982 class. Meanwhile, Rawlings restored diplomatic relations with Libya, and 
broadcast a new willingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union, Iran, and Eastern Europe.140  
Later scholars considered Rawlings’ ascent to power a symptom of the military’s 
inability to convert political dominance into institutional stability, while the charismatic leader 
merged the military’s strong corporate identity with lower ranks’ (and the Ghanaian poor’s) 
radical aspirations.141 Paradoxically, decades of international military training stunted the Ghana 
Armed Forces’ ability to renew itself organically and contributed to Rawlings’ grievances 
against the military hierarchy. Ghana’s “complete dependence on international circuits of 
military production and training” constricted junior ranks’ advancement.142 American 
policymakers interpreted the coup not as the failure of American attempts to reshape the 
institutional or corporate character of Ghana’s military in the past decade but as evidence of an 
even greater need for “training to strengthen professionalism and discipline.”143 But this required 
a shift in the rhetoric of American military assistance away from its prior, gradualist emphasis on 
influencing Ghanaian military development and toward restoring a lost, mythical 
professionalism.  
                                                 
138 Embassy of Ghana, “Rawlings Explains Motive for Military Take-Over,” Ghana News, January 1982, 6; 
Embassy of Ghana, “Holy War Still On -- Rawlings,” Ghana News, January 1983. 
139 Embassy of Ghana, “Rawlings Explains Motive for Military Take-Over,” 6–7. 
140 Embassy of Ghana, “Relations with Libya Restored,” Ghana News, January 1982; Embassy of Ghana, “Bright 
Future for Ghana – Soviet Relations,” Ghana News, May 1984; Embassy of Ghana, “Soviets Declare Support,” 
Ghana News, January 1982; Embassy of Ghana, “Iranians Hold Talks on Trade,” Ghana News, June 1982; Embassy 
of Ghana, “Cultural Exchange Pact Signed,” Ghana News, January 1983. 
141 Hutchful, “Institutional Decomposition and Junior Ranks’ Political Action in Ghana,” 248–251. 
142 Ibid., 212. 
143 United States Defense Security Assistance Agency, Congressional Presentation; Security Assistance Programs 
FY 1983, 1982, 305, ASI: 83 fiche 7144-13, U.S. Government Documents, Anshutz Library, University of Kansas. 
 
201 
 
The Department of Defense assumed that its IMET program had such power. Since 1979, 
the Defense Security Assistance Agency’s annual reports repeated familiar refrains: Education 
and training in the United States prepared foreign military leaders for “operating, maintaining 
and managing a military establishment,” while reinforcing “a political and professional military 
element in support of democratic processes.”144 Training under IMET was “professional and 
nonpolitical, reflecting the US tradition of civilian supremacy and the instrumental rather than 
policy role of the military.”145 Defense policymakers still boasted, “IMET is not a cultural 
exchange program, but the exchange of cultural values inherent in bringing foreign and US 
military trainees together is an additional and essentially cost free benefit.”146 Meanwhile, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs affirmed, “Without exception, each of our 
ambassadors reports that IMET is one of the most valuable programs we have to offer.”147  
Recognizing the Rawlings government’s “anti-US sentiments,” in 1983 the Defense 
Security Assistance Agency declared the IMET program to be even more important, and “one of 
the few remaining vehicles for fostering US interests in Ghana.”148 Rawlings and the junior 
officers and non-commissioned officers who conducted the coup “exacerbated problems of 
military discipline, and increased the need for professional training.”149 In 1984, noting that U.S.-
Ghanaian relations “improved perceptibly starting in the summer of 1983,” they reaffirmed 
Ghanaians’ critical need for American military training, since “the trainees are exposed to 
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American values and democratic, human rights oriented institutions, including the traditional 
role of the US military within our society.”150 The U.S. recognized that “Although political 
developments in Ghana during the past few years have resulted in an erosion of the influence 
within the military of Western oriented personnel, there is still a significant amount of respect for 
Western techniques and systems.”151 Finally, “Maintenance of the [IMET] program is one of the 
principal means of professional contact with the Ghanaian military at a time when military 
personnel of countries hostile to the US, i.e. Libya, are increasingly present in Ghana.”152  
By 1985, after Ghana’s economy had failed to recover, Rawlings had invited the World 
Bank to intervene, and Ghana adopted a U.S.-supported structural adjustment program, the 
Defense Security Assistance Agency was optimistic about American assistance again. “The 
unquestionable professional benefits of the security assistance program are considerably 
enhanced by the opportunity to demonstrate to key personnel within the Ghanaian defense 
establishment the traditional role of the US military within our society,” they reported.153 
Similarly, in 1986, as Rawlings’ military government continued into its fourth year, the 
Departments of Defense and State were sure its education and training program could 
“encourage nonalignment and counter Soviet bloc influence, and stimulate the development of 
the new democratic system.”154 
Political uncertainty following Rawlings’ first coup in 1979 gravely challenged the 
traditional narrative justifying American military education and training grants to Ghana as a 
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source of long-term stability. In response, U.S. policymakers relabeled the program’s purpose 
into an essential toehold for American interests that simultaneously preserved and re-transmitted 
an ideal of civil-military relations—despite little historical evidence of success. The program 
continued to sponsor roughly the same number of students for the next decade, but the rhetoric 
the United States employed to justify its programming decisions reveal a combination of 
underlying attitudes about international military education and Military Internationalism.  
First, as an individual identity and not a schedule for corporate or national development, 
Military Internationalism preceded specific program descriptions and influenced how observers 
evaluated programs’ results. In 1970, 1979, and again in 1990, Congressional critiques of the 
International Military Education and Training program chided its inability to “measure” results, 
but American policymakers never questioned whether sponsoring just twenty to thirty Ghanaian 
military officers’ training in the U.S. each year would eventually yield society-wide changes. 
Instead, when a group of junior officers who had not yet participated in American professional 
military education seized the government, American policymakers reformulated their position 
from emphasizing IMET’s conservative tendency and projected that the new government 
required a transformation that Ghana was unable to provide for itself. In annual reevaluations 
judging and justifying IMET with Ghana after 1979, the Defense Security Assistance Agency 
and the State Department did not consider Rawlings’ revolution evidence of the failure of a 
decade and a half of American professional military influence. As they did after previous coups, 
academic observers quickly recognized that Ghana’s revolution had fundamentally Ghanaian 
origins.155 Instead, military assistance planners proposed that international military education and 
training was the last best hope for Ghanaian governance and Ghanaian-American relations. 
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Similar to the experience of failed modernization projects in the early 1960s, results from Ghana 
never seriously challenged the faith in the power of Military Internationalism inherent in 
international military education and training; they only prompted a more expansive expectation 
for what Military Internationalism might accomplish.156 The IMET program’s justification and 
application evolved in light of new conditions, but the underlying international identity remained 
unquestioned—at least by military assistance planners. 
 
Momentum or Inertia in the 1980s 
 The United States’ international military education and training program changed 
remarkably little during the 1980s, even as fierce battles raged in American government and 
academia over the proper course for American foreign policy with respect to Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America. As scholars reassessed the persistence of military rule abroad, Congress 
continued to challenge American military assistance programs for non-democratic and abusive 
regimes abroad.157 Jointly administered by the Departments of State and Defense, spokespersons 
for the International Military Education and Training Program deftly defended the program using 
language that embraced the long-held faith in the power of American communities to improve 
visitors from the global South while offering long-term strategic rewards. Best of all, by weaving 
congressionally mandated concern for human rights into the curriculum for foreign visitors, 
client states’ political, economic, and cultural transformation was bound to result as a “cost-free” 
benefit for U.S. foreign policy.  
 
 The simultaneous growth of American interventionism and exceptionalism in U.S. 
foreign policy during the Reagan years required security assistance programs to serve several 
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purposes at the same time. Military and economic policy under Reagan combined a renewed 
dedication to intervention worldwide with the ongoing commitment to deregulation and rejection 
of social corporatism inherited from the Nixon era.158 Early in his first term, Reagan and his 
advisors pushed against weakening Soviet influence everyplace they could detect it through 
massive rearmament, applying economic and diplomatic pressure, and sending military 
assistance to counterrevolutionary movements and pro-Western regimes across the global 
South.159 American security assistance expanded sevenfold between 1980 and 1985, economic 
assistance abroad doubled, and the total American security assistance budget topped $9.7 
billion.160 The IMET program doubled in dollars to $56 million, but its portion in relation to 
other types of military assistance shrunk from 25% to just 7%, and less than 1% of all American 
aid.161  
U.S. hegemony over the institutions of global finance also made economic aid contingent 
upon accepting American neoliberal economic ideology.162 Especially during the global 
recession of 1981-1982, revolutionary regimes across Asia and Africa, including China and 
Rawlings’ Ghana, increasingly tabled socialism in exchange for International Monetary Fund 
loans.163 The Defense and Security Assistance Agency marked these changes in Ghanaian 
domestic economic policy in their annual summary of American aims for the IMET program in 
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Ghana, while asserting that the U.S.’s ongoing program to train influential Ghanaian military 
officers moderated extreme fluctuations in Ghanaian domestic politics.164 
 Ironically, waging economic Cold War in the global South with the carrot-stick 
combination of military aid and economic assistance that demanded “conditionality” and 
“adjustment” to market forces exacerbated the United States’ own domestic economic problems. 
By the mid-1980s, unprecedented annual budget deficits defied traditional American domestic 
political arrangements.165 American liberals and conservatives alike attacked the massive foreign 
aid infrastructure, hotly contested American intervention in Latin America, and questioned 
military sales programs that, they feared, caused arms races and instability at the expense of 
American economic stability.166 As they had since the 1950s, Congressional debates over the 
size and purpose of America’s security assistance program revealed where individuals’ regional 
and domestic concerns merged with discussions on international policy.167  
Especially in the Democratically-controlled House, where representatives scoured the 
security assistance budget in search of areas to cut, the ideologies behind each military assistance 
program occasionally revealed themselves in high relief. In a typical example from 1985, David 
Obey (D-WI), chair of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations squared off against retired Lieutenant General Ernest Graves, former director of 
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the Defense Security Assistance Agency, currently a senior fellow in International Security 
Studies at Georgetown University, and Frank Kramer, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs, when looking to cut $1 billion from President 
Reagan’s $9 billion foreign aid request.  
“If we are going to be looking at a 10 percent cut, we ought to start with the big babies 
first,” Obey opened. “What do we really get out of a $50, $75,000 IMET program in any of these 
places? Can I really come with a straight face, tell my constituents or tell members of the House 
on the floor, if I am asked, these dollars are essential this year – – given the budget crunch – – 
essential to the national interests of the United States?”168  
 “Well, the goal in the smaller countries . . .” Graves attempted to answer.169 
Obey cut him off: “I recognize what the goal is, and I am not questioning the fact that 
these programs might be nice to have or useful.” The question was, he demanded, “if we are 
dealing with a budget crunch, are they . . . essential to the national interests of the United 
States?” 170 
Graves and Kramer took turns responding. “I think the position of the administration in 
including these is that they see improving our security ties with those countries as fitting in with 
the overall effort to improve security around the world. And I think they are probably taking the 
view that the $50,000 is just as well spent as the $50,000 in some of the larger programs,” 
Graves answered.171 
“A critical point to remember about IMET,” Kramer added, “is that it is a long-term 
program. It is going to have no immediate consequences that are essentially in the same way as 
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putting a weapon in the hands of a country that is being attacked. So when you cut it, you’ll not 
have immediate consequences.”172 Congress may find itself with a “short-term” deficit problem, 
Kramer warned, and may find cutting IMET a tempting short-term solution, so “I think the 
answer to your question is no, it is not critical,” he admitted. “But if you take a longer view, 
there are some countries, I think, that you can say would never be essential or are very unlikely 
to be, but the whole purpose of the IMET program is to create a long-term and enduring 
relationship.”173  
Defending the program despite the difficulty measuring its effectiveness was only one 
challenge. “Some people do not like the fact that we have trained people who have ended up 
being dictators of various countries,” Kramer admitted, “but the fact is we have incredible access 
because of that program, and probably dollar for dollar it is the most important program we 
run.”174 So, he summed up, “whether you have to have IMET in Guinea, I doubt it over a given 
year. I think you have to look at it over a given number of years.”175 
This conventional response explicitly reiterated many of the rhetorical and ideological 
shields that protected international military education and training from serious scrutiny, and it 
implied the rest. IMET was a long-term program; critics must avoid the temptation to fixate on 
the lack of measurable results. Even for countries where the U.S. had no national interest, the 
program kept open channels of “incredible access” and permitted the U.S. to maintain more than 
just a token diplomatic presence nearly everywhere. More than that, the program built 
“relationships,” both institutional and individual. At the time of this hearing, more than 100 
nations participated in the U.S. IMET program in some way.176 Even in Guinea—which in this 
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testimony was shorthand for “the least important places of the Third World”—the U.S. could 
extend its psychological influence. Admittedly, many graduates of the program committed 
improper deeds—as this and other hearings throughout the 1980s confessed—but the program 
was always cost-effective.177 Especially in a security assistance context dominated by massive 
grants to a few strategically significant recipients, the justifications inherent in IMET program’s 
modest involvement worldwide made it stand out as a form of military assistance that could 
please an exceptionally wide range of political constituencies.178 In eras when budgets grew 
tight, the program’s low overall cost and mythical cost-effectiveness actually preserved it from 
reductions.179 These defenses had justified the program’s expansion in the early 1960s, had 
survived the decline of high modernization and bureaucratic decentralization in the 1970s, and 
persisted through the 1980s.  
Congressional attempts at the end of the 1980s to come to terms with the international 
military education and training program’s cost effectiveness and lack of measurable results 
revealed how persistent and consistent the ideals remained. In September 1989, Sen. Patrick 
Leahy (D-VT) again acknowledged decades-old critiques of America’s international military 
education and training program: “There has never been an objective evaluation of whether IMET 
training actually changes attitudes about respect for human rights and civilian control,” he told 
the Committee on Appropriations.180 “The Committee is told that IMET is a superb program 
                                                 
177 Shultz fields mostly questions on Human Rights in Shultz, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs 
Appropriations for 1986, 128–138; Lt Gen Gast (Defense) and Under Sec. Schneider field mostly Human Rights 
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with high payoff to the United States in foreign policy and national security terms,” he said.  181 
“If this is so self-evident, it should be easy for the appropriate agencies in the executive branch to 
prepare a full analysis of the program demonstrating the achievements of the IMET program.”182 
In June 1990, as Leahy announced the publication of the General Accountability Office report on 
IMET that he had commissioned, he declared, “IMET is a program that runs on momentum or 
inertia. Until this GAO study I requested, I do not think that anybody had looked at IMET since 
the early 1970s.”183 He was not entirely correct—the Defense Security Assistance Agency 
published a complete review of the program in 1979, as we have seen. But Leahy’s conclusion 
was valid: despite vast changes in global politics, the Cold War, and the objectives of American 
foreign policy, the IMET program’s justifications had not significantly changed since the early 
1970s. 
The General Accounting Office raised familiar objections to the international military 
training program’s administration in 1979, but the ideology behind the program remained firmly 
entrenched. Neither the Defense nor State Department had established a method of evaluating the 
success of international military education and training; they failed to maintain contact with 
IMET graduates or track their progress through their home militaries; and local training officials 
frequently changed their courses’ content and deviated from approved course materials.184 On 
the other hand, the GAO acknowledged, international military education and training programs 
seemed to succeed at “expos[ing] participants to U.S. values, citizens, institutions, and 
commitment to human rights.”185 Despite Leahy and GAO’s critique, the IMET program’s 
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ideological foundation that international military training had the potential to transform visiting 
military officers psychologically—at a low cost—remained intact. 
The Defense Security Assistance Agency published its 1989 responses to Congressional 
inquiries in an academic article in 1990. Spiro C. Manolas and Louis J. Samelson wrote, “the 
Administration takes the view . . . that IMET is an effective, low-cost component of the $8 
billion global U.S. security assistance effort.”186 At the then-current level of $47 million per year, 
they argued, the program provided “U.S. access to and influence[d] foreign governments far out 
of proportion to its modest cost.”187 On the other hand, they could offer “no rigorous proof either 
supporting or contradicting” whether American education and training efforts “actually can 
change attitudes in foreign counties toward such core U.S. concerns as civilian control and 
human rights.”188 Repeating the remarkably resilient phrases about the programs’ benefits and 
compiling anecdotal evidence and testimonials from graduates of U.S.-sponsored training, the 
1990 assessment demonstrated that faith in the transformative power of Military Internationalism 
still underlay American assumptions about its foreign military education and training programs. 
This assessment still identified national outcomes as a primary goal of American 
assistance, but did so in disembodied ways. “Nation-building is not an objective of the IMET 
program per se,” it reported, “nevertheless, it is an important byproduct.”189 Emphasizing 
“technology, management, and technical skills,” these programs “had a positive effect on the 
infrastructure of IMET recipient countries. The effect has been to stimulate ‘nation building’ 
which, in turn, has encouraged economic development.”190 This assertion, which does not 
explain how a human-centered training experience could influence the infrastructure of a 
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country, relies on an implicit understanding that the foreign officer’s experience in a U.S. 
military school or training facility equated to an institutional intervention between American 
society and his—and it could just as well have been written in 1960. This is not simply wishful 
thinking, the case of one Executive Branch department attempting to justify its budget. This 
assessment revealed two important aspects of this small, ongoing project of U.S. military 
assistance:  First, the expansiveness of the American faith in the technical and practical 
superiority of American training that permitted it to merge so successfully with modernization 
theory continued to permeate the international military education and training program for 
decades. Second, in emphasizing once again the national outcomes of the individuals’ training 
experience, this assertion illustrates the paradox that state actors failed to recognize that the 
national outcomes they presumed would follow American policy relied on sub-national or non-
national interactions first.  
A final example illustrates this paradox further. As it had through the 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s, Congress remained suspicious that American military assistance enabled dictators who 
violated their subjects’ human rights.191 At the same time, through the international military 
education and training program and its companion, the Informational Program, the Departments 
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of State and Defense reformulated those Congressional concerns precisely into justifications for 
these exchange programs. “To our knowledge,” Manolas and Samelson reported in 1990, “No 
other government which provides education and training to foreign militaries places an emphasis 
on human rights practices which even approaches the attention which the U.S. attaches to this 
subject in its military schools.”192 Meanwhile, just a few minutes before Leahy paraded out the 
GAO report—which he personally commissioned—that criticized the IMET program’s 
execution but upheld its “cost effectiveness,” Senators Leahy and Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) 
pressed Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew to 
explain a recent Miami Herald article describing widespread human rights abuses by fifteen El 
Salvadorian Army Officers—fourteen of whom were graduates of American IMET programs.193 
Bartholomew responded: “We have found, over the years, that one of the best tools we have for 
introducing foreign military personnel to American values is through the Individual [sic] Military 
Education and Training program.”194 He admitted, “The tragic situation in El Salvador is truly a 
hard test of our ability to encourage those values. Nonetheless, we remain convinced that our 
policy bolsters the center against violent extremists of the left and the right. IMET is a key 
component of that policy.”195 
 
Conclusion 
Other historians have noted recently how the discourse of modernization has returned to 
American foreign policy in the last decade. Nils Gilman attributes its resurgence to the age of 
terrorism, where 21st century Americans, seeking a national identity and national mission of 
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comparable vigor to their “ideologically fanatical enemies,” have unwittingly returned to the 
optimism and confidence of the 1950s.196 Nick Cullather exposes the irony that the failed 
American-funded dam project in Afghanistan’s Helmand Valley in the 1960s left the land 
useless for anything except poppies, which financed the Taliban’s rise to power in the 1990s; and 
that America’s reconstruction plan after the 2003 invasion included restoring the dam.197 By 
these accounts, modernization theory reappeared after a well-earned absence. 
In other places, modernization theory did not really go away after the Vietnam War, we 
were just not looking for it in the right places. Programs that sponsored foreign military 
personnel in the U.S. continued for decades after the 1960s because they conformed to deeply 
held beliefs about the power of American expertise to transform the world. Quite the contrary, 
the programs were remarkably resilient, and weathered the major shifts in American foreign 
policy in the 60s, 70s, and 80s despite the absence of evidence that they worked, because they 
appealed to a deeper faith that individual contact with ordinary Americans could inspire visitors 
to remake their societies. Because these programs yielded psychological, not physical, benefits, 
they were inexpensive. Since they depended so much on local American communities’ initiative 
for success, their practical execution and ongoing ideological sustenance flexibly adapted to 
major changes in American foreign policy during those decades.  
American sponsor families for international military personnel probably would not have 
recognized their service as a project of American liberal internationalism, fueled by universalist 
ideologies of American exceptionalism and modernization theory. In 1959, the Draper 
Committee said, simply, that when foreign nationals lived in close contact with U.S. citizens, 
they developed an appreciation for American values and way of life, and that they went back 
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home changed men and women.198 This sentiment repeated, nearly verbatim, for decades, from 
senators, secretaries and under secretaries of State and Defense, generals, and scholars of 
modernization, of realism, and of “new directions in foreign policy,” although usually there was 
something more unsaid or implied about what that change entailed. Modernization theory 
absorbed the official policy for visiting military students, and it never went away completely. In 
another sense, as we shall see, the ideological grooves of Military Internationalism in American 
communities that made the two compatible preexisted and ran deeper than the careers of the 
great social scientists of the 1950s and 1960s.   
The United States’ ongoing military training exchange with Ghana in the years after the 
1979 coup reveals how flexible and durable the rhetoric surrounding international military 
education could be. Instead of questioning the apparent lack of fruit of two decades of military 
exchanges, American policymakers aggressively defended the international military education 
and training program as a precarious toehold of American influence. In the minds of American 
planners, international military education preserved the ideal, Western norms of civil-military 
relations in the hearts of Ghanaian officers and, as Ghanaian politics continued to overwhelm the 
ideals’ practicality, American policymakers projected onto international military education the 
role of preserving America’s entire diplomatic relationship with Ghana. Both of these 
missions—preserving the ideal of the professional, non-political military and the ability of the 
international military education and training program to sustain American diplomatic relations 
with Ghana—vastly overestimated what it could actually accomplish in the short term. Neither 
seemed inappropriate, however, given the underlying faith that international military education 
and training exchanges still embodied the transformative potential of person-to-person contact 
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between the military officers from the global South and the ideal American.199 Since that faith 
never faltered during this time, the specific rhetoric that tapped into that faith to justify specific 
policies could be radically redirected without collapsing entirely.
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Part II 
Chapter 4: “Baled-Hay Diplomacy:” Military Internationalism in Kansas City 
 
The organization was so perfected this year that things really hummed, – – enough straw 
to sit upon, beverages galore, expert dinner accommodations, and all of us such nice 
people! And all of it so utterly American, but particularly mid-American. I believe we 
truly represented ourselves, good old cross-section of U.S.A from hither and yon – What 
a gold-mine those fine officers represent, creme de la creme of each country’s intellect, 
individuality and prowess. Because of us some of them will be truly sad to leave our 
country, will vow never to forget us and will have added an indescribable dimension to 
their scope. As one friend said on leaving, “I will never forget you all. I can’t explain 
what's happened in my mind!” 
 – Greater Kansas City People-to-People member Joy Parr, describing the 1966 rodeo and 
barbeque with Fort Leavenworth’s Allied Officers.1 
 
Introduction: Cultural Diplomacy versus Military Internationalism 
Nothing said “America” like Kansas City and nothing said Kansas City like rodeo. Each summer 
since 1963, sponsor families from the Greater Kansas City Chapter of People-to-People 
International had hosted Fort Leavenworth’s international officers and their wives and children at 
Kansas City’s Benjamin Stables for pony rides, a “chuck wagon” dinner, and Western stage 
show featuring music, “Indian ceremonials,” “Indian dancers,” “real life cowboys and all the 
other activities of the ‘old west.’”2 As the rodeo opened, a mounted honor guard galloped into 
the arena waving the flags of each of the visiting officers’ forty-two nations. The rodeo staff 
“reserved seats grouped together in a choice location without charge” for the group. The U.S. 
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Army provided a bus for the hundred or so international officers and their families, and paid their 
admission. Civilian sponsors and their guests, about three hundred in all, paid two dollars each to 
attend. The night made memories. “The gay laughter or quiet murmur of conversation under the 
trees in the darkness at parting time seemed especially rich this particular Sunday night,” Joy 
Parr remembered.3 “Rich in fellowship, rich in human understanding, rich in a mellow, glowing 
sort of way!”4 Sponsors, international officers, and their families repeated similar sentiments 
each year for thirty more years before cuts to the international officer program budget forced the 
Greater Kansas City People-to-People Chapter to abandon the rodeo event.5  
Between the 1960s and 1980s, volunteers from the Leavenworth-Lansing Chamber of 
Commerce and the Greater Kansas City Chapter of People-to-People International channeled the 
eager participation of local women, political and business leaders, and the International Military 
Student Division staff at Fort Leavenworth to forge relationships that reinforced the local, 
national, and international prominence of all three. A host of reasons inspired local men and 
women to sponsor the hundred or so international officers and their families during their 
yearlong course at the Command and General Staff College. Largely, they internalized People-
to-People’s founding myths, first articulated by President Eisenhower in 1956 and repeated 
without embarrassment for decades: that through hospitality and understanding, private citizens 
of all countries could “get together and leap governments,” to learn to cooperate, and to bring 
world peace.6 Through the events they hosted, the organizations that cooperated, and the way 
they celebrated their efforts and accomplishments, these volunteers asserted a much larger role 
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4 Ibid. 
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for themselves in the already complex relationship between individuals, community 
organizations, and the United States’ foreign policy objectives.  
This chapter explores how communities around America’s most prominent school for 
visiting military officers developed institutions that validated their own community ethos by 
accommodating international families. It argues that American families around Fort 
Leavenworth formed friendships with the families of visiting military elites that conformed to 
prior American presumptions of common military ethics that transcended political borders, but 
expressed and renewed their friendships in ways that resisted the changing rhetoric of American 
foreign policy toward Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Since American foreign policy celebrated 
ordinary families’ contributions to transforming visiting military officers, local women assumed 
the most prominent roles organizing, executing, and interpreting the meaning of off-post 
community programs for international families. Both women and men considered “Midwestern” 
hospitality an essential element in their relationships because it encouraged personal connections 
that “leaped governments.” Although women and men around the Fort cherished their 
international relationships, their professed cosmopolitanism always had a military twist. 
Ironically, for American communities around Fort Leavenworth, their transnational identity that 
claimed superiority over traditional diplomatic and national political structures in fact depended 
on the United States government to provide a steady flow of foreign elites and their families for 
renewal.  
Leavenworth and Kansas City communities’ robust partnerships with the Army post’s 
international officers reflected prior assumptions about the modernizing effects of American 
military education and training already established in American foreign assistance policy after 
1960. As Chapter 1 showed, the international military education and training program expanded 
in the early 1960s to encourage American communities to convey the same political, economic, 
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and social values that American social scientists equated with modernity. Part of that transaction 
included wresting control of the United States massive military assistance program away from 
“unimaginative” and security-minded bureaucrats in the Eisenhower Administration.7 Yet the 
trend toward national mobilization in support of modernization directly contradicted the 
simultaneous nationalization and centralization of other forms of American cultural diplomacy in 
the 1960s.8  
Despite an explosion of occasions for interaction in the 1940s and 1950s—international 
students at American universities and “every man an ambassador” campaigns, for example—
historians argue that American nationalism eclipsed internationalism and the federal government 
centralized and hijacked cultural exchange for Cold War ideological combat.9 Richard Arndt, 
who relates with passion his career as “a mole” for “the university world” within the State 
Department and U.S. Information Agency’s (USIA) cultural diplomacy programs, catalogs 
cultural diplomacy’s unrelenting decline after 1953 until the death of USIA in 1999.10 Charles 
Thomson, the State Department’s former Chief of Cultural Relations, himself discounted “the 
People-to-People movement” in 1963 for lacking “serious and sustained impact,” for “spotty, 
and sometimes superficial and sentimental” activities, and for falling short of creating the 
“numerous long-term programs carried on by foundations and by educational, scholarly, 
religious, and industrial groups.”11 Kenneth A. Osgood mocks People-to-People volunteers as 
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Potomac Books, 2005), x–xii. 
11 Charles A. Thomson and Walter H. C. Laves, Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy (Bloomington, IN: 
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unwitting dupes in the service of Eisenhower’s domestic propaganda machine.12 The persistence 
of American racism also gravely limited the impact effect of cultural diplomacy campaigns 
abroad, as American performers often dissociated themselves from American foreign and 
domestic policy while simultaneously “blowing up the world” with American culture.13 Yet 
women and men around Fort Leavenworth remained active integrating international families 
throughout this time. Cultural diplomacy did not corrode everywhere in the United States. 
 Rapidly changing informational technology and globalization may have accelerated 
cycles of public information and eroded diplomats’ traditional control over the flow of 
information, but diplomacy became more democratic as a result, not less.14 Instead, just as 
Robert Kroes argues that the “targets” of American cultural diplomacy abroad actively received, 
interpreted, and re-transmitted American symbols and messages back to the world, we find that 
the individuals—Americans and international families—at the point of interaction in the U.S. 
interpreted their exchange according to their own motives.15 Robust local initiatives for 
international cooperation that thrived around Kansas City for decades after 1960’s reveal that 
many Americans’ internationalist impulses remained intact.  
As U.S. foreign policymakers struggled to understand the limits of American military 
power after the Vietnam War, the International Military Education and Training program that 
funded the Command and General Staff College’s international officers persisted. Partly because 
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it ran on “inertia,” partly because Defense and State Department officials deftly redefined the 
program’s goals to reflect changing American foreign policy objectives, and partly because it 
cost little, international military education and training remained a staple of American military 
assistance policy through the 1990s.16 Most importantly, however, the fundamental assumption 
that made foreign military training a natural instrument for modernization theorists, Cold War 
realists, and human rights-minded reformers still persisted: life among American communities 
yielded lasting psychological benefits for foreign visitors that over time transformed their home 
states and reinforced American influence there.  Men and women volunteers around Fort 
Leavenworth understood this aspect of American foreign policy, but also specifically discounted 
this as their primary motivation. Genuine friendship and empathy motivated most of them, they 
said.  
As we saw in Chapter 3, modernization theorists’ initial rhetoric praising life among 
ordinary Americans survived in local communities long after the supposed decline of 
modernization theory. In a similar way, independence from formal state diplomacy permeated 
the organizations surrounding Fort Leavenworth’s international officers and preserved them even 
after America’s moment of cultural diplomacy lost its independence and supposed purity in the 
1960s. Although historians readily admit that twentieth century American transnationalism 
began with private religious, philanthropic, and civic organizations, they often fail to recognize 
that in American communities, such “private”—or non-state—initiatives remained as the century 
ended.17 Even Arndt, the unapologetic “mole” against USIA bureaucratization of cultural 
diplomacy, marvels at the longevity of the Fulbright program and International Visitor Program, 
when “all else has declined or disappeared.”18 These thriving transnational hospitality networks 
                                                 
16 See Chapter 3. 
17 Tyrrell, Reforming the World; Manela, The Wilsonian Moment; Zimmerman, Alabama in Africa; See, for 
example, Ekbladh, The Great American Mission; Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings; Mazower, Governing the World. 
18 Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, 545. 
 
223 
 
upend the narrative in which the “real world” of geopolitical competition slowly strangled pre-
Cold War humanitarianism. Diplomatic or public policy justifications for international military 
exchanges, then, often only mimicked the prior assumption that cultural exchange activated 
transnational identities. Around Fort Leavenworth, for example, both the assumption and the 
identities persisted.  
The presence of so many specifically military visitors challenges, but does not 
necessarily vitiate the humanitarian or internationalist impulse of the Kansas City community, 
despite historians’ claim that American militarism replaced cultural exchanges based on purer 
cosmopolitan instincts as the century progressed.19 Still, locals’ transnational identity matured on 
the home front of American empire, as the more powerful partner in an unequal alliance.20 For 
ethnologist Catherine Lutz, for example, U.S. military bases were sites “at which empire 
[became] a lived experience” for entire American communities.21 On the other hand, taking the 
women who recorded and publicized most of the sponsors’ activities at their word requires 
acknowledging that they genuinely felt they were contributing to world peace. These same 
women imagined, organized, and led a Peace Festival in Kansas City in 1968, 1969, and 1970. 
Clearly, there was more going on here than simple Cold War militarism. 
Women’s conspicuous influence integrating Fort Leavenworth’s international families 
with the Greater Kansas City Chapter of People-to-People and the Leavenworth-Lansing 
Chamber of Commerce requires a new assessment of the balance between gendered expectations 
                                                 
19 Vagts first acknowledged the rise of militarized fascist societies before World War II, but also the paradoxical 
condition of secularized states after World War II embracing military titles and other forms of “civilian militarism.” 
See Vagts, A History of Militarism, 490; See also Sherry, In the Shadow of War; Hubert P. Van Tuyll, “Militarism, 
the United States and the Cold War,” Armed Forces & Society 20, no. 4 (Summer 1994): 519–30. 
20 See, for example, Lutz, Homefront; Lutz, “Empire Is in the Details”; See also the Roundtable on Henry Luce’s 
“American Century,” in “Diplomatic History” vol. 23 (1999), including: Kroes, “American Empire and Cultural 
Imperialism”; Lundestad, “‘Empire by Invitation’ in the American Century”; Wagnleitner, “The Empire of the Fun, 
or Talkin’ Soviet Union Blues”; Arndt, The First Resort of Kings; Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas; Rosenberg, 
Spreading the American Dream; Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases. 
21 Lutz, Homefront, 209; Lutz, “Empire Is in the Details,” 598, 607. 
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of hospitality and Kansas City and Leavenworth women’s confidence seizing leadership roles in 
transnational organizations. Hospitality could be powerful, especially when it was international. 
Calling for renewed attention to the essential but unofficial role women played around American 
overseas military bases—including both American and local women who provided social and 
sexual services—Cynthia Enloe argues that governments depended on “allegedly private 
relationships” between classes and nationalities to conduct international affairs.22 Enloe focuses 
her ethnography on diplomatic and military communities overseas, but her observation that “the 
personal is international” applies equally stateside, where American women provided hospitality 
and social services to visiting families from abroad. In this case, however, the active cooperation 
between the International Military Student Division office at Command and General Staff 
College and the dual sponsorship programs in Leavenworth and Kansas City made the 
relationships less private and significantly more official.  Further, since People-to-People 
celebrated that they “leaped governments” to create international relationships, women who 
previously had little official power according to national standards of diplomacy seized the 
opening the language of volunteerism carved to make themselves central to the practice of 
citizen-diplomacy.  
Instead, the occasional partnership between Army officials and local civilian groups and 
the remarkable resilience of community programs despite shifting American foreign policy 
suggests that something closer to Iriye’s “two worlds” was at work.23 The historiographies of 
Eisenhower’s non-public people-to-people initiatives, cultural diplomacy, and military education 
and training as vestiges of the supposedly “real” world of state power dwell on decline. As an 
example of sub-state international exchange, underwritten as it was by a major State and Defense 
Department program, sponsorship programs for foreign military families reveal the persistence 
                                                 
22 Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases, 196. 
23 Iriye, “Internationalizing International History,” 53. 
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of initiative for cultural exchange and peace that Iriye considers not “imaginary” at all, but 
actually the main story.  
 
The Informational Program: Cultural Diplomacy, Military Assistance, and More 
When the Departments of State and Defense first seriously evaluated the effectiveness of 
the Informational Program within the international military education and training program in 
1971, they recognized that it was impossible to untangle the “official” lessons in American 
politics, economy, and culture from the initiatives of community members to provide hospitality, 
sponsor families, home visits, and social activities.24 State Department inspectors acknowledged 
that for Americans and visiting military personnel alike, unofficial interaction with local families 
had become the “most effective” aspect of the program.25 Sponsor families offered “a contact 
with the local civilian world” and offered “the most accurate view of life in America as it is 
actually lived.”26 Sponsors initiated home visits, facilitated “attendance at sports events,” and the 
sponsor “or his wife solve[d] shopping problems.”27 The sponsor became the foreign military 
trainee’s “guide, philosopher, and friend.”28  
We could read these observations by the State Department’s Inspector General for 
Foreign Assistance as endorsements for the ordinary Americans’ enthusiasm for cultural 
diplomacy objectives, but they also suggest official unease with American communities’ 
initiative. Despite 1960s modernization theorists’ statist proclivities, historian Nils Gilman 
argues, “Modernization theory deemed good governance to be of the people and for the people, 
                                                 
24 See chapter 3, above. Campbell and Strauss, “Memorandum from Neil H. Campbell and Elliot B. Strauss, Office 
of the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance, U.S. Department of State, to Anthony Faunce, Acting Inspector 
General, Department of State, November 15, 1971, Subject: Review of Military Assistance Training - Informational 
Program and Orientation Tours,” 10–11. 
25 Ibid., 11. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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but most assuredly not by the people.”29 The State Department’s inspectors recognized that the 
sponsor program evolved organically around foreign military visitors, but the sponsor program 
had preceded—and would likely outlive—official cooperation with the military bases.30 Formal 
diplomatic structures wielded no intellectual influence over the content of the exchange between 
visitors and sponsor families—a potentially subversive arrangement. Still, just as government 
agents consented to share with local civic groups “the financial obligations for picnics, 
luncheons, invitations to sporting events, visits to local industries, courts, newspapers labor 
meetings, and other activities leading toward the achievement of [Informational Program] 
objectives,” they also assumed that any cultural or intellectual exchange would benefit American 
foreign policy objectives.31  
Department of Defense officials at specific military schools did not lament the absence of 
overriding intellectual or diplomatic control over the cultural contact inherent in international 
military education and training. Since 1963 their mission was to provide “a balanced 
understanding . . . of United States society, institutions, and ideals,” and emphasized trips and 
tours as the ideal method to present that understanding.32 From the beginning, however, local 
directors of international programs cherished their intellectual independence. Colonel William 
Pipkin, who directed Fort Leavenworth’s Office of Allied Personnel between 1969 and 1972, 
enjoyed offering unconventional lessons in American life, such as “when we took them to 
Washington, D.C. one year, all of the speakers that we had were black professors from Howard 
                                                 
29 Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, 18 Emphasis in original. 
30 Campbell and Strauss, “Memorandum from Neil H. Campbell and Elliot B. Strauss, Office of the Inspector 
General of Foreign Assistance, U.S. Department of State, to Anthony Faunce, Acting Inspector General, Department 
of State, November 15, 1971, Subject: Review of Military Assistance Training - Informational Program and 
Orientation Tours,” 7. 
31 Ellis, “Memorandum from Atlee R. Ellis, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Directory of Military Assistance and Sales to 
Defense Security Assistance Agency (Comptroller), 23 December 1971, Subject: IGA Report, ‘Review of Military 
Assistance Training - Informational Program and Orientation Tours,’” 1. 
32 Gilpatrick, “Memorandum for the Service Secretaries from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, September 13, 1963; 
Subject: An Informational Program for Foreign Military Trainees and Visitors in the United States,” 2. 
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University, and they didn’t paint a very beautiful picture as far as the treatment of blacks and the 
potential for blacks.”33 After trips like this, he recalled, visiting officers “were amazed that we 
would take them and show them the bad as well as the good,” and that Americans’ openness 
“changed how they felt about people in the United States.”34 In 1979, the Defense Security 
Assistance Agency also warned against heavy-handed “ideological” indoctrination in the 
Informational Program, suggesting, “Preaching and exhortation in a classroom would be 
counterproductive; it is best to let the IMET trainees learn by seeing and experiencing.”35 In 
1990, they reiterated, “IMET is a people-to-people program. Its aims and purposes are long 
range in nature and scope.”36  
As the largest of the American services’ institutions of advanced military education, Fort 
Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff College’s diverse student body made it a 
representative example of how the United States envisioned its role in educating foreign officers 
and developing foreign militaries. Actually, several different schools resided at Ft. Leavenworth, 
including schools for sergeants, junior officers, senior officers and various technical specialties 
within the army.37 Command and General Staff College was the school for middle-ranking 
officers, usually Majors and Lieutenant Colonels, intended to prepare them for command 
positions.  Since the mid-1950s, each annual class included about 1200 officers from the U.S. 
Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and equivalent ranks among civilians within Department 
of Defense agencies. The school also hosted the most international officers of any single 
American military training organization, averaging between 90 and 120 international students 
                                                 
33 Col. William P. Pimkin [sic], interview by J. Patrick Hughes, transcript, August 6, 1992, 12, Box 1, Folder 21, 
CARL International Officer Collection; See also, Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 13. 
34 Pimkin [sic], interview, 12. 
35 Harry O. Amos et al., U.S. Training of Foreign Military Personnel, Volume 1: Executive Summary (McLean, VA: 
General Research Corporation, Tactical Warfare Operations, March 1979), 6. 
36 Manolas and Samelson, “The IMET Program: Report to Congress,” 20. 
37 The overall name for the training facility at Ft. Leavenworth is the Combined Arms Center. “US Army Combined 
Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth Public Home Page,” accessed March 20, 2012, 
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/index.asp. 
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per year, usually from 40 to 50 different nations each year. 38 By 1991, over 112 different allied 
nations had sent officers to Command and General Staff College, including at least thirty from 
Ghana since 1969. The school invited international officers to bring their spouses and children to 
Leavenworth, and most chose to.39 All international families resided off-post in the community 
around the towns of Leavenworth and Lansing, Kansas, with a combined population of roughly 
30,000 between 1960 and 1990.40  
Some aspects of the “broad inclusiveness” that modernization theorists claimed 
distinguished American modernity also knitted together social institutions around Fort 
Leavenworth.41 Local civilians’ participation in the Command and General Staff College’s 
international officer program, for example, represented the consensus between the state and 
charities, universities, businesses, and international organizations that David Ekbladh described 
as characterizing the American modernization “mission.”42  The Informational Program’s 
recommended schedule of tours of local labor unions and agricultural facilities, and visits with 
“leaders of opposition parties” signified faith that liberal capitalism’s successes could inspire the 
foreign officer to become “modern,” and that he would nurture modernity when he returned 
home. Still, the plan had its limits.  
First, military education and training programs affected very small numbers of officers 
from each country. Using Ghana as an example, between 1969 and 1992, for example, only 
                                                 
38 “International Officer Program” slide in Eggering, “Class Director’s Mission Statement”; Jim Fain, “Re: A Very 
Quick Question,” March 20, 2012; Between 1956 and 1967, the numbers are complicated by the presence of two 
different courses--a “regular” and “associate” course. By 1967 the “associate” courses went away, and the quota was 
97 international officers, roughly 10%. Pipkin, “Allied Personnel at USACGSC.” 
39 In the late 1980s, approximately 70% of visiting officers were accompanied by family members. Eggering, “Class 
Director’s Mission Statement.” 
40 “KANSAS Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990,” U.S. Census Bureau, March 27, 1995, 
http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/ks190090.txt; In 1990, the ethnic/racial composition of Leavenworth 
Kansas was approx. 75% white, 15% Black or African American, 8% Hispanic or Latino. Self-reported racial data in 
a census has methodological limits, so these figures are rough estimates. U. S. Census Bureau, “American 
FactFinder - Results,” U.S. Census Bureau, accessed March 31, 2014, 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_10_SF1_QTP3. 
41 Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, 20; Ekbladh, The Great American Mission, 136. 
42 Ekbladh, The Great American Mission, 154. 
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thirty Ghanaian officers attended Fort Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff College.43 
Although some Ghanaian historians acknowledge a “proud” military tradition, it is far from 
certain that Ghanaian military officers of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s would be considered 
“elites.”44 In addition, this school did not export “technology” in the sense of training in complex 
military equipment, but rather lessons in the value of technology. Its curriculum emphasized 
leadership and organizational skills for senior leaders. Aside from a graduate’s lapel pin, it 
produced no public landmark to commemorate American largesse.   
The community around Fort Leavenworth exemplifies how unofficial relationships filled 
gaps left because the Informational Program only targeted military members themselves, not 
their wives. The list of “significant facets of American life” that remained part of the 
Informational Program since its inception in 1963 changed little in three decades, but the 
Informational Program regulated only part of the interaction between visiting military families 
and the local community. Unofficial social events and networks for foreign officers and their 
families sprouted spontaneously around the Command and General Staff College after 1950. 
Civilian sponsor families from began hosting international officers in 1952, supplementing the 
Army-assigned “military” sponsor each international officer already received. In 1962, 
volunteers from the new Greater Kansas City Chapter of People-to-People began providing each 
international officer and his family with a third sponsor family to introduce them to “Kansas City 
life.” Both “Leavenworth sponsors” and “Kansas City sponsors” organized picnics, formal 
dinners, and informal social events for sponsors and their international officers’ families 
throughout the year.  Sometimes the local organizations coordinated their activities with the 
                                                 
43 This data obtained by surveying the plaques lining the walls at the Lewis and Clark Hall, CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, 
Kansas 
44 Addae argues,“In the 1940s and 1950s no sensible young man with secondary education (and these were 
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Army, and sometimes the Army contributed funds, but in most cases, the local volunteers 
interpreted the events’ meanings according to their own motives.  
 
What made the Informational Program so critical was that it officially declared the 
totality of American community and cultural life a valid topic for military education. The 
program itself touched only a fraction of the foreign elites participating in American military 
education, and as we have seen, produced very few measurable results in either military 
capability or strategic realignment.45 No bother; the program’s most valuable lessons were “long-
term,” psychological, and hard to quantify. Even if they wanted to, the Directors of Allied 
Personnel at Fort Leavenworth could not monopolize social and cultural exchange occurring off 
post or insulate visiting officers and their families from Leavenworth and Kansas City 
volunteers. On a practical level, since seventy percent of each class’s foreign officers brought 
their families, and all families lived off-post, Directors of Allied Personnel needed neighbors and 
volunteers to help visitors move in.46 As we have seen, the assumptions that the life among 
ordinary Americans had transformative power permeated official and unofficial descriptions of 
the international program since its inception. Civilians around the Fort understood the 
assumptions, largely shared them, and celebrated their role providing the hospitality and 
friendship they felt the U.S. Army empowered them to share. Fort Leavenworth personnel could 
not have limited the community’s initiative if they tried.  
 
                                                 
45 See chapters 1 and 3. 
46 Fort Leavenworth began permitting foreign officers’ families to live on-post after 2002. Jeanne Boetig, Interview 
with Jeanne Boetig at Leavenworth Public Library, February 12, 2014, Author’s possession. 
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How International Officers’ Families and the Town of Leavenworth Kansas Came to Know 
Each Other 
Even though the names and shapes of the unofficial social programs for visiting officers’ 
families changed over the years, military wives and civilian women in the town of Leavenworth 
continued to lead them all. In 1947, the Leavenworth Officers Wives Club created the “Pan 
American Group” to cater to Latin American officers and families whose numbers swelled 
during World War II.47 The international program grew during the Cold War. By 1960 over 
1,800 international officers—roughly 100 per class—from sixty-one different countries had 
attended the staff college.48 By then, the former Director of Allied Programs recalled, the 
“International Group” subcommittee of the Officers Wives Club was “well organized and 
operating at full steam.”49 Within the International Group, “language groups” evolved for 
families of German, Spanish, and French speakers to meet for monthly social events—usually 
involving tea.50  In 1968, a “Middle East” group formed.51 By the 1980s, the groups gathered 
women based on mixed categories of language, region, and culture, including groups for French, 
German, English speakers from Europe and the Commonwealth, “Latin”—Spanish and 
Portuguese, and Arabic.52  
Reflecting their blurred lines of responsibility, between 1950 and 1990 other unofficial 
auxiliary programs were called the “International Officers Program,” “Operation International” 
                                                 
47 Reichley, International Officers:  A Century of Participation at the United States Army Command and General 
Staff College, 15. 
48 In the 1950s, CGSC offered “regular” one-year courses, with about 80 International officers per class, and two 
six-month “associated courses” with 30-35 International Officers each. By 1967, the staff college offered one year-
long class per year, with about 100 officers per class. Pipkin, “Allied Personnel at USACGSC”; U.S. Army, Fort 
Leavenworth: From Frontier Post to Home of the United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1964, 
51. 
49 Pipkin, “Programs for Allied Officers.” 
50 Dottie Burks, “From the Fort: Allied Wives Tea,” The Leavenworth Times, July 18, 1965, 4B, Leavenworth 
Public Library; Unknown, “Welcoming Tea,” The Leavenworth Times, August 18, 1970, 6, Leavenworth Public 
Library. 
51 Barbara Ford, “From the Fort: Language Group,” The Leavenworth Times, October 1, 1968, 12, Leavenworth 
Public Library. 
52 Boetig, Interview with Jeanne Boetig at Leavenworth Public Library. 
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or “Program for Allied Officers,” depending on the source. The Officers Wives Club, the 
Leavenworth Jaycees (which dissolved in the early 1970s), and the Leavenworth-Lansing 
Chamber of Commerce’s separate Operation International committee and Women’s Division 
formed temporary coalitions year-round to arrange activities for visiting officers and their 
families. They staffed registration booths in the first days of each class to enroll newly arrived 
officers and their families in the Officers Wives Club and sponsorship program. They hosted 
picnics for international families, coordinated off-base sponsor families for each visiting family, 
held wives’ coffee klatches, food fairs, international “fashion shows,” and conducted the annual 
“American Language Program” that taught newly arrived families lessons in American culture.53 
The groups’ activities blended with one another, with no clear line distinguishing unofficial from 
officially sanctioned activities for officers’ families. 
Staff college leaders actually depended on the unpaid social services the Leavenworth 
community provided international officers’ families, but needed not fear the vulnerability of that 
position. The International Group began as a “wives” organization, but with a hierarchy that 
mirrored the military chain of command.  Before 1970, the Command and General Staff College 
Commandant’s wife personally selected the President of the International Group.54 She was 
usually a Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel’s wife, one former Director of Allied Operations 
recalled, wife “with plenty of backing for her projects.”55 Most American students were Majors, 
so the International Group president “outranked” any American spouses who were new to the 
group. She coordinated the language groups, ran monthly gatherings for tea, organized the 
international “food fairs” and fashion shows, and coordinated with community organizations for 
larger programs. She also acted as a bridge between the Commandant and the community leaders 
                                                 
53 Pipkin, “Programs for Allied Officers.” 
54 Unknown, “International Group,” c 1992, Box 1, Folder 3, CARL International Officer Collection. 
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who supported Fort Leavenworth’s programs for international officers and their wives.56 As a 
senior officer’s wife, she represented to the wives and children of visiting officers a domestic 
version of the staff college syllabus.   
In the 1960s, as the off-post, civilian-run “Operation International” organizational 
structure supplanted some of the on-post Officers Wives Club activities, women maintained their 
control over the content of off-duty events. The civilian sponsor program was the most visible. In 
1953, the Leavenworth Jaycees formally expanded the sponsor program that had previously 
assigned only an American military officer to assist each incoming international officer to 
provide a “civilian” sponsor or sponsor family for each visiting officer and his family. A 
sponsor’s job was to “help the allies get settled in the community and feel at home. They have 
them in their homes for visits and meals to show them how the American family lives,” and to 
provide “all those things of courtesy and hospitality one would expect to do for an old friend 
newly arrived on station.”57 The new “civilian” program paralleled the “military” sponsor, with 
formal staff college support, coordinated by the Operation International committee of the 
Leavenworth-Lansing Chamber of Commerce.58 By 1991, the international military student 
office boasted that over 500 local families had served as sponsors, some for as long as thirty-six 
consecutive years.59 The army instructed all sponsors, civilian and military, that “a close and 
supportive relationship between yourself and the IO [international officer] is essential in 
providing an accurate view of what America is and who Americans are. This is as important as 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Dolly Gordon, “Operation International,” Leavenworth Times, January 17, 1982, 2, Leavenworth Public Library; 
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the IOs military training.”60 Again, the Army reaffirmed local civilians’ authority to interpret and 
transmit the essential meaning of “what America is and who Americans are” for themselves.  
The Operation International committee was not technically a women’s organization, but 
women chose to lead it. When the Leavenworth Jaycees ran the sponsorship program before 
1974, a husband/wife team chaired the committee.61 In 1974, Georgia Capshaw, wife of retired 
CGSC Chief of Staff Colonel Benjamin Capshaw, took over the program, continuing the 
traditional relationship between the formal base organization and community women.62  Between 
1974 and 1995, only three women, Georgia Capshaw, Mary Kalhorn, and Dolly Gordon presided 
over Operation International.63 The Chamber of Commerce also included a Military Relations 
committee to coordinate public affairs events with the Fort, but Operation International directed 
the two most visible joint programs: the sponsor program and the American Language Course. 
The “American Language Course” represented a synthesis of the Command and General 
Staff College’s military training, the Informational Program’s broad campaign to impress the 
lessons of “modernity,” and modern American domestic ideals. Since the 1950s, foreign military 
members received formal English language training prior to beginning the staff college, but their 
families rarely did.64 In 1977, Joanna Pipkin, wife of the Director of Allied Personnel at the time, 
reached out to the Leavenworth community for help. Pipkin pitched the idea to Sister Maria 
Edwards, an English professor at nearby St. Mary College, and in July, the American Language 
                                                 
60 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, “CGSC Circular 351-6; Sponsor’s Guide” (U.S. Army 
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62 Ibid. 
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Course for Allied Wives and Children began.65 Classes met three times per week during the 
month of July, just before the staff college classes began.  Under the direction of Dolly Gordon, 
president of the Operation International committee of the Chamber of Commerce, the program 
expanded and moved to the local Presbyterian church and school, which provided nursery and 
kindergarten facilities for mothers with small children.66  
The women who ran it carefully controlled the size and scope of the course. In 1984, 
forty-three officers’ wives and their children attended.67 In 1986, there were fifty-nine wives and 
136 children.68 Partly to ensure the event remained “civilian” and free from tensions caused by 
competing ranks, Gordon prohibited American spouses of military officers from volunteering 
with the course.69 Instead, volunteers from the local American Association of University Women 
(AAUW) chapter supplied half of the course’s twenty-four teachers. Active and retired public 
school teachers, college, and high school students also volunteered.70 To encourage Islamic 
women who were reluctant to participate in public gatherings, Gordon carefully excluded all men 
from the church except those giving presentations.71 The Leavenworth Rotary club, the Chamber 
of Commerce, the Officers Wives Club, the AAUW, and the city Superintendent of Schools’ 
office also provide financial or material support to the course.72  The course changed its name to 
the American Orientation Course in the late 1980s, deemphasizing formal English classes for 
wives while simultaneously expanding to include English lessons for international children up to 
age eighteen. “All involved agree,” William Pipkin told the Leavenworth Times, “that this is not 
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68 Unknown, “AMERICAN LANGUAGE COURSE FOR ALIED WIVES AND CHILDREN,” Fact Sheet, (July 
1986), Box 1, Folder 4, CARL International Officer Collection. 
69 Boetig, Interview with Jeanne Boetig at Leavenworth Public Library. 
70 William P. Pipkin, “American Language Classes Termed Successful,” Leavenworth Times, July 31, 1983, 2D, 
Leavenworth Public Library. 
71 Boetig, Interview with Jeanne Boetig at Leavenworth Public Library. 
72 Unknown, “American Language Course.” 
 
236 
 
long enough to really teach a non-English speaker to learn the American language, however it 
gives them a start and there are many other pluses for the one-month course.”73 
In addition to teaching the basics of the American language, the American Language 
Course promised an “introduction to U.S. Midwestern culture [and] way of life.”74 This included 
lessons in Midwestern womanhood.  The course “introduces them to things that are different 
such as measurements and clothing sizes; it introduces them to the City Library and all the 
children are enrolled in the RIF [Reading is Fundamental] program,” William Pipkin recalled.75  
The 1979 move to the First Presbyterian Church enabled mothers to deposit their children with 
American babysitters during the course.76 By 1983 the course included lectures on “How to Use 
Cosmetics,” “Easy Recipes,” “Cooking and How to Use Kitchen Appliances,” and 
“Needlework,” as well as lectures in safety by the county sheriff and in library services from the 
Leavenworth Public Library.77  Like the “international food fairs” and “international fashion 
shows,” which celebrated both the diversity of each Command and General Staff College class 
and built camaraderie between families, the American Language Course had the additional effect 
of confirming to foreign officers that modern American wives should cook, sew, and be 
comfortable placing their children in the hands of competent authorities for education and 
nurturing.  
More than just implying that social events, food, and fashion were “female” American 
spheres, the Leavenworth community actually resembled a mirror hierarchy of women 
representing the entire Command and General Staff College’s international mission. The feminist 
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insight that “the personal is political” also applies to international politics, Cynthia Enloe argues 
in Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: therefore, “the personal is international.”78 To understand the 
multiple directions power flows in international relationships, she argues, “we have to read 
power backwards and forwards.”79 Even in supposedly official diplomatic contexts, private 
relationships were never merely social. When “read forward,” Enloe says, “the personal is 
international” implies that “ideas about what it means to be a ‘respectable’ woman or an 
‘honorable’ man have been shaped by colonizing policies, trading strategies and military 
doctrines.”80 “Read backward,” she says, “the international is personal” implies that governments 
depended on wives to provide “their diplomatic husbands” with unpaid social services such as 
polite and discreet hospitality as an essential element of formal diplomacy. In American 
communities, Officers Wives Club and Operation International activities represented both of 
these readings, for different reasons, but also added another.  
The ideologies of modernization that shaped and continued to justify the international 
military education and training program after 1960 applied equally to the spouses of targeted 
military officers. It remained an objective of American foreign relations that the families of 
military elites should also receive lessons in American modernity. Seventy percent of the 100 to 
120 foreign officers in each annual class brought their spouses and children to Fort Leavenworth, 
but the formal Informational Program only provided tours and lectures for the Allied officers. 
The sponsor program helped fill the gap in informal ways, but the American Language Course 
mirrored the Informational Programs’ political, economic, and cultural educational objectives 
more concretely. The course clearly provided a valuable social experience and relieved some 
stress on the officers themselves by building international support networks among wives. The 
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fort celebrated the “symbiosis” between the community and the military, its leaders suggested, 
while social functions helped break down political barriers between participating nations.81 It 
was more than just an “ice breaker,” however.  In its educational setting, where all the 
international women were equally foreign, national distinctions and rivalries broke down.82 The 
American Language Course also gave the community the opportunity to intervene early in each 
family’s year in Kansas to deliver its expectations of the visitors’ behavior in restaurants, traffic, 
grocery and department stores, and the library.83 The course’s semi-official status and base-
affiliated leadership reinforced the power of the message. 
Some aspects of the American Language Course mirror imperialist applications of the 
“civilizing mission” disguised as domesticity. Capitalist expansion in the twentieth century 
commodified consumer goods, especially household and hygiene items, to signify social 
differences, prescribe ever-shifting criteria of modernity, and justify American and European 
intervention worldwide.84 During the Cold War, historian Emily Rosenberg argues, 
“Representations of American women continued to be a central icon in this equation. America = 
modernity = consumption = freedom= modern women.”85 In his 1959 “Kitchen Debate” with 
Nikita Khrushchev, Richard Nixon staged the modern American kitchen to reinforce that point.86 
Walt W. Rostow labeled the ultimate phase in his taxonomy of modernization “The Age of High 
Mass Consumption”87 On the other hand, as Timothy Burke argues in Lifebuoy Men, Lux 
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Women, “consumer needs are no less real for having a history, no less deeply felt for having been 
part of the world that global capitalism and colonialism have made.”88 Sponsor families recalled 
that visiting women actually needed to know how to read American food labels, the English 
words for spices, and American standards for clothing sizes.89 The assumption that life among 
American communities transformed visitors from poorer states that buttressed American 
international military education and training policy for three decades required such a transfer of 
modern consumer habits. On the other hand, American women also specifically discounted their 
role as agents of American foreign policy and related to the officers’ families they sponsored 
simply as friends.90  
Future study may plumb the extent that American women failed to recognize their role as 
tools of imperialism disguised as modernity, or whether hospitality in providing lessons in 
American-style domesticity masked a false consciousness. As journalists and newsletter editors, 
women played prominent roles describing and interpreting the events for international officers 
around Fort Leavenworth, as the next section explores. Even there, though, women emphasized 
the universality of their relationships as wives or mothers, and they praised “Midwestern” 
hospitality. American women clearly enjoyed leading organizations for international visitors and 
they valued their international friendships, but how they reconciled their roles as international 
mentors with changing attitudes toward work, home, and family in the United States requires a 
different set of questions and sources. Not surprisingly, visiting women left very little written 
evidence describing their impressions of life around Fort Leavenworth or their relationships with 
their sponsors. Any of their words that do appear come filtered through newspaper or newsletter 
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editors for public consumption. Describing the American Language Course in 1987, one AAUW 
volunteer hinted at the challenge of understanding visiting women’s perspectives: “Teachers 
should not assume that the students understand, even though they may be nodding their heads as 
if they do.”91   
Volunteering also offered rewards. “Dolly Gordon was a powerful woman,” a former 
leader of the International Group recalled.92 “It was not enough for me to invite the twenty 
Europeans to my home. I needed to include the general’s wives, and Dolly Gordon . . . and the 
president of the Officers Wives Club.”93 The Officers Wives Club also provided leadership 
opportunities and titles that revolved regularly as military personnel rotated in an out of Fort 
Leavenworth. The Chamber Women’s Division nurtured its relationship with the post by inviting 
international wives to speak at their luncheons, distributing to new arrivals information about the 
city of Leavenworth, and helping register them in the Officers Wives Club.94 In return, the 
Women’s Division flourished, and the Chamber celebrated the women’s initiative. In 1981, for 
example, the Women’s Division listed 179 members, compared to 450 or so in the rest of the 
Chamber of Commerce.95 Francis Thorne, President of the Leavenworth-Lansing Chamber of 
Commerce in 1982, boasted, “few chambers have an independent Women’s Division as we do in 
Leavenworth. But that difference is possibly our strongest force. The Women’s Division lends 
support, power, leadership and inspiration to every facet of our battle to create a more vibrant 
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Leavenworth area.”96 Serving international officers’ families offered local women conspicuous 
leadership opportunities in public spheres.  
It was more than a coincidence that Leavenworth women largely organized those 
opportunities, directed their implementation, and interpreted their meaning for the community. In 
addition to organizing and running the off-post activities that united American and international 
families, women dominated the manner in which residents of Leavenworth received information 
about the base after 1960. The Leavenworth Times published short “From the Fort” articles twice 
weekly that included announcements about social programs, school events, courses and classes 
for wives in a variety of subjects, information about immunization clinics, sports leagues, 
concerts and shows, swim lessons, and red cross training, to name a few. Each year, the “From 
the Fort” column announced and described the Allied officer picnics, the Officers Wives Club 
International Group, the Food Fairs, and Fashion Shows. No editor explained why, but only 
women wrote this column.97 Before July 1968, “From the Fort” appeared on the “Social and 
Personal” page of the Times, next to “Dear Abby” and “Dear Polly.” Without comment, on July 
31, 1968 the Times editors renamed the “Social and Personal” page to “Women,” and the “From 
the Fort” column remained on the “Women” page until 1985, when “People/Events” replaced the 
“Women” page and “From the Fort” disappeared from the Times. Each January between 1981 
and 1987, the Women’s Division and Operation International also reasserted their mandate as the 
primary liaison between Leavenworth citizens and visiting officers’ families from up to fifty 
different nations around the world in the Leavenworth-Lansing Chamber of Commerce’s Annual 
Report insert in the Times. Year after year, the average reader of the Leavenworth Times received 
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twice-weekly updates “From the Fort” written by Leavenworth women, on the “Women” page of 
the paper, and emphasizing women’s opportunities to volunteer or join the fort’s services. 
Operation International and the Officers Wives Club offered local women real power, but 
power was not the only motive for volunteering. Local men also volunteered to sponsor and 
serve international officers and their families. “Being part of sponsoring a family or an 
unaccompanied student officer is fun. It’s educational. It’s enjoyable.” John Reichley wrote in 
the Leavenworth Times in the same year the “From the Fort” section disappeared and the 
“Women” section became “People/Events.”98 “If you would like to participate in a program that 
will enable you to learn all about another country, and possibly form lifelong friendships you 
can. But not this year. All the sponsor positions are filled.”99 For most people, sponsoring 
international officers’ families was personally rewarding. 
The Officers Wives Club sponsored International Food Fairs and Fashion Shows 
annually after 1960 because they were interesting and fun. They held “American” food 
demonstrations for international families early in the school year to demonstrate “the preparation 
of foods unique to America,” especially “thaw and serve” and “the packaged-instant variety,” but 
at the two International Food Fairs, where Allied families shared native dishes with the 
community, tickets sold out each year.100 In 1985, one local remembered, there was “keema from 
Pakistan, a salad from Nepal, yaki-man-do from Korea/USA, rice and peanut butter from the 
Ivory Coast, pasticcia from Greece, tempura and sushi from Japan, couscous from Algeria, and 
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Norwegian meat balls from, of all places, Norway.”101 “Where else on earth?” John Reichley 
mused, could a person enjoy nsima and sadza from Malawi and Zimbabwe, kebbeh from 
Lebanon, semmelknodel from German, cabbage tamalitos from Honduras, biryani shrimp from 
Oman, tinga from Mexico, limpia sauce from the Philippines, okra and rice from Liberia, and 
kartoffelauflauf from Switzerland in one meal?102 Women’s groups organized the events, but 
even unaccompanied bachelor officers participated. In 1985, for example, three unaccompanied 
Kenyans and their civilian sponsor procured and roasted a goat for the food fair.103 At the fashion 
show in 1980, 500 guests and 78 models—wives, daughters, and sons—representing 28 visiting 
nations packed the Leavenworth High School gymnasium to demonstrate their homelands’ 
fashions. Afterward, the entire crowd joined in a chorus of “Let There Be Peace On Earth.”104  
Although the International Food Fairs and Fashion Shows were always a new experience 
for the international guests, for the Officers Wives Club and Leavenworth sponsors they were 
also well-rehearsed annual rituals of internationalism. “Let There Be Peace On Earth” did not 
spontaneously erupt from guests in kimonos and lederhosen, overwhelmed with fraternal love. 
Organizers cued the song up as part of the ritual. Still, for each new group of international guests, 
it no doubt appeared fresh. Like the descriptions of the annual rodeos, sources dwell on these 
events as both typical expressions of Americans’ celebration of diversity as well as the particular 
internationalism of the civilian-military-international community around Fort Leavenworth. 
“Where else on Earth” could such events occur, the Times asked.105 Leaders of People-to-People 
might argue that the answer could have equally been: “Kansas City” or “Mid-Western America.” 
But congregating to celebrate specifically domestic aspects of international cultural exchange 
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(food and clothing) as part of the education of military officers from around the world 
demonstrated an explicit intervention between American women and international wives. It was 
explicit, yet unofficial; and could not have occurred without the tacit cooperation of American 
military assistance policymakers.  
Women and men still became sponsors to make friends, and international character 
intensified the experience. At Christmas, for example, the German liaison officer at the staff 
college hosted a serene and poignant Christmas program at the Fort’s Memorial Chapel where 
German officers’ families, American officers and sponsor families, and even German-born 
Kansans “who wanted to share in the traditional church celebration from the ‘Old Country’” 
gathered to sing and pray in English and German.106 In 1987, longtime sponsor John Reichley 
recalled, the German wife of a CGSC student met there a former German soldier who served 
alongside her father in World War II.107 “It was that kind of evening,” Reichley contemplated. 
“One for old friends, new friends, and total strangers, sharing in a special kind of ceremony. 
We’re all glad we went.”108 Francis and Eunice Alexander of Leavenworth sponsored the officer 
from India every year between 1962 and 1986.109 They maintained a cupboard full of Indian 
spices to pass from year to year; they had travelled to India three times to visit their old friends; 
and the Allied Personnel Office periodically called them for information about India.110 Zureida 
Mutalib of Malaysia, Geeta Shah and Aruna Thata of Nepal, all in native dress, discussed their 
countries and lifestyles at the Women’s Division quarterly luncheon in 1982.111 Dolly and Ed 
Gordon visited their former sponsoree, Pakistani President and 1963 CGSC alumnus Muhammad 
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Zia-Ul-Haq in Pakistan before his death in 1988.112 Renate Edwards, herself an immigrant from 
Germany, sponsored families from Morocco, Ethiopia, and Portugal, Iran, and Malaysia, and 
became a foster-mother for Margarita, the wife of a Greek officer who stayed in the United 
States to deliver her baby, after the rest of her family returned to Greece.113 Sponsorship 
cultivated extraordinary friendships.  
On the other hand, the United States’ extensive military interference in Latin America, 
Europe, Africa, and Asia made these bountiful international experiences possible. The United 
States brought these officers and their families to Fort Leavenworth—5,600 officers from 122 
countries at Command and General Staff College between 1894 and 1994—via a military 
education and training program designed to expand American hegemony.114 From a different 
perspective, though, many sponsors empathized with visiting military families because of their 
own experience in the United States’ overseas empire. Three Leavenworth families, Charlene 
and Arnie Arts, Jeanne and Chris Boetig, and Sarah and Norman McLeod, with a combined 85 
years of sponsoring between them, all acknowledged that their initial experience as daughters 
and wives of American military personnel stationed in Germany during the Cold War made them 
empathetic with Allied officers and their families in Kansas. Arnie Arts remembered: “When my 
wife and I got to Germany, we got off the plane and she said, ‘I need to use the restroom.’ I said, 
‘Right over there.’ And she said ‘which one do I go to?’ So I saw the need right away for 
someone who is familiar with the area to help people who had not been there before. And as a 
result, when they asked me if I wanted to sponsor, I said I’d be more than happy to.”115 Jeanne 
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Boetig remembered being the lonely wife of a lowly Second Lieutenant stationed in Bamberg 
Germany in 1976: “The empathy that I bring to the women is why I do what I do.”116 Stationed 
in Heidelberg with her Army father in 1948, Sarah McLeod traveled extensively: “My parents 
wanted us to be able to go and see all of these wonderful places, so I think travel is just in my 
blood.”117 Not all Leavenworth or Kansas City sponsors were former military, but many shared 
the experience of overseas military travel that America’s large overseas military presence made 
common and that placed particular demands on service members’ wives and children.  
Proximity to a military base that hosted so many international families facilitated 
Leavenworth volunteers’ international relationships, but militarism did not necessarily define 
them. Instead, inspired by the Army’s official endorsement of all aspects of American culture, 
residents of Leavenworth Kansas saw hosting foreign military personnel as a family endeavor. 
Kansas women led the programs that welcomed, registered, fed, and oriented visiting officers 
and their families within the community, partly because those things needed to be done and 
partly because the women volunteers felt empowered to do them. Other groups were less 
successful integrating international families into their strategies to expand their roles in the 
community.  
Local news sources did not associate hospitality for visiting military families from 
Africa, Latin America, or Asia with the American civil rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Off post, Kansas City’s major newspaper did not reveal whether non-white military families or 
international officers received different treatment than other non-whites in Kansas City.118 
Neither the Leavenworth Times, the Greater Kansas City Chapter of People-to-People, nor the 
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base’s own newspaper The Lamp explicitly named visiting officers’ races or commented on 
African American participation in the sponsorship program, even though racial turmoil rocked 
other Army facilities in the U.S. in the late sixties and early seventies.119 Fort Leavenworth 
instituted a Race Relations Council in August 1971 to take “positive actions to eliminate racial 
tensions and improve racial harmony” on the post, for example, and in March 1973 began 
requiring Army personnel to attend three-day race-relations workshops on “Inter-Racial 
Communication, Racial Awareness, Ethnic Minorities in American Life, and Racism.”120  
The Lamp carefully detached general concerns with race in the United States in the 1970s 
from specific manifestations of racism in the Leavenworth community by echoing commentaries 
from non-locals. In 1973, for example, The Lamp commemorated “Brotherhood Day” at Fort 
Leavenworth by reprinting Reader’s Digest’s account of a rural Iowan elementary school 
teacher’s famous study in discrimination, under the title “Brown Eyes-Blue Eyes: An 
Unforgettable Experiment in Prejudice and Self-Delusion.”121 In 1976, The Lamp reprinted 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity H. Minton Francis’ comments on Black 
History Month, which encouraged all American military personnel “to insure that black history 
and all other non-European histories take their rightful place in American history.”122 Even when 
prodding Leavenworth readers to eschew “ethnocentrism,” the Fort’s paper carefully suggested 
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that all Army personnel were capable of a variety of forms of discrimination. In 1978, for 
example, The Lamp prodded, “For those of you who have served tours overseas or moved to a 
different state, have you ever found yourself frowning on the way the local population operates 
on a day-to-day basis?”123 Discrimination and “ethnocentrism” were abstract evils in these 
articles, not specific consequences of regional or institutional racism. 
Instead, international visitors allowed the Fort and the Leavenworth community to 
celebrate the post’s “cosmopolitan atmosphere” without acknowledging race as a salient issue.124 
At the 1975 International Food Fair, for example, The Lamp celebrated “160 different dishes 
were featured on the menu—from Australian mock kangaroo tail soup to a fish dish from 
Zaire.”125 Although it mentioned Zaire by name, this article later specifically listed every 
continent except Africa as a source for the 52 international officers at Command and General 
Staff College that year.126 Race was not completely absent from the post’s consciousness—on 
the same page, just below that 1975 “International Gourmands” article, The Lamp 
commemorated Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.127 Instead, the post disassociated international 
visitors from the community’s efforts to overcome racism. Sometimes, Leavenworth sources 
fabricated a straw man of prejudice in order to warn vaguely against “stereotyping” foreign 
visitors. “Not everyone from Spain is a bullfighter,” The Lamp scolded in 1974.128 “Be open-
minded about him and his country, for he can teach you a great deal. Do not ask him degrading 
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questions which injure his national pride and reflect your own lack of knowledge. Spain does 
have electricity.”129 Attacking an imaginary anti-Spaniard sentiment was a simpler and safer 
route to reiterate to the international program’s well-worn justification that “the greatest 
ambassador of good will the US can have abroad is a foreigner who has been treated with 
kindness in your country,” without broaching the complex questions of racial justice persisting in 
the community.130  
 
As they interpreted what visiting officers’ families needed to know about the “American 
language,” or tea, schools, fashion, or the library, Leavenworth women volunteers 
simultaneously reaffirmed the essential social structures and domestic conventions that defined 
their community. Far from the extremes of simply imposing American domesticity or offering 
American-style liberation for oppressed women of the world, instead, they subtly re-worked their 
own roles in the community. With the tacit—and occasionally explicit—approval of the Army’s 
largest institution for educating and training military elites from around the world, Leavenworth 
women reasserted that their participation and leadership in local community organizations was 
what made the United States internationally admirable.131 Since the international military 
education and training program supposedly extolled all aspects of American life, their 
contributions became foreign policy. Army leaders routinely thanked them for their contributions 
and employed their service throughout the year, so women in the Officers Wives Club, Operation 
International, the Women’s Division of the Chamber of Commerce, and ordinary sponsor 
families considered themselves co-ambassadors with the Army. 
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In parallel to the mostly male Command and General Staff College classroom 
environment, Leavenworth’s women leaders and military spouses from all countries imagined 
solidarities with one another and in relation to the Army post and military life that defied 
national boundaries.132 They wove local and global expectations for women’s work in the service 
of the military and within the community that expanded to encompass visiting unaccompanied 
male officers who were often equally disoriented and local men who felt the rewards of 
internationalism just as keenly. Small differences in rank, region of origin, pay, or comfort with 
English may have reinforced national hierarchies among visiting officers and their families; even 
among American women these differentials made the relationships uneven. Even when they 
recognized these differences, American men and women regularly remarked that the 
opportunities for leadership and friendship the foreign officers provided rewards which often did 
more for the helpers than the helped.133 
 
“And All of Us Such Nice People:” People-To-People and the International Officer 
Immediately after its founding in 1962, the founders of the Greater Kansas City Chapter 
of People-to-People (GKCPTP) recognized that Fort Leavenworth’s allied officers provided an 
ideal opportunity to put into practice the kind of informal international cooperation their 
founding principles extolled. As a result of their well-organized annual activities and active 
sponsorship program with the regularly renewed groups of foreign military visitors each year, 
Kansas City volunteers claimed to embody the People-to-People ethos and boasted that they 
represented the model chapter of People-to-People International. They reiterated a version of 
internationalism and hospitality that integrated women’s leadership in the organization and 
recognized women’s contributions both as American sponsors and as important partners in 
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visiting officers’ families. This version of internationalism was explicitly Midwestern: it equated 
hospitality with rodeos, picnics, and car rides to single-family homes in rural settings, and 
connected agricultural knowledge with cosmopolitan wisdom. It also claimed to thrive 
independently from formal government sponsorship. Finally, the international headquarters of 
People-to-People International gladly rebroadcast the success of its largest chapter, and the 
Greater Kansas City Chapter regularly boasted of its influence over the International—to the 
benefit of both. 
 
People-to-People International represented a Cold War attempt to resist the 
nationalization of cultural diplomacy, but on the national level, succeeded mostly in keeping its 
own myth of the superiority of private initiative over formal diplomacy alive.134 Following the 
precedent of the close cooperation between private industry and the Office of War Information 
during World War II, the State Department encouraged and funded private businesses and 
nongovernmental organizations to cultivate “a positive image” of the United States abroad.135 
After 1953, President Eisenhower’s new U.S. Information Agency (USIA) made private 
participation in American diplomacy a priority. Throughout the spring of 1955, USIA director 
Ted Streibert and Conger Reynolds, the chief of the Office of Private Cooperation, cobbled 
together committees representing essential aspects of supposedly private American society to 
revamp America’s image abroad. Committees included leaders in advertising, the hotel industry, 
universities, business organizations, cartoonists, musicians, labor leaders, scientists, entertainers, 
veterans, women’s groups, religious groups, radio and television producers, and jurists.136 By 
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September, Reynolds had created 41 committees, chaired by the most influential personalities in 
their fields.  
As they met at the White House on September 11, 1956, President Eisenhower addressed 
them with an eloquence Conger Reynolds considered “comparable to Lincoln’s words at 
Gettysburg.”137 “If we are going to take advantage of the assumption that all people want peace,” 
Eisenhower told the gathering, “then the problem is for people to get together and to leap 
government . . . if necessary. . . to work out not one method but thousands of methods by which 
people can gradually learn a little bit more of each other.”138 Reynolds considered this the 
“inaugural” meeting of People-to-People, but acknowledged that People-to-People International 
did not actually take shape until 1961, after “private incorporation.”139 Ironically, Reynolds 
blamed this slow start on the government for siphoning funds away from this “private” initiative 
for peace and toward the Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps.140 But 
People-to-People International still celebrated the ten-year anniversary of Eisenhower’s 1956 
address as their founding moment. They held their tenth annual National People-to-People 
Conference in Kansas City, Missouri.141 
Throughout that decade, People-to-People’s leaders constantly reasserted their 
independence from “government.” Eisenhower himself regularly reiterated his original disdain 
for formal diplomacy. “There is very little that our government—or any government—can do to 
plant the seeds of international understanding in the hearts and minds of people around the 
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world,” he wrote in 1962.142 “It can only be done by people themselves.” 143 In 1966, Eisenhower 
recalled, “I acted to establish People-to-People as a formal movement designed to promote 
contact, communication, exchange, and friendly relationships between individual citizens of 
various countries.”144 Wil Rose, People-to-People International’s president in 1966, reflected that 
Eisenhower’s description of People-to-People as “a movement” specifically distinguished it from 
an “organization” or “agency.”145 People-to-People’s “one hope for success,” Rose recalled, was 
“the participation in some act of personal diplomacy by individuals everywhere.”146  
People-to-People International’s own anti-statist rhetoric in the 1960s challenges the 
prevailing interpretation that national or strategic motives subjugated cultural diplomacy as the 
decade progressed. Eisenhower built independence from formal diplomacy into the fiber of the 
People-to-People mission by specifically discounting the usefulness of governments and 
empowering members to “leap governments—if necessary to evade governments” to build 
transnational relationships.147 Later Presidents—who People-to-People designated “Honorary 
Chairmen”—repeated similar rhetoric. John F. Kennedy celebrated the “varied” nature of 
People-to-People volunteers: “the housewife whose recipe contains the yeast of kindness, the 
soldier whose arms embrace homeless waifs, [and] the doctor who heals with humility.”148 
Lyndon Johnson gushed, “People-to-People works outside government in a field vital to us all—
the promotion of friendship among citizens of every land.”149 Wil Rose quoted Woodrow Wilson 
to express his independence: “What has made American great is not what we have done under 
                                                 
142 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “A Role for You In World Affairs,” People-to-People News, Winter  -1963 1962, 
Unnumbered pages, Kansas City Public Library, Missouri Valley  Special Collections. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Wil Rose, “The Next Ten Years,” People-to-People Newsletter, December 1966, 7, Publications 1960-1979 
Binder, GKCPTP. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Eisenhower, “Remarks at the People-to-People Conference - September 11, 1956,” 750. 
148 Catharine W. Menninger, “People to People,” People, People-to-People International, undated, c 1986, Box 1, 
Folder 15, CARL International Officer Collection. 
149 Ibid. 
 
254 
 
compulsion of law, but what we have done of our own volition.”150 Richard Nixon reminded 
People-to-People’s board of directors in 1969 that “those little things you do” were no less 
significant than “the great decisions that have to be made in Congress or in the State Department 
or in the White House.”151 Kansas City volunteers believed all the Presidents since Eisenhower 
gave them tacit permission to extend their vision of American hospitality around the world 
without referring to formal diplomatic objectives or ideologies like Modernization Theory or the 
Nixon Doctrine.  
More important than Nixon’s address to the national board of People-to-People, though, 
was that the Greater Kansas City Chapter transcribed it at length in their monthly “Contact” 
newsletter. In this case, regional domestic constituencies benefitted from American foreign 
policy, but in a way that disregarded traditional diplomacy in favor of their own local vision of 
Americanism.152 As Chapter 1 showed, Eisenhower distrusted the political process for failing to 
understand the United States’ “mutual security” dilemmas or to secure appropriate levels of 
foreign aid. Given the Kennedy cabinet’s drubbing of Eisenhower’s “unimaginative” approach to 
foreign assistance, it is possible that Eisenhower resented his own marginalization from foreign 
affairs after 1961. Eisenhower also feared that excessive military spending gravely undermined 
the United States’ economic resiliency and image abroad.153 Whatever his motives for opposing 
early 1960s liberal developmentalism, People-to-People volunteers took Eisenhower’s words as 
approval for their populist approach to foreign relations.  
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The Greater Kansas City Chapter of People-to-People was formally incorporated in 1962, 
but claimed to have represented the first “workable” model for a local chapter since 1959. Daniel 
Millman, a Kansas City lawyer who was the Kansas City chapter president before serving on the 
national board of People-to-People International considered the chapter’s “strong self-reliance,” 
and “independent leadership” the archetype for chapters worldwide, and he called it the “Kansas 
City Plan.”154 The “Kansas City Plan” unified existing clubs, civic organizations and “other 
institutions interested in international relations and trade” before formally affiliating with 
People-to-People International.155 In reality, the two groups largely revolved around one another.  
To some extent, the presence of People-to-People International’s headquarters in Kansas 
City and the regular participation of Kansas City chapter members on the International board of 
directors made mutual self-reference predictable. In 1969, for example, Daniel Millan suggested 
the new International president Jim Doty would ensure the Greater KC Chapter its “rightful place 
in the sun.”156 In 1971, Jim Doty presided over the Kansas City Chapter’s annual membership 
dinner and swore in the local branch’s new officers and directors.157 Since the mid-1960s, the 
International also publicized the Kansas City Chapter’s accomplishments as its own, and vice-
versa. Charles Stevenson, former vice president of Kansas City’s Hallmark Cards and civilian 
aide to the Secretary of the Army, wrote in the International’s magazine People in 1964 that 
Kansas City offered the ideal mix of international visitors and local hosts that made People-to-
People so successful there.158  
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Fort Leavenworth provided the mortar for this relationship between the International and 
the local chapter, but Stevenson emphasized that rural Americana, not military obligations, 
attracted international visitors. The most enduring memory of American military education for 
international officers, he argued, was “the hospitality of civilians who lived near the bases where 
they attended school and invitations to homes for dinner or even a weekend stay.”159 Around Fort 
Leavenworth specifically, he recalled, the Army base sometimes provided transportation for 
foreign officers, but sponsor families often drove their guests to events. “This allows a splendid 
opportunity for getting acquainted before the social amenities begin and affords comment on the 
American countryside—interestingly enough, a subject which rates high on the frequency of 
discussion when these nationalists return home,” he wrote.160 In gatherings at sponsors’ homes, 
he observed, “the men are astonished at the big cars, the vastness of the utilities, the expansive 
highway systems.” Women, “while perhaps not as fluent in English as their mates,” might 
discuss “the tremendous range and moderate prices of consumer items and the packaging of 
American products seen on shopping trips. The women would compare prices on stockings, 
brooms, blankets, children’s wearing apparel and just about everything a young matron’s 
afternoon bridge club would discuss.”161 Ultimately, Stevenson speculated, the presence of “the 
People-to-People movement” around such military schools ensured that “whether any of these 
officers ever will be in the top echelons of their governments’ military or political hierarchy . . . 
all of them will have a warm spot in their heart for our country.”162 
Here Stevenson merged nationalist boasting (large American highways, moderately 
priced brooms, etc.) with Cold War geopolitics, but he also danced between pro-rural regional 
bias and more purely-stated internationalism. He combined the organization’s larger narrative—
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celebrating the civilian in communities around military bases—as a path for world peace that 
circumvented formal diplomacy in favor of direct, individual interaction. Specifically citing the 
Leavenworth community as the model synthesis of military-civilian-internationalism, Stevenson 
also located the heart of his internationalist vision in the Midwest, and claimed for People-to-
People International the accomplishments of its proto-chapter in Kansas City.  
Immediately after its inception, the Greater Kansas City Chapter of People-to-People 
integrated joint activities with Fort Leavenworth’s international officers into its raison d’etre. 
According to legend, Greater Kansas City People-to-People’s first president and Schlitz Brewery 
president Forrest McCluney received approval in 1962 from the staff college commandant, 
Lieutenant General Harry J. Lemly, Jr., for People-to-People to begin providing “Kansas City 
sponsors.”163 On February 28, 1963, at the first annual Installation Dinner, McCluney announced 
to the chapter’s one hundred charter members the chapter’s goals: expand membership to 1,000, 
“encourag[e] letter writing between the people of Kansas City and the people of the world,” host 
an annual Diplomatic Ball for Allied Officers at Fort Leavenworth and staff of the seventeen 
foreign consulates in Kansas City, and include “foreign officers attending the Command and 
General Staff school at Fort Leavenworth” in the chapter’s future activities.164 The chapter’s 
membership peaked at about 400 in 1968, but after that rarely topped 175.165 Instead, integration 
with the Allied Officers dominated the chapter’s activities.   
For two decades after 1963, the chapter’s monthly or bi-monthly “Contact” newsletters 
demonstrated the sponsorship program’s centrality to the chapter’s self-image. Typical issues 
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were four to ten pages long, typed and mimeographed between the 1960s and 1970s, and printed 
from a personal computer during the 1980s.166 The chapter’s presidents were all men until 1983, 
but women and men served in near equal numbers as the chapter’s other officers (First and 
Second Vice President, Secretary, and Treasurer).167 In the 1960s and 1970s, however, women 
exclusively edited “Contact.”168 Each newsletter listed upcoming events—picnics and barbeques 
at Fort Leavenworth, guest lectures and dinners in Kansas City for volunteers and international 
guests were common. Many included updates from members on foreign travel. Quips or quotes 
from thank you cards or letters of appreciation often praised specific members or the People-to-
People concept in general. Each issue during the academic year published the schedule for 
upcoming “Know Your World” presentations, where international officers at Fort Leavenworth 
described their nations’ “geography, history, customs, current and past events” in evening 
lectures for the Command and General Staff College class and any interested local civilians.169 
Each spring, the newsletter included an application form for volunteers who wished to sponsor 
incoming visiting officers. The May 1974 “Contact,” for example, was devoted entirely to 
explaining the sponsorship program. It listed the fifty-one nations sending officers to CGSC that 
summer and its detachable application form permitted volunteers to list the country or region of 
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origin they desired and whether they preferred unaccompanied officers or those with families.170 
As ever, this newsletter’s anecdotes reminded readers of the joy of sponsoring: “‘We used to 
have sponsors but now we have friends,’ one officer and his wife told Mr. and Mrs. T.O. 
Lawton”; “Friendship is an even exchange”; “We enjoyed being with so many nice people and 
liked the delicious food and good drinks you served us.”171 This edition of “Contact” also 
included a follow-up request from a Belgian military officer for a Kansas City home for two of 
his nieces as they studied English in America.172  
The editors of “Contact” prominently displayed letters of appreciation from foreign 
officers and their families because they reinforced so many aspects of People-to-People’s self-
image. Often, the letters repeated the theme of independence from national diplomatic paradigms 
and nation-bound military allegiance, even when military families wrote them. The March/April 
1966 edition, for example, reprinted a lengthy and gushing letter of thanks from Sudanese 
Colonel Tag El Sur Mustafa, a recent Command and Staff College graduate, to his sponsors, 
Helen and Robert Black. “When people discuss BAD or GOOD relationships between nations 
they tend to forget or drown out the voices and efforts of the individuals!” Mustafa wrote.173 
“Good fruitful relationships between nations,” he continued, “start and grow through individual 
good efforts.” To the Blacks, he wrote, “the efforts and invitations which you make it a habit to 
extend to all types of foreign allied students to come to your house and spend days and weeks . . . 
that fact that you make them feel at home like they have known you for years and years; all this, 
is really NO LESS than the millions of food tonnages, or billions of dollar aids, which flow from 
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the U.S.A. to wherever the need arises.”174 Finally, he asserted, “I intend to keep and promote 
this friendship for generations . . . to be able to contribute to the efforts which are being spent in 
my own country to lead it on the right road toward the Gate of Freedom.” 175 “Contact”’s editor 
stressed: “It is an eloquent and impressive expression of created good will,” emphasizing that 
sponsor families nurtured these relationships with great care, and implying that sponsor families, 
not foreign aid, would bring about any improvement in Sudan’s (or any other place’s) political or 
economic condition.176  
Helen Black’s special relationship with Sudanese officers epitomized the dizzying 
heights of international prestige sponsorship offered. She and her husband were active 
throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and she served as Treasurer and Vice President of the 
chapter for several years.177 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, she organized the “international 
warehouse,” collecting donated small appliances, pots and pans, linens, utensils, and household 
goods to loan to help allied families “make a residence a home” for the year.178 She also 
sponsored dozens of officers from African states, including I.G.M.K. Kpeto, who later became 
Commandant of the Ghana Armed Force Staff College, and whose own wife exchanged letters 
regularly with Black for many years.179 In 1966, she sponsored Sudanese Lieutenant Colonel 
Jaafar Nimeiri, who returned to Sudan and seized power in a military coup in 1969.180 On a tour 
of the United States in 1977, Nimeiri arranged for Black to join him on his presidential 727 jet 
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for tours of San Francisco, New York, and Los Angeles. After a private tour of Disneyland, 
Black joined Nimeiri for dinner with Mayor Tom Bradley and actor Sydney Poitier at the home 
of African-American music mogul Clarence Avant.181 After the tour, Helen Black hosted 
Nimeiri’s wife, the First Lady of Sudan, at her home in Kansas City. In 1979, the Commandant 
of the Command and General Staff College presented a special copy of the 1966 CGSC 
yearbook to Black, and requested she deliver it to Nimeiri when she had the chance, “since he 
had never received his.”182 Black’s exploits with Command and General Staff College graduates-
turned-heads-of-state were not atypical—“Contact” routinely boasted about the numbers of 
graduates who had become Generals or Heads of State—and they symbolized the ideal reward 
for sponsoring foreign officers.  
International relationships based on the illusion of parity between an American military 
meritocracy and military officership abroad sometimes translated into social mobility that short-
circuited traditional definitions of class. Both “Contact” and the Leavenworth Lamp routinely 
reported the numbers of Command and Staff College Graduates who become heads of state, 
chiefs of staff, general officers, or influential business leaders.183 By 1974, for example, of the 
3,500 international Command and General Staff College graduates from 77 different countries, 
14 had become heads of state or prime ministers, 118 became “ministers of state or 
ambassadors,” 981 had become general officers and 84 became Chiefs of Staff for their 
services.184 “Contact” routinely described foreign officers’ return visits to the United States—
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often as high-ranking officials and always culminating with a visit to their Staff College 
sponsor—or reciprocal visits abroad where sponsors became guests of honor. Such visits offered 
almost fairy-tale social mobility for sponsor families. In 1977, for example, Jean and Chuck 
Nelson visited former sponsorees in Denmark, Greece, and Austria. “They entertained us 
royally,” the Nelsons told “Contact,” including “special places” off limits to ordinary tourists.185 
In 1981, Helen Black spent two months as the guest of Indonesian General Norman Sasono, the 
military governor of Jakarta.186 In 1991, Barton Cohen and his wife Mary honeymooned in 
Southeast Asia, visiting Thailand, Myanmar, and Singapore as guests of former sponsorees who 
were now generals and wealthy executives. Their host in Singapore graduated from Fort 
Leavenworth as “the country’s youngest Lt. Col.,” he had since retired from the Army, he had 
also retired as “managing editor of ten English language magazines,” and enchanted the Cohens: 
“Who knows his limits—he is still in his mid thirties.”187 “As you can tell,” Barton told 
“Contact,” “involvement with [the] International Officers program gave us unique opportunities 
for insight into these countries which otherwise could never have been achieved.”188 Visiting 
their former guests also allowed Helen Black, Ed and Dolly Gordon, and Barton and Mary 
Cohen to leap classes while abroad.  
Parity in international regard for military officers was still an illusion that required 
cultivating. Although John Reichley boasted in the Leavenworth Times that more Americans 
“expressed a great deal of confidence” in the United States Armed Forces than in the President, 
Supreme Court, television news, or “organized religion,” military officers from few of the states 
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that sent officers to Fort Leavenworth received as much compensation or respect from their 
home states.189 As Chapter 5 will explore in more detail, Ghanaian soldiers in the 1970 struggled 
to supplement their income by farming, taking civilian jobs off post, or, as both a cause and 
symptom of pervasive military rule in Ghana, maneuvering for secondary postings in 
government ministries and industrial boards.190 Foreign officers attending Fort Leavenworth 
often needed assistance furnishing their homes or apartments in Kansas. As early as 1965, 
women from Leavenworth operated a warehouse to loan household items, kitchen equipment, 
and bedding to international families.191 Helen Black’s annual pleas to Kansas City People-to-
People members for small appliances, linens, kitchen utensils, cookware, and furniture for the 
Allied Warehouse through the 1970s betray how many international officers needed assistance 
providing for their families.192 As Chapter 5 will show, however, international travel itself 
offered some military officers both tangible financial incentives that mimicked class 
advancement as well as an international reference for the socio-cultural strata senior military 
officers could occupy.  
Ironically, but not surprisingly, the pinnacle of advancement that so attracted American 
families to their former sponsorees abroad often resulted from non-democratic paths to power 
that contradicted the Staff College’s formal opposition to military rule. The “Allied Officers’ 
Hall of Fame” which opened at Fort Leavenworth in August 1973 to honor Command and 
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General Staff College graduates who had risen to high positions in their states specifically barred 
alumni who seized power via coups d’état.193 But Helen Black’s adventures with Sudanese 
President Jaafar Nimeiri and Dolly and Ed Gordon’s visit to Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-
Ul-Haq brought no official condemnation.194 Instead, these visits epitomized possibilities for 
social mobility that first required American families to project the respectability of military 
officership in American culture onto foreign officers. Many of those officers returned home to 
more volatile political-military hierarchies, but regardless of their means of advancement, the 
original American faith in the goodness of the exchange permitted American visitors to share in 
their new social status without scruples. In these cases, the legitimate international relationship 
formed on the illusion of parity permitted American sponsor families visiting former sponsorees 
to imagine themselves part of ruling classes of military elites far out of proportion to their 
statuses in the U.S. The thin cultural barrier reflected both sides’ misperception of the other’s 
class status, permitting individuals to scramble class hierarchies when they crossed borders. 
Helen Black’s regular updates in “Contact” in the 1970s also reveal genuine hospitality 
that spanned continents and generations. She hosted first ladies and wives of visiting Generals at 
her home, but also her sponsor families’ extended family members, friends, business partners, 
and fellow nationals. In 1977 Black served Thanksgiving dinner at her home to Hung, the 
nephew of a former sponsoree from Vietnam, to Waty, the son of Indonesian General Sasono 
who was studying in Atchison, Kansas, and Bashier, a friend of Colonel Fouad of Sudan who 
was a student at Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas. “My years of associations with 
                                                 
193 Unknown, “Since 1973: 86 Allies Honored in Hall of Fame,” 8; Unknown, “Allied Officer Hall Of Fame,” 
Unknown, c 1979, Box 1, Folder 2, CARL International Officer Collection; On barring coup leaders, see: Bruce 
Bigelow, “Army College Teaches About War, Friendship; Foreign Officers Are the Students,” The Kansas City 
Times, January 14, 1984, Box 1, Folder 17 “Journal Articles-misc. 1953-1998,” CARL International Officer 
Collection This is a continuation page, the front page of the article is missing from the International Officers 
Collection. ; Reichley, International Officers:  A Century of Participation at the United States Army Command and 
General Staff College, 37. 
194 Unknown, “Helen Black,” 2; Reichley, International Officers:  A Century of Participation at the United States 
Army Command and General Staff College, 25. 
 
265 
 
Officers of many countries have brought me great rewards,” she reflected. “Namely young 
people who can sit at my table with my own precious family and we can all be in love and 
gratitude in our way be grateful to God for each other and for those back home who are still in 
our hearts.”195 When her friends Abdel Mustafa, his wife, and their new baby returned to Sudan 
in 1976 after three years at Kansas State University, Black contemplated, “It is always difficult 
to see part of your family move so far away to their beloved homeland.”196 She welcomed 
thirteen Sudanese friends for Christmas dinner in 1979—three officers plus their wives and 
extended families.197 A month later, she hosted the chief engineer and chief mechanic from 
Sudan Airways and their wives for sightseeing, touring a local tractor manufacturer, and 
shopping, followed by tea and dinner at her home.198 In April 1979, Major Paul of Sudan asked 
Black to pin his new rank of Lieutenant Colonel onto his uniform, and gave Helen “the greatest 
honor she’s had since she began sponsoring Allied Officers.”199 
Wives of visiting officers provided especially powerful reinforcement for the People-to-
People ethos. In 1964, the wives of three Thai colonels who remained in Thailand while their 
husbands attended CGSC sent glowing thank you letters to Ray and Rea Petty, who had 
sponsored three Thai officers in 1963.200 The Pettys invited their Thai officers for Sunday 
dinners, a visit to Rea’s sister’s farm, a baseball game, a show at the Starlight Theater, and a 
Kansas City Chiefs football game. “I don’t think we ever got the ‘safety’ explained to the men,” 
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Rea remembered. “Ravi cheered for the Chargers—no wonder the Chiefs lost.” 201 By then, “the 
Thai officers were acknowledged members of the Petty family, and spent a week-end with them 
in St. Joseph, Missouri at a reunion of Mrs. Petty’s family.”202  
The colonels’ wives wrote to thank the Pettys, and the article carefully reproduced their 
exact wording. “I have received from Col. Chalerm written about you—you are so kind to him I 
cannot possibly express my deep appreciation of your beautiful hospitality to my husband,” one 
said.203 “I have two children, Ruj, our son is 13 years now, he hope to continue to study in 
America . . . Panit, daughter, is 12 years she is very tall than me . . . If her dream come true she 
want to continue her study in United States too.” Colonel Ravi’s wife first apologized for her 
troubles with English, but since “Colonel Ravi he always talking about your family even I don’t 
know you very well but I feel like we have been friends long time ago.” “My husband is lucky to 
stay with a lovely family,” Colonel Ravi’s wife wrote—especially one so lucky to have 
daughters, since “In our custom, the daughter is better than son because even when they grown 
up they always take their family to get in touch all the time.” Naturally, both wives invited the 
Petty’s to visit Thailand, although with some embarrassment: “It’s not so civilize like your 
country but it’s nice to know Thai people that known all over the world ‘land of smile.’”204  
This article revealed so many of the ways sponsoring international officers manifested the 
entangled relationships and identities Military Internationalism evoked in Kansas City. A draft 
version of the article remained in the Greater Kanas City People-to-People archive; it is likely a 
Kansas City member drafted the article in 1964 for publication in People-to-People 
International’s publication, People. The article demonstrated how concepts of modernity 
survived and manifested themselves through military families at the local level. Most of all, it 
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reiterated the way the steady supply of international elites permitted People-to-People volunteers 
at the local level and at the organization’s headquarters to realize and publicize their goals.  
The article’s unknown author reaffirmed the genuine depth of affection between the 
Pettys and their international guests, but also hinted that the exchange was unequal. Quoting the 
Thai women’s simple English verbatim, including the claim that Thailand “not so civilize like 
your country,” the author revealed that men and women from both groups acknowledged 
differentials in national modernity. Other articles from the early 1960s articulated national 
differences as differentials of modernity in ways that echo theorists’ proposition that modernity 
was essentially a state of mind. After the 1966 rodeo, for example, Joy Parr exclaimed with 
delight that the evening had left her new international friend unable to explain “what’s happened 
in my mind!”205 That theme almost completely disappeared by the 1970s, however. It was not 
the Petty article’s main purpose, either; People-to-People International’s editors excised that 
sentence from the article in People with a worldwide readership. Usually, articles boasted that 
the international officers were “of the highest type, selected carefully by their own countries, 
screened by ours,” they were the “creme de la creme of each country’s intellect, individuality 
and prowess,” and they represented “their countries’ apex in charm, adaptability and 
personality.”206  
Instead, when both Kansas City and International publications emphasized that 
Midwesterners were unexpectedly cosmopolitan—claiming, for example, “A visitor might not 
anticipate that this is a cosmopolitan center”—they were actually confronting a keenly felt 
differential in modernity between rural and urban Americans.207 People’s editors deleted the line 
“not so civilize like your country” from the Pettys story to soften the emphasis on national 
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difference to magnify the article’s celebration of Midwestern hospitality, captured in the article’s 
first line: “It all began with the Rodeo.” For members of the local chapter, People articles 
exhibited how Kansas City members had perfected the ethos and organization of international 
contact to become the model local chapter. For People-to-People International, the Petty article 
exemplified the global reach of individual Midwestern hospitality. Elsewhere they celebrated 
engineering students from India, for example, who chose Kansas State University because “the 
dark skinned a student, the student in the funny robe, seems to be accepted a little quicker in 
Kansas.”208 A new generation of internationalists—“the First International Generation”, they 
called it—formed People-to-People chapters on campuses in Kansas and Oklahoma, “deep in the 
heart of America.”209 National differences were a given in People-to-People’s publications, but 
their particular vision of internationalism routinely required reasserting “middle American” 
values. 
Finally, the Petty article connected the women of both countries in a special way—even 
when the Thai women never actually travelled. Emphasizing the family-to-family nature of the 
relationship, as if Thai women and American women understood that the essence of national 
military cooperation was a nurturing domestic environment best secured by women, reinforced 
the way People-to-People claimed to “leap governments” to join peoples.  
Kansas City women with little formal access to the infrastructure of international 
relations seized sponsoring international military officers as an opportunity to participate as 
equals—even as leaders—in a global internationalist movement. Regardless of who were the 
more active sponsors in Kansas City, “Contact” featured more updates from women sponsors 
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than men, and women reflected on their mission in People-to-People without embarrassment. For 
example, as “associate editor” in 1966, Joy Parr reprinted United Nations Secretary-General U 
Thant’s words for the local chapter: “Peace and order in the world are not the exclusive business 
of statesmen, diplomats, and international officials,” Parr quoted.210 “They are the urgent 
personal business of all men and women who are capable of wishing for a better world for their 
children and their fellow man.”211 Parr had read Thant’s words in the New York Times, she said, 
and she reprinted them to express solidarity with a global internationalist vision as well as a local 
one. Later that summer, as she described the annual rodeo, Parr contemplated the near-spiritual 
value of international contact. “When you can truly dissolve the sometimes stilted awkwardness 
or forced hilarity of an arranged meeting,” she wrote, “There comes that lovely sense of 
fulfillment, – serenity, which is needed and sought by ALL MANKIND.”212  
Women produced “Contact,” and it celebrated their participation in the mission. Colonel 
Mustafa of Sudan may have sent his eloquent “Thank You” letter to Helen Black and her 
husband in 1966, but “Contact” made clear that he meant it for Helen.213 In 1969, Editor Gail 
Ward boasted, “YOU have become active, responsive, participating members in an organization 
that is doing something about the world situation! YOU have become interested in helping 
others! YOU have been bitten by the patriotism bug, and you have helped yourself in the 
process!”214 Phonda Goldsmith reflected in 1976 that she was “particularly fortunate to live in 
the proximity of the Command and Staff College and thus be able to sponsor an Allied Officer 
and his family.”215 She felt sorry for People-to-People members in other chapters who lacked this 
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opportunity. “I can think of nothing which can bring greater pleasure,” she said. “The rewards 
are beyond description.”216 Fifi Osman, wife of Egyptian Colonel Hazem Osman, reinforced this 
sentiment three years later with an ebullient letter of thanks, which Goldsmith shared with 
“Contact”: “I will never, ever forget this year in the states as long as I live. . . Phonda, this past 
year was the best year of my life – it really was!”217 
The blossoming friendship between four families that editor Lois Dunn described in 1976 
needed no American men. Billie Hartwell and Bonnie Harsh decided, “after two years of duo 
sponsorship . . . we are each sponsoring a family this year.”218 (Individuals in Kansas City 
commonly shared sponsorship duties between two friends.) This year, Bonnie and her nine year-
old son met Tunisian Major Aziz Skik and his “very attractive, dark-eyed family—Aziz, Najet 
and their children Leyla, Nabil and Thoraya” at the park. Both families then joined Billie and her 
Pakistani family for a walk through the park—“the Tunisian children were particularly excited 
about seeing a squirrel”—a drive through Kansas City’s upscale Plaza and Mission Hills, and 
“an old-fashioned picnic including homemade ice cream and cake.”219 The families discussed 
“the Democratic Convention, Republican Convention, the national election, the landing on Mars, 
and, of course, our Bicentennial year,” while “the children immediately began riding bicycles, 
skateboards, playing basketball, badminton, etc., and made themselves completely at home.”220 
These families’ relationship flourished naturally and predictably, even without American men 
present.  
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Kansas City’s People-to-People women led events for international military officers 
beyond “family” gatherings, as well. On an October afternoon in 1979, four Kansas City women 
directed two busloads of male Argentine military officers (sixty-eight in all) for lunch, shopping, 
and sightseeing around the city.221 Their American husbands joined the group later that night for 
dinner. These articles, and countless others like them, did not dwell on the absence of men, but 
made it clear, in Bonnie Harsh’s words, that women had no less significant a role creating “close 
ties” and “warm hearts”  with international military officers and their families.  
In 1968, women from Kansas City’s People-to-People chapter initiated an annual Peace 
Festival that displays from another angle how close Fort Leavenworth’s international military 
officers were to People-to-People’s fundamental rhetoric about building world peace through 
individual cooperation. For a week in September, People-to-People volunteer Ann Brown and 
her committee staffed displays in a Kansas City shopping center featuring People-to-People 
publicity, showing “films relating to our personal work toward peace,” and selling small sheaves 
of wheat, “our symbol of peace.”222 They sold 4x6 inch flags of all nations “at a nominal cost . . . 
because of the trend toward international themes in civic, professional, school, and church 
meetings, they are in great demand.”223 Reflecting the chapter’s ongoing veneration for Dwight 
Eisenhower’s internationalist vision, in 1969 Ann Brown included a special display paying 
tribute to Eisenhower’s memory, whose birthday coincided with the festival. In 1970, Dotty 
Wetherill led the Peace Festival committee, which featured “KU [University of Kansas] student 
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nurses from abroad, student ambassadors, and PTP members present to answer questions about 
our activities.”224  
The Peace Festival did not last into the 1970s, but still demonstrated how Kansas City 
women seized the opportunities People-to-People offered to initiate community projects with 
global intent. For them, sponsorship was not a mere social opportunity that reinforced domestic 
spheres. People-to-People volunteers believed they built real alliances, they produced genuine 
cooperation between individuals which yielded global results in the form of cross-cultural 
understanding, economic exchanges, intellectual collaboration, and, ultimately, peace. When 
Helen Black accompanied Sudanese President Nimeiri across the United States, she was more 
than just a model of American domestic consumption. She became a soldier for her global vision 
of international cooperation, though she expressed what that vision would look like through her 
Thanksgiving table. Ann Brown organized the first Peace Festival in 1968 to draw Kansas City 
and the world closer together. Helen Black, Ann Brown, Billie Hartwell, and Bonnie Harsh did 
not accept that they were reinforcing American empire via domesticity cloaked in modernity. On 
the other hand, the ongoing presence of a large supply of international visitors, made possible by 
a vast network of American military expansion worldwide, maintained a fresh and diverse 
international clientele for their efforts.  
Kansas City chapter President Charles Nelson wove nearly all the aspects of the chapter’s 
identity together as he praised Dotty Wetherill and the Peace Festival in November 1970’s 
“Contact.” “To achieve peace,” he reflected, “we have tried military power, foreign aid, lend 
lease, diplomacy, and so on, without the long-term success we had hoped to achieve. Now, 
without detracting from these efforts, let us try building peace through friendship. Keep in touch 
with all your guests and especially be certain our allied officers and others are not left alone 
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during our holidays.” 225 He concluded, “For peace’ sake, give of your time until it feels 
good!"226 Nelson discounted both the results and the potential for formal diplomacy, he 
recognized the initiative the women of People-to-People felt empowered to take organizing a 
major project to articulate the goal of peace, and he saw no contradiction behind hosting military 
officers and fostering peace. The privileged place of Midwestern values was the only aspect of 
the Kansas City People-to-People version of Military Internationalism Nelson neglected to 
mention there. Given the ink spilled over the annual rodeo, it was hardly necessary. 
From rural food, relaxed wardrobe, and rustic furniture to its interactive recreation of the 
frontier myth, no spectacle captured People-to-People’s Midwestern exceptionalism like the 
rodeo. The great union of Ray and Rea Petty and three Thai families “all began with the Rodeo.” 
The 1963 rodeo was the first major event the Greater Kansas City People-to-People Chapter held 
its incorporation in 1962, and they publicized it constantly after that.227 Held at Kansas City’s 
Benjamin Stables in July, shortly after the newest fifty Allied officers arrived at Fort 
Leavenworth, the first rodeo and “western-style barbeque,” gave the group “a rare experience 
with American hospitality.”228 The rodeo quickly became the chapter’s signature event. In 1964, 
the Kansas City Rodeo dedicated its first rodeo performance of the year to the Allied Officers 
and the Greater Kansas City Chapter of People-to-People. At the opening ceremony, as the 
master of ceremonies introduced each of the forty-two nations represented, a rider “raced into the 
arena, with that country’s flag streaming stiffly in the breeze.”229 Sponsor families and 
international families sat on bales of hay and shared a “chuck wagon” dinner of potato salad, 
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Jell-O, fried chicken and roast beef, and “an unlimited supply of beer and Coca Cola.”230 
Children rode on ponies and stagecoaches, while “Kansas City’s all-Indian ‘Council of Fire’ 
staged authentic Indian dances, complete with drums, Indian songs, and full regalia.”231 “Real 
life Cowboys” demonstrated firsthand to foreign guests “what they had read about or seen in 
movies—roping and wrangling techniques.”232 Through the sixties and seventies, over one 
hundred officers joined each CGSC class, and the event grew in size and importance for both the 
Kansas City volunteers and the officers’ families.  
Between 1963 and 1994, the rodeos provided foreign officers and their families “their 
first experience with Western music, corn-on-the-cob and American Indians,” and by all 
accounts, people loved them. To Joy Parr, the rodeo “was a little like Xmas morning, full of 
anticipation and curiosity, appreciation and, yes, a little trepidation,” but by 1966, “the 
organization was so perfected . . . that things really hummed.”233 The warmth of conversation 
after the rodeo, she recalled, was “especially rich.”234 In 1971, the Command and General Staff 
College Commandant personally thanked chapter president Chuck Nelson after the rodeo. “The 
events made a tremendous impression on the Allied officers and their families,” he wrote, “and 
has been the topic of conversation ever since.”235 In other years, the foreign visitors “thoroughly 
enjoyed an opportunity to see feather-clad, drum-beating American Indians face to face,” and 
“the friendly multi-lingual conversations soon centered around the Indian dances.”236 The 
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presence of a mutually foreign “other” may have lightened the tension and anticipation of the 
moment for Americans and visiting families alike.  
People-to-People publicized every aspect of the event.237 In their annual appeals for more 
members, Kansas City’s “Contact” editors and People-to-People presidents routinely touted the 
rodeo as the most enjoyable “perk” of membership.238 They even warned members that the 
duties of sponsorship did not end after the rodeo, as if they suspected members for volunteering 
to sponsor for that purpose alone.239 The rodeos also inspired articles for the International’s 
People publication that reiterated both the Kansas City chapter’s particular excellence at 
conducting well organized, exciting, and far-reaching international events and the inherent 
superiority of “mid-western” American hospitality.  
Rodeos reiterated People-to-People International’s argument that Midwestern values 
trumped formal diplomacy. On the surface, the nature of international military education and 
training made military uniforms and national flags seem indispensable. People-to-People 
volunteers around Fort Leavenworth carefully erased those national and hierarchical distinctions 
in the way they reported on social events. “Except for a few Americans decked out in authentic 
Western cowboy garb,” the International’s People magazine reported in 1964, “host and guest 
alike were casual sports attire—blending together merely as people, with little national 
distinction.”240 Instead, the rustic West leveled national categories. “Baled-hay diplomacy was 
                                                 
237 “Allied Officers Guests at Rodeo,” Kansas City Times, July 1, 1968, Clippings File, Kansas City Public Library, 
Missouri Valley  Special Collections; See also: Unknown, “Annual Barbecue Picnic Dinner - Rodeo”; Unknown, 
“July 2nd Barbecue -- Rodeo Acclaimed Best Ever”; Unknown, “5th Annual Chuck Wagon-Rodeo July 8, 1967”; 
Gail Ward, “Chalk-Up a Successful BBQ-Rodeo,” Contact, Greater Kansas City People-to-People Council 
Newsletter, August 1969, Binder: Contact 1963-1970, GKCPTP; Unkown, “Picnic Planned Today for Allied 
Officers,” Leavenworth Times, July 22, 1984, Leavenworth Public Library; Reichley, International Officers:  A 
Century of Participation at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, 27; Unknown, “No Rodeo 
1995,” Contact, Greater Kansas City People-to-People Council Newsletter, May 1995, Binder: Contact 1990s, 
GKCPTP. 
238 Unknown, “It’s Allied Officer Time Again,” 1–3. 
239 Bob Combs, “Allied Officers Picnic,” Contact, Greater Kansas City People-to-People Council Newsletter, 
September 1970, 2–3, Binder: Contact 1970s, GKCPTP. 
240 Unknown, “American Rodeo Goes International,” 20. 
 
276 
 
the order of the day,” People claimed.241 “Seated on the bales of hay, Greeks and Indonesians, 
Thais and Germans munched barbecued chicken and corn on the cob, drank coffee drawn from a 
ten gallon can, and compared notes with American hosts about the foods and customs of their 
native lands.”242 When they returned to their countries, allied military men talked more about 
“the hospitality of civilians who lived near the bases” than their military training.243  
Other letters of appreciation in People-to-People’s publications stressed the connection 
between Midwestern geography and international hospitality. “Contact” reprinted Nepalese 
Major Rajendra Thapa’s poetic tribute to Eileen Boschert, his sponsor in 1983: “The air you 
breathe will be freshened by the Rockies/As will be mine by the Himalayas./The blood in your 
vessels will be circulated by the Mississippi and Missouri/So will be mine by the Ganges and 
Baghmati.”244 People-to-People International’s People newsletter called this “Wheat Belt 
Internationalism,” and reported that Indian students who could have attended New York 
University chose Kansas State University because “it’s too hectic there for a guy from another 
country. Here, the folks have a little more time for you.”245 For a Nigerian veterinary student, 
Kansas offered the best opportunity “to see Americans at their best – relaxed, casual, and not 
putting on the dog.”246  
The superiority of “Baled-hay diplomacy” and Western garb over foreign policy and 
military uniforms fit into People-to-People’s larger anti-statist narrative. People boasted in 1966: 
“It wasn’t the skyscrapers that impressed these foreign visitors most about the United States. Nor 
the glitter of its cities.”247 It was the rural places; the stockyards in Kansas City and the Great 
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Bend in Kansas. The American Mid-West—“almost as far geographically as one can get from a 
foreign border” and “once the nation’s bedrock of isolationism”—had become home to “the first 
international generation” of American youth, wrote Maurice “Moe” O’Reilly, the People-to-
People spokesman and former director of public relations for Goodyear.248  
 
Privileging “baled-hay diplomacy” over formal foreign policy reflected People-to-People 
International’s version of internationalism that replaced official diplomatic relationships with 
non-governmental and rural contacts. “Wheat Belt Internationalism” thrived on volunteers, not 
State Department employees, and women volunteered.249 Women participated enthusiastically in 
the opportunities this type of internationalism opened for leading community organizations and 
building rewarding personal relationships with other Americans and interesting visitors from 
abroad. Fort Leavenworth’s robust supply of international officers contributed to that narrative 
by constantly refreshing the pool of international elites and sanctioning their contact with 
Midwestern host families. After purging the national trappings of military service and replacing 
them with casual Midwestern garb, a different kind of internationalism emerged that both 
depended on the U.S. government’s official interaction with foreign militaries while claiming 
superiority over formal relationships of state power. 
 
Conclusion 
Anti-statist rhetoric embedded in People-to-People’s origins mirrored the United States’ 
international military education and training program’s celebration of contact with “ordinary” 
Americans and empowered local women outside traditional channels of international diplomacy. 
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As a result, women volunteers organized activities for international officers and their families, 
established the necessary relationships with Fort Leavenworth’s staff to promote their activities, 
and interpreted the events’ meanings for the rest of the community. By the early 1960s, through 
the sponsorship program for Allied Officers, local women nurtured a version of internationalism 
based on a “Midwestern” rendering of American hospitality and transnational cooperation that 
emphasized family bonds over national boundaries. Through annual picnics and rodeos, food 
fairs and fashion shows, and classroom lessons for wives and children in the “American 
Language,” women and men around Fort Leavenworth reinforced their own perception of what it 
meant to be a Midwestern American. Hospitality, amiability, and openness to international 
visitors were all aspects of that internationalism, but it also depended on the United States’ 
robust international military education and training program to provide the people necessary to 
practice that vision. Ironically, then, women and men in the community around Fort 
Leavenworth claimed independence from formal American diplomacy and Cold War geopolitics 
in ways that would have shocked the academics and policymakers who originally justified for 
America’s international military education and training empire.  
 Chapter 3 demonstrated that policymakers refused or failed to measure the power of the 
IMET program, but accepted that it formed “people to people” relationships “of a higher order” 
as part of their support for it. The women and men around Fort Leavenworth, Kansas would have 
agreed, with a caveat. Their relationships were superior in spite of, not because of, their military 
origins. Sponsors and volunteers celebrated their initiatives, their volunteerism, and even in the 
“city life” that sponsors from Kansas City supposedly upheld, their Midwestern values, their 
independence from nation-bound diplomacy, and women’s special authority to unite families 
from around the world. 
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Chapter 5: Writing for Peace: International Men and Women of the Ghana 
Armed Forces 
 
Introduction: Makana’s Fanara Diary 
In February 1975, as his six-month peacekeeping deployment came to an end and he and his 
battalion of 500 Ghanaian soldiers prepared to leave Egypt, Lieutenant Makana Blay published 
his observations and impressions in the Ghana Armed Forces News.1 His full-page article 
described the Ghanaians’ mission, the terrain, sandstorms, Cairo and its charms, and positive and 
negative interactions with Egyptian Arabs. Beneath a photo of four Ghanaian soldiers and a 
dozen or so children, his caption read: “When it's time for Saakem" the soldiers hardly dine 
without their newly acquired friends (Egyptian Children) coming around for their share. And this 
is well within the spirit of African Unity: Be Thy Brothers Keeper.”2  
Three “lessons” from the experience struck him:  
“Our men can talk face to face with other nationals without any feeling of inferiority 
complex. They know that they are and can be as efficient as any other soldier from any part of 
the world.” 
“We have seen how other nationals live. Some . . . are less better off than the Ghanaians 
but they don’t complain much . . . They don’t curse the world when there is shortage of sugar 
and milk.” 
                                                 
1 Lt. Makana N. Blay, “From Makana’s Fanara Diary,” Ghana Armed Forces News, February 15, 1975, 4, GAF 
DPR. 
2 Saakem" as it appears in the text. Ibid.; Lt. Col. Eric Aggrey-Quashie, “Re: A Very Specific--and Easy--Request 
from an American Historian and Researcher,” April 1, 2014 This email confirms the text of the caption under the 
photo. 
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“As for Pte [Private] ABONGO he now knows that a dollar is a paper note just like the 
cedi. When he was first paid his dollar allowance popularly known as a ‘Kissinger’ he uttered in 
surprise, ‘so the dollar way people de talk about ibi [it be] paper?  I tink say ibi [it be] gold.’”3   
 
Since the earliest days after independence in 1957, members of the Ghanaian Armed 
Forces and their families consciously and intentionally joined a global community of military 
service best described as internationalist. Chapter 2 argued that civilian and military political 
leaders routinely pegged Ghanaian military education and training to international norms 
(usually Western, but not exclusively), and restated national military objectives using 
internationally recognizable reference points and language. Even taking their statements at their 
most cynical and self-serving to justify military coups and regimes, in practice they resulted in 
actual international travel for thousands of Ghanaian military men and their families in the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.4  
This chapter explores how Ghanaian soldiers themselves interpreted that international 
travel, how they specifically considered the opportunity for travel, education, and training abroad 
as incentives to join the armed forces, and how they negotiated the economic and political 
incentives of military-sponsored international travel with its own risks and with political and 
economic uncertainty in Ghana between the 1970s and 1980s. It argues that during those years, 
Ghanaian military personnel and their families found the experiences of international military 
education and peacekeeping personally rewarding, but they also connected Ghanaians to global 
                                                 
3 The Cedi is Ghana’s national currency. The “Kissinger” is named after U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 
who helped negotiate the 1973 cease fire and UN mission in Sinai. In other places, Blay and his colleagues 
transcribed literally the stereotypical “Abongo” style of speech. Blay, “From Makana’s Fanara Diary,” 4; Unknown, 
“Lt Cpl Abongo Is Back from No Man’s Land,” Ghana Armed Forces News, February 15, 1975, 2, GAF DPR; 
Unknown, “Lt Cpl Abongo Gossips: Afro Man and Fine Fine ‘Bobby,’” Ghana Armed Forces News, April 15, 
1975, 2, GAF DPR. 
4 Capt. Georgina Mensah became the first Ghanaian woman peacekeeper in 1985. Stephen Owusu, “The Lone 
GHANBATT Lady,” Litani: UNIFIL News, February 1985, 5, AG-20; S-1078 Personal Files; Box S-1078-0089; 
Folder 5 - Litani - UNIFIL News Jan-Jun 1985, UN ARMS. 
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communities while weakening some national bonds. International military service provided 
Ghanaian families alternate strategies to negotiate economic insecurity in ways that strikingly 
resemble other diaspora communities, with an essential difference: in this case, Ghanaian 
soldiers families’ transnational identity still depended on functioning state agencies and 
international diplomatic processes to facilitate their travel, and the state usually expected them to 
return promptly after their training. These Ghanaians’ alternate identity was both family-centered 
and global; employing international travel as both an economic and political strategy to “get 
ahead” and to forge global relationships based on an international humanitarian ethos.5 Like local 
volunteers around Fort Leavenworth, this brand of internationalism transcended the state, but 
still depended on military scaffolding only the state could provide.  
 Especially during the period of Ghana’s military rule (1966-1992), historians have 
struggled to reconcile the possibility of an “imagined community” of Ghana with the evidence of 
massive political, economic, and cultural fractures in the Ghanaian state.6 Many African scholars 
consider the nation-state an unfortunate yet unavoidable level of analysis.7 They acknowledge 
that the nation-state was the shape of colonialism’s “civilizational siege” of Africa, but rail 
against the nation-state for failing to express the essence of African identity.8 Ghanaian 
historiography continues to grapple with whether Ghana met “national” criteria at all, as ongoing 
competition between regional and ethnonationalisms makes nation-state status fit uncomfortably 
around Ghanaian history in the three decades after independence.9  
                                                 
5 See Akyeampong, “‘Diasporas,’ Mobility and the Social Imaginary.” 
6 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
7 Manger and Assal, “Diasporas Within and Without Africa--Dynamism, Heterogeneity, Variation,” 16; Manning, 
The African Diaspora: A History through Culture, 323; Robert Young, Postcolonialism, A Very Short Introduction 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 61; Amoah attempts to reengage the “anthropological reality” of the 
nation, in opposition to other trends in historiography. Amoah, Reconstructing the Nation in Africa, 4. 
8 Korang, Writing Ghana, Imagining Africa, 12. 
9 Ibid.; Amoah, Reconstructing the Nation in Africa, 5. 
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Not even the military, the proto-national institution which actually administered the state 
for most of those years, remained free from society-wide cleavages between corporate and class 
identities, elitism and radicalism, and ethnicism.10 On the contrary, the prominent historian of 
Ghanaian military sociology Eboe Hutchful argues, involving themselves in politics made 
Ghanaian military leaders even more susceptible to “contentious and contradictory hues of 
broader social dynamics.”11 Military leaders implanted within the corporate structures of the 
military “the very social pathologies (of mismanagement, corruption, ethnicism and so on) that 
the military was attempting to eradicate in Ghanaian society.”12 From the “right-leaning” coup in 
1966 to the “left-leaning” one in 1972 to the “revolution” of 1979, at one stage or another, all 
leading social factions in Ghana have imagined their class interests conjecturally reflected in the 
military.13 Likewise, scholars of national security generally agree that the Ghanaian armed 
forces, like most others in sub-Saharan Africa, failed to represent the ideals of “professionalism” 
which were supposedly necessary to bring political development.14 Cloven as it was by class, 
ethnic, and political divisions, rarely, if ever, did an organization called “the military” act in a 
“national” way.  
In the same ways they complicated Ghana’s already fractured political economy after 
independence, persistent ethnic and regional allegiances also gravely circumscribe any 
discussion of class within the Ghanaian military. Hutchful argues that none of the leading 
political or economic factions in Ghana at that time resembled a “fully formed class” or had 
                                                 
10 Baynham calls this a “fragmented” rather than “integral” relationship with their political and social environments. 
Simon Baynham, “Introduction:  Armed Forces in Africa,” in Military Power and Politics in Black Africa, ed. 
Simon Baynham (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 7. 
11 Hutchful, “Institutional Decomposition and Junior Ranks’ Political Action in Ghana,” 214. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 251. 
14 Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style, 56; Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous Order: 
Military Forces in African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 57; Huntington, The Soldier and 
the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, chap. 4; Huntington, “Political Development and 
Political Decay,” 429; Eboe Hutchful, “Military Policy and Reform in Ghana,” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 35, no. 2 (June 1, 1997): 252. 
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“liberated itself from its roots in pre-capitalist social structures.”15 Those contradictions applied 
equally within Ghana’s ruling petty bourgeoisie, within the public sector of high civil servants 
and military officers, and between local manufacturers and merchants. This chapter, therefore, 
employs the term “class” to describe Ghanaian military families’ socio-economic patterns in 
income and consumption that connected them to similar communities of soldiers in Ghana but 
that also translated—however inexactly—to international economic standards for soldiers 
modeled in places like the United States. As Chapter 4 did, this chapter argues that the thin 
cultural barrier between Ghanaians and the members of other military communities they 
encountered abroad reflected both sides’ misperception of the other’s class status. Ghanaians 
employed this perceived differential in status to make claims for pay and benefits from the 
Ghanaian government and from the international community.  
Instead of searching the Ghana military’s failure to fulfill national ideals or its limited 
success supplying a locus of nationalism around which Ghanaian identities coalesced, this 
chapter looks instead for alternate uses of military service for individual Ghanaians’ identities. 
Compared with other Ghanaian elites, military service offered some enviable opportunities—
especially in international travel and training. Chapters 2 and 3 explored Ghana’s ongoing 
relationship with the U.S. International Military Education and Training program. Ghanaian 
military elites also aggressively pursued inclusion in United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
first in Congo from 1960 to 1963, then in the Sinai between 1973 and 1979, and Lebanon 
continuously after 1979. After 1989, Ghanaian soldiers or police joined multinational 
peacekeeping missions around the world—twenty-three in just the next decade—providing 
80,000 soldiers in forty years between 1960 and 2000.16 This extensive military participation 
                                                 
15 Hutchful, “A Tale of Two Regimes,” 41. 
16 Including: Namibia, Angola, Western Sahara, Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Chad, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slavonia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, East Timor, Kosovo, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone. The number 80,000 includes repeats--it is a tally of participants, not individual soldiers. United 
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abroad reaped corporate benefits and national ones. The UN reimbursed the government of 
Ghana for equipment depreciation and peacekeepers’ salaries, for example. But peacekeepers 
themselves also developed international relationships while earning significantly more money on 
deployments than they could in Ghana. International service altered Ghanaian families as well. 
Especially on professional courses abroad, wives and children often joined in the travel. In most 
cases of UN service, wives and children learned new ways to adjust to the difficult separation. 
As a result, in the 1970s and 1980s, military education, training, and UN service abroad—and 
the political and economic benefits flowing from them—became an essential aspect of Ghanaian 
service members and their wives’ individual identities and economic strategies.17  
This chapter also argues that internationalism itself motivated Ghanaian soldiers and their 
families. When abroad on courses or in Egypt or Lebanon in the seventies and eighties, members 
of the Ghana Armed Forces considered themselves part of an imagined global community of 
military scholars and peacekeepers that transcended or exceeded their imagined national 
community as an essential marker and motivation for their service.18 Soldiers’ dispatches from 
the field, their poems, the messages from home, memoirs, even Makana’s photo of Egyptian 
children crowding Ghanaians soldiers at mealtime and its caption proclaiming the “spirit of 
Africa” evoked this community. To complicate matters, as the nation-state dissolved or reformed 
in their absence, as it did periodically in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Ghanaian soldiers—as all 
Ghanaians did—continually renegotiated their national identities. Polarizing the issue into 
international, national, and sub-national identities does not imply that the individuals lived more 
                                                 
Nations Information Center, Ghana: Four Decades of UN and Regional Peacekeeping (Accra: United Nations 
Information Center, 2000), 26–27. 
17 Ghanaian women soldiers began peacekeeping in very small numbers in 1985; by the 1990s participated in larger 
numbers. Major Comfort Ankomah-Danso describes her experiences briefly in “Breaking the Barriers: Women in 
Peacekeeping” in ibid., 18; See also Owusu, “The Lone GHANBATT Lady,” 5. 
18 Anderson’s “imagined” community is the nation-state. Iriye’s “imagined world” is global. Anderson, Imagined 
Communities; Iriye, “Internationalizing International History,” 53. 
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than one social reality; they just spoke of it in dichotomous terms.19 But de-emphasizing the 
nation for a while reveals ways that other identities expressed themselves, sometimes with 
surprising intensity. 
If, rather than looking at the national as the essential or radical attribute of military 
service, and instead consider it an occasional, and occasionally uninvited, guest in individuals’ 
much larger worldview, we see individuals constantly negotiating the extent to which they 
permitted the state to contribute or hinder larger plans. Ghanaian service members and their 
families sometimes engaged the state as an economic enabler, sometimes as a foe subjecting 
them to danger, sometimes providing refuge from danger, or sometimes as a mode of 
transportation into a global community. Both men and women leveraged military service and the 
new template for modernity it imposed to make claims for themselves against the Ghanaian state, 
just as Ghana did to make claims against the international community.20 Women on the home 
front learned new ways to manage households in their husbands’ absence, for example. As this 
chapter explores, they did so by combining some Army-sponsored resources with new and 
existing social networks in combinations that resembled women’s strategies in other military 
communities around the world. Ghanaian soldiers and their families moved easily in and out of 
the global community, even if—as Private Abongo’s realization that the ‘Kissinger’ was a paper 
note just like the Cedi—the initial international experience was jarring.  
Part of the definition of the post-independence African diaspora includes the ability to 
move freely between family, ethnic, national, and international identities.21 In Diasporas Within 
                                                 
19 This is very similar to what we see Congolese traders doing between Kinshasa or Brazzaville and Paris. 
MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, Congo-Paris. 
20 Malians made similar claims against the French in the late 20th century. Mann, Native Sons. 
21 Akyeampong, “Africans in the Diaspora,” 183; Manu, “‘Efie’ or the Meanings of ‘Home’ Among Female and 
Male Ghanaian Migrants in Toronto, Canada and Returned Migrants to Ghana,” 143; Manning, The African 
Diaspora: A History through Culture, xvii; William Ackah, “The Intersection of African Identities in the Twenty-
First Century: Old and New Diasporas and the African Continent,” in Reframing Contemporary Africa: Politics, 
Economics, and Culture in the Global Era, ed. Peyi Soyinka-Airewele and Rita Kiki Edozie (Washington, DC: CQ 
Press, 2010), 131; Arthur, African Diaspora Identities, xii; Clarke, “New Spheres of Transnational Formations,” 48. 
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and Without Africa, Leif Manger and Munzoul Assal call for us to rethink diaspora communities 
not as bounded groups, mobile, with clear cut-identities of race and ethnicity, isolated from their 
environment and in various states of assimilation.22 Instead, they suggest, diasporas are 
relational, they are sites of intersection for multiple identifications, providing political and 
economic resources as bases for redefining people’s identities and forms of belonging.23 After 
independence, individual Africans, especially Ghanaians, made transnationalism and travel key 
strategies for survival and accumulation.24 In Ghanaians’ social imaginary, “going abroad” 
meant “getting ahead.” International military structures provided Ghanaians vast numbers of 
opportunities for “going abroad,” so it makes sense that the transnational or international 
experiences they made along the way altered their local and national identities. Continuing pre-
independence patterns of mobility, the combination of voluntary and reluctant military travel 
also resembled other Africans’ enthusiasm and hesitation to join the diaspora.25 In such a way, 
military service to the nation contributed to the de-stabilization of the nation-state that Manger 
and Assal and Paul Gilroy argue are hallmarks of the transnational diaspora identity.26 A closer 
look at international military service, therefore, offers striking similarities—with some 
significant differences—between Ghanaian military personnel and their families and other 
African diaspora communities abroad.  
The chapter begins by exploring Ghanaian individuals’ enthusiasm for international 
military travel in the context of the corporate and national benefits it also provided for Ghana’s 
                                                 
22 Manger and Assal, “Diasporas Within and Without Africa--Dynamism, Heterogeneity, Variation,” 7. 
23 Ibid., 12. 
24 Akyeampong, “‘Diasporas,’ Mobility and the Social Imaginary,” 25. 
25 Although Abaka maintains that “Hausa” identity persisted, not that a “military” identity replaced it. Edmund 
Abaka, “Traders, Slaves, and Soldiers: The Hausa Diaspora in Ghana (Gold Coast and Asante) in the Nineteenth and 
Early Twentieth Centuries,” in Movements, Borders, and Identities in Africa, ed. Toyin Falola and Aribidesi Adisa 
Usman, Rochester Studies in African History and the Diaspora, v. 40 (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester 
Press, 2009), 194; Arthur, African Diaspora Identities, 128. 
26 Manger and Assal, “Diasporas Within and Without Africa--Dynamism, Heterogeneity, Variation,” 17; Paul 
Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1993). 
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Armed Forces and the Ghanaian state in the 1970s and 1980s. Much of the political uncertainty 
that threatened Ghanaian political leaders also affected Ghanaian soldiers—which is not 
surprising because they were often the same. For Ghanaian military families, international travel 
for education or UN service provided a temporary economic or political asylum, or offered 
benefits that loosened restraints of class and that they could parley into economic independence 
in the future. Military families often used extra pay and benefits to build houses for themselves 
and furnish them with appliances that were scarce in Ghana. Thus they bridged traditional values 
governing domestic space with recent innovations that represented their changing criteria for the 
modern home and modern family. While abroad, Ghanaian families also formed global networks 
with other military families, with other soldiers, and with the people whose peace they deployed 
to protect. UN service was the most common method for forming these networks and building 
economic and political buffers, but UN service also caused lengthy separations between 
Ghanaian soldiers and their wives. Women, therefore, participated in the internationalist identity 
differently than men, often by becoming more independent and detaching somewhat from prior 
regional or group identities. Finally, the chapter explores international military service not as an 
economic or political strategy, but as a transnational identity. Considering its ongoing 
dependence on state resources, this identity is best described as international, based partly on 
national pride but largely on equal participation in a global project for peace. 
Between the mid-1960s and early 1990s, the military dominated Ghanaian politics, but 
this chapter does not dwell on military rule or its impact on Ghanaian society or the armed forces 
themselves. With few exceptions, historians concur that military rule was disastrous for 
Ghanaian political culture, Ghana’s economy, and even the armed forces’ own development.27 In 
                                                 
27 Baynham, “Divide et Impera”; Hutchful, “Military Policy and Reform in Ghana”; Austin, “The Ghana Armed 
Forces and Ghanaian Society”; Baynham, The Military and Politics in Nkrumah’s Ghana; Addae, History of Ghana 
Armed Forces: Military Organizations and Regiments; Aboagye, The Ghana Army. 
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the late 1960s and 1970s, Ghana’s military declined in capability and morale as precipitously as 
the rest of Ghana’s economy. Some sympathetic voices suggest that military rule was a symptom 
of larger regional and global stress, and the armed forces declined in parallel to Ghana’s general 
economic decline after 1962.28 None claim that military rulers delivered on their promises to 
restore national unity, end corruption, or deliver prosperity better than a civilian government did, 
or could do. Neither does this chapter. Instead, it attempts to evaluate how individual families in 
Ghana’s armed forces employed the military’s tenuous, but ongoing, connections to international 
military exchange and employment structures in their personal strategies for political or 
economic liberation and how they internalized the moral aspects of participating in a global 
military structure.  
 
“We Know the Sea That Washes Our Shores:” The Politics of International Service 
Until now, we have examined the United States’ international military education and 
training program from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy, from the perspective of American 
communities, and as an essential element of the Ghana Armed Forces personnel policies. For 
Ghanaian families, international training or peacekeeping deployments abroad often offered a 
method to mitigate political and economic uncertainty at home. Much of the evidence describing 
the way individuals employed international military travel between the early 1960s and 1990s 
suggests that international travel altered the way Ghanaians identified with their own state. Like 
other Ghanaian professionals, military members were also vulnerable to changing political and 
economic circumstances in Ghana and abroad. Military service combined the two conditions—
opportunity for international training through travel and vulnerability—in ways that were both 
common and unique among other groups of Ghanaians abroad. 
                                                 
28 Addae, A Short History of Ghana Armed Forces; See also Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics. 
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Ghana Armed Forces leaders had always touted military service for offering 
opportunities for advanced education, but recruits especially responded to the opportunities for 
education and training abroad. Even before independence, promising cadets attended the Royal 
Military Academy at Sandhurst. Six left for England in 1956; two did in 1957. Thirteen more, 
including G. Dako, did in 1958.29 By 1970, sixty Ghanaian men had gone to Sandhurst.30 The 
chance to attend Sandhurst inspired other young men from Dako’s hometown of Achimota to 
join the army as well, he recalled, which was significant because Akans from Achimota 
previously reviled military service.31 At Sandhurst, Dako met cadets from Iraq, Malaysia, South 
Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and Sierra Leone.32 He later remembered his service as “a world of 
extensive travel throughout Ghana, Europe, and America.”33 An Army recruiting advertisement 
in the Ghanaian Times promising “overseas training in the United Kingdom” convinced Henry 
Kwami Anyidoho to compete for a job as an army radio operator in 1960.34 “In those days,” he 
recalled, “to travel to the United Kingdom alone was a great achievement in society.”35 
International travel, in other words, permitted Dako and Anyidoho to transcend former regional 
and ethnic prejudice against military service. Shortly after the 1966 coup, in his AF News article 
celebrating the putsch, public affairs officer Lieutenant A. A. Enninful boasted, “A number of 
young officers are currently on study leave in Ghanaian universities.  Elsewhere in European 
universities there are lots more studying engineering or doing post-graduate courses.”36 For 
                                                 
29 Addae uses the common practice of using only first initials when discussing minor military officials in historical 
work. Sandhurst’s records do not include his first name. More research may reveal his first name. A. R. Morton, 
“RE: Request for Research Assistance Regarding Ghanaian Cadets at RMA Sandhurst,” January 18, 2012. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Addae, History of Ghana Armed Forces: Military Organizations and Regiments, 3:74. 
32 Ibid., 3:76. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Anyidoho, My Journey . . . Every Step, 19. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Enninful, “The Change From Civil To Military,” 20. 
 
290 
 
Ghanaians, Harvard historian Emmanuel Akyeampong argues, “to travel is to get ahead,” and for 
some, military service offered a promising opportunity for just that.37 
Since independence, international education programs were necessary for promotion to 
higher ranks in Ghana’s armed forces, they bestowed prestige, and military and political leaders 
manipulated them as rewards. Like any other political prize, overseas courses could also be 
withheld from political enemies. American ambassadors knew it; so did the Defense and State 
Department officials who ran the U.S.’s International Military Education and Training 
Program.38 Just before his overthrow in January 1972, for example, President Kofi Busia 
attempted to defuse a perceived threat to his office by ethnic Ewes by scattering Ewe officers, 
sending Air Force Commander Brigadier Ashley-Lassen to the Imperial Defense College in India 
for a year.39 After that plan failed, Colonel Emmanuel Erskine, one of the nine members of the 
ruling National Redemption Council junta who ousted Busia accepted a one-year posting to the 
Imperial Defense College in England just three weeks after the coup as a reward.40 Recalling his 
staff college experience three decades later, Brigadier Achel was convinced that “his politics” 
had both led to his selection for the U.S. Command and General Staff College in 1976 and 
capped his career at Brigadier in the 1980s.41  
In the wake of the 1979 coup, the general fractures in the Ghana Armed Forces became 
tangible to Ghanaians struggling to secure or retain overseas courses they thought they had 
                                                 
37 Akyeampong, “‘Diasporas,’ Mobility and the Social Imaginary,” 30. 
38 Black, “Confidential Telegram from Shirley Temple Black, US Ambassador to Ghana, to Secretary of State; 12 
March 1976, Subject: Changes in Pricing of Foreign Military Training Program”; Dan Henk, Uncharted Paths, 
Uncertain Vision U.S. Military Involvements in Sub-Saharan Africa in the Wake of the Cold War, Occasional Paper 
18 (Colorado Springs, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy, 1998), 29; 
William H. McCoy, Senegal and Liberia: Case Studies in U.S. IMET Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and 
Development, N-3637-USDP (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 4. 
39 Air Force Commander, Army Commander, etc. were equivalent to the Chief of Staff. Bennett, “Epilogue:  
Malcontents in Uniform,” 304. 
40 Fred L. Hadsel, “Telegram from U.S. Ambassador Fred L. Hadsel, Ghana to U.S. State Department, February 10, 
1972; Subject: Changes in NRC,” Telegram (Accra, February 10, 1972), RG 59 SNF 1970-1973; Box 2323, folder 
POL 15 Ghana, 1/1/70, NACP. 
41 Achel, Interview with Brigadier Achel. 
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earned. Henry Kwami Anyidoho’s is a case in point. In spring 1979, Anyidoho “was all joy” 
when he learned of his selection for the staff college at Fort Leavenworth.42 During the June 4, 
1979 uprising, however, junior officers and non-commissioned officers loyal to Flight Lieutenant 
Jerry J. Rawlings detained then-Major Anyidoho along with most of Ghana’s other senior 
officers for questioning and trials. His regiment’s junior officers locked Anyidoho and his 
colleagues in the headquarters’ coffee room for several days before transferring him to Flagstaff 
House, Ghana’s capitol building, to join senior officers from across Ghana in detention.43 At 
military bases elsewhere, junior officers and men incarcerated the senior officers in the Officer’s 
Mess, prohibited them from receiving visitors or food from their families, and shaved their 
heads.44 By the end of June, Rawlings’ Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) released 
most of the senior officers, but executed eight Ghanaian generals, including former Head of State 
Acheampong, the Chief of Defense Staff and Chiefs of Staff from the Army, Air Force, and 
Navy.45  
The junta eventually released Anyidoho; but “a young signal officer” who Anyidoho had 
angered earlier in his career derailed Anyidoho’s posting to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. “My 
course was cancelled and restored, then cancelled again and restored, and cancelled,” he 
recalled.46 “The mental torture was so much that I was losing weight rapidly.”47 Anyidoho 
decided to forget about the course, forget about the army, and concentrate on building up his 
family farm. “My children were growing so I farmed to supplement my pay in order to feed them 
properly,” he wrote.48 In fact, nearly every Ghanaian military family supplemented its income in 
                                                 
42 Anyidoho, My Journey . . . Every Step, 64. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Oduro-Kwarteng, The Memoirs of a Colonel Retired, 40; Baynham, “Divide et Impera,” 636. 
45 Aboagye, The Ghana Army, 103. 
46 Anyidoho, My Journey . . . Every Step, 65. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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some way during the 1970s and 1980s by farming, cooking, or performing additional domestic 
work for pay.49 During the heyday of “Operation Feed Yourself” in the 1970s, military units 
themselves also ran cattle ranches, poultry farms, cassava farms, rice, and yam farms on military 
bases across Ghana.50 Anyidoho had used the income he and his wife Mercy had earned in 
Georgia, U.S.A in 1975 and 1976 to begin a palm oil plantation near Accra, and he retreated 
there after his humiliation in June 1979. “It was when I returned from the Pokuase farm one 
evening,” he recalled, “that a young officer from Signals, Captain Egeme-Ari had come to look 
for me; I was to leave for the course the following day! I was not enthusiastic anymore but 
decided to think it over.”51  
Anyidoho had trained in the United States twice before. As an unmarried corporal, Henry 
became the first Ghanaian to attend a technical school in the United States in April 1962, when 
he completed the Field Radio Repair course at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Despite first-hand 
experience with Southern racism—he was thrown out of an off-post pool room because of his 
color—he still considered the trip “one of my life dreams came true; I landed in the white man’s 
country!”52 “A good deal of integration had taken place” in the American military, he said, and 
he felt “very lucky to have established a very good relationship with most of my white 
classmates.”53  
Then-corporal Anyidoho did not dwell on the experience of being a Black African in 
segregation-era Georgia; in his memoir, he did not mention it again, even when he came back to 
the American South in 1975 and 1979. In May 1975, Major Anyidoho returned to Fort Gordon 
for the yearlong Advanced Communications Course.54 His wife Mercy, who had a certification 
                                                 
49 Addae, History of Ghana Armed Forces: Military Organizations and Regiments, 3:26. 
50 Ibid., 3:26, 143. 
51 Anyidoho, My Journey . . . Every Step, 65. 
52 Ibid., 26. 
53 Ibid., 27. 
54 Ibid., 60. 
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from the Nursing Council of England and Wales, joined him in Georgia and found a nursing job 
at a hospital in Augusta, even though she had given birth to their daughter Mawuse just three 
months prior.55 Mercy’s mother moved into his on-post house in Accra to mind Mawuse. In 
Georgia, meanwhile, Mercy cried “night after night” over the little daughter she left in Ghana.56 
Henry and Mercy made friends with other Ghanaians in Augusta, including a doctor from the 
hospital and his wife, two other Ghanaian officers at Fort Gordon and their wives, and the wife 
of a Ghanaian officer who had stayed in the U.S. “to do a degree course in Nursing” after her 
husband finished his course and returned to Ghana.57  
In Georgia in 1976, Henry and Mercy invested their money carefully. “Georgia being a 
cotton producing state,” he wrote, “we bought a lot of clothes for our children and our friends . . . 
Most impressive of all, we bought two new Toyota cars.”58 They planned to keep one, he 
recalled, but the other “was to be sold in Ghana for us to start a private housing project. A 
turning point indeed!”59 When Henry’s course ended and he returned to Ghana, Mercy stayed 
behind for a few months “since she was doing a short course and also wanted to earn a few more 
dollars.”60 He remembered, “We were going to miss each other for a while, but for a good 
purpose.”61  
Henry and Mercy’s experience in Georgia closely resembled other economic migration 
strategies for non-military Ghanaians of the same period. African émigrés often found work in 
hospitals and clinics in non-metropolitan communities in the United States during this time.62 
Brigadier Ignatius Achel’s wife worked at a nursing home in Kansas while he attended 
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Command and General Staff College, for example.63 In a kind of mini-chain, Henry first 
established a home in Georgia, then sent for Mercy, who quickly found a job and remained in the 
U.S. after he returned to Ghana. Mercy’s arrival inspired the other two Ghanaian officers’ wives 
to come to Georgia and join their spouses, Henry recalled. 64 She facilitated their integration in 
the host society while maintaining a connection with home, just as transnational African 
immigrant networks do elsewhere.65 Despite great sadness leaving her children, Mercy 
understood her contribution to the migration, saw herself as Henry’s partner, and even remained 
in the U.S. to maximize the family’s economic gain.66 The Anyidohos arranged for extended 
family members in Ghana to perform child-rearing tasks in their absence, but also made use of 
the resources of the Ghanaian state—in this case, Anyidoho’s on-post house—to facilitate the 
process.67 Finally, the Anyidohos used their savings from the migration to build a home and 
business in Ghana. John Arthur argues that when migrants abroad built homes in Africa, they 
declared their intent to foster a transnational identity that straddled multiple societies.68 Building 
a home expressed material well-being, dedication to ancestors and extended families, and 
affirmed ties with the homeland.69 In short, during their year in Georgia in 1975 and 1976, the 
Anyidohos capitalized on a state-to-state program for military cooperation to execute their own 
family’s transnational economic strategy while maintaining a simultaneous “presence” in home 
communities as well.70 
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Their experience with staff college in 1979 revealed a different purpose for international 
education. The June 4th uprising fractured the Anyidoho family. Mercy and the two youngest 
children moved to her brother’s family home. Their two older sons lived with Henry on-post at 
Burma Camp. “I brought the bigger boys Akpe and Kafui to sleep in the Camp for two reasons,” 
Henry recalled. “Firstly, I wanted them to grow up as strong and bold men who will not panic at 
the slightest sign of danger and secondly just in case I got picked up in the night, they could be 
witnesses to it.”71 After receiving word that his staff college posting had returned, Mercy 
convinced Henry not to pass up the opportunity. “Her reason was simple,” he remembered. “The 
army was my chosen career so I should pursue it.”72 When a driver arrived to take him to the 
airport the next morning, he had still not told his children he was leaving. “What kind of life was 
this!”73  
Throughout the trip, he remembered, his thoughts returned to his wife and children: 
“Were they safe?”74 Henry discovered mid-journey that he was headed to the U.S. Marine Corps 
Command and General Staff College in Quantico, Virginia and not Fort Leavenworth. He 
became only the second Ghanaian officer to attend there. 75 “I did not want to leave anyone at 
home because of the uncertainties,” he wrote, so he applied through the Ghanaian embassy for 
Mercy and the children to join him in Virginia, borrowing money from friends and relatives to 
pay for their travel.76 When they finally arrived, he remembered, “all the wives of the other 
officers in my den, and we were twelve in all, came to my bungalow and put the house in 
order.”77  
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The Anyidohos’ year at the Marine Corps staff college in the U.S. kept them safe. They 
had leveraged the Ghana Armed Forces’ continuing relationship with international training and 
education programs around the world for their own protection. In a time of danger after the coup, 
the Anyidohos manipulated the Ghana government’s longstanding international commitment to 
obtain protection from violence the domestic Ghanaian state could not contain. They found in the 
American community around Quantico Marine Corps base a welcoming multinational 
community that was familiar with international military officers, and that the Anyidohos easily 
recognized from their prior experience in the U.S. for military education.  
The Ghanaian state initiated and administered international military education, but 
individuals continually negotiated with the state’s uncertainty. In January 1980, Major Michael 
Abana readily accepted a short-notice assignment to the Pakistani Command and Staff College in 
Quettah despite the army’s promise that they would send him to the Indian staff college later in 
the year. Given the political upheaval of the prior year in the Ghanaian armed forces, Abana said, 
he feared he might never get the opportunity to attend staff college if he passed up that chance.78 
By then, he said, “I was fed up with military rule in Ghana for a while yet” but had no illusions 
about Pakistan’s ongoing military governments, either.79 “There was a day that we were 
discussing these sorts of things in the classroom, when I told [my Pakistani colleagues] point 
blank that it was not their responsibility to rule, they are to soldier!” he recalled.80 “I was lucky I 
was not sacked! Why could I have been sacked? [Because] they have told us, ‘we know the sea 
that washes our shores, but we do not talk about it.’”81 They need not mention the Indian Ocean 
by name; they need not mention the illegitimacy of military rule. Both just were. Both the 
Pakistani army and Abana understood that military rule was problematic, but with a combination 
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of fatalism and resolve, the staff college continued, and continued to accept Ghanaian officers. 
Meanwhile, Abana and his wife Peggy both learned a different perspective about Pakistan. 
“Even up till now,” he mused thirty years later, “whenever something happens in Pakistan, if she 
hears, she says ‘Hey Mike, this is happening in Pakistan.’ It was a good education for her, too.”82  
Michael Abana, Peggy, and his Pakistani colleagues all considered their friendships legitimate, 
even if they knew their respective governments were not. 
Sometimes the Ghanaian state did worse than just than frustrate the military scholar 
abroad. Like Henry and Mercy Anyidoho—but on the other side of the world—in 1975, 
Lieutenant Steve Oduro-Kwarteng attended a Signals Officer course overseas, in India. Like the 
Anyidohos, he saved his money. “At the end of the course, I was able to return to Ghana with a 
dashing two-door Datsun car ordered directly from Japan,” he wrote.83 Similar to Anyidoho, he 
left Ghana again in autumn 1979 for a three-year program in electrical and telecommunication 
engineering at two military universities in India.84 “In the second year of the degree course,” he 
recalled, “I received a confidential letter from the defense advisor at the Ghana high commission 
in India telling me of my retirement from the Ghana Army.”85 In his absence, the Ghana Armed 
Forces had decreed that all officers and senior enlisted personnel who were “closely associated” 
with Rawlings’ Armed Force Revolutionary Council “should be retired from the Armed 
Forces.”86  
Oduro-Kwarteng lived through the January 1972 coup as a junior officer, and he 
understood the perils of a politicized military, but he could not avoid the chaos of Flight 
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Lieutenant Rawlings’ June 4,, 1979 revolution. As the coup began, Rawlings and his AFRC 
detained all officers with the rank of major and above and directed the senior Captain in each 
armed forces unit “to take control of affairs in the unit until things were properly sorted out, and 
that no senior officer was to be touched.”87 This order triggered Major Henry Anyidoho’s 
captivity in the regimental coffee room at the Ghana Armed Forces Headquarters at Burma 
Camp. At the first major meeting between Rawlings’ Council and representatives from across the 
services, Rawlings selected then-Captain Oduro-Kwarteng to take notes and produce a transcript 
for the meeting. Oduro-Kwarteng served as Rawlings’ recorder routinely after that, often 
appearing in photographs beside Rawlings, although Oduro-Kwarteng claimed he had no 
ideological stake in the revolution.88 Rawlings retreated from power temporarily between 
September 1979 and December 1981, and Ghana’s new civilian regime attempted to restore the 
military hierarchy by offering Armed Forces Revolutionary Council members the choice “to go 
on courses overseas, to retire and be resettled, [or] to take extended leave before re-joining their 
units.”89 Oduro-Kwarteng, already on a course in India at that time, shared Rawlings’ 
(temporary) fate: the Limann government forcibly retired both from the Ghana Armed Forces.90 
A formal international agreement had sent Oduro-Kwarteng to India in September 1979, 
but he quickly exercised his own initiative when the scaffolding of national sponsorship 
dissolved beneath him. In May 1981, the Ghanaian government formally “retired” him, but the 
Indian military university he attended did not acknowledge his changed status, so Oduro-
Kwarteng kept the news to himself and “concentrate[d] on the course.”91 “Because I was no 
more recognized as an Army Officer,” he wrote, “I told myself that if the Ghana government did 
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not want me in the Ghana Army anymore, the Engineering market in the civil world might want 
my services. From then on, I forgot about the Ghana Army and rather worked harder on my 
books and projects.”92 He finished the course in 1982 and earned a bachelor’s degree in 
engineering, but his family faced a difficult choice.  
Stephen Oduro-Kwarteng, his wife Genevieve, and their three children (one born in 
India) were out of work and out of money. “Some universities were prepared to accept me for the 
Masters Degree,” he wrote, “but it was financially very difficult for me to sponsor myself in a 
university in India.”93 They considered staying in London, “but [we] did not have the resident 
permit.”94 They knew that “back at home in Ghana, people had been looking for AFRC members 
and their associates to bring them to face justice.”95 In fact, Rawlings had overthrown President 
Limann in December 1981, and his own Provisional National Democratic Congress (PNDC) was 
behind the purge of former Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) members. 
Nevertheless, Stephen Oduro-Kwarteng recalled, “I had nothing to hide and nothing to be afraid 
of, so I did come home.”96 In 1983, the Ghana Army reinstated Oduro-Kwarteng and restored his 
captain’s rank. When the state retired Oduro-Kwarteng from the service, he “forgot about the 
army” and concentrated on his studies as an engineering student. After weighing their options 
and returning to Ghana, Steve and Genevieve warily re-established their connection to the army 
and the Ghanaian state. 
In both the Oduro-Kwarteng and Anyidoho families’ cases, the Ghanaian state facilitated 
the international travel that they wielded in their own defense against the state itself. Neither 
dwelled much on this contradiction in their memoirs, but both recognized that their service in the 
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armed forces was contingent on political factors in Ghana that they could not control. Kwame 
Anthony Appiah argues that by the mid-1970s, most ordinary Ghanaians avoided interaction 
with Army officials, who so dominated Ghana’s civic and economic life that they were more 
likely to be “feared and resented” than welcomed.97 Both of these families maximized the 
protection the state offered while simultaneously insulating themselves from the danger it 
threatened. This tense relationship with the state, which shifted between national military service 
and transnational labor migration, resembled the experience of other Ghanaians in the diaspora, 
who often considered their migration “a voluntary and personal act undertaken without 
government role.”98 Ghanaian military families usually returned to Ghana after shorter absences 
and relied on formal state mechanisms to execute their travel plans, but by joining Ghanaian 
communities abroad, investing their pay carefully, and building homes for themselves on their 
return, they insulated themselves from the state’s unpredictability in ways similar to others in the 
diaspora.99 
International military service with the United Nations offered Ghanaians other 
opportunities for similar self-preservation. Major General Emmanuel Erskine employed a related 
tactic in June 1979, when he carefully negotiated for 300 of Ghana’s contingent of 500 
peacekeeping soldiers in the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF) in the Sinai to move to 
the new United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) rather than return to Ghana as the 
UNEF mandate ended.100 Erskine considered service in the bloody Lebanese war safer than 
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returning to Ghana. “I felt that to send the troops home might act as a catalyst for exacerbating 
the already difficult and uncertain situation in Ghana,” he later wrote.101 Like him, many of them 
may have been in personal danger, as well. In February 1972, just weeks after Ghana’s second 
coup, Colonel Acheampong rewarded fellow National Redemption Committee member then-
Colonel Erskine for his three weeks’ service as Army Chief of Staff with a one-year posting to 
the Imperial Defense College in England.102 Erskine resumed his position as Army Chief of Staff 
after he returned in January 1973. In November 1973, Erskine led the Ghanaian delegation that 
negotiated with U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim for Ghana’s inclusion in the UNEF II 
peacekeeping mission and led to his own selection as Chief of Staff for the UN force.103 Erskine 
served exclusively with the U.N. in Egypt and Lebanon after that, even commanding the United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon until 1986, when he finally returned to Ghana.104  
International military service kept Erskine safely away from Ghana during the turbulent 
years surrounding the demise of the Acheampong regime and the rise of Rawlings without ever 
damaging his reputation. The stakes were high. The three Army Commanders who succeeded 
him were killed in the coup or executed in June 1979, and Erskine understandably avoided 
Ghana during that time.105 He specifically cancelled a planned trip to speak to the Ghana Armed 
Forces Command and Staff College in June 1979 and spoke at the Nigerian Staff College 
instead.106 Erskine convinced the United Nations to pay him directly at a pay scale comparable to 
other UN officials and far higher than the Ghanaian standard, so he could afford for his wife and 
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six children to remain in England while he served in the Middle East.107 Throughout the 1970s 
and even during the Rawlings years, the Ghanaian AF News, Ghanaian press, and Ghanaian 
Embassy celebrated Erskine’s achievements and visibility as a highly decorated, internationally 
recognized Ghanaian military officer leading a global mission for peace.108  
For these three military families—the Erskines, Anyidohos, and Oduro-Kwartengs—the 
international military education and UN service offered protection from political uncertainty in 
Ghana. The three families’ responses to that uncertainty also revealed an allegiance to an 
international ideal of military corporateness that transcended national identities. For them, 
Military Internationalism persisted when national structures failed.  
 
There was nothing surprising or unusual about the wives of the other eleven officers in 
the Anyidohos’ class at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College preparing their home for 
Mercy’s arrival. In practically any other setting, we might expect any other group of neighbors or 
classmates to do the same. In fact, the gesture’s very ordinariness—and the Anyidohos 
understanding of it—offers hints to the universality of the experience that requires our attention. 
Henry Anyidoho’s “den,” his community of twelve classmates who worked as a unit through the 
staff college year, included a Canadian officer, a U.S. Army officer, the Anyidohos’ sponsor, and 
eight other American Marine Corps officers.109 Two other African officers, Commander Kassem 
                                                 
107 Ensio Siilasvuo, “Incoming Code Cable from Siilasvuio to Urquhart/Guyer; September 20, 1974, Subject: 
Urquharts Cable 1529 to Guyer (Erskine Pay)” (New York, September 20, 1974), AG-20; S-0332 UNEF Subject 
Files; Box S-0332-007; Folder 7 Ghana 12/111973-11/11/1974, UN ARMS; Unknown, “Biographical Note; Major-
General Emmanuel Alexander Erskine” (New York, December 22, 1975), AG-20; S-0332 UNEF Subject Files; Box 
S-0332-007; Folder 6 Ghana 1973-1979, UN ARMS. 
108 Unknown, “Top Post for Erskine,” Ghana Armed Forces News, December 15, 1974, 6, GAF DPR; Embassy of 
Ghana, Ghana News, Vol 6 No 7/74 1974 (Washington, DC: Embassy of Ghana, April 30, 1974), 4–5; Unknown, 
“Erskine Rides High,” Ghana Armed Forces News, September 15, 1975, 1, GAF DPR; Unknown, “Gen. Erskine 
Takes On New Job,” Ghana Armed Forces News, March 15, 1976, 5, GAF DPR; Unknown, “UNTSO in Close Ties 
With UNEF,” Ghana Armed Forces News, September 15, 1976, 11; Embassy of Ghana, “Erskine: Army Must Be 
Loyal to Govt.,” Ghana News, February 1981, 5. 
109 Anyidoho, My Journey . . . Every Step, 68 Unlike Fort Leavenworth students, the Anyidhohos had only a 
“military sponsor,” and not a separate sponsor family from the civilian community around the base (or two). 
 
303 
 
Amir Abdel Hamid of Egypt and Lieutenant Colonel John Shagayah of Nigeria, were in other 
“dens” at the college. After the course, Henry and Colonel Shagayah remained close friends and 
visited each other regularly. In the 1980s, during UNIFIL deployments, Henry visited former 
classmates Major Adnan Bechara of Lebanon and Colonel Dedvani Jehuda of Israel (in different 
rooms, presumably, but not necessarily).110 Henry’s English professor, Dr. Argus Tresidder 
complimented Henry’s work, challenged him to improve as a writer, and later inspired him to 
write Guns Over Kigali, his memoir of serving in Rwanda.111  
International military education connected the Anyidohos to an alternate global 
community where even spouses’ relationships mirrored the classroom’s internationalism. 
Participants publicly sported national military insignia, but only to identify them as a 
transnational partner, not supplicant. At least Henry Anyidoho thought so. He boasted that his 
final essay on African unity “won a great deal of admiration” and became a research resource for 
the Marine Corps Staff College curriculum for many years.112 Such an identity, constructed on a 
world scale rather than a national one did not entirely contradict the nation-state, but it requires 
us to seek alternate relationships between families in international military communities. This is 
what Manger and Assal mean by “dynamism, heterogeneity, and variation,” although they may 
be surprised to find similarities between international military identities and diaspora ones.113 
 
Internationalism Accessed through UN Service 
Given UN service’s clear benefits to the Ghana government’s national interests, the 
military’s corporate interests, or even individuals’ economic interests, it is difficult to parse the 
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extent to which Ghanaians’ expressions of international solidarity with soldiers and peacekeepers 
represents an internationalist identity. After Ghana joined the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai 
(UNEF II) in 1973, the UN paid Ghana well, and Ghana’s military governments passed much of 
that reimbursement on to soldiers’ families. Still, the experience of peacekeeping service 
required individual families to derive meaningful explanations for the difficulties of the mission, 
the potential danger of peacekeeping service, and the combination of personal benefits (in the 
form of increased pay) and global benefits (in the sense of international peace) that peacekeeping 
accrued. This section describes how UN peacekeeping served national, corporate, and individual 
needs in order to reveal Ghanaians’ expressions of international solidarity that simple terms of 
nationalism, power, class, or wealth cannot explain. Instead, UN service, like military training 
and education abroad, actualized in service members and their families an international identity, 
membership in an unbounded group that employed national resources for its creation and 
support, but in which individual participants readily exchanged national identities for supra-
national ones sometimes, and sub-national ones other times. In the next section, we explore more 
deeply how Ghanaian soldiers made the international act of peacekeeping, personal. 
 
 In 1973 and again in his 1989 memoir, Lieutenant General Emmanuel Erskine asserted 
an international identity accessible through global military service, and urged Ghanaian 
participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions to gain access to it, but corporate stresses 
within Ghana’s military also motivated him. He attended commissioning training and two 
advanced staff colleges in the U.K. in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as Signals Officer training in 
the United States in 1962.114 In 1973, as Army Commander, he claimed that Ghanaian military 
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leaders “yearned” for another UN-sponsored peacekeeping mission to provide experience and 
opportunities for Ghanaian soldiers, just as Ghana’s mission in the Congo had done a decade 
earlier.115 The Congo crisis had brought unusually rapid mobility for Army officers between 
1960 and 1963, but the end of the mission had also caused training, experience, and promotions 
to stagnate.116 Simon Baynham, the prominent historian of Ghana’s military, argues that service 
in the Congo and Ghana’s period of rapid expansion and promotion in the early 1960s created a 
massive clot of men with near-equal age, rank, and expectations for advancement despite a 
dearth of promotion opportunities.117 “Institutionalized instability” resulted, Baynham argues, 
partially blaming the 1966 and 1972 coups on ongoing competition for training, education, and 
opportunities for promotion that resulted.118  
Erskine undoubtedly perceived in 1973 that Ghanaian participation in UN peacekeeping 
duties offered more than just a relief valve for the deadlock in the Ghana Armed Forces 
personnel system. Choosing to graft Ghana’s military fortunes onto internationally acceptable 
military missions, funded by the international community itself, cannily gained access to external 
sources of cash, justified continued claims for grants in international military training and 
education from abroad, and provided regular opportunities for officers to lead deployed 
provisional units that did not require restructuring Ghana’s own military. As Chapter 2 
described, the UN required “staff trained” officers to fill high-profile leadership posts in Sinai 
and Lebanon, which Ghana was keen to fill.119 Between 1974, when the first Ghanaians arrived 
in Sinai and the late 1980s, Ghanaian battalions of 500 to 700 personnel rotated into the Sinai 
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(until 1979) and Lebanon (after 1979) every six months. Each battalion included a commanding 
officer and appropriate staff titles that did not need to match duty titles in Ghana. Continuously 
after February 1974, Ghanaian officers and non-commissioned officers also filled essential posts 
in UNEF and UNIFIL headquarters.120  
When combined with significant financial incentives paid directly to the military 
members, service with the UN offered tangible benefits to both the Ghanaian state and Ghanaian 
Armed Forces as an institution within the state. Early in 1974, Ghana’s United Nations 
delegation led negotiations demanding that all UNEF troop-contributing nations—at that time 
these included Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Senegal, Poland, and Canada—should 
receive the same pay, ending the prior practice of reimbursing “poorer” countries less than 
“wealthy” ones.121 The UN’s reimbursement rate climbed from roughly US$500 per person per 
month in 1974 to over $900 per person per month in 1980, of which the Ghanaian government 
returned approximately half to the individual soldiers.122 This extra pay reached a large number 
of Ghanaian soldiers and their families. Ghana’s army declined from about 11,000 to 8,000 
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soldiers between the early 1970s and early 1990s, but 31,000 Ghanaians served tours in either 
the Sinai or Lebanon between 1973 and 1990.123 In September 1975, after Nepal and Panama 
discontinued their service, Ghana agreed to send an additional 200 troops per six-month rotation, 
increasing their contingent from 500 to 700.124 Similarly, in 1981 Ghana agreed to boost its 
UNIFIL contingent from 476 to 650.125 By 1982, Ghana also claimed between US$5.5 million 
and US$7.5 million per year in equipment reimbursement for its 650-member UNIFIL 
contingent, nearly half of the Ghana government’s own military budget in 1984.126 Beginning in 
1974, the United Nations reimbursed Ghana Airways for delivering Ghanaian personnel and 
equipment to the Sinai and Lebanon at rates higher than the UN’s normal competitive 
contracting procedures prescribed.127 Erskine touted UN service as an “immense help to the 
socio-economic development of the country;” at least it paid for itself. 128 
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Just as the Anyidohos and Oduro-Kwartengs had when on professional education 
courses, Ghanaian soldiers and their families invested their extra pay carefully in ways that 
insulated them from the Ghanaian state itself. Like other Ghanaians in the post-independence 
diaspora, building a house became a priority.129 After Steve and Genevieve Oduro-Kwarteng 
returned to the Ghana Army in 1983, they took a large mortgage and began construction. “I 
started getting worried that at that stage I did not have even a building plot, let alone a building 
anywhere for use after retirement or particularly in case of emergency,” Steve Oduro-Kwarteng 
wrote.130 After peacekeeping deployments in 1986, 1988, 1989, and 1992, they had repaid the 
mortgage.131 “Imagine a second lieutenant,” suggested retired Colonel Michael Abana. “He goes 
to spend six months. He doesn’t buy anything. He brings all the money, maybe $2000 or $3000. 
What is he going to do with it? He knows the difficulties in our country. So he will buy a plot of 
land. And the next time he goes, and he comes back, he will start building a house. So that by the 
time he becomes a captain, if he doesn’t make it [the promotion], he is finished building his 
house.”132 After that, he supposed, “if you realize that the Armed Forces won’t take you any 
more, you can simply go and resign . . . because of your experience as a military man, you may 
even get a job.”133 One former Chief of Defense Staff suggested that disappointment with 
military involvement in politics convinced many Ghanaian officers to quit the armed forces 
altogether and used their UN allowances to begin businesses.134  
Soldiers and their families employed their UN allowances to acquire household goods 
unavailable in Ghana. The Army Chief of Staff even commanded them to “spend the extra 
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allowance they would get wisely and return home with enough money to be put in their 
respective ventures.”135 Lieutenant Oduro-Kwarteng’s comrades returned from the Sinai in 1975 
with “radio tape recorders, radiograms, black-and-white televisions and tabletop fridges among 
others, purchased mainly from the Egyptian market.”136 In 1977, the Ghanaian contingent 
returned from Egypt with a large number of sewing machines.137 From Lebanon, Ghanaian 
shipping and import companies facilitated soldiers’ shipments of home appliances, corn mills, 
generators, roofing sheets, and ceramic floor tile-making machines.138 “For every participation in 
UN peacekeeping operations,” Oduro-Kwarteng wrote, “while some of us were showing interest 
in acquisition of various types and models of home appliance, a few individuals were interested 
in saving their allowances for investment in home projects or purchasing commercial items for 
business.”139 In 2012, retired Colonel Abana considered that in Ghana’s dismal domestic 
economy, the ability to purchase refrigerators and other “essential things” made UN service so 
lucrative that he thought no Ghanaian soldier would ever again attempt to overthrow the 
government and risk Ghana’s exclusion from future UN service, although Flight Lieutenant 
Rawlings was not deterred in 1979.140 
Just as access to international travel unhinged traditional regional and ethnic prejudices 
against military service, access to external sources of cash also helped destabilize stereotype of 
the armed forces as a lower class occupation. As they did elsewhere in Africa, competing 
regional, family, ideological, religious, and ethnic identities often subsumed class identities in 
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postcolonial Ghana.141 Within the Ghanaian military and between the military and the rest of 
Ghanaian society, those identities competed vigorously, as the ongoing struggle over the abongo 
stereotype reveals.142 In a 1969 letter, a reader who identified himself as “Abongo Boy” 
complained to the Armed Forces Magazine that both on-post and off-post elementary schools 
discriminated against the children of soldiers.143 He appropriated the title abongo to file a 
grievance against class-based discrimination. In 1975, another letter complained about Ghanaian 
soldiers—“Real abongo boys”—cheering against the Armed Forces’ own soccer team during 
matches.144 In this case, the letter writer employed the full vitriol of the term to demean soldiers’ 
lack of solidarity—as if the “new” Ghanaian soldier should rise above the stereotype of soldiers 
as ignorant yokels with no prospects or loyalty. Also in 1975, however, Lieutenant Makana’s 
Fanara Diary described “private Abongo’s” lesson in world economics and national pride when 
he realized the Ghanaian Cedi and the U.S. Dollar were both “paper.” Although the stereotype 
persisted somewhat, by the mid-1990s, Stephen Kojo Addae wrote, Ghana’s Army barracks 
“portrayed a lower middle class citizenry, thanks to the many international UN peacekeeping 
operations that take Ghanaian service personnel to missions all over the world.”145 Just as 
American sponsor families around Fort Leavenworth had demonstrated, for Ghanaian soldiers 
the international aspect of military service helped weaken both hard economic class boundaries 
and soft cultural ones defining military service. 
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Service with the UN provided Ghanaian families with cash and access to household 
goods, but time apart required wives on the home front to adapt to new social and economic 
conditions that mimicked older struggles over authority in Ghanaian family life.146 Across Africa 
after World War II, European colonial powers imagined that creating reliable “industrial 
citizens” required changing prior ideas about work, mobility, property, and family.147 “Industrial 
man had a wife,” Frederick Cooper writes, and although colonial officials used “masculine 
pronouns” to describe the transformation to modernity they intended, they directed their efforts 
at women.148 “Unless they joined their men–and lived off the men's wages,” Cooper argues, 
women “were the epitome of tribal life and retarding influence.”149 British colonial armies 
exemplified the process of  “detribalizing” male soldiers and their wives, introducing rigid 
regulations restricting soldiers’ marriage, living arrangements, and hygiene in order minimize 
desertion, maximize discipline, and reproduce future generations of soldiers.150 Those 
regulations largely softened in the Ghana Armed Forces, but the Armed Forces News still 
acknowledged that becoming an “army wife” was a process of psychological transformation.151   
Being an “army wife” required a new identity: “You may say she is a bigamist—sharing 
[her] husband with a demanding other entity called ‘duty,’” Captain K. Adu-Bediaku wrote in 
the Ghana Armed Forces Magazine in 1968.152 “When ‘duty’ calls, she becomes the No. 2 
wife—and until she accepts this fact, her life can be miserable.”153 The Armed Forces News 
described the transformation of Ghanaian women into “army wives” in terms that echo the 
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contradiction between military-imposed modernity and Ghanaian family traditions from the 
colonial era. American modernization theorists of the 1960s considered extended families—and 
the financial obligations they entailed—“traditional” and “obstacles” to modernization.156 
Calling on military wives to embrace “No. 2” wife status as a precondition for marital happiness 
seemed to contradict that aspect of the psychological transformation to modernity. Presumably, 
being “married to the military” is a common expression for “army wives” around the world, but 
to call her “No. 2 wife” stings in a special way for Ghanaian women.157 The emotional 
transformation required—and its reward of escaping misery—was both distinctly African and 
universal to the “modern” military family.  
The Army wife Adu-Bediaku described defied easy classification. “An Army wife is 
international,” he wrote.158 She was equally comfortable in the city or the country, and 
transcended ethnicity. “She may be an Akim farm girl, a Ga fishmonger, a Kwahu trader or an 
Army Nursing Sister. When discussing their Army problems, [wives] speak the same 
language.”159 This description sounded more national than international, as if military spouses 
transcended regional or ethnic divisions, and Adu-Bediaku proclaimed such a Ghanaian identity 
for military spouses. But the identity he described is both smaller and larger than that. He called 
it “international,” but it was also mobile. “She can be a great actress, watching her children’s 
heartbreak at posting time, she gives an Academy Award performance: ‘Takoradi is going to be 
such fun,’ ‘I hear they have a beautiful Amenity Center with all sorts of games;’ ‘Farm products 
and fish are comparatively cheaper . . . .’ but her heart is breaking with theirs, and she wonders if 
this Army life is worth the sacrifice. One day later, en route to the new station, and filled with a 
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spirit of adventures, she knows it is.”160 Adu-Bediaku connected the Ghanaian family to an 
imagined universal military community that moved freely within and without national borders. 
As military families often relocated within Ghana—and occasionally around the world—the sub-
national family identity and the supra-national military identity sometimes eclipsed regional or 
national ones. Adu-Bediaku intended his article to celebrate army wives’ selflessness warmly, 
not as a treatise on the militarization of Ghanaian family life, but he also claimed for Ghanaian 
wives equal participation in the supposedly universal characteristics of army wives around the 
world, using local idioms to drive home his point.  
Women on Ghanaian army bases had always performed unofficial and official domestic 
duties in camp administration, and they had established support structures even in their spouses’ 
absence. As we have already seen, both women and men routinely supplemented family incomes 
by farming, cooking, or performing other domestic jobs.161 Inherited from the Royal West 
African Frontier Force, the Sakari Magazia system promoted influential non-commissioned 
officers’ wives in each military unit with the title Magazia, or “Woman Leader” in Hausa.162 
Typically, the Magazias supervised sanitation around barracks buildings and disciplined wives 
and families of enlisted personnel around the barracks. They wore sergeant’s rank, accompanied 
inspecting officers around the camps, and were “so respected and so powerful that any soldier 
who cross[ed] her could get demoted from his rank to something lower, or fined heavily.”163 
During the 1970s, Magazias from each Company and a senior Magazia from each Battalion 
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became advocates on behalf of wives to the larger command and administered the Army Wives 
Association and Armed Forces Wives Association.164  
The Ghana Army imagined that women took the opportunity to improve themselves in 
their husbands’ absence on peacekeeping deployments. Instead of normal sanitation duties, 
“besieging” the Paymaster’s office, or “the traditional busy cooking around half-past one,” the 
AF News’ Comfort Akwagyiram observed in 1976, “few wives are engaged in this ‘Abongo 
wife’s role.’”165 Instead, wives’ organizations organized sewing, cooking, and literacy classes.166 
Under the “2nd Infantry Battalion in Action” headline ran the lead: “The Women at Home and the 
Men on the Beat” in the Sinai.167 Beneath a photo of Ghanaian women studying dutifully at 
school desks a caption read, “I would not be surprised if you find your wives writing your letters 
on your return home.”168 Beneath one of a dozen women cooking: “How happy would the 
husbands become if they return home to discover that their wives have acquired skills to prepare 
various dishes.”169 To Lydia Baafi, wife of the commander of then-current Ghanaian UNEF II 
detachment and “Chairman of the Wives’ Club” in 1976, life for army wives whose husbands 
had deployed was considerably busier than usual. She had organized “basketball, netball, and 
athletics” for the other wives, but also “classes in cookery, beadwork, needlework, [and] tie and 
dye.”170 “We try as much as possible to depend on some of the wives who are experts in their 
various fields,” Baafi told the AF News’ Comfort Akwagyiram. “For instance, the nurses among 
us once in a while organize lectures on child-care.”171  
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Peacekeepers’ wives used the deployments to access formal education and build 
supporting relationships with other families, and former domestic roles changed as women 
became more independent, but they did not change much. Even while celebrating the possibility 
that an Army wife might become an excellent, literate chef, the AF News suggests that these new 
skills primarily made her a more supportive wife—able to please her husband with love letters 
when he was away and with dinner when he returned. By promoting these small educational 
initiatives for wives of deployed soldiers and distinguishing them from typical “Abongo’s wife’s 
roles” of communal cooking, sweeping, and waiting for pay, the Ghana Armed Forces’ official 
news magazine equated the deployment with an occasion for wives’ transformation.172 They 
became more educated, more independent, and less connected to regional or ethnic identities. 
Becoming a peacekeeper’s wife was another step beyond the “Army wife” on continuum that 
ended with modernity. 
Some of the same colonial tactics of reshaping African women’s expectations for work, 
family, and property in order to modify the (male) African labor force into modern citizens 
continued in Ghana’s armed forces even after independence.173 Especially in British colonial 
armies, processes for creating reliable colonial soldiers mirrored those colonial powers pioneered 
for creating industrial citizens.174 Hygiene inspections, home inspections, and officially 
registering wives were all part of the European program of “detribalization.”175 Around British 
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colonial army posts, young African women adopted the clothing, hairstyles, perfumes, and 
cosmetics linked to Western conceptions of “femininity.”176 Even after independence, Ghanaian 
soldiers required their commanding officer’s permission to marry; Henry Anyidoho recalled his 
pride after his commander complimented Mercy as “a good choice.”177 The Ghana Military 
Academy closely scrutinized cadets’ courtship behavior in the 1960s and 1970s. “As a gentleman 
officer-to-be, one was expected to know how to handle the lady partner,” Stephen Oduro-
Kwarteng remembered.178 “The officer cadet was watched as to how he handled or treated his 
partner” and “We were told that it was the pride of any unit commander to have his young officer 
call on him to introduce his wife as the lady who had been his girlfriend while he was at GMA 
[the Ghana Military Academy].”179 The Ghana Army regulated enlisted soldiers’ marriages as 
well, reminding service members in 1975, for example, that they should register all their wives 
with the service to permit them to enter and live in the barracks—even though only one wife was 
entitled “free medical care in military Hospitals.”180  
In the era after independence, however, Ghanaians—both elites and ordinary citizens—
also seized the rhetoric of modernity to made demands against their own states and against the 
international community. For Africans, Frederick Cooper argues, modernity had concrete 
meanings, including “health facilities, education, decent pensions, opportunity to sell one’s crops 
and obtain useful commodities from elsewhere.”181 For them, modernity was a policy as much as 
a theory, and the language of modernization gave them a basis for asserting claims: “if you think 
we should be modern, help us find the means.”182 Criteria for what constituted a modern, 
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successful home reached Ghanaian soldiers and their wives women through extensive 
international travel on courses abroad—like the “American Language Course”—and through 
regular cycles of UN service alongside military members from around the world. The AF News 
also reinforced those standards, for example, celebrating the “international army wife,” 
encouraging wives to take reading or cooking lessons, or reprinting the Chief of Staff’s 
exhortation to deploying soldiers to invest their money carefully in their “respective ventures.”   
Ghanaian military families seized the prescriptive rhetoric of the modern military to 
assert such claims for pay, benefits, and housing.183 In order for a Ghanaian woman to become 
the “international” army wife the AF News praised—that is, an independent mother living in 
isolation from her extended family—she required specific tools: A sewing machine to prepare 
and mend garments by herself, and from home; a refrigerator to enable her live farther away 
from the community and shop less often. UN service helped purchase tape players, radios, and 
television sets from abroad that joined military families to new and less communal modes of 
domestic entertainment. Ghanaian soldiers abroad carefully saved their money to apply their 
family strategies, acquired paving machines and roof tiles, for example, to accommodate new 
standards for the nuclear family living in detached quarters. Training courses and UN service 
abroad provided the opportunity demonstrate new norms for domestic wealth and insulate them 
from capricious national military budgets. Through the homes they built, household appliances 
they acquired, and new, mobile identities military service celebrated, Ghanaian military families 
both labored under external standards modernity and shouldered them. New modes of living 
around Army posts demanded new household appliances, but Ghanaian men and women also 
cooperated to leverage their international military service into acquiring those new markers of 
domestic success.  
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The small changes in education and outlook also reinforced their disconnection with 
former domestic roles, especially given the genuine difficulty of separation. Unfortunately, we 
have only a few bits of historical evidence recording peacekeepers’ wives own words on that 
subject. In September 1974, describing a recent picnic for the families of deployed soldiers, the 
AF News quoted several of their letters:184  
“Almighty God,” wrote the Battalion Magazia Abiba Belu, “give Lt-Col Nyame [the 
detachment commander] patience, sympathy and encouragement . . . We know the life is not an 
easy one there, but with your dynamism and fortitude all will be fine. If they keep on drinking 
because of the difficulties, please convince them to stop.” To her husband, she wrote: “We pray 
always for your well-being. Live in peace and work harder for promotion.” 
Abla Gadzo Abordo reassured her husband Raphael, “My pregnancy is not troubling me. 
Pray for me to deliver a bouncing baby boy for you to become a soldier like you.” 
Esi Boridziwor Okine gave her husband wonderful news: “I’ve given birth to a beautiful 
baby girl for you this month. She has taken your pointed nose.”  
Stephen Menu also had good news for his father Akwai, “Your big cat has delivered three 
kittens and the rabbit too has had five.”  
Ofori Mensa told his dad, “Papa, I pray that nothing will happen on you at that place.” 
Not all wives or children were so enthusiastic. “That day you left me, it made me sick. I 
couldn’t eat the next day,” wrote Beatrice Mamle Cudjoe to her husband. “David, at times I feel 
so lonely that I find it difficult to sleep.”  
“I feel miserable without you,” wrote Faustina Amegbletor to her husband John.  
“Don’t let anybody deceive you to do bad things,” wrote Cicilia Arkason to her husband 
Michael.   
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“We want to read from you,” Mary Boatemaa begged her father Micheal Atta. “People 
are showing off with letters from their husbands.” 
Finally, Deborah Ketor reassured her husband John, “When you are worried sing ‘Across 
the Bridge’ by Jim Reeves.”  
“Comrades,” a sergeant from the Rear Party reassured them, “all is well and groovy. 
Your wives are always happy. Don’t be disturbed at all. Work hard to come back as worthy 
ambassadors.”185 
These family reflections were both typical and unique. Private David Gamor, 
correspondent for the AF News, supposed that “these feelings expressed by the wives and 
daughters of the soldiers serving in the Middle-East could come from anybody at anytime who 
finds himself in the same situation.”186 Every family similarly separated in the diaspora would 
recognize their sorrow, heartache, and fear. In this case, though, specific circumstances of 
international military service distinguished this separation from others. They prepared and shared 
their letters at an Army-sponsored picnic; even at their most intimate, the messages passed 
through Army hands with Army approval. Wives prayed for their husbands’ safety, but also that 
they would serve honorably within the Army in order to merit promotion. They lamented their 
separation, but some still prayed for their sons to become soldiers as well—as if willing their 
own separation on to future generations. On the other hand, identifying Jim Reeves as the 
preferred method of consoling a lonely husband is as good an indication of a transnational 
identity as any. Even the article’s title—“Sentimental Journey”—evoked Ghana’s heroic 
participation in Burma during World War II.187 They recognized that their husbands and fathers 
were in danger, but they also acknowledged that their families’ sacrifices were, on some level, 
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connected to a larger project of international peace.188 Unique political and economic conditions 
characterize all diasporic communities; in this case, Ghana’s service with the United Nations 
shaped this one.  
 
Continually since 1973, hundreds of Ghanaian soldiers deployed to the Middle East on 
seven-month peacekeeping missions. This section briefly explored the national and corporate 
incentives that convinced Ghanaian military leaders to pursue and sustain these missions in order 
to contrast the ways individual service members and their families understood their deployments. 
UN reimbursements provided millions of dollars to Ghana’s struggling economy in the 1970s 
and 1980s and subsidized the Armed Forces’ training and equipment beyond what the Ghanaian 
government could afford. Serving alongside soldiers from around the world made Ghanaian 
soldiers “more aware of international norms for the treatment of soldiers,” and their meritorious 
service became a source of national pride.189 For Ghanaian families, UN service offered pay and 
material rewards that few other Ghanaians could access during that time. Soldiers’ families built 
houses, furnished their homes with refrigerators and radios, started businesses, and supplemented 
their income selling scarce household goods and appliances. International military service 
imposed new domestic standards on soldiers’ families, but soldiers’ families also employed that 
service to fashion their own responses. These economic opportunities came at a cost: lengthy 
separations.  
Ghanaian soldiers’ wives associations mitigated their sense of isolation with programs 
building both personal independence and solidarity with other wives. They often displayed 
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variously local and international identities that connected military families to one another 
regardless of regional or ethnic background, privileging global norms of military service that 
transcended national identities. They expressed their loneliness and anxiety from their 
separations in typical ways, but the specific reason for their separation was very different from 
other cases of labor migration in the post-independence African diaspora. It is to that mission, its 
danger and Ghanaian families’ understanding of the emotional significance of being 
“peacemakers” that we turn next. 
 
Writing for Peace 
As we have seen, both leaders and ordinary members of the Ghana Armed Forces used 
combinations of local, national, and international reference points to explain their decisions to 
join the army and evaluate military service’s benefits for their families’ lives. Since 
independence, Ghana’s government and Ghanaian military leaders aggressively pursued 
education and training opportunities abroad, partly because Ghana lacked the capacity to provide 
advanced training on its own, partly to maximize the amount of military assistance it received. 
Service members themselves also roundly appreciated the experience of international education. 
When preparing his massive history of the Ghana Armed Forces, Stephen Kojo Addae recalled, 
“This author has been told again and again, by retired officers trained in the UK, the salutary 
experience of training with men from all over the world.”190 After retiring from the Army as a 
Major General, Henry Anyidoho believed, “one of the greatest benefits I got from the Army was 
the acquisition of knowledge. I received training from all sorts of institutions, locally and 
overseas.”191 International education was common for Ghanaian soldiers, especially officers, and 
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they routinely praised the experience as educational, inspirational, and enjoyable. It sometimes 
offered safety from both physical and economic danger, as we have seen.  
Compared to international education, UN service offered similar financial incentives, but 
was more dangerous and affected far more Ghanaians. As many Ghanaians soldiers served as 
peacekeepers in UNIFIL in one six-month rotation in the 1983 than all the IMET-sponsored 
students at American training facilities in thirty years between 1960 and 1990.192 Service with 
the United Nations offered neither comfort nor safety—six Ghanaian soldiers died in the Sinai 
between 1973 and 1979; twenty-two died in Lebanon between 1979 and 2000.193 In their 
descriptions of their UN service, however, Ghanaians expressed solidarity with a global military 
ethos that surpassed Ghanaian regional differences, celebrated Ghana’s global leadership in the 
international order the UN represented, reinforced Ghanaian Pan-Africanism, and offered 
psychic rewards to individuals as “peacemakers” that transcended ethnic, national, or pan-
African identities.194 Just as Ghanaian students had when on courses abroad, individual 
Ghanaians serving with the United Nations expressed a form of transnational solidarity only 
accessible through service in a global military endeavor, Military Internationalism. 
 
As Kwame Nkrumah had in the early 1960s, Ghanaian political elites in the 1970s and 
1980s—civilian and military—considered the United Nations essential for Africa’s political and 
economic improvement, Ghana’s included. Participating as equals in the UN General Assembly 
empowered all newly decolonized states, Ghanaians above all, even when Cold War powers 
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attempted to thwart their collective will.195 African nationalism “was of little consequence” to the 
United Nations in 1945, Kwame Nkrumah wrote in 1970. “Since then, however, so many former 
colonies have achieved independence that Afro-Asian countries now form the most influential 
single group within the United Nations.”196 William Ofori-Atta, Ghana’s Minister of Education, 
reminded participants at the African Regional Symposium on Disarmament and Development in 
July 1970, “The new nations of Africa and Asia are the most ardent supporters of the United 
Nations and also the strongest advocates of a world order.”197 Ghana’s Secretary for Trade Kofi 
Djin expressed the same belief at a flag-raising ceremony in Accra celebrating the UN’s fortieth 
anniversary in 1985. “There could be no alternative to the UN,” he said, “to which small nations 
like Ghana would continue to look [and] use as a forum to discuss and exchange views on issues 
that affect the global peace.”198  
Ghana’s ambassadors acceded with delight to Secretary-General Waldheim’s requests to 
reaffirm Ghana’s participation in each UNEF and UNIFIL mandate as the Security Council 
renewed them—roughly every six to ten months.199 Ghana’s government accepted the Secretary-
General’s request to increase its UNEF detachment in 1975 and again in 1976 when Brian 
Urquhart, Undersecretary General for Special Political Affairs, struggled to find another African 
state to replace the withdrawing Senegalese, Nepalese and Panamanian contingents.200 The 
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Secretary-General requested that Ghana maintain its full contingent of 595 even when the rest of 
the UNEF II force shrunk from 4895 to 4215 in 1977.201 He requested an additional 180 
Ghanaians to join UNIFIL in Lebanon in 1983, and Ghana’s contingent there grew from 400 to 
nearly 600.202 As with all other requests to extend the UN mission’s mandate, Ghana’s 
ambassador pledged, “Ghana would continue its contribution for as long as called for.”203 
Officially, Ghanaians considered their participation in UN peacekeeping a great global 
compliment, and imagined vast benefits to flow from it. “It is common knowledge that in any 
belligerency, especially between two people or nations, one needs a neutral person or nation to 
stand in between the two parties in order to bring peace,” the AF News reported in 1976.204 “It is 
needless to say that such a person or nation need be peace-loving. Thus when the Ghana Armed 
Forces and, for that matter Ghana, was invited to take part in the peacekeeping operations in the 
Middle East in 1974, the obvious was implied.”205 “I think the whole Middle East problem rests 
on the shoulders of the Ghana contingent,” said the contingent commander, Lieutenant Colonel 
Kwame Baafi, 1976.206 Victor Ansah, correspondent for the AF News, argued that helping re-
open the Suez Canal, Ghana served “world humanity and civilization” and benefitted Ghana and 
the entire world by helping lower oil prices.207 
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AF News correspondents and contributors to the UN’s peacekeeping journals emphasized 
Ghanaians’ equal participation in the peacekeeping “melting pot.” Captain John Amissah wrote 
in Litani, UNIFIL’s monthly news bulletin, “The different members of the organization, with 
their varied sociocultural backgrounds, entails regarding the UN, and for that matter its 
peacekeeping offspring UNIFIL, as a ‘melting pot’—a common ground for the blending of ideas 
and cultures for the salvation of mankind.”208 “No individuals or nations,” he warned, “should do 
anything to derail the UN ideal, otherwise they would be adding more fuel to the fire to explode 
the ‘globe’.”209 Military police from Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, and Norway might 
“vary in their religious beliefs, language, race, culture, and even in their military training and 
equipment,” Amissah wrote from Lebanon, but with “mutual understanding and cooperation,” all 
desired “fostering greater brotherhood among the different nationals.”210 Lieutenant Makana 
Blay recalled the advice his commanding officer—“that good old ‘Osofo’”—gave as he departed 
for Sinai in 1975: “We should be good ambassadors whilst in the Middle East because we are 
‘citizens of no mean country.’”211 “Our men can talk face-to-face with other nationals without 
any feeling of inferiority complex,” said Blay. “They know that they are and can be as efficient 
as any other soldier from any part of the world.”212 The AF News reprinted internationally-
obtained compliments with pride. From UNEF Chief of Staff and Indonesian Brigadier General 
Rais Abin: “I am profoundly impressed with the Ghanaian soldiers.”213 A Canadian colleague: 
Ghanaian soldiers’ “ready smile is inspiring for all of us and very good for high morale.”214 A 
Nigerian diplomat: “Our brothers serving with UNEF have a high sense of dedication to duty, 
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but above all they keep their national consciousness and work hard to put Ghana on the world 
map.”215 For the editors of the Armed Forces News, equal status among deployed forces 
reinforced Ghanaian nationalism. 
Peacekeeping seemed to cement Ghanaian soldiers’ national identity, or at least the 
Ghanaian government attempted to subsume regional or ethnic differences into a larger, unified 
Ghanaian culture and present it for international consumption. At the Medal Day ceremony in 
1985, as one detachment of Ghanaians received their UN service medals and prepared to return 
to Ghana, the contingent staged an elaborate demonstration of music, clothing, dance, and 
ceremony by small groups claiming to represent Ghana’s largest ethnic subdivisions. “Like other 
ethnic groups of Ghana, the Ewes have reverence for their ancestors and cultural values,” 
Stephen Owusu wrote in Litani.216 A group of Ewe, “adorned in various paraphernalia” and 
“depicting a chief and his elders” demonstrated a typical “festival scene” in an Ewe kingdom.217 
Next, a group of Ga men “offered another rich aspect of Ghanaian culture in the form of the 
Kpanlogo dance which was so popular among Ghanaian youth in the late ‘70s.”218 Finally, a 
soldier dressed as an Akan chief. “He wears a headgear and sandals plaited in solid gold. The 
gold trinkets around his neck and wrists weigh the hand so much that the hand has to be 
supported by a servant before a handshake.”219 In photos, the Chief and his retinue, arrayed in 
Kente cloth and gold, “dance to the ‘Adowa’ tune,” while a “‘Fetish Priest’ evoking his spirits” 
purifies the ceremony.220 To Owusu, “This is how Ghanbatt presented its country to guests at the 
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Medal Day celebration.”221 This was also how they re-affirmed the idea of Ghana to the diverse 
Ghanaian unit itself. 
In stories like this, Ghanaian identity appears for fleeting moments, expresses itself, and 
then recedes behind other international, global, or individual ones. At a different ceremony three 
months earlier where the UNIFIL Force Commander issued UN Peace Medals to the Ghanaian 
and Irish battalions, the Irish Catholic chaplain and Ghana’s Muslim imam prayed side by side—
one in English, the other in Arabic—for “those connected with the task of working for peace.”222 
After parade formalities, both groups migrated to the Mess for “a few minutes of throat wetting,” 
a “jaw-breaking concert by Irish soldiers which sent a stab of pleasure into the hearts of the 
audience,” and a Ghanbatt band concert, “with a blend of classical, Ghanaian highlife, and 
reggae tunes.”223 Within just a few hours, Ghanaian soldiers expressed global religious identities 
(Christian and Muslim prayers), solidarity with the UN and the internationalist peacekeeping 
ethos that united small troop contributing states such as Ireland and Ghana, and a moment of 
pride in the national band’s national music, before forgetting it all “for that short evening, the 
men danced away the difficulties in the task of peacekeeping.”224  
In the way it boosted Ghanaians’ pride while simultaneously shredding national 
distinctions in transnational social events, the Ghana contingent’s band epitomized 
peacekeepers’ churning national, international, and global identities. The Ghana Army’s 6th 
Infantry Battalion ceremonial band joined the first Ghanaians who arrived in the Sinai in 1974. 
They played martial music for official purposes, but at night they became “The Ranchis,” 
playing dance music gigs for peacekeepers around the Sinai.225 “For those who may raise an 
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eyebrow to ask about the sanity behind sending bandsmen to the war zone, I will like to refer 
them to the Vietnam War when the US government provided its troops with the James Brown 
show band,” Public Relations Officer Captain Victor Ansah wrote, with international aplomb.226 
The Ranchis’ successors, the “HOT BARRELS” became local celebrities after Ghana’s 
contingent commander loaned them to the Swedish contingent for a night.227 “We were worried 
as to what type of music would appeal to the Swedish,” Lance Corporal Raphael Tay 
remembered.228 “But we got over it” when the band was “mobbed after doing the African beat 
‘Shakara’. The shouts of ‘Da capo’, (enchore) were enough to assure the bandsmen that they 
were prepared to take in any number Western, African, Latin, Congo etc., and the band dug it out 
to them. That was a night to be remembered. A show that was scheduled to last two hours from 8 
p.m. local time, ended at 12 p.m.”229 
The HOT BARRELS were Ghana, Africa, the UN, and the globe all in one. At a gig at 
UN Headquarters in Ismalia, Egypt they mixed American ballads like “Killing Me Softly” with 
Highlife and their own compositions “Buffer Bone” and “To Sinai and Back.” 230 “No less than 
15 different countries [were] represented on the staff of the UN Headquarters,” and the HOT 
BARRELS kept them spellbound, proving to “the multi-racial set up what Ghana could offer 
aside its military duties.”231 After the HOT BARRELS jammed for African ambassadors to the 
Arab Republic of Egypt at the African Diplomatic Club in Cairo, Ghana’s ambassador gushed, 
“You guys have made me proud among my friends.”232 The band was “the best in Egypt,” and 
“signed a month agreement with a popular night club and hotel ‘La Ronde.’” “The ‘HOT 
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BARRELS’ and the Ghana contingent has made Ghana known,” Ansah crowed. “Very soon, we 
shall not be called ‘Ghana Bissau’ by our brothers, the Egyptians.”233 It is not clear if “Ghana 
Bissau” was an Egyptian slur against Black Africans in general or just against Ghanaian 
provincialism, but Ansah boldly seized “brotherhood” status from the Egyptians nonetheless. 
Plus, “armed with a few pamphlets on tourism in Ghana” he added, the band also promoted 
tourism, “a foreign exchange earner”—a real concern in the deepest days of Ghana’s economic 
crisis and recurring theme in the AF News as it struggled to justify military spending in Ghana. 
The HOT BARRELS returned to Ghana in February 1975. Their replacement, “Third 
Generation,” apparently “played so well that it made the music of the Hot Barrels taste sour in 
the mouth of those who had swallowed mouthfuls of it.”234 Each deployed unit brought a band, 
and the band brought part of Ghana with it. But at gigs for multinational audiences, the band also 
transcended Ghana and men from around the world danced.  
 Finally, Ghanaian soldiers expressed solidarity with an international military identity in 
the 1970s and 1980s in the ways they yearned for peace. In one of the very first dispatches from 
the Sinai, before Medals Day parades, before the massive reimbursements to Ghana’s soldiers 
and government, before anyone knew that Ghana would continuously maintain 500 to 700 
soldiers in the Middle East for the next four decades, Public Relations Officer A. A. Enninful 
reflected: “It may be a difficult task, it may be a thankless endeavor and surely their reward shall 
not be in gold or silver . . . Beyond this, there is definitely a richer something – the Beatitudes’ 
reward for the peacemakers: ‘they shall be called the children of God’.”235 Makana Blay’s 
“Fanara Diary” mourned for Egypt’s children, “Poor innocent children! Some of them lost their 
fathers during the war. How I wish there is peace so that huge sums of money being spent on 
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arms would be used on their upbringing.”236 Warrant Officer Stephen Owusu, who served three 
tours in Lebanon in the 1980s as a correspondent for the Public Information Office, collected and 
republished his most poignant articles in 2009 in Writing for Peace, taking the title from a Litani 
article he wrote in 1985.237 “Before my maiden physical contact with Lebanon,” he wrote, “I had 
only a faint idea of the country . . . I remember one particularly ghastly scene in a TV news slot, 
where street battle in Beirut left the streets filled with horror, reminiscent of a battlefield. My 
reaction to what I saw was that of shock and sympathy for the defenseless civilian population 
(made up of children, women and the aged) I saw fleeing in panic for dear life.”238 After that, he 
recalled, “I nursed the urge for an opportunity to help in my little way the efforts of the United 
Nations to restore peace in Lebanon.”239 In 1985, he returned to Ghana after his third tour in 
Lebanon “with my hands raised in prayer for the country I love and have sacrificed so much for 
to see the light at the end of the tunnel, for my sacrifice and that of my United Nations colleagues 
will be futile if it is not linked up with total peace for Lebanon.”240   
 Ghanaian soldiers expressed their longing for peace the AF News and in the “Poet’s 
Corner” of Ghana’s peacekeeping magazines. In the Marakah, Ghana’s journal from Lebanon in 
the late 1980s, Warrant Officer Sowa Okpoti wrote: “Allow me to do my duty to God and man / 
To a people famishing for peace and security in this turmoil / the restoration of dignified life in 
tranquility is my lot / Though I’m but a spark in the peace process / Surely, I’ve something up 
my sleeve to surprise the world with.”241 In another poem, “Mediterranean Sea,” Okpoti wrote: 
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“Mother Mediterranean here we are, we beseech / Great Demarcator of two terrains, here we are, 
we kowtow . . . Peace and security being our search / Your sympathy and empathy we crave.”242 
The AF News published Private Ahwireng E. D. Atore’s poem, “Peace”: “I’m Peace / I’m 
Odomonkoma (God) / I love peace so I created it . . . I warn you! / Keep peace and prevent 
destruction / Birds which run north, south, / east and west even announce / my message of peace 
/ I pray thee / Keep peace.”243  
For these soldiers, Ghana’s military publications were perfectly acceptable fora to 
express a global desire for peace. More than that, they considered themselves global citizens—as 
sons of the “Mother Mediterranean”—who actually brought peace to the world. Their sentiments 
were not simply longing for peace in their troubled home; they expressed their passion for the 
project of peace that they had undertaken in another place, alongside comrades from other 
places. For Owusu, “the country I love” was Lebanon; Okpoti considered himself “but a spark in 
the peace process” but one with “something up my sleeve to surprise the world.” They genuinely 
desired peace, and they genuinely considered themselves part of the international structure that 
delivered it. They could only do this from outside Ghana, but their decades of prior experience 
integrating international education, international intellectual and political influences, 
international travel, and international economic strategies made soldiers from the Ghana Armed 
Forces adept at expressing their international identities on peacekeeping missions abroad. As we 
have seen, many of the same influences made their families equally adept at manifesting multiple 
international identities as well.  
 
Conclusion 
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 Introducing their volume Diasporas Within and Without Africa—Dynamism, 
Heterogeneity, Variation, Leif O. Manger and Munzoul A. M. Assal argue that individuals and 
groups in diasporas relate and integrate into communities in hosts of ways, and that in future 
studies, “these differences need to be found empirically, they cannot be derived from any 
theoretical position.”244 This chapter uses examples from Ghanaian men and women who 
participated in a massive global network of military education and training and peacekeeping 
operations to find such differences. It proposes a new transnational identity for Ghanaians that 
combined individuals’ alternate political and economic strategies with a global ethos of 
peacemaking. That identity intersected with the internationalism that other military travelers and 
communities around global sites of international military exchange also expressed. 
 Ghanaian families found in international education and international peacekeeping 
service a combination of resources for personal protection, both political and economic, as well 
as new demands and new opportunities for a new outlook. Many Ghanaian families chose 
military service after independence specifically because it offered the best opportunity to 
participate in a social imaginary that celebrated “going abroad to get ahead.” Given Ghana’s 
political uncertainty between the 1960s and 1980s, Ghanaian military families abroad both 
depended on the Ghanaian state for transportation to the sites of international contact but could 
not rely on the state to continue to support them while abroad. Some, such as the Anyidoho 
family, the Oduro-Kwartengs, and the Erskines, even employed international military 
agreements specifically to protect them from their own nation-state. The Ghanaian state, for its 
part, similarly leveraged its participation in international peacekeeping missions to alleviate its 
own economic crises by claiming millions of dollars in reimbursement from the United Nations 
for its troops and equipment in Egypt, then Lebanon. 
                                                 
244 Manger and Assal, “Diasporas Within and Without Africa--Dynamism, Heterogeneity, Variation,” 19. 
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 Even larger numbers of Ghanaian soldiers gained access to international travel, service 
alongside soldiers from around the world, and generous reimbursement from the international 
community performing peacekeeping for the United Nations. Thousands of Ghanaians—up to 
31,000 people, counting repeats—deployed to the Sinai and Lebanon between 1973 and 1990. 
While deployed, they acquired household goods such as appliances, furniture, and building 
materials that permitted them to execute personal economic strategies that both insulated them 
from further dependence on the Ghanaian state and resembled economic strategies of Ghanaians 
in diaspora communities elsewhere around the globe. One essential difference, however, was the 
way military wives adapted to the isolation resulting from lengthy separations and the danger of 
military service, even peacekeeping service. They responded by learning new skills and forming 
new communities, with the paradoxical result that they both conformed more closely to 
patriarchal ideals about the “ideal military wife” while acquiring the resources to become more 
independent at the same time. They developed an international identity around national military 
service that required mobility and prescribed internationally defined standards for modernity 
while simultaneously offering resources only available from international sources. 
 International education and peacekeeping service did more than fatten Ghanaian soldiers’ 
pockets, however. In the ways they expressed solidarity with other military families abroad—
especially around institutes for education and training, they manifested the same internationalist 
ethos we found in communities of military families and their sponsors around Fort Leavenworth. 
International military travel cultivated personal relationships, and an international identity 
resulted. Peacekeepers, likewise, expressed through reflective essays, poetry, and their own 
memoirs their commitment to global peace after serving with the United Nations in the Middle 
East. Such service clearly reinforced their national pride, and the Ghana Armed Forces defended 
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its size, budget, and corporate benefits based on this national pride, but individual Ghanaians’ 
pride also transcended strictly national boundaries.245  
                                                 
245 Embassy of Ghana, “Erskine: Army Must Be Loyal to Govt.,” 5. 
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Conclusion 
In Sweetness and Power, his “anthropology of modern life” exploring the global sugar trade,  
Sidney Mintz asks, “If the users themselves do not so much determine what is available to be 
used as add meanings to what is available, what does that say about meaning?”1 Must the power 
to “determine availabilities” automatically confer the power to bestow meaning? How did 
individuals on the margins of global networks of trade, labor, and consumption also participate in 
devising and deciding the social meaning that swirled around rites of consumption? This 
dissertation asks similar questions about a more recent global commodity, military-sponsored 
international travel, and discovers, like Mintz, that the power to determine the meaning of global 
military exchanges flowed both ways in both vertical and horizontal axes.  
Vertically, both citizens and their governments appropriated the lofty official language 
that international military exchange transcended nations, transformed visitors into modern 
citizens, forming lasting relationships, and brought peace—when it suited them. Women 
volunteers around Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for example, seized Eisenhower’s repeated 
pronouncement that ordinary citizens, not governments, made the best ambassadors, and led 
community programs supporting international officers and their families at the Command and 
General Staff College. Ghanaian soldiers and their families maximized the rewards of 
international education and training programs abroad or UN peacekeeping service to exercise 
their individual strategies to mitigate Ghana’s political and economic uncertainty. Government 
agents in Congress, the Defense and State Departments fell back on the unmeasurable human 
dimensions of international military training when forced to defend specific programs’ lack of 
real results or, worse, evidence that American military training programs created monsters. 
                                                 
1 Sidney Wilfred Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Viking, 1985), 
xxix. 
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Political and military elites in Ghana held up mythical, modern, military values of loyalty, 
professionalism, and nationalism they acquired via international sources alternately to discourage 
military intervention into Ghanaian politics, defend their intervention after the fact, or sustain 
peacekeeping operations that benefitted political and military leaders alike. Both Ghanaian and 
American citizens cited the new identity that international military travel exposed to make claims 
against their governments. Governments also acknowledged that identity, if only to defend 
lucrative international exchange programs. 
Horizontally, the internationalist identity that military exchange nurtured augmented 
individual Ghanaians and Americans’ regional and national outlooks. In the ways it empowered 
international interaction between “ordinary” citizens of different states, Military Internationalism 
also changed the way women and men in American communities interacted with one another. 
American cultural imperialism wrapped up as domestic ideals offered an export version of 
patriarchal hegemony for foreign visitors, but American women still led the process of wrapping 
an offering. Likewise, Ghanaian military families made the entire globe their workplace as they 
exercised economic strategies similar to other African families in the post-independence diaspora 
abroad. Meanwhile, both men and women capitalized on international circuits of hospitality to 
form long lasting friendships around the world. The major difference was that a global military 
infrastructure—the United States’ massive education and training program and the United 
Nations’ unending mandate for peacekeeping deployments—both enabled and restricted 
individuals’ freedom to travel. Likewise, individuals who attached themselves to a global 
military infrastructure while simultaneously affirming their commitment to peace ensured that 
the internationalist identity they professed was intellectually flexible enough to accommodate a 
wide range of seemingly contradictory values.  
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Part 1 of this work explored the history of the United States’ international military 
education and training program in the three decades after 1960 and Ghana’s parallel participation 
in international training and education during that time. First, by evaluating the United States’ 
international training program, I argued that American policymakers who thought they were 
contributing to the modernization of the “developing world” were actually restating prior 
assumptions about the transformative power of travel to the United States. They applied those 
assumptions to existing international military education and training exchange programs, and the 
programs became resilient enough to weather great changes in American foreign policy over 
three decades. Next, I examined how Ghanaian military planners and military-turned-political 
leaders consumed international military education assistance to educate Ghanaian officers, 
justify their own intervention into Ghanaian politics, and export military expertise to other 
African states. They cannily employed internationally recognized metaphors to explain their 
actions and plot their courses, but also sincerely regarded some international military ethics and 
valued highly opportunities for international travel only accessible to military personnel. 
Policymakers in both the United States and Ghana assumed that international travel, especially 
for military elites or potential elites, could yield corporate transformation and modernization to 
recipient states’ entire societies, via the military. But those advancements only occurred after 
individual transformations. I argued that the transformation to modernity they described was 
closer to a symptom of a global internationalist identity than the cause.  
Part 2 argued that the individuals affected experienced the international exchange much 
more concretely. Around American institutions for military education, the community structures 
that evolved to welcome, instruct, and socialize visiting military personnel and their families 
flourished on their informal, unofficial status. American women, especially, thrived in the 
environment which specifically discounted the role of the state and which elevated universal 
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values of hospitality, internationalism, and world peace. Ghanaian families on military-
sponsored courses abroad also employed international education to exercise a global social 
imaginary based on entrepreneurial travel to relieve economic and political stresses in Ghana. 
Finally, large numbers of Ghanaian soldiers and their spouses integrated the trials and danger of 
international peacekeeping both for the benefits they provided and with a genuine faith that their 
service nurtured an authentically better world. All of these groups, in other words, saw 
international military travel as a method to access or actualize something better than the world of 
geopolitical competition between Cold War hegemons, the ravaging of their proxy wars, and the 
economic stagnation and neo-colonialism that scorched the battlegrounds between them.  
 
In 1993, three decades after Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick initiated the 
“Informational Program for Foreign Military Trainees and Visitors in the United States,” the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy commissioned the RAND Corporation to evaluate once 
again whether training international military students delivered any measureable results.2 
RAND’s Jennifer Morrison Taw and William H. McCoy repeated in 1993 many of the same 
conclusions that the State Department’s Neil Campbell and Elliot Strauss made in 1971 and 
Harry Amos of the General Research Corporation reiterated in 1979: International students 
returned home with “positive impressions of the United States,” yet there was “no proven means 
of evaluating the effectiveness of the IP.” It was “virtually impossible” to assess “positive 
actions and non-actions” of U.S.-trained personnel, but their “transgressions . . . such as the 1989 
murder of Jesuit priests and two women by the Atlacatl battalion in El Salvador” were “often 
glaring.”3 In all likelihood, Taw and McCoy mused, post-Cold War budget cuts would render 
                                                 
2 The Effectiveness of Training International Military Students in Internal Defense and Development, Executive 
Summary (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), iii. 
3 Jennifer Morrison Taw and William H. McCoy, International Military Student Training: Beyond Tactics, A 
RAND Note (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 11, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a282473.pdf. 
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further discussion moot anyway, since “total U.S. foreign military training is therefore declining 
inevitably.”4  
That 1993 concession was striking not because it was a fresh admission of failure atop a 
stack of likeminded reports three decades old, but because it still held out faith in the intangible 
benefits that flowed from personal relationships between international military students and 
Americans at all. In that manner, the Ghanaian case is representative universally: as an exercise 
in foreign policy, the United States’ international military education and training program had no 
chance to mold a recipient state’s national political development, democratic institutions, or 
commitment to human rights via intervention into the professional education of military leaders. 
Scholars and government-funded studies alike repeated the same conclusion for decades, even 
when they continued to praise the program in principle. In places where the U.S. sought or had 
the capacity to maintain limited political influence, they considered even a token military 
exchange program worthwhile. Yet no one—not American or Ghanaian policymakers nor 
American or Ghanaian citizens—considered the education and training of Ghanaian military 
personnel in the United States a failure. American political elites and citizens praised the 
program in principle because, as they ever were since the earliest days of American military 
exchange programs in the twentieth century, the specific sites of ideological transfer—American 
communities—were permanently above question. Likewise, Ghanaians celebrated the 
opportunity to travel to the United States for the individual personal, economic, and political 
benefits it brought. Military travel brought Ghanaians and Americans closer to the “imagined 
world,” the interdependent global community. Even when graduates of American staff colleges 
overthrew their governments—as did Acheampong in 1972 or Nimeiri in 1969—no one claimed 
the relationships they formed with their sponsor families had anything to do with the coup. 
                                                 
4 Taw, The Effectiveness of Training International Military Students in Internal Defense and Development, 
Executive Summary, 18. 
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Even elsewhere in Africa, where the United States ran small exchange programs, military 
education in the U.S. resulted in no noticeable national or corporate benefits on its own. RAND’s 
William H. McCoy admitted that particularly in Africa, “where change and development have 
not occurred despite considerable investment by many countries around the world, training in the 
United States may simply be a respite for a deserving individual from an otherwise dreary 
existence.”5 U.S. training brought no improvement to either the “professionalism or capabilities” 
of the Liberian army during the 1980s, for example, even though the U.S. IMET program 
sponsored roughly the same number of Liberian military students as Ghanaians in the previous 
decade.6 Ghana even helped lead the Economic Community of West African States’ 
peacekeeping mission to Liberia in 1989. At best, as the case of Senegal showed—where the 
U.S. trained roughly half as many soldiers as Ghanaians—international military training was 
only one of several factors contributing to a state’s civil-military relationship, including political 
stability, economic security, and ethnic harmony.7 By demonstrating that this held true for 
Ghanaians as well, the case of Ghana is representative in that international military travel 
provided individual families opportunities to improve their own lives. Across the decades, 
Americans largely accepted this as an acceptable outcome, if not the official one. 
Compared to the United States’ far larger military training initiatives in Southeast Asia in 
the 1960s and Latin American from the 1950s through the 1980s, the limited number of 
Ghanaian soldiers who trained in the United States makes the Ghanaian case unique. An 
International Military Education and Training program like the one that brought small numbers 
of Ghanaian elites to the United States operated under considerably less menacing ideological 
                                                 
5 McCoy, Senegal and Liberia, 5. 
6 413 Liberians, 451 Ghanaians between 1976 and 1989. Manolas and Samelson, “The IMET Program: Report to 
Congress,” 35; McCoy, Senegal and Liberia, 25, 61. 
7 201 Senegalese from 1976-1989. McCoy, Senegal and Liberia, 8; Manolas and Samelson, “The IMET Program: 
Report to Congress,” 35. 
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conditions. American military education and training that took place abroad needed other ways 
to reconcile the coercive aspects of modernization theory or Cold War anti-communism without 
the reserve of faith in the goodness of American communities to mask the programs’ militarism.  
Refusing to correlate the social imaginary of a global military community with graduates 
who return terrorize their communities fails a critical test of internationalism. In Latin America 
or Southeast Asia, for example, a code of silence or refusal to hold fellow graduates accountable 
for human tragedies they caused appeared to be a corporate by-product of Military 
Internationalism. At least, highly publicized cases of American-trained soldiers torturing and 
murdering political opponents caused a great deal more soul-searching over whether the United 
States was simply training “assassins.”8 American training for those nations’ armies occurred 
among American communities, to some extent, but far more often in home countries or in the 
Canal Zone. In the latter case, the internationalist faith that maintained the Informational 
Program never entered the picture. It is not clear that American training or life in American 
communities caused sadistic behavior. Describing Uruguay’s dirty war of the mid-1970s, for 
example, The New Yorker’s Lawrence Weschler recalled that some officers insisted, “with an 
almost perverse hemispheric pride, [that] Latin American militaries were quite capable of 
coming up with all kinds of unpleasantness on their own, and needed no instruction from the 
North.”9 But more than 1,400 Uruguayans attended the School of the Americas in the Canal 
                                                 
8 Nelson-Pallmeyer, School of Assassins; Gill, The School of the Americas; Taw, The Effectiveness of Training 
International Military Students in Internal Defense and Development, Executive Summary, vii; McCoy repeats “a 
rumor,” spread via “a human rights newsletter,” that Marcos’ top torturer (Lt Col Rolando Abadilla) studied at 
CGSC. McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 190; Jennifer Morrison Taw, Thailand and the Philippines: Case Studies in 
U.S. IMET Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and Development (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), xiv; On 
the code of silence between “former torturers persisting in their midst,” see Weschler, “A Reporter at Large: The 
Great Exception I -- Liberty,” 43–85, esp. p. 48 Some Uruguayans insisted, “with almost perverse hemispheric 
pride,” that they even taught the US trainers how to torture, although over 1400 Uruguayan officers trained at the 
School of the Americas in Panama before 1977. Holden, “The Real Diplomacy of Violence”; Bartholomew, Senate 
Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations; Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1991; H. R. 5114, 891. 
9 Weschler, “A Reporter at Large: The Great Exception I -- Liberty,” 48. 
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Zone between 1950 and 1977 when President Carter terminated all American military assistance 
to Uruguay. Therefore, the question of how American military training for soldiers in the client 
states also damaged the global community still lingers.10  
That lingering question, I suspect, prevented Akira Iriye from acknowledging 
international military training and peacekeeping missions among the alternate, transnational 
paths to cooperation he included in his definition of internationalism.11 Without question, formal 
state machinery dominated the shape and structure of the exchanges, and usually couched them 
in terms of geopolitical security. On the other hand, both the individuals who travelled and the 
individuals whose hospitality nurtured relationships with the travelers devised their own 
strategies to extract meaning from that travel, be it economic, political, or cultural. Even 
policymakers, when pressed, admitted that those individual meanings—relationships “of a higher 
order”; a peacekeeper with “something up my sleeve to surprise the world with”—were more 
than just a cost-free benefit; they were closer to the “real world” after all.  
                                                 
10 Ibid., 46. 
11 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, 2. 
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